be re-instated by the court who for nineteen years has acqui. esced in his expulsion from the membership of a corporation for non-payment of corporate dues. In another case, the plaintiff who, six years before, had been expelled from a be nevolent society, brought suit to be restored to membership. It appeared that he had previously sued for certain benefits, and that the suit had been determined against him on the ground that he had been expelled; and it was held that the former suit constituted an effectual bar to his proceeding for restoration to membership.2 The legality of an expulsion is not to be collaterally questioned.3

95. The remedy within the association to be exhausted before application to the court. So long as the government is fairly and honestly administered, those who have griev ances should be required in the first instance to resort to the remedies for redress provided by the rules and regulations. Thus a broker having been suspended as a member of the stock-exchange, on his confession of insolvency, can not be reinstated, or maintain any claim against the association, except in accordance with its rules, and where they provide an ample remedy equity will not relieve. For, if the constitution or by-laws provide a remedy within the association for a suspended or expelled member, then he must avail himself of that remedy before he can ask the courts to interfere. And, at all

Soc., (1844) 8 Watts & S. 247; People v. Fire Underwriters, (1876) 7 Hun, 248.

514; s. c. 8 Abb. N. Cas. 344, 349; per Miller, J.

Moxey v. Philadelphia Stock Ex

1 Bostwick v. Detroit Fire Depart- change, 14 Phila. 185. ment, 49 Mich, 513.

2 Bachmann V. New Yorker Deutscher Arbeiter Bund, 12 Abb. N. Cas. 54; s. c. 64 How. Pr. 442.

3 Black & White Smiths' Soc. v. Vandyke, (1836) 2 Wharton, (Pa.) 309; Commonwealth v. Pike Beneficial Soc., (1844) 8 Watts & S. 247; Society for the Visitation of the Sick v. Meyer, (1866) 52 Pa. St. 125, 131. Cf. Commonwealth v. Oliver, (1849) 2 Parson's Sel. Cases, 420, 426.

4 Lafond v. Deems, 81 N. Y. 507,

6 Screwmen's Benef. Assoc. v. Benson, (Tex. 1890) 13 S. W. Rep. 379, holding that where the constitution of a charitable corporation reserves to a member expelled by the board of trustees the right to appeal to the members of the corporation at a corporate meeting mandamus will not issue in favor of an expelled member who has taken no appeal from the action of the board, though the order of expulsion may be contrary to law and void; White v. Brownell, 2 Daly,

events, he will be obliged to exhaust the remedies provided for by the constitution and by-laws of the association, before he can appeal to the courts; but a resort to that remedy is excused if it be clearly useless. Thus an adverse vote of fourteen members of a committee of twenty justifies the expelled member in applying to the court before making a motion before the committee to reconsider their determination. But an abolition of the right of appeal does not excuse the member from exhausting his remedy within the association before applying to the courts when it does not appear that an appeal would have been necessary.a

§ 96. Ipso facto termination of membership.- Under a law which makes the non-payment of assessments for a given period after notice operate as a suspension ipso facto, it is not necessary that the suspension be judicially determined by any judiciary of the order. Thus when the by-laws of an association provided that if a member should neglect for thirty days to pay assessments or dues, his membership should cease and determine without notice, and his claims upon the association be forfeited; it was held that no action could be maintained for recovery of an assessment, the payment of which had been thus neglected, as the membership was ipso facto terminated." But where the constitution of a voluntary medical society provided that if the annual dues were not paid by a certain time the defaulter should forfeit his membership; that of this he should be duly notified by the secretary; that notice of the

329, 365; s. c. 4 Abb. Pr. N. S. 162, 199; Lafond v. Deems, 81 N. Y. 507; s. c. 8 Abb. N. Cas. 344; Niblack on Mutual Benefit Societies, §§ 130, 131; Chamberlain v. Lincoln, 129 Mass. 70; Karcher v. Supreme Lodge K. of H., 137 Mass. 368, 372; Oliver v. Hopkins, 144 Mass. 175; Poultney v. Bachman, 31 Hun, 49; McAlees v. Supreme Sitting Order of Iron Hall, (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1888) 12 Cent. Rep. 415; McCallion v. Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc., (1886) 70 Cal. 163, per McKee, J.

Poultney v. Bachman, 31 Hun, 49; McAlees v. Supreme Sitting Order Iron Hall, (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1888) 12 Cent. Rep. 415; Oliver v. Hopkins, 114 Mass. 175.

2 Loubat v. Le Roy, 40 Hun, 546; reversing s. c. 15 Abb. N. Cas. 1. 3 Loubat v. Le Roy, 40 Hun, 546; reversing s. c. 15 Abb. N. Cas. 1.

4 Lafond v. Deems, 81 N. Y. 507. 5 Borgraefe v. Knights of Honor, 22 Mo. App. 127.

6 McDonald v. Ross-Lewin, 20 Hun, 87.

requirement should be served each year, and that on reading the roll of members any such defaulter should be immediately stricken from the roll, it was held that non-payment of the dues at the specified time was not ipso facto a forfeiture of membership. In respect of religious associations it has been held that a person, who, being a contributor, is, under the canons of the church of the New Jersey diocese, entitled to vote at parish meetings, is not affected as to that right by the vestry's resolution to receive no further contributions from him.

§ 97. Suspension.- A person suspended from membership is thereby debarred from exercising the rights and enjoying the privileges and benefits incident thereto. The penalty of suspension is frequently imposed upon members of lodges and mutual benefit societies for delinquency in non-payment of dues. And it is held that the beneficiaries of a member of a benevolent society who stands suspended for non-payment of assessments, by operation of the laws of the society, at the time of his death, can not recover on the benefit certificate on the ground that the subordinate lodge of which he was a member had continued to treat him as a member, and to treat his unpaid dues to the supreme lodge as dues payable to the subordinate lodge, for which it had extended him credit.' These cases turn largely upon the construction of the by-laws of the lodge or order. In a Minnesota case the by-laws of a benevolent association provided that a member who should fail to pay an assessment should be suspended, but that a payment within three months should re-instate him; and another provision of the by-laws provided for the action of the association in cases where members delinquent for more than three months should desire to pay and obtain a restoration of their rights. A member delinquent for less than three months, paid an assessment while on his death-bed, and it was held that

Medical & Surgical Society v. Weatherby, (1883) 75 Ala. 248, per Somerville, J.

Lodge v. Abbott, 82 Ind. 1; Borgraefe v. Knights of Honor, 22 Mo. App. 127: Manson v. Grand Lodge,

2 State v. Trinity Church, 45 N. J. 30 Minn. 509. 230.

4 Borgraefe v. Knights of Honor, 22

Knights of Honor Supreme Mo. App. 127.

his rights were thus restored without action on the part of the association.' Where a by-law of a benevolent society provided that any subordinate lodge in arrears should stand suspended, and no death benefit should be paid if a death occurred during the suspension, it was held that the by-law was not to be construed as cutting off the right to receive the benefit, except during the continuance of the suspension."

1 Manson v. Grand Lodge, 30 Minn. 509.

2 Knights of Honor Supreme Lodge v. Abbott, 82 Ind. 1.

§ 98. Introductory.-The legal questions involved in cases of voluntary withdrawal from corporate bodies relate to its effect upon the member's interest in the property and upon his liability to creditors. Whether the consent of the society or company has been given, is not usually in issue in cases of withdrawal from voluntary associations; but from companies having capital stock, the member or shareholder can not sever his connection so as to relieve himself from liability to the corporation or its creditors by a mere abandonment of his shares, without the consent of the corporation; and under

1 Laurel Run Building Assoc. v. Sperring, 106 Pa. St. 334; Rockville &c. Turnpike Co. v. Maxwell, 2 Cranch, C. C. 451; Mills v. Stewart, 41 N. Y. 384; Selma &c. R. Co. v. Tipton, 5 Ala. 787; s. c. 39 Am. Dec. 844; United Society v. Eagle Bank, 7 Conn. 456; Bishop's Fund v. Eagle Bank, 7 Conn. 476; Klein v. Alton &c. R. Co., 13 Ill. 514; Ryder v.