a mortgage to secure a subsequent debt is a purchaser for value, but not to secure an antecedent debt.32 As against innocent purchasers, even as short a delay as three months in enforcement, where there was ample opportunity, has been held to render a claim stale.33 In older days, when voyages were longer, they were often held stale after one voyage. On the Lakes, the limit, in the absence of special circumstances, is one season of navigation.35 In short, the time varies according to the opportunity of enforcement, the change in the situation of the parties, and the hardship occasioned or avoided by enforcing it or denying it. The supply man acquires his right against the vessel, not only by furnishing necessaries in his own port, but by shipping them to the vessel in another port.37

34

Necessaries are not "furnished" to a vessel, unless that particular vessel is in the mind of the parties. Though it may not be necessary to show that they were actually used upon her, an indiscriminate furnishing of necessaries to the owner of a fleet does not give an indiscriminate lien upon the fleet, regardless of the manner in which the necessaries were applied.38

32 CHUSAN, 2 Story, 455, Fed. Cas. No. 2,717; Ella (D. C.) 84 Fed. 471.

33 Coburn v. Factors' & Traders' Ins. Co. (C. C.) 20 Fed. 644. 34 General Jackson, 1 Spr. 554, Fed. Cas. No. 5,314.

35 Hercules, 1 Spr. 534, Fed. Cas. No. 6,401; Nebraska, 69 Fed. 1009, 17 C. C. A. 94.

36 Harriet Ann, 6 Biss. 13, Fed. Cas. No. 6,101; Eliza Jane, 1 Spr. 152, Fed. Cas. No. 4,363; CHUSAN, 2 Story, 455, Fed. Cas. No. 2,717; Thomas Sherlock (D. C.) 22 Fed. 253; Tiger (D. C.) 90 Fed. 826.

37 Marion S. Harris, 85 Fed. 798, 29 C. C. A. 428; Yankee, 233 Fed. 919, 147 C. C. A. 593.

38 James H. Prentice (D. C.) 36 Fed. 777 (decided before the act); Aitcheson v. Endless Chain Dredge (D. C.) 40 Fed. 253 (decided before the act); Astor Trust Co. v. E. V. White & Co., 241 Fed. 57, 154 C. C. A. 57, L. R. A. 1917E. 526; Cora P. White (D. C.) 243 Fed. 246; Walter Adams, 253 Fed. 20, 165 C. C. A. 40.

Advances

Not only the supply man can proceed against the vessel, but any one who advances money on the credit of the vessel, express or implied, for the purpose of paying for such necessaries, has a claim against the vessel. In other words, advances of money under such circumstances are necessaries.39 But money lent to the master or owner without reference to the ship, or money advanced to pay off claims not maritime, cannot be collected by suit against the vessel.40

The fourth section of the act specifically provides that it shall not be construed to "affect the rules of law now existing in regard to the right to proceed against a

vessel for advances." 41

SAME "NECESSARIES" DEFINED

48. "Necessaries," in this connection, mean whatever is fit and proper for the service on which a vessel is engaged. Whatever the owner of that vessel, as a prudent man, would have ordered if present at the time, comes within the meaning of the term, as applied to those repairs done or things provided for the ship by order of the master, or other legal representative of the owner.

Care must be taken to consider the meaning of the terin "necessaries," as used in connection with this doctrine of supplies and repairs. In a broad sense of the word, anything is necessary for the ship which tends to facilitate her use as a ship or to save her from danger. In that sense

29 Emily B. Souder, 17 Wall. 666, 21 L. Ed. 683; Guiding Star (C. C.) 18 Fed. 263; Worthington, 133 Fed. 725, 66 C. C. A. 555, 70 L. R. A. 353.

40 A. R. Dunlap, 1 Low. 350, Fed. Cas. No. 513.

41 In view of this language in the act, the statement in the Cimria (D. C.) 214 Fed. at page 129 is a little hard to understand.

seaman's wages, towage, salvage, and many other things. which come under the admiralty jurisdiction would be necessary. But a thing may be necessary without being a necessary. The former is not the meaning when used in connection with supplies and repairs. If it were, then, as necessaries furnished a domestic vessel were prior to the Act the basis of a lien against a vessel only when a state statute gave it, that would have put it in the power of a state legislature to modify some of the most ancient grounds of jurisdiction in admiralty. In the sense in which the word is now being used, it is associated with supplies and repairs, and it means such things of that general nature as are fit and proper for the use of the ship. It is not used in as strong a sense as its colloquial meaning would imply. It does not mean essential, but fit and proper. Whatever is fit and proper for the use of a vessel as a profitable investment, and would have been ordered by a prudent owner if present, comes within the term.*

42

For reasons given above, salvage is not a necessary in this sense, but an independent ground of admiralty lien, though repairs connected therewith may be. The act uses the word in its former sense, and was not intended to change it.43

The same is true as to towage.**

It has been held, also, that the services of a contracting stevedore in furnishing men to load or discharge a ship are necessaries.45

§ 48. 42 GRAPESHOT, 9 Wall. 129, 19 L. Ed. 651; J. Doherty (D. C.) 207 Fed. 997.

43 Convoy (D. C.) 257 Fed. 843.

44 J. Doherty (D. C.) 207 Fed. 997; Hatteras, 255 Fed. 518, 166 C. C. A. 586.

This seems to the author a of a stevedore who works

45 Rupert City (D. C.) 213 Fed. 263. stretch of the doctrine. The services manually are more like those of a seaman; and an attempt to draw a distinction between the man who works and the man who superintends is indulging in mere refinement. But some courts have drawn it. See post, p. 121.

46

The definition given in the black-letter heading is that of Lord Tenterden in Webster v. Seekamp. It is adopted by Sir Robert Phillimore in the Riga," a leading case on the subject. It is defined by Judge Dyer to mean "those things which pertain to the navigation of the vessel, and which are practically incidental to, and connected with, her navigation." 48

It is wider in its meaning than when used by the common-law courts in reference to the contracts of infants. For instance, supplies to the restaurant of a passenger steamer have been allowed." And Judge Benedict has carried the principle so far as to hold that liquor furnished to the bar of a passenger steamer comes under the same head, as "supplying the ordinary wants of the class of passengers transported on the boat." 50 It includes muskets or arms to protect a vessel from pirates.51 It has been held to include provisions, money, rope, life-preservers, chronometers, and nets and other equipment for a fishing vessel.52

53

This doctrine is analogous to the remedy given by section 6438 of the Virginia Code to those who furnish supplies to corporations. In Fosdick v. Schall, the Supreme Court had decided that men who furnished supplies to a railroad necessary to keep it going had an equitable charge. on the income prior to a previous mortgage, thus overturning common-law ideas, and ingrafting an admiralty prin

46 4 Barn. & Ald. 352.

47 L. R. 3 A. & E. 516.

48 Hubbard v. Roach (C. C.) 9 Biss. 375, 2 Fed. 393.

49 Plymouth Rock, 13 Blatchf. 505, Fed. Cas. No. 11,237.

50 Long Branch, 9 Ben. 89, Fed. Cas. No. 8,484; Mayflower (D. C.) 39 Fed. 42; compare Sterling (D. C.) 230 Fed. 543.

51 Weaver v. S. G. Owens, 1 Wall. Jr. 359, Fed. Cas. No. 17,310. 52 Ellen Holgate (D. C.) 30 Fed. 125; Ludgate Hill (D. C.) 21 Fed. 431; Belle of the Coast, 72 Fed. 1019, 19 C. C. A. 345; Georgia (D. C.) 32 Fed. 637; Hiram R. Dixon (D. C.) 33 Fed. 297; Geisha (D. C.) 200 Fed. 865; Fortuna (D. C.) 213 Fed. 284.

53 99 U. S. 235, 25 L. Ed. 339.

ciple upon chancery law. Section 6438 of the Code and similar statutes of other states have adopted it as a part of our statute law.

SAME NECESSARIES FURNISHED DOMESTIC

VESSELS

49. For supplies or other necessaries furnished a domestic vessel there was prior to the Act of June 23, 1910, no implied lien unless there was a local statute giving it.

As in such cases the owner is accessible, the reason for giving the master power to bind the vessel ceases, and hence the court decided early in its history that in case of supplies to domestic vessels the credit was presumptively given to the owner, and not to the vessel.54

Validity of State Statutes Giving Such Liens

In the course of the opinion the court intimated that if a state statute gave a right against the vessel in such cases they might enforce it. Acting upon the hint, many states passed acts giving rights of action in rem against domestic vessels, and even authorized their own courts to enforce them.

The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts should be exclusive, and conferred this jurisdiction in the first instance on the District Courts, but added a clause saving to the common-law courts all remedies which the common law was competent to give. Hence the courts had to decide that those state enactments which purported to bestow on their courts jurisdiction in rem to enforce a maritime right were unconstitutional. This principle, however, only applied to proceedings in rem pure and simple. For instance, an act which gave seamen a right to sue the owner for their wag

§ 49. 54 GENERAL SMITH, 4 Wheat. 443, 4 L. Ed. 609.