properly a claim for wages, and in this case the judge of the City of London Court has determined that the claim is a claim for wages. This finding the court ought not to interfere with Brown v. Cocking, 16 W. R 933, L. R. 3 Q. B. 672. The plaintiff is a seaman within the wide definition of that word in use in actions of wages (see The Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Vict. c. 60, s. 742), and the remuneration he seeks to recover in the action

can properly be described as wages. A surgeon and a woman who acted as shipkeeper have been held entitled to bring actions in rem for their wages: The Jane and Matilda, 1 Hagg. Adm. 187; The Lord Hobart, 2 Dods. 100, and the right to proceed in rem for wages extends to services rendered on shore equally as to services rendered on board a ship; the question being whether the services so rendered were, as is contended to be the case here, maritime services, Req. v. The Judge of the City of London Court and Owners of the Ss. Michigan, 38 W. R. 638, 25 Q. B. D. 339.

Sir F. JEUNE, P.-This claim is on the face of it a claim in an action in rem for wages as ship's husband, and the learned judge in the court below appears to have held that as a matter of law the plaintiff had a maritime lien, and he therefore gave judgment for the amount of the claim. But was there anything to support this view? I think not. According to the particulars filed the claim is in terms for wages as a ship's husband, and that I think raises the question which I think can be decided on prohibition whether a ship's husband in the well-known and ordinary meauing of the expression, can so claim. But if we look at what was proved in the action the result is the same. From the evidence it is clear that the plaintiff's duties were the duties of a ship's husband, and that he made some voyages, not many, on the ship; but it does not follow that there was anything necessarily done on the ship, though it may be that the plaintiff incidently performed some of his duties on board the ship.

HIGH COURT.

The question then arises, Does the plaintiff bring himself within the 10th section of the Admiralty Court Act, 1861? By such 10th section the claim over which jurisdiction is given must be a claim "by a seaman of any ship for wages earned by him on board the ship." I agree that the word "seaman" may be extended to any person who is employed in the practical employment or management of a ship: but the gist of the matter is that the employment must be to do the work of the ship, and I think you may go a step further and say you must look at the nature of the employment and see whether it is such work as is required to be done on board ship. I say that because in the case of The Chieftain, 11 W. R. 538, Br. & L. 104, Dr. Lushington, in dealing with the case of a captain who was employed a great deal on shore, looked at the nature of his duties, and held that he was entitled to a maritime lien for his wages. But having regard to the character of the duties of the plaintiff in this case, I do not think that they are duties of the nature of these of a seaman even in the most extended sense which can be given to the term. Under these circumstances the correct view seems to to me to be that a ship's husband acting as such and employed as such is not a person who comes within the 10th section of the Admiralty Court Act, 1861, and consequently that his claim is not a claim within the 3rd section of the County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 1868. I do not think that the case of Reg. v. The Judge of the City of London Court and the Owners of The Ss. Michigan is at all contrary to this view, for there the plaintiff who claimed wages had been mate of The Michigan, and was still employed on her.

Under these circumstances I am of opinion that there was no jurisdiction for the City of London Court to entertain the claim, and that the prohibition must go.

Solicitor for applicant, Williams.
Solicitor for plaintiff, Harris.

judgment was given declaring that the plaintiff was entitled to an account of what was due to him by P. under the contract with M.; but the judgment contained no declaration or inquiry as to damages. Upon taking the account it was, on the 13th of November, 1897, found that a balance of 19.366 Mexican dollars was due by P. to the plaintiff. Upon a motion by the plaintiff to determine questions as to the currency, in which the account should be calculated and the balance paid,

Held, by the Court of Appeal (affirming Kekewich, J.) (dissentiente Vaughan Williams, L.J.), that having regard to the form of the judgment at the trial of the action, the balance found due must be turned into English money, as on the 13th of November, 1897, when the amount due was first ascertained. An action for an account is in equity an action for the balance found due on taking the account, and not a series of actions for particular items in the account.MANNERS v. PEARSON, C.A., 498.

ADMINISTRATION :

1. Assets-Insolvent estate-Crown debt-Legacy duty-Priority.-A debt due by a bankrupt to the Crown for legacy duty is entitled to priority over the general creditors of the bankrupt; and such priority can be asserted in the bankruptcy proceedings notwithstanding the vesting of the bankrupt's estate in his assignees.-GALVIN, RE, C.A. (Ir.).

2. Costs-Creditor's action-No assets. In a creditor's action for administration of the personal estate of a testator it turned out, pending the administration action, by reason of the decision of another court, that the testator had no assets.

Held, that the rule in Bluett v. Jessop, Jac. 240, nevertheless applied, and that the plaintiff in the administration action should pay the costs of the executor.- HIBERNIAN BANK v. LAUDER, V.C. (Ir.)

3. Intestacy-Co-parceners-" Purchaser," tracing title from-Real estate-Inheritance, law of-Descent -Heir-at-law-Issue-Ancestor, standing in place of-Inheritance Act, 1883 (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 106), 88. 1, 2-Lunacy-Real estate of lunatic-Sale-Purchase-money-Conversion—Lunacy Regulation Act, 1853 (16 & 17 Vict. c. 70), 88. 124, 135.-The doctrine of Cooper v. France, 19 L. J. Ch. 313-that on the death intestate of a co-parcener a co-heiress of the purchaser of land, her son, notwithstanding section 2 of the Inheritance Act, 1833, stands in her place quoad her share-applies equally in favour of her more remote lineal descendants. Accordingly, on the death intestate of a son of such a co-parce

ner,

Held, that the entire share descended on the nephew of such son (the nephew being a grandson of the co-parcener), and that no part thereof descended to the descendants of a sister of the coparcener.

The purchase-money of a lunatic's descended moiety of land sold in 1863 under section 124 of the Lunacy Regulation Act, 1853,

Held, under section 135, transmissible, upon his death intestate, in precisely the same manner as the descended moiety if the same had not been sold. -RE MATSON, JAMES v. DICKINSON, Ch.D. Kekewich, J.

4. Practice-Priorities-Rates-Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 62), 8. 1, sub-sections 1 (a), 6; s. 3.-The priority conferred by section 1, sub-section 1, of the Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Act, 1888, applies in the administration of the insolvent estate of a person who has died since the 31st of December, 1888, the date of the commencement of that Act;

but does not apply in cases of death prior to that date.-HEYWOOD v. HEYWOOD, Ch.D. Stirling, J.,

72.

5. Testamentary expenses-Costs of unsuccessfully opposing probate-Order as to payment of costs by the Probate judge-Testator's personal estate insufficient. -The plaintiff took an action in the Probate Division against the executors, contesting the validity of the testator's will. That action was dismissed, but the judge of the Probate Division ordered the costs of both parties to the action to be paid out of the testator's estate. The personal estate being insufficient, the executors took out an administration summons to ascertain whether the plaintiff's costs of the probate action were payable out of the testator's real estate, which had been devised subject to the payment of testamentary expenses.

Held, that the costs in question were not testamentary expenses. - PRINCE, RE, GODWIN v. PRINCE, Ch.D. Stirling, J.

See also Bankruptcy, 1, 5, 8; Partnership, 2; Solicitor, 6; Trustee, 1; Will, 6.

ADMIRALTY :

1. County court-Jurisdiction—Ship—Sale of ship by bailiff of county court in action in rem-Admiralty title-County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 71), ss. 3, 12, 23-County Court Rules, 1892, ord. 39B, rr. 40-42 (105-107)--County Court Rules, 1889, Form 331.-The purchaser of a ship sold by the high bailiff of a county court under the decree of a county court having admiralty jurisdiction made in an action in rem, takes the ship free from all antecedent liens, mortgages, and liabilities.—“ RUBY,” THE, P.D. & Ad.D., 464.

2. County court-Practice-Mode of trial-Meaning of term "actions" in consolidating and amending Act-County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 51), s. 2—Maritime cause— County Courts Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 43), s. 101. -The proper mode of trial in the case of a maritime cause over which a county court having admiralty jurisdiction has jurisdiction under the 2nd section of County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 1869, is either by the judge alone or by the judge assisted by mercantile assessors.

The parties in such a suit are not entitled to a jury section 101 of the County Courts Act, 1888, by which it is provided that, in all "actions where the amount claimed shall exceed five pounds, it shall be lawful for the plaintiff or defendant to require a jury to be summoned to try the said action, unless the action is of the nature of the causes or matters assigned to the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice, not being by the context applicable to admiralty or maritime causes tried in a county court having admiralty jurisdiction.-"THEODORA," THE, P.D. & Ad.D.,

157.

3. County court-Ship-Wages-Ship's husband -Salary-The County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 71), s. 3-The Admiralty Court Act, 1861 (24 Vict. c. 10), s. 10.— A county court having admiralty jurisdiction has no jurisdiction under the County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 1868, over a claim by a ship's husband for his salary or other remuneration due to him in that capacity.-"RUBY," THE (No. 2), P.D. & Ad.D., 687.

ADULTERATION:

Food-"Skimmed" milk-"Separated" milkDisclosure of injurious alteration-Sale of Food and