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goods abroad which are an infringement of a patent applicable to the United Kingdom alone, who sends these goods by post to an English customer in compliance with his order to so send them, does not infringe the patent for the United Kingdom, for in such a case the sale and delivery take place o utside this country.

Decision of the Court of Appeal (45 W. R. 481, [1897] 2 Ch. 322) affirmed.-BADISCHE ANILIN FABRIK V. BASLE CHEMICAL WORKS (BINDSCHEDLER), H.L., 255.

4. Invention-Monopoly-Monopoly Act, 1623 (21 Jac. 1, c. 3), ss. 4, 6.-The proviso in section 6 of the Monopoly Act, 1623, which exempts letters patent for new inventions from the operation of the Act, must be construed as including in the exemption letters patent for new inventions which by reason of some defect in the specification capable of amendment by disclaimer, cannot for the time being and until the disclaimer has been filed be enforced. PECK v. HINDES, Q.B.D.

5. Prolongation of term for ten years-New patent. -Where it appeared that an invention was of considerable merit, that there were great difficulties in introducing it, and that the petitioner had incurred loss in his endeavours so to do, their lordships recommended a new patent for the term of ten years.--CURRIE AND TIMMIS' PATENT, RE, P.C.

6. Revocation-Evidence of prior user-Admissibility. Where an action for infringement of a patent had been dismissed on the ground that there had been a prior use of the invention at a specified place, and a petition was then presented to have the patent declared void, the petitioner relying solely on the instance of prior user which had been proved in the infringement action,

Held, that evidence sought to be adduced by the respondent to the petition as to alleged prior user at other places was not admissible.-HAGGENMACHER'S PATENT RE, Ch.D. Romer, J. PERPETUITY.-See Appointment, 2; Will, 7, 13. POOR LAW:

1. Loan for term of years-Redemption without consent of lender-Poor law Loans Act, 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 11), s. 2.-Guardians of the poor who have since the 24th of April, 1871 (the date of the passing of the Poor Law Loans Act, 1871) borrowed moneys, to be repaid at stipulated times, cannot even with the authority of an order of the Local Government Board under section 2 of the Act compel the lender to accept against his will repayment otherwise than in accordance with the contract.

The decision of the Court of Appeal ([1897] 1 Ch. 335), affirmed.-WEST DERBY UNION v. METROPOLITAN LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY, H.L.

2. Rating-Beneficial occupation-London County Council-Assessment of public park-Rateable Value --London Council (General Powers) Act (53 & 54 Vict. c. ccxliii.), 88. 4, 5.-Where lands are held by a county council, and every part thereof must by statute be retained by the county council in perpetuity for the use of the public, and the expenses of management exceed the incomings, the county council is not rateable in respect of such lands.

Hare v. Overseers of Putney, 29 W. R. 721, 7 Q. B. D. 223, approved.

Decision of the Court of Appeal (44 W. R. 621, [1896] 2 Q. B. 25) affirmed.-LAMBETH OVERSEERS v. LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL, H.L., 79.

3. Rating - Coal mines - Evidence - Profits or

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annual value-Gross and rateable.—At the hearing of an appeal against a rate on a colliery, the colliery company put forward evidence that the best and only fair method of arriving at the net annual value was that of ascertaining the receipts in the year, and then deducting therefrom the proper deductions; in fact, rating it like a railway. If this was admissible, it worked out eubstantially correct. It was contended that this evidence was not admissible, but that it should be rated on the annual rent obtainable.

Held, that the evidence was admissible.

Held, further, that where in a rate the gross and rateable value are entered at the same figure, the gross is to be treated as an ascertained figure, and such deductions as can be properly made may be made therefrom.-DENABY COLLIERY Co. v. DONCASTER UNION, Q.B.D.

4. Rating Exemption - Buildings occupied for police purposes-Chief constable's residence-43 Eliz. c. 2, s. 1.-Local Government Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 41), s. 61.-By section 64 of the Local Government Act, 1888, the buildings used by the police at Leicester, then vested in the justices, became the property of the county council.

The chief constable for the county, on his appointment to that office, had to reside in a certain part of the police premises, and the assessment committee assessed that portion of the police buildings to the poor rate.

Held, that such rate should be quashed, because that part of the police premises occupied by the chief constable was occupied by him for the purposes of the police, and the fact that he was permitted to keep his wife and family there also rendered his occupation thereof none the less an exclusive occupation of that part of the building for the purpose of the county police.-LEICESTER COUNTY COUNCIL v. LEICESTER ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE, Q.B.D., 585.

5. Rating-Exemption by private Act-Constructiou-20 Geo. 3, c. lv.-38 & 39 Vict. c. lxxxii.-A private Act of 1780 vested a piece of land in trustees for certain purposes therein mentioned for the benefit of the inhabitants of a borough and provided that for ever thereafter the land should be deemed and taken as within and parcel of the borough, but should in no wise be assessed to poor's

rate.

Held, that the land was exempt for ever from being assessable to poor's rate and therefore a race committee, to whom the trustees had leased a portion of the land for a racecourse, were not liable to poor's rate by reason of their occupation.-PONTEFRACT ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE v. PONTEFRACT PARK TRUSTEES, C.A.

6. Rating Exemption Society instituted for purposes of the fine arts-Royal College of MusicSociety not making " any dividend, gift, division, or bonus in money unto or between any of its members” -Scientific Societies Act, 1843 (6 & 7 Vict. c. 36), s. 1.-The Royal College of Music was a society created and incorporated by royal charter, for the advancement of the art of music by means of a teaching and examining body charged with the duty of providing musical instruction of the highest class, and of rewarding with academical degrees and certificates of proficiency, and otherwise, persons, whether educated or not at the college, who on examination might prove themselves worthy of such distinctions, for the promotion and supervision of musical instruction in schools and elsewhere conducive to the cultivation and dissemination of the art of music, and for the encouragement

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Held (affirming the judgment of Hawkins and Channell, JJ., [1898] 1 Q. B. 304), that the college was a society instituted for purposes of the fine arts exclusively, within the meaning of the Scientific Societies Act, 1843, s. 1, and did not, in making the above-mentioned payments to members of the teaching staff "make any dividend, gift, division or bonus in money" to its members within the meaning of the section; and therefore that the society was entitled to exemption from parochial rates in respect of the building occupied by them as aforesaid.-ROYAL COLLEGE OF MUSIC v. WESTNINSTER VESTRY, C.A.

7. Rating-Gross estimated rental-Rateable value -Appeal against rateable value-Right of rating authority to adduce evidence to increase gross value in rate-book-Parochial Assessments Act, 1836 (6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 96), s. 1.—On a ratepayer's appeal to quarter sessions against a poor rate on the ground that, though the estimated gross rental in the ratebook is correct, the rateable value is too high in consequence of a sufficient sum not having been allowed for deductions, the rating authority are bound to accept the gross value as appearing in the rate-book, and cannot, in order to show that the rateable value is not too high, give any evidence to show that in fact the gross estimated rental as appearing in the rate-book is too low.-HORTON v. WALSALL GUARDIANS, Q.B.D., 607.

8. Rating-Market garden-Land covered with greenhouses-" Agricultural land"-" Buildings or other hereditaments "-Liability of land covered with glass, being part of a market garden-Agricultural Rates Act, 1896 (59 & 60 Vict. c. 16), 88. 1, 5, 6, 9.Land covered with glasshouses erected for the purpose of its cultivation is, though used solely as a market garden, a "building or other hereditament," and not " agricultural land,' "within the meaning of section 1, sub-section 1, of the Agricultural Rates Act, 1896; and is, therefore, not entitled to the partial exemption from rates granted by that Act to "agricultural land."

Decision of the Queen's Bench Division reversed (Vaughan Williams, L.J., dissenting).-SMITH v. RICHMOND, C.A., 401.

9. Rating Railway-Railway lines at stationStation appurtenances-Running lines or sidings.In addition to the four main lines passing through a railway-station, certain other lines were made at the station and used, some for the purposes of through traffic when the main lines were occupied, or likely to be occupied, and others for the purposes of carrying goods into the railway company's warehouse and into a private coal yard adjoining the station, and for the making up and departure of local passenger trains. These lines were also used for the standing of empty trains without engines.

Upon a case stated by a court of quarter sessions for the opinion of the High Court, the question being whether these lines were to be rated as running lines or sidings,

Held, that the primary and principal purpose for which the lines in question were made and used was the carrying of passenger and goods traffic,

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Poor Law. 128

and that they were running lines and should be rated accordingly.-STOCKPORT UNION v. LONDON AND NORTH-WESTERN RAILWAY Co., C.A. 10. Rating-Reservoir of water company-Assessment of ,, Land covered with water Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), s. 211, subsection 1 (b).-A reservoir of water covering an area of some ten acres was constructed by a water company for the purpose of storing water. The bed of the reservoir consisted of a thick lining of concrete laid on the earth, which had been excavated for the purpose, and was permanently covered with water; and the reservoir was surrounded by an embankment lined with concrete, which embankment was used solely for the purpose of keeping the water in the reservoir and rose above the surface of the ground.

Held, that the reservoir was "land covered with water " within the meaning of section 211, subsection 1 (b), of the Public Health Act, 1875, and was consequently rateable at one-fourth part only of the net annual value.-SOUTHWARK WATER CO. v. HAMPTON COUNCIL, Q.B.D.

10A. Rating-Reservoir and waterworks-Basis of rateable value-Effective capital value, how arrived at-Rateable value, how arrived at-Costs of construction.-When arriving at the rateable value of a reservoir and waterworks, when part of the works lie outside the parish for which the assessment is made, the reservoir and waterworks must be taken as integral portions of the undertaking, aud, although rateable separately, they must not for the purpose of such assessment be valued apart from the rest of the undertaking.

The effective capital value of such reservoir and works should be arrived at from their cost as a basis, and so from that by a percentage of interest, the gross rental and rateable value can be arrived

at.

By the Acts which empowered the waterworks to be carried out the corporation had made roads and bridges around the lake, and substituted a church, schools, and vicarage for those submerged by the lake.

Held, that the expense incurred in carrying out these operations ought not to be included in arriving at the total costs of the works to ascertain the effective capital value.

The reservoir was at present capable of delivering 52 million gallons per day, but the catchment area at present connected with the reservoir was only sufficient to provide 41 million gallons. Catchment areas capable of providing the remaining 11 million gallons would ultimately be connected. Of the 52 million gallons 39 would be delivered by means of three pipes at Liverpool, and the remaining 13 million gallons would be passed down the River Vyrnwy as compensation water in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1880. At present only one of the lines of pipes, capable of carrying 13 million gallons a day, had been laid.

Held, that the effective capital value of the undertaking ought to be taken at 26-52 of the total capital expenditure.

The rate per cent. on the effective value of the undertaking to be taken to make the rateable value is a question of fact, and the court will not interfere unless it is shown that the percentage is arrived at on a wrong basis.- Liverpool (MAYOR) v. LLANFYLLYN UNION, Q.B.D.

11. Rating—“ Tied" public-house-Market value above rent actually paid-Brewers as hypothetical tenants-Exclusion of person contracts between

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DIGEST.

publican and brewers-Parochial Assessment Act, 1836 (6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 96), s. 1.-—The occupier of a tied public-house appealed to quarter sessions against an increased assessment or his licensed premises.

The quarter sessions reduced the assessment subject to a case being stated, and the question raised was on what basis the tied house-the rent paid for which by the occupier to his brewers being admittedly less than the market value of the house -ought to be estimated at for the purposes of the poor rate.

Held, that the statute required the assessment to be based on the value of the hereditament itself, but that in estimating that value the quarter sssions were right in taking into consideration the fact that rival brewers would give a price in the market for the house above that which would support a rent given by a publican who merely took the premises for the purposes of his own retail trade as a yearly tenant; but that any special value which brewers might for reasons connected with their own brewery be willing to give for the premises ought to be excluded, since a publican had a right, like an ordinary tenant, to have his premises rated apart from any personal contract existing between himself and his landlord.-WHITE v. BRADFORD-ON-AVON ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE, Q.B.D., 603.

12. Settlement-Divided parish-Local Government Act, 1894 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 73), ss. 1 (3), 67, 68.A poor-law settlement gained by birth is a settlement in a particular parish. Consequently the settlement is destroyed on the division of the original parish under section 1, sub-section 3, of the Local Government Act, 1894, as the parish in which it was acquired thereby ceased to exist.-DORKING UNION v. ST. SAVIOUR'S UNION, C.A., 309.

POST OFFICE :

Telegraphs and telephones-Underground wiresPostmaster-General-Road authority-Power of, to impose conditions on Postmaster-General-What conditions may be imposed-Telegraph Act, 1863 (26 & 27 Vict. c. 112), s. 5, sub-section 3; 8. 9.-Section 9 of the Telegraph Act, 1863, provides that the company-which by a later Act includes the Postmaster-General-shall not place any telegraph under any street except with the consent of the bodies having the control of the streets; and section 5, sub-section 3, provides that any consent may be given "on such pecuniary or other terms or conditions as the person or body giving consent thinks fit."

Held, that the objections which the road authority are entitled to raise under section 5, subsection 3, are objections as to matters only which concern them as a road authority, and that they cannot raise objections as to the modes or conditions of carrying on the service or the reasonableness of the charges for such service; and that they cannot, therefore, when giving consent to the Postmaster-General to lay an underground telephone wire, impose the condition that the wire should not be laid for the use of a particular telephone company unless such company were prepared to provide an improved service at a reduced cost, as such condition would be not only outside the scope of their duties as a road authority, but also unreasonable.-POSTMASTER-GENERAL v. LONDON CORPORATION, Q.B.D.

POWER.-See Appointment, 1-4; Will, 25.
PRACTICE:-

1. Appeal-Appeal from judge without jury—

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Appeal raising questions of fact.-The rehearing on appeal of a case tried by a judge without a jury is not governed by the rules applicable where there has been a trial and verdict by a jury. The Court of Appeal must act on its own considered conclusion on questions of fact as well as law.-COGHLAN v. CUMBERLAND, C.A.

2. Appeal-Case stated for opinion of Queen's Bench Division-12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, 8. 11-Judicature Act, 1873, 8. 19.-An appeal lies from a decision of the Queen's Bench Division on a special case stated with respect to an appeal to a court of quarter sessions under section 11 of 12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, although judgment has been entered in the court of quarter sessions in conformity with that decision. LODGE v. HUDDERSFIELD (MAYOR) (No. 2), C.A., 482.

3. Appeal-School board election-Petition-Interlocutory order-Appeal to Court of Appeal-Municipal Corporations Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 50), Part IV., 8. 93. sub-section 7-Municipal Elections (Corrupt and Illegal Practices) Act, 1884 (47 & 48 Vict. c. 70), 8. 36-General Rules, 1883, for the execution of Part IV. of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, rr. 48, 57.—From an order of a judge at chambers in an interlocutory application arising in a school board election petition an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal. MONKSWELL (LORD) v. THOMPSON (No. 2), C.A.

4. Costs-Action against public authority-Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 61), s. 1 (b).—When in substance "judgment has been obtained" by a public authority as defendant within the meaning of sub-section (b) of section 1 of the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, and costs have been given in its favour, such judgment carries the right to have taxation as between solicitor and client, although no direction as to the mode of taxation is given in the judgment.-NORTH METROPOLITAN TRAMWAYS Co. v. LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL, Ch.D. Romer, J., 554.

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5. Costs-Application for judgment under order 14-Leave to defend-Case remitted to county court— Costs of application under order 14 to be costs in the -County Courts, Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 43), 88. 65, 116-Rules of the Supreme Court, ord. 14, r. 9 (a).—In an action to recover under a contract a sum above £20, but less than £50, the plaintiff applied for judgment under order 14. The defendant obtained leave to defend on payment of the amount claimed into court, and the money was paid in. An order was subsequently made on the application of the plaintiff, and affirmed by a judge at chambers, remitting the action to the county court, and directing that the costs of the application under order 14 should be costs in the On appeal,

cause.

Held, that as the case was not brought within section 116 of the County Courts Act, 1888, or ord. 14, r. 9 (a), there was no jurisdiction to make the order as to the costs of the application under order 14.

Quære, whether an order purporting to make costs under order 14 costs in a county court action could be made at the hearing under ord. 14, r. 9 (a).--DUNN v. APPLETON, C.A.

6. Costs--Interlocutory proceedings-Costs reserved -New regulation. Where interlocutory applications have been ordered to stand to the trial and are not then mentioned to the judge, the costs of such applications are to be treated as costs in the action, and taxed accordingly, and need not be mentioned in the judgment. Where such appli

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cations have been disposed of, but the costs have been reserved, such costs are not to be mentioned in the judgment nor allowed on taxation without the special direction of the judge.-BRITISH NATURAL PREMIUM ASSOCIATION v. BYWATER, Ch.D. Byrne, J., 28.

7. Costs-Security for costs-Limited companyPlaintiffs in action-" Sufficient security"-Companies Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89), s. 69.-The security for costs required to be given by a plaintiff company, under section 69 of the Companies Act, 1862, must, as that section provides, be" sufficient"-neither illusory nor oppressive-having regard to the probable costs likely to be incurred by the defendant.-DOMINION BREWERY Co. v. FOSTER, C.A.

8. Costs-Set-off-House of Lords-R. S. C., ord. 65, r. 14.-The Appeal Committee after final judgment has been given in the appeal will not set off costs due by an appellant in the House of Lords against balance costs due to the appellant as the result of a decision in the Court of Appeal. If there is a probability of any question of costs or any other matter arising after and as incident to the appeal, the matter ought to be mentioned at the hearing.RUSSELL v. RUSSELL (No. 2), H.L.

9. Costs-Taxation-General costs of action-Costs of counter-claim.-Where the plaintiff is ordered to pay the costs of the action, and the defendant to pay the costs of the counter-claim, only costs actually occasioned by the counter-claim can be charged to the defendant, and the general costs of the action must not be apportioned between the plaintiff and the defendant, but must all be paid by the plaintiff.-ATLAS METAL Co. v. MILLER, C.A., 657.

10. Declaratory judgment-Injunction-Jurisdiction-Local Government-Public Health (Buildings in Streets) Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 52), s. 3—Ord. 25, r. 5.Where the Legislature has pointed out proceedings before magistrates as the proper course for a local authority to take with regard to offences under a particular statute the Court of Chancery will be very slow to exercise its jurisdiction to restrain such proceedings by injunction where there is no evidence that the local authority intend to commit any illegal act.

A fortiori it will be still less likely to make a declaration of rights where no relief, by way of injunction or damages, is asked.

Whether the court has, under ord. 25, r. 5, jurisdiction to make such a declaration under such circumstances, quære.-GRAND JUNCTION WATERWORKS Co. v. HAMPTON DISTRICT COUNCIL, Ch.D. Stirling, J., 644.

11. Discovery-Interrogatories-Criminal or penal proceedings-Pollution of river-Proceedings to restrain-Penalty--Rivers Pollution Act, 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 75), ss. 3, 10.-Proceedings instituted in a county court for an order under section 10 of the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act, 1876, requiring a person to abstain from polluting a river, which is constituted an offence against the Act, are not proceedings of a criminal or penal nature, although disobedience by the person against whom the order to abstain is made renders him liable to a penalty. An order for discovery by the person against whom proceedings for the abstention of pollution of a river are pending may accordingly be made.

Decision of the Court of Appeal (45 W. R. 3, [1896] 2 Q. B. 297) affirmed.-DERBY CORPORATION V. DERBYSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL, H.L., 48.

12. Discovery-Production of documents-Insur

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ance, marine-Ship's papers-Re-insurance.--In an action by the original underwriter against the reinsurers upon a policy of marine insurance, the defendants are entitled to an order for production of ship's papers.-CHINA TRADERS' INSURANCE Co. v. ROYAL EXCHANGE ASSURANCE ASSOCIATION, C.A., 497.

13. Discovery-Production of documents-Pricilege-Copies-Secondary evidence.-A document once privileged is always privileged.

After the trial of an action certain documents relating to the same subject-matter in a previous action were discovered at the office of a solicitor, who had obtained them from the representatives of the solicitor of the plaintiffs' predecessor in title. The defendant, having appealed from the judgment, sought production of the documents on the hearing of the appeal.

Held, that the documents were privileged from production.

Minet v. Morgan, 21 W. R. 467, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 361, followed.

Wheeler v. Le Marchant, 30 W. R. 235, 17 Ch. D. 675, explained.

But, held, further, that the defendant, having had an opportunity of taking copies of some of the documents, was entitled to give secondary evidence of such as he had copies of.

Lloyd v. Mostyn, 10 M. & W. 478, followed.CALCRAFT v. GUEST, C.A., 428.

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14. District registrar-Jurisdiction-Power to set aside judgment-Ord. 35, rr. 1, 5, 6.—Where in action proceeding in a district registry the plaintiff has signed judgment in default of appearance, the district registrar has jurisdiction to set the judgment aside on the ground that it has been entered for a larger sum than was in fact due.

The effect of rule 6 of order 35 is that in all matters other than those in which the district registrar has exclusive jurisdiction under rules 1-5, proceedings may be taken either before the district registrar or a master.-ToWNEND v. KIRKHAM, C.A., 65.

16. Evidence-Inspection - Examination of witnesses on commission-Order to send abroad property in dispute-Jurisdiction-R. S. C., 1883, ord. 37, r. 5; ord. 50, r. 3.-In interpleader proceedings as to the right to the possession of a stamp album, one of the claimants applied for an order that the album might be sent abroad for inspection by witnesses who were to be examined there on commission.

Held, that the court had jurisdiction to make such order under ord. 37, r. 5, and ord. 50, r. 3. Leader v. Smyth, 8 Times L. R. 612, overruled.— CHAPLIN v. PUTTICK, C.A., 481.

17. Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1843 (6 & 7 Vict. c. 94) -Japan Consular Court-Criminal case-Appeal— Special leave.—Under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1843 (6 & 7 Vict. c. 94), her Majesty has power to constitute for Japan a court, by Order in Council, with a jury of five, with jurisdiction over her Majesty's subjects.

The rule as to special leave to appeal in criminal cases laid down in In re Dillet, 12 App. Cas., affirmed.-CAREW, EX PARTE, H.L.

18. Foreign state plaintiff-Action for appointment of new trustee-Counter-claim for damages for libel—– Order excluding counter-claim-R. S. C., 1883, ord. 19, r. 27; ord. 21, r. 15.-The fact that the plaintiff is a foreign state is not a sufficient reason for allowing the defendant to set up by

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way of counter-claim a claim which he could not set up against an ordinary plaintiff. An order will therefore be made excluding a counterclaim for damages for a libel alleged to have been published by a foreign state which is plaintiff in an action seeking the appointment of new trustees of a fund in court.-SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC v. COMPAGNIE FRANCO-BELGE DU CHEMIN DE FER DU NOR DE LA REPUBLIQUE SUD AFRICANE, C.A., 67.

19. Foreign state-International law-Cross-action -Where a foreign state sues in this country, a counter-claim cannot be made against it except for matters arising out of the original action, and claims for damages for breach of agreement by the plaintiff state which would, if a subject were suing, form the subject-matter of a separate action will be struck out.-SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC v. LA COMPAGNIE FRANCO-BELGE DU CHEMIN DU FER DU NORD.-Ch.D. North, J., 151.

19A. Garnishee-Rent-Apportionment Act, 1870, 8. 2.-Notwithstanding the Apportionment Act, 1870, rent cannot, before it is payable, be attached under a garnishee order as a debt owing or accruing due.-BARNETT v. EASTMAN, Q.B.D.

20. House of Lords-Decision on question of law final.-A decision of the House of Lords once given upon a question of law is conclusive upon the House atterwards.-LONDON TRAMWAYS Co. υ. LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL, H.L., 609.

21. Interpleader-Sheriff's interpleader-Claim to goods seized in execution—Claimant ordered to pay value of goods into court-Withdrawal of sheriff— Second execution-Liability of claimant to make further payment into court.-Where a claimant of goods seized by the sheriff in execution has paid into court the value of the goods and the amount of the sheriff's charges as a security for the execution pending the hearing of an interpleader issue, and before the hearing a second execution has been levied on the same goods, and the claimant has claimed the goods again, he may be ordered, as a condition to the sheriff being directed to withdraw, to pay into court again the value of the goods and the sheriff's charges as a security for the second execution creditor.-KoTCHIE v. GOLDEN SOVEREIGNS, C.A., 616.

22. Judgment-Joint debtors-Effect of judgment against one-Pleading-Costs.-The rule in King v. Hoare, 13 M. & W. 494, that a judgment against one of two joint debtors is a bar to proceedings against the other, applies where both joint debtors are originally made defendants to, and enter an appearance in, the same action, and judgment by consent has been obtained against one of them in that action.

Where one joint debtor has consented to judgment, the other, if he wishes to avail himself of the judgment as a defence, should plead it; and where he did not plead it, he was ordered to pay the costs of the action up to the time of the consent judgment.-MCLEOD v. POWER, Ch.D. Byrne, J.

23. Judgment-Setting aside-Judgment obtained by fraud-Fresh action to set aside judgment-Jurisdiction. Where a judgment has been obtained by fraud, the court has jurisdiction, in a subsequent action brought for that purpose, to set the judgment aside.-COLE v. LANGFORD, Q.B.D.

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24. Lis pendens-Dismissal of action for specific performance Order vacating registration Pendens Act, 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 47), s. 2.-Upon the dismissal of an action for specific performance, which has been registered as a lis pendens, the successful party may, in addition to the usual judgment, have an order to the effect that the registration shall be vacated unless an appeal is set down within a certain specified time.-BAXTER v. MIDDLETON, Ch.D. Kekewich, J., 350.

25. Mayor's Court-Costs-Libel-Less than £5 recovered-Mayor's Court of London Act, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. clvii.), s. 11—Rules of 1890 and 1892.The fact that in a particular case no scale of costs is provided by the Mayor's Court of London Rules, 1890, is not in itself sufficient to show that that court has no inherent jurisdiction to order costs in the cases not specifically provided for.

Semble, that in actions for libel tried in the Mayor's Court of London, in which less than £5 is recovered, the court has jurisdiction to order costs to be paid to the plaintiff, beyond court fees and allowances to witnesses, although no scale is provided by the rules for such a case.-HALL v. LAUNSPACH, C.A,

26. Nonsuit-Discontinuance-Ord. 26, r. 1.—A plaintiff can no longer claim as of right to be nousuited so as to be at liberty to bring a second action. The right to discontinue an action is now entirely regulated by order 26, and the plaintiff cannot discontinue at the trial without an order of the judge, who may make such terms as he thinks just with regard to the plaintiff's right to bring another action.--Fox v. STAR NEWSPAPER CO., C.A., 340.

27. Palatine Court-Order for attachment-Defendant out of jurisdiction-Court of Chancery of Lancaster Act, 1850, s. 15-Court of Chancery of Lancaster Act, 1854, s. 7—Order made order of High Court.-Where a defendant in an action in the Chancery Court of Lancaster appears to the action, but resides out of the jurisdiction, and after judgment an order is made in the Palatine Court for leave to issue a writ of attachment against him, that order will be made an order of the High Court under section 15 of the Court of Chancery of Lancaster Act, 1850.-DUNMORE v. WHARAM, Ch.D. Byrne, J., 366.

28. Parties-Joinder of defendunts-Joinder of separate causes of action against several defendanisOrd. 16, rr. 4, 5; ord. 18, r. 1.-A claim to recover damages from three defendants on the ground of deceit cannot rightly be joined in the same action with a claim to recover damages from two of such defendants on the ground of conspiracy.

Sadler v. Great Western Railway Co., 45 W. R. 51, [1896] A. C. 450, followed.-GoWER v. COULDRIDGE, C.A., 214.

29. Parties-Joinder of plaintiffs-Separate causes. of action-Right to relief arising out of same trans-action-Ord. 16, r. 1.-In an action by a shareholder in a limited company against the directors, the company being joined as a defendant, the plaintiff claimed damages from the directors for having induced him by deceit and fraud to buy shares in the company, one of the particulars of deceit and fraud being the payment of a dividend out of capital. The plaintiff also claimed on behalf of himself and all the other shareholders a declaration that the payment of the said dividend was ultra vires and illegal, and that the directors were liable to repay to the company the money so paid by them.

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