security contained a power of sale. The creditor exposed for sale the property held in security at a price less than the amount due under his security, and failed to find a purchaser. The creditor then applied to the sheriff under section 8 of the Heritable Securities (Scotland) Act, 1894, and the sheriff issued a decree that the debtors had forfeited their rights of redemption, and that the creditor was vested absolutely in the subjects at the price named.

Held, that the transaction constituted a sale to the creditor, and was chargeable by virtue of sections 54 and 57 of the Stamp Act, 1891, and the first schedule thereto, with ad valorem duty.INLAND REVENUE COMMISSIONERS v. TOD, H.L.

21. Stamp duty-Exchange of shares in company for shares in other company-Conveyance or transfer on sale-Exchange-Stamp Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 39), s. 55, Schedule.—A transfer of shares in a company in exchange for shares in another company held to be a conveyance or transfer on sale within the meaning of the Stamp Act, 1891.— COATS v. INLAND REVENUE COMMISSIONERS, C.A., 1.

22. Stamp duty-Foreign security issued in the United Kingdom-Stamp Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 39), s. 82, sub-section 1 (b) (i).-The appellant was the holder of one of a series of bonds given by a newly-formed American company in exchange for bonds in an old company which was being wound up under a reorganization scheme. It was stated on the bond that it should not be valid for any purpose unless authenticated by the trustee's certificate thereon indorsed. The bond was executed by the new company in the United States and delivered to a trust company, which was to act as trustee. The trust company did not immediately sign, the certificates on the bonds which were destined for England; but, in order to avoid a heavy premium for insurance, forwarded the bonds unsigned, and at the same time sent over an official to sign the certificates in London. The appellant's bond was handed to him in London after the certificate had been so signed.

Held, that the bond was issued in the United Kingdom within the meaning of section 82, subsection 1 (b) (i), of the Stamp Act, 1891.-BARING v. INLAND REVENUE COMMISSIONERS, C.A., 98.

23. Stamp duty-Mortgage-Trust deed for securing debentures-Transfer of mortgage-Substituted security―Stamp Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 39), 8. 86, sub-section 1; 8. 88, sub-section 1; Schedule 1.—A limited company issued in 1892 £300,000 4 per cent. debenture stock, secured by a trust deed which was duly stamped. By a subsequent trust deed for securing debenture stock made in 1897, and having the same trustees, after reciting that the £500,000 debenture stock was still outstanding and that the company was intending to issue further irredeemable 3 per cent. debenture stock, the amount of stock to be issued was limited in the first instance to £300,000, the company acknowledging in the deed that they were indebted to the trustees in that sum carrying interest at 33 per cent. The company were to be at liberty to issue further 3 per cent. debenture stock not exceeding £540,000, making a total of £840,000; such further stock was only to be issued for the purpose of redeeming or paying off the £500,000 4 per cent, stock at the rate of not more than £108 of the new stock for every £100 of the stock redeemed or paid off. Before issuing any of the further debenture stock the company were to execute and deliver to the trustees an acknowledg

ment of indebtedness for the amount of the further proposed issue, and the trustees were to certify on the trust deed that the company were entitled to make the issue.

Held, first, that the trust deed was a security for the repayment of £840,000 advanced or to be advanced within the meaning of section 86, subsection 1, and section 88, sub-section 1, of the Stamp Act, 1891, notwithstanding that certain preliminaries must necessarily be complied with before the issue of any further stock in excess of £300,000; and secondly, that in respect of £500,000 the deed was not a transfer of a mortgage, but was a substituted security, and was therefore only liable to the reduced ad valorem duty of 6d. per cent. under the heading "Mortgage, Bond, Debenture, Covenant" in the first schedule to the Stamp Act, 1891.-CITY OF LONDON BREWERY Co. v. INLAND REVENUE COMMISSIONERS, Q.B.D.

24. Succession duty-Father and son in partnership -Death of father-Acquisition by son of father's share in business-Succession-Sale and purchaseConstruction of partnership deed-Succession Duty Act, 1853 (16 & 17 Vict. c. 51), s. 2.-A father admitted his son into partnership for a term of five years. The son brought no capital into the business, but the value of the business was estimated at £62,445, of which two-thirds was to be deemed the father's share and one-third the son's; and one condition of the partnership deed was that, in the event of the father dying during the partnership, the son was to take the whole of the business and pay to the father's executors or administrators £10,000. By a deed of even date the son agreed to pay to the father and his executors a rent-charge of £139 per annum in respect of the freehold property of the partnership.

On the death of the father during the partnership the Crown claimed succession duty in respect of the father's share of the business which passed to the son, less the sum of £10,000 payable by the son to the estate of the deceased.

Held, that the son's acquisition of his father's share of the business was a succession, on which succession duty was payable.

Judgment of Vaughan Williams and Kennedy, JJ. (45 W. R. 446), reversed.-ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. BROWN, C.A., 145.

See also Settlement, 1.

INNKEEPER :—

1. Deposit-Expressly for safe custody-Non-disclosure of value or nature of article deposited-Innkeepers Act, 1863, s. 3.-The plaintiff, a guest at defendant's inn, handed a parcel containing jewellery to the defendant's manager, saying, "Keep that for me," but not stating its nature or contents. The parcel was stolen, but not through the wilful act or neglect of the defendant or any of his servants. The usual notices in compliance with the Innkeepers Act were hung up in the inn.

Held, that the deposit so made was not a deposit "expressly for safe custody" within the Innkeepers Act, 1863, and that the defendant was not liable beyond the sum of £30.-O'CONNOR . GRAND INTERNATIONAL HOTEL Co., Q.B.D. (Ir.),

2. Liability for property of guest-Temporary refreshment. Where a person uses an inn, either temporarily or otherwise, for the purpose of receiving such refreshment or accommodation as the innkeeper offers, the relation of landlord and guest exists between the parties, so as to make the landlord liable for the loss of the guest's property

during his stay in the inn.-ORCHARD v. Bush, Q.B.D., 527.

INSURANCE:

1. Burglary and housebreaking-" Actual forcible and violent entry "-Entry by turning handle of door. A policy of insurance against loss of jewellery in the assured's shop by burglary and housebreaking defined these terms as "loss by theft following upon actual violent and forcible entry upon the premises." At 8 a.m., during the temporary absence of the porter in charge of the shop, an entry was effected by turning the handle of the door of the shop, which was shut, but neither bolted or locked, and jewellery was stolen.

Held, that the loss was covered by the policy.GEORGE AND GOLDSMITHS' INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, ARBITRATION, RE, Q.B.D., 557.

2. Life Proviso for cash payment of premium— Onus probandi-Duties of insurers' agent-Payment of premium by notes discounted and then dishonoured.

-Where a life policy contains provisions to the effect that it shall not be in force till the first premium is paid, and that if a note be taken for the first or renewal premium and not paid the policy is void at and from default, the onus is on the policy-holder to prove cash payment of the premium.

Where the insurers' agent accepts in payment of a premium a note which is not paid when due, there is no presumption that he was to raise money thereon as an agent for the insured and pay the premium out of the proceeds.

And where the insurers accept their agent's note in discharge of an account current between them in which the agent was debited with the amount of the premium, that affords no presumption of an intention to treat their own agent as agent for the insured, or the insurance as subsisting contrary to the terms of their contract with the policy-holder.

Acey v. Fernie, [1840] 7 M. & W. 151. approved. -LONDON AND LANCASHIRE LIFE ASSURANCE CO. v. FLEMING, P.C.

3. Life policy-Trust for wife and children-Mode of payment-Married Women's Property Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 93), s. 10-Married Women's Property Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 72), 88. 11, 22.Section 11 of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, does not apply to a policy effected by a husband in favour of his wife and children before the commencement of that Act, even though the husband dies after that Act has come into operation. The moneys payable under a policy effected under the Married Women's Property Act, 1870, should, therefore, be paid to a trustee appointed in accordance with section 10 of that Act, and not to the legal personal representatives of the husband.

In re Adams' Policy Trusts, 31 W. R. 810, 23 Ch. D. 525, followed.

In re Soutar's Policy Trusts, 32 W. R. 701, 26 Ch.D. 236, discussed.-TURNBULL v. TURNBULL, Ch. D. Stirling, J., 3.

4. Marine-Collison clause-Exemption of underwriters-Proviso-Construction.-A collision clause in a policy of insurance upon a ship stipulated that no liability was to attach to the underwriters in respect of " any sum which the assured may become liable to pay, or shall pay, for removal of obstructions under statutory powers, consequent

on such collision

Held, that the underwriters were exempt from liability, whether by way of damages or otherwise,

for the removal of obstructions consequent on collision.

The North Britain, 42 W. R. 243. [1894] P. 77, approved." ENGINEER," THE, H.L., 530.

5. Marine-Freight-Notice of abandonment— Personal negligence of the assured.-Where a ship carrying a cargo sustains sea damage to such an extent as would justify an abandonment to the underwriters on ship, and under such circumstances that the cargo could not possibly be carried on in any substituted ship, it is not necessary that notice of abandonment should be given to the underwriters on freight.

Rankin v. Potter, 22 W. R. 1, L. R. 6 H. L. 83, followed.

It is no defence to an action on a policy of marine insurance, claiming as for a loss by perils of the sea, that the loss was brought about by the personal (though not wilful) negligence of the assured in the navigation of the ship.-TRINDER, ANDERSON, & Co. v. THAMES INSURANCE Co., C.A., 561.

6. Marine-Mortgage of shares in ship—Policy on ship—Right of mortgagee to sue on policy-Mortgagor master of ship-Barratry of master. The plaintiff advanced a sum of money to a person who was about to purchase certain shares in a ship upon the terms that the latter should be appointed captain, and that the advance should be secured by a mortgage of the borrower's shares in the ship, and that an insurance should be effected on the ship to cover the plaintiff's interest as mortgagee. A policy on the ship was accordingly effected by the ship's husband " as well in their own names as for and in the name or names of all and every other person or persons to whom the same doth, may, or shall appertain in part or in all." The policy covered a loss by perils of the sea and by barratry of the master. The mortgagor was appointed captain, and the ship was lost through his barratrous act. In an action on the policy,

Held, that, as the plaintiff's interest in the ship was covered by the policy, he was entitled to recover, the causa proxima of the loss being a peril of the sea; and, further, that, if the mortgag r was appointed captain by the plaintiff as well as by the co-owners, the wrongful act of the captain was barratrous as against the plaintiff, and the latter could recover as for a lost by barratry.-SMALL v. UNITED KINGDOM MARINE INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, C.A., 24.

7. Marine-Policy-Perils to the hurt of ship— Damaged cargo-Liability of ship's underwriters.A ship was insured by her owners, the plaintiffs, under a time policy, and the perils insured against were, among others, "of the sea, and of all other perils, losses, and misfortunes that have or shall come to the hurt, detriment, or damage of the said ship or any part thereof."

The vessel was laden with cotton seed, and, while proceeding up the Thames, was run into and so damaged that she had to be run aground to save her from sinking in deep water. After having undergone some temporary repairs, she was floated and taken into dock, but her cargo was so damaged with mud and water that the cargo owners abandoned it, and neither they nor their underwriters would pay freight or take delivery. In dock the damaged cargo became a nuisance, and had to be discharged and got rid of by the plaintiffs, who sought to recover from the ship's underwriters the costs of so doing.

Held, that the expense so incurred by the

plaintiffs was not covered by the policy.-FIELD STEAMSHIP Co. v. BURR, Q.B.D., 490.

8. Marine-Policy on freight-Exception-Claim consequent on loss of time-Delay by peril of sea.—A time policy of marine insurance against total loss of freight of a ship contained the following exception: "Warranted free from any claim consequent on loss of time, whether arising from a peril of the sea or otherwise.”

While the ship was proceeding on a voyage under a charter her main shaft broke by perils of the sea, the damage being of such a character that the necessary delay for repairs frustrated the objects of the adventure, and the owners lost their chartered freight. In an action by the owners against the underwriters,

Held, that the claim was within the terms of the warranty, and therefore the underwriters were not liable.

Decision of the Court of Appeal (45 W. R. 114, [1897] 1 Q. B. 29) affirmed.—BENSAUDE v. THAMES AND MERSEY INSURANCE Co., H.L., 78.

9. Marine-Policy on freight-Loss by fire— Meaning of general words "all other losses and misfortunes.' -A portion of a cargo of coals, the freight on which was insured against loss by fire, and also against "all other perils, losses, and misfortunes that have or shall come to the hurt, detriment, or damage of the subject-matter of the aforesaid subject-matter of insurance, or any part thereof," having become heated during the course of the voyage, on which freight was insured, was discharged and sold at an intermediate port, where the master, having discovered the heating of the cargo, had put in for the general safety of the ship, freight, and cargo. None of the cargo had been on fire, and the portion sold fetched the price of sound coals, less the expenses of discharging and an allowance for damage by handling.

The shipowners claimed from the underwriters for a loss of their freight on the portion of cargo so discharged and sold; and it was agreed that the underwriters would not rely on the defence that the ship was unseaworthy, or the condition of the cargo improper.

Held, that the shipowners were entitled to recover the loss of freight claimed as a partial loss under the policy.-"KNIGHT OF ST. MICHAEL,” THE, P.D. & Ad.D., 396.

10. Marine-Repairs to ship in dock-Survey for Lloyd's classification-Apportionment of expenses between shipowners and underwriters.-A ship owned by the plaintiffs was placed in dry dock, for the purpose of repairs for which the defendants, as underwriters on the ship, were liable. The plaintiffs took advantage of the ship being in dock to have her surveyed for the purpose of retaining her class at Lloyd's, which they were entitled to have done at any time within twelve months of the date when the survey was due.

Held that the dock dues for the time when the survey was being done must be borne equally by the plaintiffs and the defendants.

Held, also, by Chitty and Collins, L.JJ. (A. L. Smith, L.J., dissenting), that the cost of getting the ship into and out of the dock must be borne equally by the plaintiffs and the defendants.

Marine Insurance Co. v. China Transpacific Steamship Co., 35 W. R. 169, 11 App. Cas. 573, followed. -RUABON STEAMSHIP Co. v. LONDON ASSURANCE, C.A., 417.

Insurance. 80

wrote a time policy on a steamer, containing a clause that if the steamer should come into collision with any other vessel, and the insured should have to pay damages, the insurers would pay.

The defendant underwrote a policy of re-insurance, on the same steamer, for the same period, subject to the same clauses and conditions as the original policy, and to pay as might be paid thereon, but only to pay all claims for loss or damage done or received through collision.

During the period covered the steamer struck a barge, which had just been sunk by collision with another vessel, and the steamer was damaged. The barge was raised next day, and sailed to her home port, and was repaired.

Held, that, although at the moment when the steamer struck her the barge could not have been navigated, yet, as she became navigable as soon as she was raised, there was a collision between two navigable vessels, in respect of which the plaintiff was entitled to recover on the policy of re-insurance.-CHANDLER v. BLOGG, Q.B.D.

12. Marine-Re-insurance-Cotton on deck-Damaged cotton-Concealment.-The plaintiffs, who had insured a cargo of damaged cotton, re-insured the same with the defendant, but did not inform him that it was damaged cotton.

The slip contained the terms, "cotton on deck, f. p. a. & c., including jettison and washing overboard." When the policy of re-insurance was tendered to the defendant for signature it differed from the slip, for, instead of the words "f. p. a. and c., &c.," it was "f. p. a., &c., as in original policy," and in that policy the risk was described as f. p. a., but including risk of jettison and washing overboard"; but he signed it without inquiry or objection. The quantity of cotton insured" on deck" amounted to £7,500.

Held, that the instructions being to insure such a quantity "on deck" clearly showed that it was damaged cotton, and that, under the circumstances, there was no concealment; also, that, although an attempt had been made to establish that the course of business was to say that cotton was damaged, no such course of business was established.BRITISH AND FOREIGN MARINE INSURANCE Co. v. STURGES, Q.B.D.

13. Marine Re-insurance-Lapse of original policies-New policy-Alteration of risk-Liability under policy of re-insurance.-The defendant reinsured certain risks with the plaintiffs. Of the two original policies covering these risks, one expired by effluxion of time and the second was cancelled, the defendant at the time that the policy was cancelled issuing a fresh policy to his assured, which, however, contained provisions differing somewhat from those in the two original policies. No notice of these changes was sent to the plaintiffs, who subsequently, in ignorance of these circumstances, paid the defendant as and for a total

loss.

Held, that the plaintiffs could not recover back from the defendant the money so paid. The defendant had paid under his policy for a total loss, and was entitled to recover from the plaintiffs under their re-insurance policy because at the time he re-insured with them, and at the time of the loss, he had an insurable interest in the subjectmatter of the insurance.

Held, also, that the difference in terms between the two policies merely affected the defendant's position with his assured, and gave no ground for the plaintiffs cancelling their liability under their

policy of re-insurance.-LOWER RHINE INSURANCE ASSOCIATION v. SEDGWICK, Q.B.D., 380.

14. Marine-Ship-Open cover-Re-insuranceContract for sea insurance-Policy-Sum or sums insured-Stamp Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict. c. 39), 8. 93.-A marine insurance company made a claim under an open cover of re-insurance subscribed by the defendant and other underwriters at Lloyd's on excesses over certain amounts upon certain risks taken by the plaintiffs. By the terms of the open cover £4,000 was specified as the limit of excess taken on any one ship, and £400 was specified as the defendant's proportion of this limit. The other underwriters' proportions were also specified, but beyond this there was no statement of the sum or sums insured.

Held, that this open cover was a contract for sea insurance within the meaning of section 93, subsection 1, of the Stamp Act, 1891; but that it was not valid as a policy, because it did not specify the sum or sums insured as required by sub-section 3.HOME MARINE INSURANCE Co. v. SMITH, C.A., -661.

15. Marine-Ship "sailing on or after a specified date."-In an action on a policy of marine insurance on goods in ships "sailing on or after the 1st of March," it appeared that the ship in question, having cleared the Custom House, finished loading her cargo about ten o'clock at night on the 29th of February, and was then ready to go to sea, but by a regulation of the port ships were not allowed to leave the port after dark. The master, however, with the object of keeping his crew on board so as to be ready to start early in the morning, moved away from the wharf about five hundred yards out into the river and there anchored. In so moving the ship he placed her in a slightly more advantageous position for starting than she would have been in had she remained at the wharf, but the gaining of such advantage was no part of the master's motive in moving her. On the following morning, the 1st of March, she proceeded on her voyage.

Held, that the ship "sailed" on the 1st of March, and not on the 29th of February, and that the policy attached.-SEA INSURANCE Co. v. BLOGG, C.A.

See also Practice, 12.

INTEREST.-See Mortgage, 5; Vendor and Purchaser, 7, 10, 14.

INTESTATES' ESTATES ACT.-See Probate, 4.

JUDGMENT.-See Bankruptcy, 9-11; Practice, 10, 14, 22-23A.

JUSTICES:

1. Conviction-Principal and accessory-" Cause" act of cruelty--Knowingly advise and counsel— Cruelty to Animals Act, 1849 (12 & 13 Vict. c. 92), 8. 2-Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 43), s. 5.-The effect of section 5 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848, is to enable the prosecution to proceed against a person who aids, abets, counsels, or procures the commission of an offence punishable on summary conviction as if he himself had committed the offence.

The owner of a horse which was lame consulted a veterinary surgeon as to whether the horse was in a fit condition to work. The veterinary surgeon advised that it was, and that the work would not cause it additional suffering. The owner worked the horse. The veterinary surgeon was summoned,

under section 2 of the Cruelty to Animals Act, 1849, for cruelly ill-treating the horse "by causing it to be worked while in an unfit state." The magistrate found that the defendant knew, when he advised the working of the horse, that to work it in its then state would be an act of cruelty, and, if the defendant had been proceeded against for counselling the act of cruelty, the magistrate would have convicted him, but, as he did not cause the act of cruelty, the summons was dismissed. On appeal,

66

Held, that the learned magistrate should have convicted, since, by section 5 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1848, anyone who counsels the commission of an offence punishable summarily may be proceeded against as a principal.-BENFIELD v. SIMMS, Q.B.D.

Bias

-

2. Disqualification- Pecuniary interest Membership of the Incorporated Law Society-Proceedings against an unqualified person for acting as a solicitor. On a prosecution by the Incorporated Law Society under section 12 of the Solicitors Act, 1874, against a person for pretending to be a solicitor, one of the justices before whom the case was heard was both a practising solicitor and an ordinary member of the prosecuting society, but not one of the council of that society. The solicitor for the accused was aware the magistrate in question was a solicitor, but he did not raise any objection. He was not, however, aware that the magistrate was a member of the society. The evidence showed that the whole responsibility for prosecutions rested solely with the council of the Law Society.

Held, on a rule for a certiorari to quash, that the justice was not disqualified from adjudicating by reason of the fact that he was a mere ordinary member of the Incorporated Law Society; that he was not affected by bias or pecuniary interest; and that he was not the prosecutor.-REG. v. BURTON, YOUNG, EX PARTE, Q.B.D., 127.

3. Disqualification-Solicitor-Clerk to magistrates -Ex officio justice-Justices' Qualification Act, 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 18), ss. 1, 2-Local Government Act, 1894 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 73), s. 22.-D., a solicitor, had acted as clerk to the magistrates of the Ringwood Division of the county of Southampton for many years, and recently became ex officio a justice of that division by virtue of being elected chairman of the district council. He tendered his resignation of the office of clerk to the magistrates, but no steps were taken to accept it, and he continued to draw the salary attached to the office aud to perform the duties connected therewith as before by means of a deputy.

W. was tried and convicted of an assault upon a woman before D. and six other justices, and he applied for a certiorari to bring up the conviction to be quashed.

Held, that the conviction must stand, as D. could lawfully adjudicate upon the case, because he had ceased in fact to be a practising solicitor at the time of the conviction, and by his accepting the office of chairman to the district council his former office of clerk to the justices had been vacated, since the two offices were incompatible.

Reg. v. Mayor, &c., of Bangor, 35 W. R. 158, 18 Q. B. D. 349, followed.-REG. v. DOUGLAS, Q.B.D., 377.

4. Jurisdiction - Right to be tried by jury · Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. c. 49), s. 17, sub-section 2.-Where a person appears before a court of summary jurisdiction, charged with an

offence to which section 17 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, applies, the court ought, in pursuance of sub-section 2, to inform him of his right to be tried by a jury before he pleads to the charge. If he be not informed of that right and, after the charge has been gone into, pleads guilty, the conviction is bad.

Semble: It is immaterial whether or not he knew of his right to be tried by a jury, and immaterial whether or not the court knew, before the proceedings commenced, that he meant to plead guilty in the course of the case.-REG. v. COCKSHOTT, Q.B.D.

5. Licensing law-Appeal-Transfer of licenceCertiorari-Mandamus--Alehouse Act, 1828 (9 Geo. 4, c. 61), ss. 4. 14.-By section 4 of 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, it is provided that at special transfer sessions "it shall be lawful for the justices there and then assembled, in the case and in the manner and for the time hereinafter directed, to licence such persons intending to keep inns theretofore kept by other persons being about to remove from such inns, as they, the said justices, shall . . . deem fit and proper persons."

A. for ten years had obtained an annual certificate for a licence to sell beer on certain premises. These premises, however, had been kept as a draper's shop during that time, and not as an inn, and A. had never sold beer therein, nor had he during that time been in occupation thereof. He applied at transfer sessions for a grant by way of transfer to B. of the licence or certificate. The justices granted the application.

Held, (1) following Reg. v. Sharman, ante, p. 367, that a certiorari would not lie; (2) that the justices had not heard and determined the matter according to law, and that a mandamus ought to be granted against them. They had not merely misconstrued the statute, but had taken into consideration matters outside the ambit of their jurisdiction.-REG. v. CƆTHAM, Q.B.D., 512.

6. Licensing law-Appeal against refusal to transfer-Notice of appeal served on justices-Order by court of quarter sessions on justices to pay appellant's costs-Certiorari-Alehouse Act, 1828 (9 Geo. 4, c. 61), 88. 27, 29.-D. appealed to quarter sessions against a refusal of the licensing justices to transfer a licence. At the hearing of the appeal the justices appeared by counsel to inform the court of the reasons on which had acted; but the quarter sessions allowed the appeal and made an order directing that the justices should pay all the costs that the appellant had incurred.

Held, that so much of the order as directed the justices to pay costs was ultra vires, as the quarter sessions had no jurisdiction under sections 27 and 29 of the Alehouse Act, 1828, to make such an order.-REG. v. LONDON (STRAND DIVISION) JusTICES, Q.B.D., 558.

7. Licensing law Excess of jurisdiction Certiorari Mandamus. At a general annual licensing meeting an application was made for a licence to sell intoxicating liquors. The justices granted the licence upon the applicant paying to them a sum of money, which money they intended to apply in reduction of the rates of the borough, or for some other similar public purpose. Certain persons, who had appeared before the justices in opposition to the application, then obtained a rule for a certiorari to bring up the licence to be quashed, and also a rule for a mandamus to hear and determine the application for a licence according to law.

Held, that the rule for a mandamus must be made absolute, on the ground that the objectors had a right to be heard before the licensing justices according to law, that the justices in annexing to the grant of the licence the condition of the payment of money showed that they had allowed their decision to be influence by extraneous considerations, and that the hearing under such circumstances was equivalent to no hearing at all; but that the rule for a certiorari must, on the authority of Reg. v. Sharman, ante, p. 367, [1898] 1 Q. B. 578, be discharged on the ground that the grant by licensing justices of a licence to sell intoxicating liquor is not a judicial order.-REG. v. BOWMAN, Q.B.D.

8. Licensing law-New licence--Certiorari to quash -Objections by one of the public-Refusal of justices to hear statements of fact except upon oath-Mandamus -Discretion of justices-Practice.—At a meeting of the licensing justices D. desired to make statements of fact in opposition to the granting of a licence for new premises.

The justices decided that they would not hear him unless he was sworn as the other witnesses who had given their evidence had been.

D., after the provisional licence had been confirmed, obtained à rule for a certiorari to bring up the provisional licence to be quashed, but as it appeared doubtful if that was the proper remedy, a rule for a mandamus was also obtained.

Held, discharging both rules, that as the granting of a licence was not a judicial order, the remedy by certiorari was inapplicable; and, as to the mandamus, that it was in the discretion of the justices to impose, if they thought fit, the obligation of au oath, and that in the exercise of their discretion they had jurisdiction to refuse to hear the objector unless he was sworn.-REG. v. SHARMAN, Q.B.D., 367.

9. Licensing Law-Renewal-Refusal-AppealAppearance of licensing justices-Costs-Jurisdiction --Alehouse Act, 1828 (9 Geo. 4, c. 61), ss. 27, 29.Where on an appeal to quarter sessions against the refusal of the licensing justices to renew a licence. the justices appeared and opposed the appeal, the quarter sessions have no jurisdiction under section 27 of the Alehouse Act, 1828, to order the justices to pay costs to the appellant in the event of the appeal being allowed.-REG. v. STAFFORDSHIRE JUSTICES, Q.B.D.

10. Licensing law-Renewal-Refusal to renes— Appeal to quarter sessions-Costs-Non-appearance objector—Jurisdiction to give costs against objector — Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vid. r. 49), 88. 31, 50-Alehouse Act, 1828 (9 Geo. 4. c 61. 8. 27-Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1884 (47 & £ Vict. c. 43), 8. 7-Interpretation Act, 1889 (52 & 5) Vict. c. 63), s. 13.-Justices at a licensing meeting are not a court of summary jurisdiction, ani therefore section 31 of the Summary Jurisdicti Act, 1879, does not apply to an appeal from them to quarter sessions; that court has no jurisdiction to order an objector to the renewal of a licence t pay the costs of the appeal.

Decision of the Court of Appeal, 45 W. E. 4 [1896] 2 Q. B. 306, reversed.

Reg. v. Justices of Glamorganshire, 40 W. R. 43 [1892] 1 Q. B. 621, overruled.-BOULTER v. KENT JUSTICES, H.L., 114.

11. Married woman-Duty of clerk to justionSummary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act, 186 (58 & 59 Vict. c. 39), 88. 4, 5, 11.—On an applicati by a married woman for an order for judicia