Gambar halaman
PDF
ePub

HIGH COURT.

FIELD STEAMSHIP CO. (LIMITED) v. Burr.

visions of the Act in respect of these comparatively defenceless persons.

It appears to me on the evidence before us that the conclusion of the magistrates was not justified. They found that there was no evidence of employment by the respondents in contravention of the Factory and Workshop Act, 1878. It is not necessary that they should find an employment by the respondents.

Case remitted to the justices to convict.
Solicitor for the appellant, Treasury Solicitor.
Solicitors for the respondent, Learoyd & Co.

Q. B. Div. (Commercial Court.) (Bigham, J.).

[ocr errors]

March 15, 16, 22.

FIELD STEAMSHIP Co. (LIMITED) v. BURR. (a.) Insurance-Marine-Policy-Perils to the hurt of ship — Damaged cargo-Liability of ship's underwriters. A ship was insured by her owners, the plaintiffs, under a time policy, and the perils insured against were, among others," of the sea, and of all other perils, losses, and misfortunes that have or shall come to the hurt, detriment, or damage of the said ship or any part thereof."

The vessel was laden with cotton seed, and, while proceeding up the Thames, was run into and so damaged that she had to be run aground to save her from sinking in deep water. After having undergone some temporary repairs, she was floated and taken into dock, but her cargo was so damaged with mud and water that the cargo owners abandoned it, and neither they nor their underwriters would pay freight or take delivery. In dock the damaged cargo became a nuisance, and had to be discharged and got rid of by the plaintiffs, who sought to recover from the ship's underwriters the costs of so doing.

Held, that the expense so incurred by the plaintiffs was not covered by the policy.

Commercial cause.

This was an action brought by the owners of the steamship Elmfield, to recover a partial loss under a time policy of marine insurance upon that vessel in the circumstances that are fully stated in the judgment.

The short point was whether the ship's underwriters are liable under a policy in ordinary form to pay expenses incurred by the shipowner in discharging and disposing of her cargo, which had been so aged in a a collision that it became worthless and was rejected by the cargo owner.

HIGH COURT.

During the currency of the policy the vessel was carrying a cargo of cotton seed on a voyage from Alexandria to London under a charter-party made by the plaintiffs with Messrs. Barnett Bros., acting for the charterers. On the 20th of December, 1896, she arrived in the Thames, when a vessel called The Derwent came into collision with her, and caused such serious damage to her hull below the waterline that it became necessary to run her ashore in order to prevent her from sinking in deep water. During the next ten days part of her cargo was put into lighters, and by this means she was sufficiently lightened to enable her to be towed to the Tilbury Dry Dock, where she was temporarily patched. On the 5th of January, 1897, she was towed to Millwall Dock, where it was intended that the remainder of her cargo should be discharged. It was proved, however, that, by the action of the water and mud which had found their way into the ship in consequence of the casualty, the cargo had become rotten of the Public Health (London) Act, 1891, ordered and offensive, and was a nuisance, and thereupon the sanitary authorities, acting under the powers the ship to abate the nuisance and to remove the cotton seed. In the meantime the owners of the and neither the cargo owners nor their underwriters cargo had abandoned the cargo to their underwriters, would pay freight or take delivery, alleging, as the and had become worthless. The cargo owners and fact was, that the cargo had ceased to be cotton seed their underwriters were justified in taking up this position: see Asfar v. Blundell, 44 W. R. 130. In these circumstances the plaintiffs made a contract with a firm of Samuel Williams & Sons, who are the owners of a pier at Dagenham, near the mouth of the river, to discharge the cargo and to spread it out on some land at a short distance from the pier at a charge of 58. per ton, and so to get rid of it. The ship accordingly left the Millwall Dock for Dagenham Pier, and was there discharged by Messrs. Samuel Williams & Sons. The claim against the defendant and his co-underwriters on the hull was a very large one, amounting to many thousands of pounds, but all disputes in connection with it have been settled between the parties, except as to items amounting in the aggregate to £1,046 12s. 10d. These items may be divided into two classes-(1) the charges incurred in dealing with the cargo between the date of the casualty and its arrival at Dagenham, amounting to £287 2s. 10d.; and (2) the charges of Messrs. Williams & Sons amounting to £759 10s. for discharging and disposing of the cargo at Dagenham. The question is whether the defendant and his co-underwriters are under any liability to recoup the plaintiffs any, and if so what, part of this expenditure. The matter in the first instance passed into the hands of Messrs. Robert Lindley, Sons, &

Joseph Walton, Q.C., and Lewis Noad, for the Davison, a firm of average adjusters of great explaintiff company.

Carver, Q.C., and Scrutton, for the defendant. At the conclusion of the argument judgment was reserved.

was

BIGHAM, J., read the following judgment: This was an action brought to recover a partial loss alleged to be due by the defendant under a time policy on the plaintiffs' ship Elmfield. The policy on hull and materials, on machinery and boilers," valued at £10,000, and the perils insured against were, amongst others, "of the seas and of all other perils, losses, and misfortunes that have or shall come to the hurt, detriment, or damage of the said ship, &c., or any part thereof." (a.) Reported by ERSKINE REID, Esq., Barrister

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

at-Law.

perience, who were of opinion that the charges in question ought not to fall on the underwriters on ship, but ought to be paid by the Indemnity Club, in which the plaintiffs' ship was entered. After some correspondence they appear, however, to have modified their view, and to have suggested that perhaps the underwriters on ship should be held liable for what the average adjusters called the "bare cost of removing the damaged cargo from the ship." This suggestion did not satisfy either the Indemnity Club or the underwriters on ship, and thereupon this action was brought in the name of the shipowners to get the dispute settled.

Mr Joseph Walton, who represented the plaintiffs, contended that the expenditure in question was recoverable as having been caused by perils which had come to the hurt, detriment, or damage of the ship within the meaning of the policy. He

HIGH COURT.

FIELD STEAMSHIP Co. (LIMITED) v. BURR.—IN RE LAURIE.

admitted that, as between the shipowner and the
cargo owner, it would have been the duty of
the former, had the cargo arrived as cotton seed,
to put it out of the ship, and to have borne the
cost of doing so; but he said that when, as in this
case, that duty did not arise, by reason of the cargo
owner being relieved from the correlative duty
of receiving the cargo-the ship in the circumstances
of this case having become injured or damaged by
the presence of a large mass of useless matter
due to the incursion of the water and its action on the
cargo that then the cost of dealing with it and
disposing of it in accordance with the law was as
much part of his client's loss by the perils insured
against as the cost of repairing the hole in the ship's
bottom. He further suggested that the repairs to
the bottom of the ship could not be executed until
the cargo was put out, and that therefore he was
entitled to the cost of discharging the cargo; and
finally he said that, in any event, he was entitled to
the difference, which he alleged was considerable,
between what it would have cost to discharge cotton
seed and the actual cost of discharging the putrid
mass in the ship. His argument went so far as to
suggest that, even if the structure of the ship had not
been injured at all, his clients would have been
entitled to recover; as, for instance, if the sea-water
had got to the cargo through the hatches, and bad
brought about consequences similar to those which
had in fact happened in this case. I think his con-
tentions were not well founded. There are cases in
which the underwriters on a policy such as this may
be liable, although the vessel suffers no physical
injury, as, for instance, where part of the cargo
is jettisoned, and it becomes necessary to make
good the loss in general average, or, perhaps,
where money has been spent under the suing
and labouring clauses. But these are cases which
depend upon different considerations. I think that,
where the insurance is upon the hull, materials,
and machinery of & ship, it is essential
before any claim at all can be made against the
underwriters, either that the shipowner should be
deprived of his ship, or of the use of her, or that
physical damage should happen to it by the direct
action of one of the perils insured against. It is not
enough for the shipowner to say, "The perils of the
sea have caused loss to me.' ""
He must go further,

and show that they have caused the loss of, or damage
to, his ship. Take an instance: The perils of the
sea, storms and adverse winds, may delay a ship on
her voyage, causing her to occupy twice the time she
otherwise would do. This is a grievous loss to the
shipowner, but it is clear he gets no compensation
from his underwriter, either for the cost of keeping |
the ship during the delay or for the extra wear and
tear she undergoes; and the reason is because the
underwriter only promises to indemnify him against
loss or damage to the thing insured which may hap-
pen from the perils included in the policy, amongst
which are not those ordinary incidents of a voyage
which a ship must encounter when she sails the ocean.
Neither the wages, nor the provisions, nor the
damages arising from the long user of the ship, form
any part of the thing insured; and I think the cases
show, and I am
satisfied that the practice
in business points the same way, that, even
when the ship suffers actual physical damage from
the perils insured against, the underwriter's liability
is to be limited to what may reasonably be regarded
as the cost of making good the particular damage in
question. Consequential damage which the ship-
owner may suffer the underwriter is not responsible
for. [His lordship referred to the cases of Robertson
v. Ewer, 1 T. R. [1786] 127; and De Vaux v. Salvador,

HIGH COURT.

4 A. & E. 420, as being in point, and also to Park on Marine Insurance, 8th ed., p. 115; Arnold, 6th ed., pp. 727-730, 800; and Benecke, p. 462.] Now, applying the law as laid down in those authorities to the present case, I come to the conclusion that the cost of dealing with and unloading and disposing of the cargo, or, as Mr. Joseph Walton calls it, the filthy mass into which the cargo had been changed, is not a loss which has happened to the thing insured by any of the perils insured against. Sea perils or no sea perils, the shipowner has to empty his ship if he ever intends to use her again, and therefore the cost of doing it cannot be said to be rendered necessary by reason of the perils insured against; it has to be incurred any way, and the fact that in the one case the shipowner would, by discharging the cargo, become entitled to his freight, whereas in the other case he cannot get his freight, seems to me not to concern the underwriters on ship at all; and if he is not entitled to the cost of discharging it follows a fortiori that he is not entitled to the cost of dealing with or disposing of the cargo. As to the contention that the plaintiffs are entitled to be paid the difference between what would be the cost of discharging the cotton seed and the actual cost of discharging the material which was in the ship, I think that also is too remote. It constantly happens that cargo arrives so damaged by sea-water as to make it more difficult and expensive to handle in the discharge than it otherwise would be. But who has ever heard of a claim against the underwriter on hull for such a loss as that? The claims are, in my opinion, too remote and cannot fairly be regarded as forming part of the cost of repairs. I find, as a fact, that the plaintiffs have been fully paid by the underwriters for all that can properly be called the cost of repairing. They have, as it seems to me, incurred further consequential loss, but it is a loss for which the defendant is not in any way liable.

Judgment for the defendant with costs.

Solicitors for the plaintiffs, W. A. Crump & Son. Solicitors for the defendant, Walton, Johnson, Bubb, & Whatton.

Q. B. Div.
(Wright, J.))

IN BANKRUPTCY.

March 14.

In re LAURIE. Ex parte GREEN. (a.) Bankruptcy-Fraudulent preference-Onus of proof— Bankruptcy Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52), s. 48. When a trustee in bankruptcy impeaches a payment made by the bankrupt as a fraudulent preference, the onus of proof of intention to prefer lies upon the trustee throughout the case, and it is not for the respondent to prove absence of intention to prefer after the trustee has proved that the bankrupt knew he was insolvent at the time when he made the payment impeached.

Dictum of Vaughan Williams, J., in In re Eaton, Ex parte Viney, [1897] 2 Q. B. 16, 45 W. R. Dig. 12, dissented from.

Motion by the trustee to declare a payment made by the bankrupt to his wife, within three months of the presentation of the petition against him, void as a fraudulent preference.

Archibald Read (Muir Mackenzie with him), having (a.) Reported by P. M. FRANCKE, Esq., Barristerat-Law.

[merged small][ocr errors][merged small]

proved that the bankrupt knew he was insolvent at the date when he made the payment impeached, submitted that the onus was now upon the respondent to prove that the bankrupt had no intention to make a preference. He cited In re Eaton, Ex parte Viney, [1897] 2 Q. B. 16, 45 W. R. Dig. 12.

WRIGHT, J.-The opinion of Vaughan Williams, J., in that case is an isolated dictum, and not one upon which I can act in the face of the judgment of Cotton, L.J., in Ex parte Lancaster, In re Marden, 32 W. R. 483, 25 Ch. D. 311. There the question was whether a judgment which the debtor had allowed his father-in-law to sign against him was a fraudulent preference, and Cotton, L.J., in giving judgment, says: "In order to show that the judgment was suffered with the view of giving the father-in-law a preference, it is not sufficient to show only that the debtor did not enter an appearance, and that he in that sense suffered the judgment, but it must be shown that he abstained from entering an appearance with the view of giving his father-in-law a preferThis being a matter which it is for the appellant to make out-not, of course, conclusively, but so as to satisfy us-in my opinion he has failed to discharge the onus, and the appeal must be dismissed."

ence.

The motion then proceeded and was allowed on the

merits.

Solicitors for the trustee, Plunkett & Leader.
The respondent appeared in person.

Prob. Div. & Adm. Div.

Admiralty.

Jan. 24.

"THE SERVIA" AND "THE CARINTHIA." (a.) Ship-Pilotage-Recovery of agreed remuneration for services not contemplated by statute under which pilots appointed-Mersey Docks Acts Consolidation Act, 1858 (21 & 22 Vict. c. xcii.).

[ocr errors]
[blocks in formation]

for the port of Liverpool, and Richard John Gore and
Robert James Durrant, first-class pilots of the port
of Liverpool, against the Cunard Steamship Co.
(Limited), to recover the sum of £2 as extra pilotage
remuneration due to the plaintiff Gore for removing
the defendants' steamship Servia, at the request of
her master, on the 10th of August, 1897, from the
Canada Dock, Liverpool, into the river Mersey to an
anchorage off the Prince's landing-stage, and from
her anchorage alongside the Prince's landing-stage
for the purpose of embarking her passengers and
their baggage before proceeding outwards on her
voyage to America: And the sum of £2 extra pilotage
remuneration due to the plaintiff Durrant for piloting
the defendants' steamship The Carinthia on her
arrival in the Mersey on the 21st of August, 1897, at
the request of her master, alongside the Wallasey
stage to discharge the sheep she had brought from
America, and from the Wallasey stage to the Wood-
side stage to discharge her cattle; the said sums of
£2 and £2 having been fixed by the Mersey Docks
and Harbour Board as the extra remuneration for the
respective services above mentioned. In the alterna-
tive the plaintiffs Gore and Durrant claimed the
several sums of £2 as reasonable remuneration for
the said extra services.

The defendants appeared to defend the suit, and pleaded that the plaintiff Gore had already been paid the pilotage rates fixed by law for piloting The Servia outwards out of the port of Liverpool, and the plaintiff Durrant the pilotage rate fixed by law for the pilotage of The Servia inwards into the port of Liverpool; that no services other than those for which the rates so paid had been paid, had been rendered by the plaintiffs respectively, and they never became entitled to the alleged or any extra remuneration; that the whole of the pilotage and the employment of the plaintiffs were compulsory by law upon the defendants, and that the removing The Servia to the Prince's landing - stage, and The Carinthia to the Wallasey and Woodside stages, were parts of the compulsory pilotage services for which the plaintiffs had been paid, and that the plaintiffs, There is nothing in the Mersey Docks Acts Consolida-fixed, and had no power or authority to fix, the said the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, had not duly tion Act, 1858-the existing Act regulating pilotage in the respective amounts of £2 and £2 or any extra River Mersey-rendering it obligatory on a shipmaster to employ a pilot to pilot his ship when she is being navigated in the port of Liverpool when not outward or inward bound; but the pilots licensed by the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board may agree with shipmasters to perform for them within the port of Liverpool extra services in the nature of pilotage services which they are not bound to perform under the provisions of the above-mentioned Act. Among such extra services for which by agreement the pilots may so become entitled to be paid are the following: Navigating a ship from an anchorage in the River Mersey to and alongside a landing-stage for the purpose of embarking passengers, mails, or cargo to be carried by her on her intended voyage outwards. Navigating a ship, after she had been brought as far up the River Mersey as the dock where it was intended she should unload her cargo, to and alongside landing-stages farther up the river for the purposes of discharging

cattle.

Observations as to whether, in case of a collision occurring to a ship at a time when the pilot was performing these extra services, the shipowners would be liable for damage occasioned by his sole fault or default. This was an action of pilotage instituted on behalf of the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, suing as the receivers and collectors of pilotage rates and earnings

(a.) Reported by C. F. JEMMETT, Esq., Barristerat-Law.

remuneration.

Dec. 14, 15.-On these days the action was heard before Barnes, J. The plaintiff Durrant and another Liverpool pilot were examined orally in court in support of the statement of claim. The result of their evidence is stated in the judgment.

Joseph Walton, Q.C., and Carver, Q.C., for the plaintiffs.-The amounts claimed by the plaintiffs are either due to them as payments for voluntary pilotage bour Board under one of their bye-laws (bye-law 18), services legally fixed by the Mersey Docks and Haror as reasonable amounts agreed on between the masters and the pilots as proper for the extra services rendered. The real question is what pilotage services must be performed by the pilots for the compulsory rates and other charges fixed by the Mersey Docks Consolidation Act of 1858? The pilotage rates there fixed for outwards pilotage (section 139) only comprises piloting a vessel "ready to proceed to sea" pilotage rate for outward pilotage paid in the case of out of the port of Liverpool, and therefore the The Servia did not include the services rendered to her in taking her to the landing-stage to embark her passengers. Until they were on board she was not

[ocr errors]

ready to proceed to sea." [As to the meaning of "proceeding to sea," they referred to The City of Cambridge, 22 W. R. 578, L. R. 5 P. C. 451; The Cachapool, 7 P. D. 217, 30 W. R. Dig. 190; Rodrigues

[merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small]

v. Melhuish, 2 W. R. 518, 10 Exch. 117; The Cockrane v. Fisher, 2 Cr. & M. 581; Phillips on Insurance, 8. 772.] So, too, the compulsory pilotage rate, fixed by the Act of 1858, to be paid in the case of vessels bound "inwards" (section 128), only includes the piloting of vessels over the bar from sea into one of the wet docks in the port of Liverpool (The Annapolis, Lush 295, 9 W. R. Adm. Dig. 19; The Princeton, 3 P. D. 90, 26 W. R. Dig. 217; The Woburn Abbey, 38 L. J. Adm. 28, 17 W. R. Adm. Dig. 20), and extra remuneration would have to be paid for taking a vessel elsewhere than to dock. The section of the Act of 1858 under which, in certain cases, five shillings a day is payable for attendance of pilots on the river (section 138), has reference merely to a charge by the pilots when attending on board a vessel at anchor waiting to go into dock or to sea. "Attendance " does not mean "pilotage."

[ocr errors]

Boyd, Q.C., and Maurice Hill, for the defendants. -All the services in respect of which the plaintiffs claim in this action have been paid for by the defendants in the pilotage dues charged in respect of the pilotage of The Servia outwards, and The Carinthia inwards. The calling of The Servia at the Prince's landing-stage was only an incident in her proceeding to sea, and her pilot was bound to perform the duty of navigating her alongside that stage as part of the outward pilotage to sea. She was then just as much "proceeding to sea as if her passengers had been put on board her by means of a tender in the river on her way to sea, or as if she had then stopped to take cargo on board. As to The Carinthia, she was compelled by the regulations and practice as to discharging cattle and sheep to take them to the Woodside and Wallasey stages, and the service of piloting her in from sea to such stage and into dock was one continuous service for which the pilot in charge of her, has properly received the "inward " pilotage rate. Whilst being piloted to the landingstages she was still under compulsory pilotage and her owners would have escaped liability for any collision caused by the wrongful act of the pilot alone: The General Steam Navigation Co. v. The British and Colonial Steam Navigation Co., 17 W. R. 741, L. R. 4 Ex. 238; The Charlton, 73 L. T. Rep. 49.

Cur. adv. vult.

Jan. 24.-BARNES, J.-This is a test action brought to try the right of the Liverpool pilots to certain extra remuneration for piloting outward-bound steamers to the Prince's landing-stage for the purpose of embarking passengers, and for piloting inward-bound cattle steamers to the Wallasey and Woodside stages before taking them into dock. Pilotage is compulsory in the port of Liverpool for the vessels in question, and the point in the case is whether the alleged extra services are covered by the compulsory pilotage rates or are to be paid for in addition to such rates.

The pilotage of the port is regulated by the Mersey Docks Acts Consolidation Act, 1858 (21 & 22 Vict. c. xcii.), under which the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board is constituted the pilotage authority, with power to licence pilots. The Mersey Docks and Harbour Board is merely a formal party to these proceedings. The other plaintiffs are pilots licensed by the board. One of them, Mr. Gore, was in charge of the defendants' steamship Servia on her outward voyage in August last, and the other, Mr. Durrant, was in charge of the defendants' steamship Carinthia on her inward voyage in the same month.

The following facts are taken from the evidence given, and admissions made at the hearing before me. First, with regard to outward-bound passenger

[ocr errors]

HIGH COURT.

steamers. Prior to the year 1895 large passenger steamers sailing from the port of Liverpool for foreign ports, loaded their cargoes in one of the wet docks of the port, and embarked their passengers in the dock or from tenders after the steamers left dock, and whilst lying in the River Mersey; but in that year the approach to the Prince's landing-stage in the river was improved so as to enable steamers after leaving dock to come alongside the stage, and there embark their passengers, and at the same time a station was connected by a line of rails with the London and North-Western Railway system, and special trains have since that time conveyed passengers direct to the riverside station.

The practice of the defendants since 1895 with their steamers carrying passengers outwards is typical of that of most of the large lines with their outward-bound passenger steamers, though some lines do not use the stage. This practice, stated as accurately as the materials before me allow, is as follows: The defendants load their steamers in the Canada Dock, some distance below the Prince's landing-stage, and after a steamer's lading is completed she is generally taken out of dock on the high water preceding the afternoon of the day fixed for her departure, and, according to the state of the tide, then proceeds to an anchor, and thence to the Prince's landingstage, or direct to the stage. Sometimes on account of neap tides it is necessary for the vessel to leave the dock earlier and moor at the defendants' buoy in the Sloyne, further up river than the stage, before proceeding to the stage. The defendants are the only company possessing a mooring buoy in the lone. The vessel reaches the stage shortly before the hour fixed for her departure, usually about 4 p.m. She is assisted alongside by a tug or tugs, and after making fast to the stage she embarks her saloon passengers and their baggage, and the mails, and sometimes receives on board some fine goods. From the stage she proceeds to sea. The time occupied at the stage is sometimes as long as four hours, and on the average about two hours. The steerage passengers generally embark by tender while the vessel is in the river at anchor or at the buoy, but sometimes in dock if the vessel goes direct to the stage. About seven steamers per week belonging to different lines use the stage for the purpose of embarking their passengers, and about the same number use the stage for the purpose of disembarking passengers on their inward voyages. The case does not directly raise any question as to the pilot's remuneration for bringing inward-bound vessels to this stage, though I understand that this question is practically involved in that before the court as to outward-bound steamers.

It is always a difficult operation to bring these large steamers alongside the stage, owing to vessels going in and out of dock and the other traffic in the river, and especially on strong flood or ebb tides. The steamers must always leave dock at high water, but they come alongside the stage at all times of the tide.

In the particular case of The Servia she left the Canada Dock on the 10th of August last, on the morning tide, in charge of the plaintiff Gore, and anchored about abreast of the Prince's stage. Shortly before 4.30 p.m. ber anchor was weighed, and she was brought alongside the stage under Mr. Gore's charge. There she embarked her saloon passengers, their baggage, and the mails, and thence she proceeded to sea on the same evening, through the Queen's Channel, bound for New York. Mr. Gore piloted the vessel to the outward compulsory pilotage limit at the North-West Buoy. The defendants have paid the outward compulsory pilotage

HIGH COURT.

AND "THE CARINTHIA.”

"THE SERVIA "" rate for Mr. Gore's service, and contend that such payment covers his service for taking The Servia to the stage. On the other hand, the plaintiff Gore claims £1 for extra remuneration for the last-mentioned service. This sum has been fixed by the plaintiff board as a regular charge to be made by pilots for bringing vessels to the stage for the purpose of embarking and disembarking passengers, on the footing that their services in so doing are not covered by the compulsory pilotage rate. The charge has been paid in respect of all steamers using the stage in manner aforesaid in and since 1895. It is now disputed.

Secondly, with regard to inward-bound cattle steamers. For a number of years a very large trade has been carried on in the importation of live cattle and sheep into the port of Liverpool. The cattle and sheep are landed from the steamers by which they arrive at the Wallasey and Woodside landing-stages, on the Birkenhead side of the Mersey, under the provisions of the Diseases of Animals Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 57), and the orders made in pursuance thereof fixing these stages for the purpose. There are rules made by the plaintiff board for regulating the time, order, and manner for berthing vessels at the stages. These stages and a part of the Alfred Dock, Birkenhead, near the Wallasey stage, are the only places in the port where the landing of live stock imported from abroad is permitted. The practice of the defendants, which is similar to that of other lines with regard to cattle steamers, is as follows: A pilot is taken off the port, and when the steamer enters the river orders are sent off to her as to berthing at the stages or the Alfred Dock. If the tide suits, and there are no steamers in the way at the stages, the vessel proceeds direct to the stage. If the tide does not suit, or there is no available berth at the stage, the vessel is anchored. If the vessel has both sheep and cattle she generally goes both to Wallasey and Woodside stages, landing sheep at the one and cattle at the other, though sometimes both are discharged at the former stage. If she has only cattle she goes to the Woodside or Wallasey stage, or in some cases to the Alfred Dock, Birkenhead, where there is accommodation for both sheep and cattle. The arrangements depend on the room in the lairages. After landing the live stock, the vessel is taken direct into a dock if the tide serves, or to anchor, and then docked as soon as possible, and the rest of her cargo is discharged in dock.

About fourteen steamers per week belonging to different lines arrive with sheep and cattle. It is difficult to manoeuvre vessels alongside the stages owing both to the traffic and tide. The assistance of a tug or tugs is required. The vessels are made fast to the stages and it takes ordinarily an hour or an hour and a-half to land the cattle and one to three hours to land the sheep, though it was stated that longer times are occasionally taken, and that cattle ships had been three tides at the stages and finished in the Alfred Dock.

In the case of The Carinthia, she was inward bound with cattle, sheep, and other cargo from America, and about 8.30 p.m. on the 21st of August last the plaintiff Durrant boarded her off Point Lynas, took charge, brought her into the river, and about 2 a.m. on the 22nd she proceeded in the usual way, first to the Wallasey stage, where she discharged her sheep, and then to the Woodside stage, where the cattle were landed. At 5 a.m. she was taken to the Canada Dock entrance, but, owing to her draught, was not permitted to enter, and was therefore anchored and lightened. She did not get into dock till the evening tide of the 23rd. The plaintiff Durrant was in charge throughout.

HIGH COURT.

The defendants have paid the inward compulsory pilotage rate for Durrant's services, and 10s. for two days' detention while at anchor at 5s. per day. They contend that such payments cover all his services, but he claims £2 for extra remuneration for taking the vessel to and from the two stages; £1 for each stage is the regular charge fixed by the Board, in a similar way to that in the outward cases. This charge, which is now disputed, has been paid in respect of all cattle steamers using the stages since the user began, about fifteen years ago.

The questions raised turn upon the construction to be placed upon certain sections of the Mersey Docks Acts Consolidation Act, 1858, which render pilotage compulsory for outward and inward-bound vessels, excepting coasting vessels in ballast or under the burthen of one hundred tons. Section 121 gives power to the board to licence persons to act as pilots "for the port of Liverpool." Section 123 imposes a penalty upon any person who shall pilot any vessel "into or out of the port of Liverpool" without a licence. Section 124 imposes penalties on any pilot who shall refuse to take charge of any inwardbound vessel upon a proper signal being made for a pilot, or of any outward-bound vessel upon the request of the master thereof." The sections dealing more particularly with outward-bound vessels are the 127th, 133rd, and 139th sections. Section 127, which is under a title "as to the duties of pilots," specifies the distances to which outward-bound vessels are to be piloted, but makes no mention of the point at which the pilot is to take charge. This point would ordinarily be the dock in which a vessel loaded, because, except in these cases of embarking passengers, a vessel would usually proceed from the dock to sea as fast as tide and weather would permit. Section 133 gives power to the board to fix rates of pilotage to be paid to pilots for piloting vessels within certain limits. The rate for "piloting a vessel out of the port of Liverpool" is to be "not less than 33. and not more than 48. per foot" draught of water. Section 139 provides that "in case the master of any vessel being outward bound," except the said coasters, "shall proceed to sea, and shall refuse to take on board or to employ a pilot," he shall still pay the full pilotage rate.

The material sections which relate to inward-bound vessels, in addition to the 124th, are the 125th, the 128th, the 130th, and the 133rd sections. Section 125 imposes a penalty on any pilot refusing to conduct an inward-bound vessel. Section 128 defines the duties of the pilot in charge of an inward-bound vessel. It provides that "the pilot in charge of any inward-bound vessel shall cause the same (if need be) to be properly moored at anchor in the River Mersey, and shall pilot the same into some one of the wet docks within the port of Liverpool, whether belonging to the board or not, without making any additional charge for so doing, unless his attendance shall be required on board such vessel while at anchor in the River Mersey and before going into dock, in which case he shall be entitled to receive 5s. per day for such attendance." There is nothing in any other section expressly extending those limited duties or preventing a pilot from making a charge for services performed beyond the limit, nor, on the other hand, imposing on the owners or masters of vessels any obligation to employ pilots to perform services other than the limited services specified in this section. Section 130 provides that in case the master" of any inward-bound vessel (except the said coasters) shall refuse to take on board or to employ a pilot, such pilot having offered his services for that purpose," he shall pay full pilotage rates as if the vessel had been piloted "into the port of Liverpool."

« SebelumnyaLanjutkan »