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[b] (Iowa Sup. 1880) In a prosecution for larceny in converting to his own use property which defendant had found, statements made by the loser in the presence of defendant to the sheriff, respecting the fact of the loss, and not contradicted by defendant, were relied on to establish the fact of loss and corpus delicti required by Code 1873, 84427, to support a confession in open court by defendant. Held, that such uncontradicted statements amounted merely to confessions on the part of defendant, and were incompetent for the purpose offered.-State v. Dubois, 6 N. W. 578, 54 Iowa, 363.
[c] (Tex. Cr. App. 1898) An accused's confession can be considered with other testimony, to establish the corpus delicti.—Tidwell v. State, 47 S. W. 466, 40 Tex. Cr. R. 38, rehearing denied 48 S. W. 184, 40 Tex. Cr. R. 38.
IV. SUFFICIENCY OF PROOF. 1. In General.
[a] (Ala. Sup. 1893) On a trial for hog theft, prosecutor testified that he lost a black sow weighing from 50 to 70 pounds. Another witness testified that at the time of the loss he found defendant with a freshly-cleaned sow which would weigh about 50 pounds; that, judging from the hair left on her, it was black; that defendant told him he had gotten the sow from one R.; that it had gotten out of the pen, and that he had killed it; that defendant's daughter came up, and said she did not know he had a hog. Held sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti to warrant the admission of defendant's confession.-Ryan v. State, 14 South. 868, 100 Ala. 94.
[b] (Cal. Sup. 1896) On a trial for burglary the prosecuting witness testified that he lived in a certain house; that he had there certain articles of personal property; that a part of said articles were in the house at 6 o'clock p. m. December 18, 1895; that about 9 o'clock p. m. of the same day A. and H., who were police officers, came to witness' house, having defendant with them, and also the said articles of personal property belonging to witness. The officers testified that between 8 and 9 o'clock p. m. of the same day they saw defendant some distance away from the house of the prosecuting witness, having with him a tin box containing opium dope. and other articles identified by the prosecuting witness. Held, that the testimony was sufficient to prove the corpus delicti, and hence to justify the admission of statements made by defendant to the officers.--People v. Harris, 46 Pac. 602, 114 Cal. 575.
[c] (Cal. Sup. 1898) On a trial for arson, to prove the corpus delicti, and to corroborate confessions of accused that on a certain night he and another drove a buggy to the front fence, and his companion got out and burned the house, barn, granary, and chicken house, there was evidence that the fire occurred about that night, and that the buildings were 60 to 150 feet apart. There was no definite description of the buildings, and no estimate of their value; nor could their relative locations be gathered from the evidence. One witness testified that he saw where a buggy had been bitched near the roadside, and saw the tracks of two men leading from there to the house, and back. Held to be sufficient to justify admission of confessions.-People v. Jones, 55 Pac. 698, 123 Cal. 65.
[a] (Ga. Sup. 1992) A conviction of arson was warranted where, in addition to defendant's confession that he had been "given away," there was direct evidence of the burning, and circumstantial evidence from which the jury could rightly infer that the fire was not accidental, but felonious, the corpus delicti being thus establishing independently of the confession. -Westbrook v. State, 16 S. E. 100, 91 Ga. 11.
[e, f] (Iowa Sup. 1878) A confession by one charged with forgery that he wrote the name on the note, but not mentioning with what intent, held not to be sufficient to authorize a conviction without other proof that the crime was in fact committed by some one.-State y. Knowles, 48 Iowa, 598.
[g] (Ky. App. 1889) Cr. Code, Š 240, provides that a “confession of a defendant, unless made in open court, will not warrant a conviction, unless accompanied with other proof that such an offense was committed.” Defendant confessed out of court to having stolen a horse, and stated where it might be found. Held, that evidence that the owner had been deprived of his property, together with the confession and the finding of the horse at the place designated, authorized a conviction.-Greenwade v. Com., 12 S. W. 131.
[h] (Miss. Sup. 1882) Defendant, when arrested on suspicion of stealing a pocketbook that the owner had lost, threw away the missing article, which was immediately identified by the owner in defendant's presence, no denial being made by the latter, and its contents were found where he said he had put them. Held sufficient to establish the corpus delicti, and warrant conviction on confession subsequently made.-Heard v. State, 59 Miss. 545.
[i] (Mo. Sup. 1859) An extrajudicial confession, with extrinsic circumstantial evidence satisfying the minds of a jury beyond reasonable doubt that the crime has been committed, will warrant a capital conviction, although the dead body has not been discovered and seen so that its existence and identity can be testified to by an eyewitness.-State v. Lamb, 28 Mo. 218.
[j] (N. Y. App. 1888) The finding of the dead body of a person murdered, with the unmistakable marks of a murder committed, is sufficient additional proof to warrant the conviction of a defendant on his own confession, under Code Cr. Proc. $ 395, providing that the confession of a defendant shall not be sufficient to warrant his conviction "without additional proof that the crime charged has been committed.”—People v. Deacons, 16 N. E. 676, 109 N. Y. 374.
[k] (Ohio Cir. Ct. 1890) Upon the trial of an indictment for murder in an attempt to commit rape, wherein the confession of the accused was introduced in evidence, corroborative evidence need be directed only to the fact of murder, without regard to the attempt at rape, that being the only corpus delicti of the case.-State v. Leuth, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 91.
 (Ohio Cir. Ct. 1890) A confession before a coroner is not a judicial confession, dispensing with other proof of a corpus delicti, but must be sustained by corroborative evidence, which, however, need not be such as would be required for a conviction of the accused independent of the confession.-State v. Leuth, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 94.
[m] (R. I. Sup. 1899) Where there was evidence, both direct and circumstantial, strongly tending to prove that the crime in question was committed, and that defendant was the person who committed it, there is sufficient proof of the corpus delicti to allow the admission of his confession in evidence, tending to prove both the fact of the crime and the defendant's agency therein.-State v. Jacobs, 43 Atl. 31, 21 R. I. 259.
[n] (Tex. Cr. App. 1899) Defendant's confession that he shot deceased through a window while he was dancing in a ballroom is sufficient to sustain a conviction of murder, when taken in connection with other evidence that deceased was shot and killed while dancing, though no one saw defendant shoot.-Sullivan v. State, 51 S. W. 375, 40 Tex. Cr. R. 633.
 (Tex. Cr. App. 1902) Where an extrajudicial confession was in evidence, it was sufficient to charge that defendant could not be convicted upon his own confession unless it was corroborated by other evidence tending to connect him with the offense, and that the corroboration was not sufficient if it merely showed the commission of an offense.-Cox v. State, 69 S. W. 145.
2. Reasonable Doubt.
[a] (Fla. Sup. 1897) The corpus delicti need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt as a basis for the introduction of a confession of the accused. -Holland v. State, 22 South. 298, 39 Fla. 178.
[b] (Ga. Sup. 1890) Under Code, $ 3792, providing that "a confession alone uncorroborated by other evidence will not justify a conviction," a doubtful or contradictory confession by a man of good moral character will not war. rant a conviction of larceny where the corpus delicti is uncertain.-Johnson v. State, 12 S. E. 471; Id., 13 S. E. 282, 86 Ga. 90.
[c] (Minn. Sup. 1860) The corpus delicti must be proved beyond a reason. able doubt by evidence other than confessions of the accused.--State . Laliyer, 4 Minn. 368 (Gil. 277).
[d] (N. Y. Sup. 1836) It is not necessary that proof of the corpus delicti should be conclusive, in order to form sufficient corroboration for confessions of defendant.-People v. Badgley, 16 Wend. 53.
[e] (Pa. Sup. 1882) Where proof of the corpus delicti is introduced in corroboration of a confession, it need not be proved beyond the possibility of a doubt, but may be found by the jury as any other fact in the case.Gray v. Com., 101 Pa. 380, 47 Am. Rep. 733. 3. Connection of Accused.
[a] (Cal. Sup. 1896) Proof of the corpus delicti, to authorize proof of admissions by defendant, need not connect him with commission of the offense. -People v. Tarbox, 46 Pac. 896, 115 Cal. 57.
[b] (Ga. Sup. 1901) The court, in charging on confessions and the necessity for a confession to be corroborated, does not err in failing to charge that the corroborating testimony must be such as to connect the accused with the crime charged, since the rule in reference to the corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice is not applicable to the corroboration of a confession. -Cochran v. State, 39 S. E. 332, 113 Ga. 726.
[c] (Minn. Sup. 1882) Gen. St. 1878, c. 73, § 103, declaring that a confession of a defendant is not sufficient to warrant his conviction “Without evidence that the offense charged has been committed," does not require evidence that the defendant on trial has committed the offense. Evidence of its commission by some person is sufficient, and it is not necessary that such evidence should be produced before the confession.-State v. Grear, 13 N. W. 140, 29 Minn, 221.
[d] (Miss. Err. & App. 1857) In a prosecution for arson the corpus delicti is the burning of the house, and, when this is established by other evidence, the confessions of the accused are competent to show that the burning was done by him criminally.-Sam v. State, 33 Miss. 347.
(115 Fed. 786.)
(JOSE PARKER & CO., Intervening Creditors).
An order of a circuit court authorizing a railroad receiver to issue certificates, and providing that they shall be prior in lien to a mortgage indebtedness or to certificates previously issued, is a final decision in
such sense as to be appealable. 2. RailroAD RECEIVERS-AUTHORIZING COMPLETION OF Road-POSTPONEMENT
OF EXISTING LIENS.
It is an unwarranted exercise of power by a court of equity to authorize its receiver to issue certificates for the purpose of completing a railroad, and to make the same a first lien on the road without giving the bondholders an opportunity to be heard, where the property is worth no more than the amount of the outstanding mortgage bonds, so that such holders are the equitable owners.
The power to postpone existing liens to liens created by the court for the purpose of completing an unfinished railroad should not be exercised unless it can be done without ultimate loss to existing lienholders. In any case, it should be exercised with great caution; and where only one-third of a railroad was built at the time of the appointment of a receiver, and its value does not exceed the amount of the liens against it, the court is not warranted in authorizing the receiver to complete the road, and to issue certificates in payment, to be a first lien, over the
objections of the lienholders. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Vermont.
See 110 Fed. 472, 473, 111 Fed. 36, 1004.
WALLACE, Circuit Judge. Error is assigned of an order of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Vermont entered August 7, 1900, authorizing the receiver of the White River Valley Electric Railroad Company to create a new issue of receiver's certificates to be used in the completion of the railroad of that company, such certificates to be a prior lien over certain certificates previously issued by the receiver pursuant to authority from the court. The facts which led to the making of the order were these: A bill of complaint was filed in February, 1900, by one of the unsecured creditors of the railroad company, asking, among other things, for the appointment of a receiver, with power to operate, repair, and complete the unfinished railroad of the defendant. The bill alleged the insolvency of the defendant; that its railroad was partially completed, and being operated over a portion of its length; that there were outstanding $120,000 bonds of the defendant, of an authorized issue of $250,000, secured by a mortgage deed covering all its property; that the bonds were held by various persons as collateral security for loans to the defendant amounting to some $60,000; that $88,000 of these bonds were held by Jose Parker & Co., as collateral security for $44,000 of notes of the defendant; that the towns through which the said railroad was to run had subscribed subsidies amounting to $55,000, conditioned upon the completion of the railroad by December 30th next ensuing; that the defendant had unsecured indebtedness amounting to $125,000; that it had become impossible for the defendant to borrow money to complete its obligations or continue the work, and some attachments had been made and others threatened; that if its outstanding bonds should be defaulted, and the property should be sold under the mortgage, it would bring a nominal sum only; and that if the outstanding bonds could be recovered, and the road completed so as to save the town subsidies, the property could be saved, and the creditors of the defendant be paid. The defendant answered, admitting the allegations in the bill of complaint, and submitting to the judgment of the court in respect thereto. Thereupon, and upon the 20th day of February, 1900, the court appointed a receiver, with power to maintain and operate the railroad, and authority to complete and equip the same; and for that purpose, and for the purpose of recovering the outstanding mortgage bonds, to issue receiver's certificates in the sum of $170,000, $70,000 of which were to be applied for the recovery of said bonds, and the balance for the completion of said railroad, said certificates to be a first lien upon all the property of the defendant of every kind. The present appellants, Jose Parker & Co., bankers, and holders of some of the outstanding mortgage bonds, intervened, and became parties to the action. The receiver issued some $60,000 of certificates, and exchanged them with holders of first mortgage bonds of about that amount, including Jose Parker & Co. He then endeavored to make contracts for the completion and equipment of the railroad, but found that no responsible contractor was willing to undertake the work for the certificates in the form and amount authorized. Thereupon the receiver moved the court for a modification of the previous order so as to permit him "to make reasonable and necessary contracts for the completion and equipment of said railroad, and issue receiver's certificates for the same, subject to the order of the court." Upon that application Jose Parker & Co. appeared and consented to such a modification of the order. The receiver represented, in substance, that unless the court authorized new certificates, which would be prior in lien to those already issued, he would not be able to secure the completion of the road. Jose Parker & Co., while consenting to the scope of the application of the receiver, objected to the creation of new certificates which would have priority over those already issued. Upon their representation that they could secure a contractor who would complete the road and receive payment in certificates without priority over the issue previously authorized, the disposition of the motion was suspended from July 20th to August 7th to give them an opportunity to do so. At the latter date, Jose Parker & Co., having failed to accomplish what they had attempted, did not appear in court, and the court made the order the correctness of which is now challenged.
We have entertained some doubt whether the order is in such sense a final decision as to permit a review by this court, except on appeal from the final decree in the cause, but have concluded that it is, upon the authority of In re Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 129 U. S. 206, 9 Sup. Ct. 265, 32 L. Ed. 656.
The question of the propriety of the action of the court in authorizing the receiver to complete the road, and authorizing this to be done by an issue of receiver's certificates in the amount of $170,000, which should be a prior lien to the mortgage bonds, is not presented by this appeal. To all this the appellants consented, and it is fairly to be assumed that in doing so they recognized this course to be expedient under the circumstances of the case. They not only accepted the certificates issued pursuant to the first order and surrendered the bonds, but they also consented to a modification of that order which might involve the creation of a larger issue of certificates. Their objections raise the single question whether the court was justified in postponing one class of certificate holders to another,—their liens to the new ones created.
We must assume from the facts in the record that, unless the court had made the order which is complained of, the completion of the