Pensions-Construction of Act of May 15, 1820. the President directed an order to be published, declaring that in future no person, while in the receipt of pay or emoluments as an officer of the army, should be placed on the pension list. The practice of the Pension Office had, however, from an early day, been governed by the same rule; which was expressly prescribed by the old Congress in the resolution of the 26th August, 1776, and in other resolutions of later date. This usage being kept up by the War Department, with the sanction of the President, before and at the enactment of the act of 1812, was, within the meaning of the law, a regulation directed by the President, and was, in effect, incorporated in it. All persons entering the army under that act were therefore bound to know that, if disabled, they could not receive pensions as invalids so long as they retained their places in the army, and received the pay and emoluments thereof. But I am distinctly informed by the Commissioner of Pensions, that this was the only limitation imposed by the usage of the office, prior to the act of 15th May, 1820, on the payment of pensions for disabilities under the act of 1812; and that where the party left the army at the time he was disabled, the pension was considered as accruing from the date of the disability, no matter when the testimony was completed or produced. This being the case, all persons who entered the army under that law had good reason to expect that, if they should become disabled, they would be allowed pensions according to the nature of their disabilities, to commence from the time when they should cease to receive the pay and emoluments of the service. The contract between them and the government was not precisely to that effect, because it was subject to the contingency that the President might prescribe other regulations which might limit still further the commencement of the pension. But, as this power has not been exercised, the case may be considered as standing precisely on the same ground as though it had not existed. Under these circumstances, it appears to me, that from the time when General Ripley was disabled by a wound received in the line of his duty, he had a just claim on the good faith of the nation to be placed on the pension-list from the time when his pay and emoluments as an officer should cease. And ac Pensions-Construction of Act of May 15, 1820. cording to the usage of the office, and to the only regulation which has been made by the President, touching the time from which the pension is to commence, if he had made his application at any time before the enactment of the act of the 15th May, 1820, he would have been allowed his pension from the time when his pay ceased, which I understand was in 1821. His right to such a pension was not, indeed, an absolute one; but it was founded on the pledge contained in the act of 1812, and fortified by considerations of the most interesting and impressive character. The effect of the construction given by my predecessor to the law of 1820 was to take away this right; and though it may be admitted that Congress had the power to do this, yet I think there can be little difference of opinion as to the harsh. ness and injustice of such an exercise of legislative authority. In regard to such revolutionary cases as might be presented under the act of 1820, there was no injustice in applying the rule given in the 2d section of that law, because all claims of that sort had been barred by lapse of time, even before the pas sage of the act of 1806-which act, as well as the act reviving it, had expired; and because that act also contained an express provision that every pension under it should commence on the day when the claimant shall have completed his testimony." This being the rule by which the pensions gratui tously proffered by the act of 1806 were to be governed, there could be no objection to repeating the same rule in reference to such cases (though it was probably unnecessary to have done so) in the act of 1820. But such a rule, when applied to cases arising under the act of 1812, which contained nothing to warn parties of the necessity to make immediate applica. tions, and under which a different usage had obtained up to the 15th of May, 1820, was, in my opinion, positively unjust; because it defeated the expectations which persons entering the service under the law of 1812 had a right to cherish; made no discrimination between cases of supine neglect and those of forced delay; allowed nothing for difficulties occasioned by sickness, loss of papers, or other unavoidable accident; and, above all, operated retroactively on the rights of parties. It is a first principle in the interpretation of statutes, that, Pensions-Construction of Act of May 15, 1820. where the words are doubtful, such a construction is to be preferred as will be most consistent with the reason and justice of the case. This principle, I think, would have justified my predecessor in construing the second section of the act of the 15th of May, 1820, as not extending to cases arising under the act of 1812; and, were I not restrained by the respect due to superior ability and learning, I would say that such a construction was demanded by that principle. The action of Congress subsequently to the law of 1820 is also calculated to strengthen the doubts above expressed. That act revived the act of 1806 for one year only; but, by the act of the 4th of February, 1822, the act of 1806 was again revived for six years, and until the then next session of Congress; and by the act of the 24th of May, 1828, it was once more revived and rendered permanent. Each of these last named reviving acts repeats, in hâc verba, the second section of the act of the 15th of May, 1820. The repeated reenactment of this provision is altogether inconsistent with the idea of its being a general or permanent provision; and shows that, in the judgment of the legislature, it had expired with the expiration of the acts in which it was contained. Upon the whole, I entertain, for the reasons above assigned, such strong doubts as to the accuracy of the interpretation heretofore given to the law in question, and so decided an opinion as to the injustice of the law itself, if the construction given to it is the correct one, that I cannot but hope that Congress may even now interfere in these cases, and carry back the pensions to the time when the disabled party ceased to re. ceive the pay and emoluments of the service. 2. "Whether, under the peculiar circumstances in which the applicant was placed, the law was applicable to his case?" The circumstances here referred to are the following: In May, 1820, a large balance stood to the debit of General Ripley, in the accounting offices, for arrears of money received by him for disbursement during the war of 1812. Suits were subsequently brought against him to recover such balance; he resisted the recovery on the ground that he was not indebted to the United States, but, on the contrary, that the United States were justly indebted to him; and, after various proceedVOL. III-5 Pensions-Construction of Act of May 15, 1820. ings in the controversy, it was finally disposed of by a verdict in favor of the defendant, which closed the account at the treasury; and, according to the certificate of the jury, still left General Ripley a creditor of the United States to a large amount. Under these circumstances, he contends that, if the law of 1820 applies to other than revolutionary cases, it ought not to affect him; because, as he alleges, he was at the time, and ever after, until the closing of his account by the verdict in his favor, disqualified by law from drawing his pension; and, being so disqualified, the limitation contained in that act did not, and could not, run against him, until it ceased to exist. The disqualification on which this argument is founded did not, so far as I can discern, exist until the 3d of March, 1823, when a provision was first introduced into the act "making appropriations for the military service of the United States for the year 1823," (which act included an appropriation for invalid pensioners,) prohibiting the payment of any money thereby appropriated to any person for his compensation, “who is in arrears to the United States, until such person shall have accounted for, and paid into the treasury, all sums for which he may be liable," &c. This prohibition was for several years incorporated in the general and other appropriation bills; and, in 1828, was enacted as a permanent law, by the act "to prevent defalcations on the part of disbursing agents of the government, and for other purposes," approved January 25, 1828. This inhibition, in my opinion, extends to the case of an invalid pensioner; and it must, therefore, be conceded that, from March, 1823, until the balance standing against General Ripley on the books of the treasury was extinguished, he was disqualified to draw his pension, even had it been previously allowed to him. It is also true, as a general rule, that statutes of limitation do not run against persons disqualified by infancy, interdiction, or any other cause, to enforce their claims; all such cases being usually excepted from the statutory bar. But it does not appear to me either that the act of 1820 can with propriety be regarded as a limitation law; or, if such be its true character, that the case of General Ripley can be brought within the principle of the exceptions above stated. The statute does not attempt to prescribe the time within which the claim is to Pensions-Construction of Act of May 15, 1820. be preferred; nor did the disqualification under which General Ripley labored prevent him from making or establishing his claim. He might have preferred and established it; and, although no money could have been paid thereon until the balance standing against him was extinguished, yet, on the closing of his accounts, he would have been entitled to receive all that had accrued during the interval, and to be regularly paid thereafter. If, then, the second section of the act of 1820 applies to this case, I must be considered as answering the present question in the negative. 3. "Whether the rule which declares that the evidence is complete only when the papers are duly authenticated, and all objections to the claim cease, is conformable to the spirit of the law?" The accuracy of the rule being thus called in question, I think it my duty to state my views on the subject, although the rule itself is in entire conformity to the second opinion of the Attorney General in the case of Colonel Johnson, dated the 19th of July, 1822, which opinion was the result of a very mature consideration; and although it has also been adopted in the President's regulation of the 18th of April, 1829. The first section of the act of the 15th of May, 1820, refers us to the act of the 10th of April, 1806; and whatever would complete the testimony under that act must certainly be sufficient. Now, the second section of the act of 1806 expressly prescribes the rules and regulations which are to be complied with in substantiating claims. They consist of certain proofs to be made by affidavits before the judge of the district, or one of the judges of the Territory in which the claimant resides, or before some person specially authorized by commission from said judge; and after the proofs have been duly submitted to the proper judge or commissioner, he is to "certify, in writing, his opinion of the credibility of the witnesses whose affidavits he shall take, in all those cases where it is said the proof shall be made by a credible witness or witnesses; and, also, that the examining physician or surgeon is reputable in his profession." The third section provides that the judge or commissioner shall transmit a list of such claims, accompanied by the evidence, affidavits, certificates, and proceedings had |