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Mr. BLANDFORD. If he has been passed over 1 time or had his promotion slowed down so that he made colonel-so that he has several more years to go, is what I am getting at the 30-and-5 propositionhe might be able to stay on active duty longer and yet retire with considerably greater retirement pay than the officer who is only going to get a $75-a-month increase.

Colonel KECK. Only if he passes the screening and retention board that we hope to set up.

Mr. BLANDFORD. This pay bill is, to a large extent, based upon legislation that hasn't passed yet. That is my point.

Colonel KECK. Not necessarily.

Mr. KILDAY. The colonel is referring to the provision on page 10 of the bill-are you not?

Colonel KECK. I was referring to new management-type legislation. Mr. BLANDFORD. I think you are referring to Operation White Charger.

I have no further questions.

Mr. KILDAY. We will meet tomorrow to hear the Chiefs of Staff of all the services.

We are adjourned until 2 o'clock tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 4:35 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned to reconvene at 2 p. m., Tuesday, February 25, 1958.)

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Washington, D. C., Tuesday, February 25, 1958.

The subcommittee met at 2 p. m., Hon. Paul Kilday, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Mr. KILDAY. We will continue with hearings on H. R. 9979, a bill to change the method of computing basic pay for members of the uniformed services, and for other purposes.

The hearing will be in order.

We have with us today the heads of the military services, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff, United States Army; Adm. Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations; Gen. R. McC. Pate, Commandant of the Marine Corps; and Gen. Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force.

General Taylor, you may proceed.

General TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, I am happy to have this opportunity to appear before you in support of the pay legislation which has been proposed to improve the career attractiveness of the Armed Forces. I shall discuss the matter from the standpoint of my particular service, the Army.

As you know, the assigned mission of the Army is the conduct of land warfare. In the relatively brief span of the past few years, we have seen truly revolutionary changes in the art of warfare which go to the heart of Army organizatoin, material, and concepts.

Technology has produced new weapons and equipment undreamed of only a few years ago. These advances establish a new requirement for trained and experienced personnel of high quality in the Armed Forces.

This requirement is not merely for technically trained men, but also for combat leaders. We anticipate that ground combat under atomic conditions will involve numerous relatively small groupings of combined arms and services, widely separated, relatively self-sufficient, and often operating independently. Under such conditions, commanders at all levels, from the squad leader to the Army group or theater commander, will require a broader base of leadership and of technical knowledge than ever before.

In view of these facts, the Army must have both highly qualified combat leaders and highly qualified technicians. We can no longer accept World War II standards and simply do the best with what we happen to have. As the Army progresses in the quality of its weapons and equipment it must progress in the quality of its people as well. We are not getting that essential personnel quality today. Now a few words, first about the officer situation, then about that of the enlisted men.

Insofar as numbers are concerned, the Army does not have a serious initial officer procurement problem, thanks to the ROTC and the requirement for service contained in the Universal Military Training and Service Act.

However, we cannot retain these officers beyond their obligated service unless they volunteer. As a result, we quickly lose to civil occupations all but a very small number of them. Moreover, many of the more highly qualified lieutenants are those who are leaving the service.

This problem is a serious one. So few of our young officers apply for continued active duty upon completion of their obligated tours that we do not have the selectivity which we desire.

For example, in fiscal year 1957 the retention rate of young officers after their 2-year obligated tour was about 17 percent. So far in 1958, this rate is running at about 16 percent. Our requirements for such officers approximate 35 percent. Thus, only half of the number we need are applying for continued active duty with the result that we are often forced to sacrifice standards of quality.

To compound this difficulty, the resignation rate of the United States Military Academy graduates is much too high. It is expected that this rate for the class of 1954 will reach 27 percent by June 30, 1959-a higher 5-year rate than in any other like period in recent time.

It is a point worthy of note that nearly 70 percent of Army officers of all grades who leave the service have indicated their reasons as being either to obtain more gainful employment or because of family dissatisfaction with immediate conditions or future prospects of service life.

To summarize the officer picture-we are not retaining enough junior officers to meet our requirements in terms of numbers or of quality. This condition cannot continue if our Army is to remain an effective instrument of our national defense.

In the enlisted area; the employment of increasingly complex weapons and equipment requires long-term school training for large numbers of personnel. As we do not have enough high quality enlistees to meet these school requirements, it is necessary to include many of the competent but short-term 2-year inductees to obtain the needed school trained output.

In the long run this procedure is wasteful, for only a small percentage of these inductees remain in the service. However, it would be even more wasteful if we placed low mental group individuals into courses which they could not assimilate. These less qualified individuals must be asigned, insofar as possible, to Army units where they receive short periods of schooling or simple on-the-job training. Considering the large number of inductees in the Army and the fact that they reenlist at a rate of only about 4 percent, it is easy to see why the continual exodus of trained personnel causes damaging disruption in Army units and generates an endless succession of new and expensive training cycles. At the same time, this turnover of trained personnel causes dangerous fluctuations in our combat readiness, maintenance, and efficiency.

In essence, then, the Army must attract and retain a higher percentage of quality enlisted personnel as well as officers. Largely because of financial factors, we simply cannot retain our most competent enlistees and inductees. They will not give the Army serious consideration as a career in the face of the more attractive living standards which they can attain in civil life.

In summary of both the officer and enlisted areas, I feel that the Army must obtain the human resources it needs to provide an adequate and properly balanced element of our defense team. The Army cannot do its job with inferior or mediocre people. Our national security is too important to be entrusted to any but some of our ablest and most competent citizens.

The pay reform of the Armed Forces as represented by H. R. 9979 would be of great assistance in remedying many of the personnel deficiencies which I have mentioned. It recognizes that a logical, businesslike, and equitable military pay system should be adopted without delay if we are to attract and retain the trained personnel we need. The Army has developed a concept for implementing the provisions of this legislation and we will be happy to discuss these details should the committee so desire.

I would not like to suggest that the passage of H. R. 9979 will end all of the personnel troubles of the armed services. The Army is thoroughly aware of the many internal actions which are necessary to assure that we treat our people well and get the most from their capabilities. Secretary Brucker has already enumerated a list of actions which we are taking. I have no feeling that this list terminates our responsibilities, but rather that we must improve our personnel management methods year by year.

Also, I would not suggest that the pay check is the only factor making for morale and efficiency among the men and women of the armed services. I would never urge anyone to come into the Army if he does so solely for the financial reward. The armed services should never undertake to compete dollar for dollar with industry in their pay scales. The men who will attain happiness in the Army and who will make the maximum contribution to the Army are those who can find their reward in a life of service to country, spent in the company of other honorable men similarly motivated. In such a life, they will need the support of a sense of achievement and a knowledge that their service is recognized and valued by their fellow citizens.

The present bill, in my judgment, is important not only because it gives greater financial security to our people, but also because it rep

resents a form of recognition of the importance of a military career. Thus, it contributes to ethical as well as to economic motivation. Both appeals to our young men are essential if we are to put the best heads of America into the service hats of tomorrow.

Mr. KILDAY. Admiral Burke, we will now hear your statement.
Admiral BURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I always welcome the opportunity to outline for you the personnel problems currently facing the Navy and the immediate and far reaching effect that implementation of improved career incentive programs would have on these problems.

PROBLEMS FACING THE NAVY

America has the ability to design and build the ships, aircraft, and nuclear weapons which will comprise the hardware and equipment needed to support the world's most modern Navy.

However, I am vitally concerned with our continued ability to effectively man this force with high caliber, highly motivated personnel. I am confident of our ability to train the personnel required to man the Navy. Regardless of the ever-increasing complexity of ships, aircraft, weapons, and equipment, we can produce personnel who are fully capable of maintaining and operating this hardware.

The real problem we are faced with is not the training of an adequate number of personnel but the necessity of having to train excessive numbers in order to compensate for the continual loss of skilled, proficient personnel who do not elect the service as a career.

In the case of our enlisted personnel, the number of first-term reenlistments provides a yardstick by which we measure the effectiveness of the administrative and legislative procedures instituted to improve career attractiveness.

In fiscal 1957 and during the first 4 months of fiscal 1958, we show a 15-percent first-term reenlistment rate. This is higher than that experienced in fiscal year 1955 and fiscal year 1956, due to the gratifying effects of past legislation such as the 1955 Career Compensation Act.

However, this first-term reenlistment rate is too low, and does not represent optimum utilization of the personnel dollars spent to train the thousands of men who came on active duty during these years. These men have been trained at Navy expense to meet Navy require

ments.

The payoff for this training is not realized during the first-term enlistment but rather during subsequent years when education and experience have merged to form the base for skilled and proficient petty officers.

During their first enlistment, we give our personnel the background knowledge needed to make the team. To lose them before their talent can be fully exploited is a waste of money and valuable manpower potential.

The officer picture is equally dark and represents an even greater expenditure of money and manpower. We are, and continue to be, critically short of junior officers in the 3-to-12-year service group. Last year alone we operated with a shortage of 3,000 line lieutenants in our surface ships.

Such deficiencies have a profound and damaging effect on our readiness for combat and our attempts to reduce material casualties in units of the operating forces.

Further, we lose those irreplaceable leadership qualities which contribute so much to the morale and training problems of the enlisted

man.

Under these conditions we are forced to fill vacant supervisory billets with very junior and relatively inexperienced officers who are not yet equipped to handle the responsibility being placed upon them.

Not only does this situation exist in our fleet ships, but a parallel is found in the aeronautical organization. We are only retaining 2 out of every 7 naval aviators beyond their obligated service.

This reduces the experience level in naval aviation to a dangerous point and further complicates our efforts to maintain the standards of aviation safety so necessary in this jet age.

I would like to cite a concrete example of the benefits that would accrue through implementation of improved career incentive measures. In fiscal 1957, Antisubmarine Aircraft Squadron 31 was selected to participate in an evaluation of unit personnel allowances.

During the period of this evaluation, this squadron was manned to 100 percent of allowance by rate and pay grade. This means that this unit received a full allowance of experienced personnel undistorted by the variables of maldistribution within ratings which shortages have made necessary.

Antisubmarine Squadron 31 operated from the U. S. S. Antietam. It flew over 2,000 hours making some 1,200 carrier landings without any aircraft accident involving complete losses or fatalities.

Concurrently, aircraft availability and the state of material readiness was greatly improved due to the superior maintenance made possible through employment of experienced enlisted personnel.

Nine other naval squadrons of this type which were manned through normal personnel distribution had a total of nine accidents resulting in complete losses during a similar period.

Considering that properly qualified personnel and second-tour pilots could prevent 80 percent of these aircraft accidents, monetary savings of $7,084,000 would have been realized.

Assuming that similar savings could be made throughout the operating forces, a marked increase in operational effectiveness and readiness would accrue. This is the state of readiness to which we aspire.

CAUSE AND EFFECT

We do our best to instill the sense of pride, self-respect and satisfaction of serving which will engender devotions to the naval life, but these high principles lose much of their weight if a man feels that his worth is not recognized and adequate provisions are not made for the attainment of a career objective which is compatible with his personal abilities.

The desirability of military career is further affected when the man is faced with the harsh realities of providing a decent living and normal advantages for his family on a day-to-day basis regardless of his loyalty and personal satisfaction with Navy life.

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