Secretary MILTON. I believe it is 2 years, now we will be right at the Officer Personnel Act normal. The end of 1959. That is a little less than 2 years.

Mr. BLANDFORD. That means you will be serving 7 years

Secretary MILTON. Seven, fourteen, twenty-one; yes, sir.

Mr. BLANDFORD. When you serve 14 years and make captain, this pay bill gives the man promoted to the rank of major the magnificent increase of $15 a month.

Mr. KILDAY. A little louder, please.

Mr. BLANDFORD. When you serve 14 years as a captain and are promoted to major, this gives the man the magnificent increase of $15 a month.

How many of these junior officers do you think we are going to get on that basis?

Secretary MILTON. I don't think the immediate sum of money is as much as you can hold out to them further down the road.

Mr. BLANDFORD. I noticed Mr. Cordiner said he thought the junior officers were adequately paid commensurate with what they might get in industry, but that is not, of course, what the junior officers are writing us about, but it is nevertheless what the Cordiner Committee found.

I mention it because I think we ought to make very clear that all the services, so I am told, are approaching normal Officer Personnel Act schedules.

Secretary MILTON. You can rest assured of that with us, because we are fast getting to it.

Mr. BLANDFORD. That, of course, raises the immediate problem, that in order to have accelerated promotion, to take this very efficient man and promote him, that you are going to have to create some vacancies someplace, and that takes us right into a bill which will get rid of some people who are already serving in more senior grades, you see. Now let me ask Mr. Brucker this question: The proficiency pay for enlisted men, one of the arguments for it is that it is very flexible. You can give it to a man, you can take it away; is that correct? Secretary BRUCKER. That is correct.

Mr. BLANDFORD. And yet the proficiency for an officer would be absolutely inflexible, because once promoted, you could never take it away. Now, what thought has there been given to the possibility of proficiency pay for officers, on the same theory of flexibility?

What I am thinking of is this, Mr. Secretary: Back many years ago we might have had somebody who was an expert cavalryman, and that might have been a very critical skill. And we did.pay farriers, I think they were called, specialist's pay in the Army because they were special horseshoe men and they were very good. But they promoted officers, and once they promoted officers they could never be demoted.

I wondered if some proficiency pay should be given to officers on the same basis as with enlisted men to meet the critical skills of the time.

In fact, I can visualize the time when we might have some critical skills among officers who would become surplus to the needs of the Army as technology advances.

Do you think there might be some merit in that consideration?

Secretary BRUCKER. I think there might be some merit in considering that because I am sure we don't want to perpetuate something that is surplus.

Mr. BLANDFORD. It struck me suddenly as strange that we are going to give enlisted men proficiency pay, but we are going to promote the officers, and the officer is there to stay. That does go into security, but I think the enlisted man is just as much entitled to some consideration for security also.

It is possible here that a man could be given the proficiency pay of an E-6, while serving in the grade of an E-5, and then be promoted to the grade of E-6, and there would be no required skill in that grade for him as an E-6, so he would end up getting no pay increase as a result of getting promoted, and that is not going to help morale.

Now, there is another feature that bothers me, on the final cost of this bill. I want to be as fair as I can with this question because I realize that when you talk of the average man, there is no such person. But I have costed this program out and have found-I might say, to my amazement-that on the average, under full implementation of this program, in 1964, the average second lieutenant will receive. $5 less per month. The average E-4, or corporal, will receive $1 a month less. The average E-3 will receive $9 a month less. The average E-2, $4 a month less, and the average E-1, $5 a month less, again saying there is no such thing as the average man.

Doesn't that put us in a rather difficult position to try to explain why we are passing a pay bill which has a final result of cutting the pay of the average enlisted man when this program is fully implemented?

Secretary BRUCKER. On your figures, there-I, of course, don't know anything about it, but on your figures, I didn't know that before.

Mr. BLANDFORD. That is the point. I don't think very many people know that is the result of this proposal, and that is the reason I wanted to raise it. I think it is one of the things that bothers people who have gotten into this bill and have found some of these situations which have developed. Now, I will grant you that there will be some. people who will get substantial increases, because there may be E-4's drawing the pay of E-6's, and that will be a substantial increase, and that is the incentive that you are trying to get for that individual. Mr. RIVERS. Could I inquire, Mr. Blandford, about that: Is that taking into consideration 6 percent?

Mr. BLANDFORD. This is when the 6 percent goes out, Mr. Rivers. This is based upon the 1964 final figure. It is a DOD figure of 1964. I had them projected out to 1964. You see, if you are projected out to 1962, all is sweetness and light, but when you project it to 1964, you see a sudden change take place, and that means that the men entering the service in the future, and what bothers me is this professional group that we are trying to create are going to go into a pay scale that will be paying them, on the average, less than they are getting today. And that, I think, could have some very serious effects upon at least getting the man, in the first place.

Now, you may be able to retain him by giving him proficiency pay, but on the other hand, if he is going to be able to say, "Well, 6 years ago, when my brother came in the Army, he got $9 a month more than I got," it is going to have a psychological effect.

Mr. KILDAY. I believe the Secretary stated he didn't know that was the result.

Secretary BRUCKER. I did not, and I would be very glad to consider that. That gives an added emphasis to my statement that I favor the 6 percent across the board.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Otherwise you would have that effect almost immediately.

Secretary BRUCKER. Yes; certainly.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Now, Mr. Secretary, another problem that I noticed in this bill-it is not in the bill itself-is in the frozen field among enlisted personnel. An enlisted man doesn't have much say in where he is assigned. He can end up in a frozen field and we get letters every day from people who are in frozen fields, and that is no fault of his that he is in a frozen field. If he comes in the Army and they assign him to a school to teach him how to drive a truck or to become a cook-and unfortunately, those two skills in the Army have probably been the subjects of more derogatory remarks than any two skills in the world—yet that is not that man's fault.

That man is assigned to that skill. He really doesn't have much to say about the skill he goes into. I don't want to say anything that will affect the recruiting posters that go around the country, but basically that is probably true, the man is assigned to school through which he may indicate some aptitude through a test that he takes. Now, the frozen field for enlisted promotions bothers me, because there is a man who must depend upon longevity for a pay increase. Now, I noticed in the Cordiner report that there were some 18,000 E-3's, I believe, who receive more than 333,000 E-4's, and that bothered Mr. Cordiner very much.

I have just called the Department of Defense and asked them if they have the service breakdown on that, because I think perhaps it is not quite fair to lump together all of the inversions as a Department of Defense figure, because I don't believe anybody can say that promotional opportunities are equal in all the services among all the enlisted personnel.

So therefore the inversions may take on a different attitude when we get a service breakdown as to the number of inversions that we have. Perhaps an inversion isn't quite as bad as it looks when you find out the reason for the inversion. Would you agree to that? Secretary MILTON. I think a detailed breakdown ought to be made of it.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Do you think perhaps there are reasons for inversions that are beyond the control of the individual man, and have nothing to do with his aptitude?

Secretary MILTON. That might obtain, but it would be a reflection upon our personnel management if it obtained to any great extent. Mr. BLANDFORD. Now, in that connection-of course, proficiency pay is an inversion, is it not? If an E-4 draws the pay of an E-6, it is an inversion, as far as an E-5 is concerned; is that not correct? Secretary MILTON. It is a controlled inversion, yes.

Mr. BLANDFORD. So it is a question of what kind of inversion it is. If you create the inversion it is a good inversion. If it is an automatic inversion, it is a bad inversion.

Secretary MILTON. It is out of control.

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Mr. BLANDFORD. Another little item that I found with interest: I wanted to see how many people were going to get hurt under this pay proposal, so I just took second lieutenants and first lieutenants and found that you had 1,505 second lieutenants in the Army with over 3 or more years of service. I found there were 2,400 in the Air Force. I found 2,185 ensigns in the Navy. Now, those people aren't going to get much of a pay increase out of this bill, except for the 6 percent. I found that you had 3,442 first lieutenants in the Army with 10 or more years of service. And they are going to be in the same situation. I don't know how many more there are going to be in the future, but Mr. McElroy and Mr. Francis yesterday said they would offer an amendment to the bill which would permit an enlisted man who becomes an officer to preserve his pay so he would not have to take a pay cut. At least we have made one dent in the right direction, we have preserved longevity for the enlisted man becoming an officer-that is the first inroad that has been made. At least that is one area of unfairness, or possible unfairness that has been corrected by the Department.

I mentioned those figures because I think that it is an indication of a number of people that can be hurt as a result of this. Now, are you familiar with that fact, Mr. Milton, or Mr. Brucker?

Secretary MILTON. I can answer it. I am familiar, because I saw those same figures this morning, and I went into them, and when you say the 3 and the 10, that means that they have that period behind them for pay purposes?

Mr. BLANDFORD. That is right.

Secretary BRUCKER. It does not mean that they have served necessarily in that grade for that particular period of time.

Mr. BLANDSFORD. I would hate to think they had served for 10 years as first lieutenants without being promoted.

Secretary MILTON. That is impossible.

Mr. BLANDSFORD. The next point I wish to make, and it will be the last point, is the permanent promotion in the Army; in 1951 you had an 80 percent selection factor to the grade of lieutenant colonel. That figure came down in 1957. In 1954, temporary promotion, you had a 72 percent selection factor, and you had a 97 percent selection factor to the permanent grade of lieutenant colonel.

Now, I mention that in connection with the heavy attrition that takes place when you have a 97 percent selection factor. Now, that is coming down. We know that.

Secretary MILTON. That is right.

Mr. BLANDFORD. But that leads to this question: Why should we count all services in grade under this pay bill for that service in grade which has already been performed? Why should we not start service in grade from the time the bill goes into effect so that we will have a chance to weed out the inefficients, if you have that many that you want to weed out, but why should a man who has been the beneficiary of accelerated promotion-and I have got the figures on the accelerated promotion-why should a man who has been the beneficiary of accelerated promotion and has not been subject to much attrition, receive the full benefit of service in grade already performed? Why should not this service in grade be in the future? Secretary MILTON. Mr. Blandford, that is a very profound question. I hope you don't expect me to give you an answer right now. would like to think it over.

I

Mr. KILDAY. You do that, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. BLANDFORD. I have no further questions.

Mr. KILDAY. Mr. Secretary and Mr. Milton, we thank you very much for coming.

Secretary Douglas.

Mr. KILDAY. You may proceed, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary DOUGLAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it gives me great pleasure to appear before you today in support of this legislation to provide a more adequate compensation system for our people in uniform. You and I are aware that our officers, airmen, and civilians constitute our most valuable asset.

This Congress has engaged and is engaging in a penetrating examination of the sufficiency of our weapons systems. You are now considering how to make adequate provision for the personnel who are charged with developing, maintaining and in case of need, employing these weapons which we are procuring at such great cost.

We recognize the high costs associated with modern weapons systems and we have indicated that we are willing to pay the price to get the best. I do not believe we have applied the same philosophy in attracting and retaining the people we need.

THE CHANGING NATURE OF OUR REQUIREMENTS

The impact of missiles and modern-manned aircraft units is being felt throughout our personnel structure. The proportion of the Air Force that must consist of technically trained officers and airmen is growing at a fast rate, with corresponding reductions in the semitechnical fields. This trend toward a greater proportion of the total force in technical career fields has, at the same time, been accompanied by an increased requirement for personnel in the higher mental, skill and educational levels. Our management and compensation systems must be geared to meet this challenge.

As missile units become operational, our personnel requirements can be expected to undergo even more change. Generally speaking, the missile wing will require approximately 15 percent more technical officers and 10 percent more technical airmen than our more complex manned aircraft units.

For example, in the B-52 wing, approximately 55 percent of the nonflying officers are in technical fields. This compares with approximately 75 percent in the intercontinental ballistic missiles units. The enlisted airmen requirements show a like change, from approximately 52 percent in the technical fields in a B-52 wing to over 62 percent in the missile unit.

The increasing demand for skilled personnel has had an adverse effect upon our combat capability. As Mr. Cordiner mentioned to you Wednesday, a portion of our more advanced equipment cannot be efficiently employed today because we do not have people qualified to operate and maintain it. We don't need more people in uniform. We need more skilled people.

THE NEED FOR A PROFESSIONAL FORCE

More than at any other time in our history, today's equipment demands professionally competent military leadership and a high level