Rules concerning Lights. OBS. Art. 2. The lights mentioned in the following articles, and no others, shall be carried in all weathers between sunset and sunrise. Art. 3. Sea-going steam ships, when under way, shall carry: (a) At the foremost head, a bright white light, so fixed as to show an uniform (b) On the starboard side, a green light, so constructed as to throw an uniform (d) The said green and red side lights shall be fitted with inboard screens, Art. 4. Steam ships, when towing other ships shall carry two bright white mast-head lights, vertically, in addition to their side lights, so as to distinguish them from other steam ships. Each of these mast-head lights shall be of the same construction and character as the mast-head lights which other steam ships are required to carry. Art. 5. Sailing ships under weigh, or being towed, shall carry the same lights as steam ships under weigh with the exception of the white mast-head lights, which they shall never carry. (d) Art. 6. Whenever, as in the case of small vessels during bad weather, the green and red lights cannot be fixed, these lights shall be kept on deck, on their respective sides of the vessel, ready for instant exhibition, and shall, on the approach of or to other vessels, be exhibited on their respective sides in sufficient time to prevent collision, in such manner as to make them most visible, and so that the green light shall not be seen on the port side, nor the red light on the starboard side. To make the use of these portable lights more certain and easy, they shall each be painted outside with the color of the light they respectively contain, and shall be provided with suitable screens. (e) Art. 7. Ships, whether steam ships or sailing ships, when at anchor in road- Art. 8. Sailing pilot vessels shall not carry the lights required by other sailing (d) The Margaret v. The Tuscar, 15 L. T. N. S. 86. (e) The Margaret . The Tuscar, 15 L. T. N. S. 86. Rules concerning Fog Signals. OBS. Art. 10. Whenever there is a fog, whether by day or night, the fog signals described below shall be carried, and used, and sounded at least every five minutes, viz.: (a) Steam ships under weigh shall use a steam whistle placed before the funnel not less than eight feet from the deck. (b) Sailing ships under weigh shall use a fog horn. (c) Steam ships and sailing ships when not under weigh shall use a bell. Steering and Sailing Rules. Art. 11. If two sailing ships are meeting end-on, or nearly end-on, so as to involve risk of collision, the helms of both shall be put to port so that each may pass on the port side of each other. Art. 12. When two sailing ships are crossing so as to involve risk of collision, then, if they have the wind on different sides, the ship with the wind on the port side shall keep out of the way of the ship with the wind on the starboard side, except in the case in which the ship with the wind on the port side is close-hauled, and the other ship free, in which case the latter ship shall keep out of the way, but if they have the wind on the same side, or if one of them has the wind aft, the ship which is to windward shall keep out of the way of the ship which is to leeward. (ƒ) Art. 13. If two ships under steam are meeting end-on, or nearly end-on, so as to involve risk of collision, the helms of both shall be put to port, so that each may pass on the port side of the other. (g) Art. 14. If two ships under steam are crossing so as to involve risk of collision, the ship which has the other on her own starboard side, shall keep out of the way of the other. (g) Art. 15. If two ships, one of which is a sailing ship, and the other a steam ship, are proceeding in such directions as to involve risk of collision, the steam ship shall keep out of the way of the other ship. Art. 16. Every steam ship, when approaching another ship so as to involve risk of collision, shall slacken her speed, or, if necessary, stop and reverse; and every steam ship shall, when in a fog, go at a moderate speed. Art. 17. Every vessel overtaking any other vessel shall keep out of the way of the said last-mentioned vessel. Art. 18. Where, by the above rules, one of two ships is to keep out of the way, the other shall keep her course subject to the qualifications contained in the following article: Art. 19. In obeying and construing these rules, due regard must be had to all dangers of navigation; and due regard must also be had to any special circumstances which may exist in any particular case rendering a departure from the above rules necessary in order to avoid immediate danger. (h) Art. 20. Nothing in these rules shall exonerate any ship, or the owner, or master, or crew thereof, from the consequences of any neglect to carry lights or signals, or of any neglect to keep a proper look-out, or of a neglect of any precaution which may be required by the ordinary practice of seamen, or by the special circumstances of the case. (i) By s. 28, it is enacted that "in case any damage to person or property arises from the non-observance by any ship of any regulation made by or in pursu ance of this act, such damage shall be deemed to have been occasioned by the wilful default of the person in charge of the deck of such ship at the time, unless it is shown to the satisfaction of the court that the circumstances of the case made a departure from the regulation necessary. But the master and owners are only liable for the negligent act of their servants, therefore, where they are compelled by law to take a pilot, he is not a servant (f) On this article see Dean v. Mark, The Constitution, 2 Moore P. C. C. N. S. 453; The Spring, L. R. 1 Adm. 99. (g) Onus of proof, that a departure is necessary, lies on the defendants. The Concordia, L. R. 1 Adm. 93. (h) The Great Ship Company v. Sharples, 3 Moore P. C. C. N. S. 31; and notes () and (g), supra. (i) See The Ida v. The Wasa of Nicolaistadt, 15 L. T. N. S. 103. OBS. in the ordinary sense, and they are, therefore, not responsible for his default. See the Merchant Shipping Act (17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, s. 388), 25 & 26 Vict. c. 63, ss. 39–41; The Maria, 1 W. Rob. 95; Johanna Stoll, 1 Lush. 312; 30 L. J. P. M. & A. 201. It is not enough to prove that there was fault or negligence on the pilot's part, but the owner must show that there was no default upon the part of the master and crew, which might have in any degree been conducive to the damage. The Iona, L. R. 1 P. C. 626; The Velasquez, L. R. 1 C. P. 494. [On the other hand, if a pilot is injured on board of a vessel by the negligence of one of the seamen, the owners cannot defend on the ground of an implied contract between owners and the pilot whom they are compelled to employ that the pilot shall take the risk of injury from the negligence of his fellow servants. Smith v. Steele, L. R. 10 Q. B. 125.] But to exempt the master and owners from liability, the act complained of must be solely that of the pilot. Hammond v. Rogers, 7 Moore P. C. C. 160; Rodrigues v. Mellish, 10 Ex. 110; 24 L. J. Ex. 26; The Carrier Dove, 1 B. & L. 113. See, also, as to compulsory pilotage under 6 Geo. 4, c. 125, and the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, The Hanna, L. R. 1 Admt. & Ecc. 283; and The Tyne Improvement Commissioners v. The General Steam Navigation Company, 36 L. J. Q. B. 22; L. R. 1 Q. B. 65. And it has also been held that the act causing the damage must be within the scope of the pilot's duty. The Diana, 1 W. Rob. 135. As to exemption, where one of the ships is foreign, The Vernon, 1 W. Rob. 316; 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, s. 527. As to the limitation of the money extent of liability, 25 & 26 Vict. c. 63, s. 54, and 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, s. 506; The Obey, L. R. 1 Adm. 102. As to liability for loss of life occasioned by collision, Glaholm v. Barker, L. R. 1 Ch. App. 223; 35 L. J. Ch. 259. As to register being primâ facie evidence of ownership, Hibbs v. Ross, L. R. 1 Q. B. 534; 35 L. J. Q. B. 193. See, generally, Lowndes on the Admiralty Laws of Collisions at Sea. Ante, "Carriers." 1. For negligently navigating a Ship and causing a Collision. That the defendant so negligently managed and directed his ship, that she ran foul of the ship of the plaintiff, whereby the said ship of the plaintiff was sunk, and the cargo of the same lost and injured, and the plaintiff incurred expense in raising and repairing the said ship and cargo, and lost the use of the said ship and the freight that he might have earned therefrom. 2. Against the Owner of a Ship for negligently leaving a Hatchway uncovered. Hibbs v. Ross, L. R. 1 Q. B. 534; 35 L. J. Q. B. 193. 3. Against the Owner of a Steam Vessel for causing a Dangerous Swell in the Thames, whereby the Plaintiff's Vessel was swamped. Luxford v. Large, 5 C. & P. 421. SHOOTING. OBS. The venue is local. See a form for trespass for the purpose of killing game, and law, Lonsdale v. Rigg, 11 Ex. 654; 25 L. J. Ex. 73; Rigg v. Lonsdale, 1 H. & N. 923; 36 L. J. Ex. 196. See Graham v. Ewart, 11 Ex. 326; 25 L. J. Ex. 42; H. & N. 550; 26 L. J. Ex. 97; affirmed, Ewart v. Graham, 7 H. L. Cas. 331; 29 L. J. Ex. 88; Bruce v. Helliwell, 5 H. & N. 609; 29 L J. Ex. 297; Jeffrys v. Evans, 34 L. J. C. P. 261. OBS. A person who, on his own land, shoots a pheasant on the land of another, and goes on such land to pick it up, commits a trespass of entering land in pursuit of game within 1 & 2 W. 4, c. 32, s. 30-the shooting and picking up the bird being one transaction, but it seems doubtful whether entering land for the purpose of picking up dead game is within that act. Osbond v. Meadows, 31 L. J. M. C. 338; [12 C. B. N. S. 10.] If rabbits be started and killed on the land of another, they are the property of the owner of the land on which they were killed, but there might be a difference if started on the land of A. and killed on that of B. Blades v. Higgs, [12 C. B. N. S. 501;] 31 L. J. C. P. 151; 32 L. J. C. P. 182; 34 L. J. C. P. 286; 11 H. L. Cas. 621. SLANDER. See "Libel and Slander." SLANDER OF TITLE. See "Libel and Slander." STOCK. See ante, "Bank of England," also ante, part 1, p. 246. STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. OBS. See post, pleas. See a form of declaration for a wrongful stoppage in transitu, and pleas, Wilmhurst v. Bowker, 7 M. & G. 883. SUPPORT. OBS. The right to support from adjacent or subjacent soil is a natural right of property apart from any question of negligence. Wyatt v. Harrison, 3 B. & Ad. 871; Humphries v. Brogden, 12 Q. B. 739; 20 L. J. Q. B. 10; Hunt t. Peake, 29 L. J. Ch. 787; [H. R. V. Johns. 705;] Smart v. Morton, 5 El. & Bl. 30; and see Bonomi v. Backhouse, El., Bl. & El. 655; 9 H. L. Cas. 503; Nicklin v. Williams, 23 L. J. Ex. 335; [10 Ex. 259; M'Guire v. Grant, 1 Dutch. 356, 368; Farrand v. Marshall, 19 Barb. 380; S. C. 21 Barb. 409, 415; Foley . Wyeth, 2 Allen, 131; Napier v. Bulwinkle, 5 Rich. 311, 323; Beard v. Murphy, 37 Vt. 101; Lasala v. Holbrook, 4 Paige, 169; Panton v. Holland, 17 John. 92; Howland v. Vincent, 10 Met. 371, 373; Hay v. Cohoes Co. 2 Comst. 159; Radcliff v. Mayor &c. 4 Comst. 195; Richardson v. Vermont Central R. R. Co. 25 Vt. 465; Charless v. Rankin, 22 Missou. 566.] As to how this right may be qualified or abandoned, see Rowbotham v. Wilson, 30 L. J. Q. B. 49; [8 El. & Bl. 123, 152.] But if any additional weight be placed on land, the owner cannot maintain an action if his house fall by reason of the adjacent or subjacent owner digging so near that the house fell, unless he did so negligently. Dodd v. Holme, 1 Ad. & E. 493; Wyatt v. Harrison, ubi supra. See Gayford v. Nicholls, 9 Ex. 702; [Thurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass. 226; Lasala v. Holbrook, 4 Paige, 169; Richart v. Scott, 7 Watts, 460; Moody v. McClelland, 39 Ala. 45; Foley v. Wyeth, 2 Allen, 131, 133. The owner of two adjoining plots of land sold one to the plaintiff, and the other to the defendant, - the latter under a covenant to build according to a certain elevation. Excavations were made by the defendant so as to enable him to carry out the contract, in consequence of which the plaintiff's building fell in. It was held, that the plaintiff had no ground of action. Murchie v. Black, 19 C. B. N. S. 190.] But although the weight upon the land has been increased by buildings, an action will lie, unless it be shown that the adjacent land gave way on account of such OBS. increased weight. Hamer v. Knowles, Stroyan v. Knowles, 6 H. & N. 454; and see Wyatt v. Harrison, ubi supra; [Brown v. Robins, 4 H. & N. 186; Hunt v. Peake, H. R. V. Johns. 705.] 370. This right to support may also be acquired, as where houses are so built that they rest for support the one upon the other. For mutual support there is either, by a presumed grant or a presumed reservation, a right to such mutual support, which is not affected by subsequent subdivision of the property on which they were originally built. Richards v. Rose, 9 Ex. 218; 23 L. J. Ex. 3; but see Solomon v. Vintners' Company, 4 H. & N. 585; 28 L. J. Ex. So the same right to support may be gained by lapse of time. Partridge v. Scott, 3 M. & W. 220; see Brown v. Robins, 28 L. J. Ex. 250; also Rogers v. Taylor, 2 H. & N. 828. [A man is not prevented from draining his own land because it will dimish his neighbor's support by withdrawing the percolating water, if his doing so does not derogate from the express or implied terms of his own grant. Popplewell v. Hodkinson, L. R. 4 Ex. 248. See Elliot v. North Eastern Ry. Co. 10 H. L. Cas. 333.] It is a good cause of action that a next neighbor conducts himself so carelessly, negligently, and unskilfully, in pulling down his own house, &c. as to injure thereby his neighbor's house, although the complainant may not, in respect of the latter house, have acquired any absolute right to the support of the building pulled down, or the adjoining soil. See Trower v. Chadwick, 3 Bing. N. C. 334; 6 Bing. N. C. 1; [Pierce v. Musson, 17 La. An. 389; Panton v. Holland, 17 John. 92; Richart v. Scott, 7 Watts, 460; M'Guire v. Grant, 1 Dutch. 356, 361; Shrieve v. Stokes, B. Mon. 453.] See the earlier cases upon this point, Peyton v. Mayor of London, 9 B. & C. 725; particularly, Dodd v. Holme, 1 Ad. & E. 493; Plant v. James, 5 B. & Ad. 791. See a form (semble, too general) in Lloyd v. Wigney, 6 Bing. 489. And it seems that if the defendant has been guilty of actual negligence, and thereby occasioned the injury, he is liable, although the plaintiff himself did not use those precautions he ought to have adopted against such injury. Walters v. Pfeil, M. & M. 362. [See Smith e. Hardesty, 31 Missou. 412.] In order to entitle the owner of land to succeed in an action against a neighbor for excavating near his boundary, it is necessary that appreciable damage should have been caused thereby. Smith v. Thakerah, 35 L. J. C. P. 276; and L. R. 1 C. P. 564. The damages should be to the amount of the plaintiff's old house thrown down by the defendant's carelessness, and not the whole expense of building a new one. Lukin v. Godsall, Peake Add. C. 15. See Dodd v. Holme, supra. It is not settled whether a party about to pull down his house is bound to give notice of his intention to his next door neighbor (who has not acquired a legal right to the support of the house, &c.) if he does not shore up his neighbor's house. See Peyton v. Mayor of London, supra; Massey v. Goyder, 4 C. & P. 161; and per Tindal C. J. in Trower v. Chadwick, 3 Bing. N. C. 353. In order to raise this question, the declaration should specially charge the omission to give notice, and the pulling down without shoring up. See form, 3 Bing. N. C. 337; post, form 3. See a form of declaration against commissioners of sewers for undermining the plaintiff's house by improperly making a sewer, The Grocers' Company v. Donne, 3 Bing. N. C. 34. As to the right to the support of adjoining property, see generally, Gale on Easements, by Willes. 1. For removing Subjacent Land and depriving the Plaintiff's Land of its support. (k) That the plaintiff was possessed of land under which the defendant wrongfully excavated and mined, and deprived the plaintiff's land of natural and sufficient support, whereby the plaintiff's land gave way and fell in. [Like counts. Humphries v. Brodgen, 12 Q. B. 740; Smart v. Morton, 5 El. & Bl. 30. (k) Venue local. See a form, Adams v. Lloyd, 27 L. J. Ex. 499; [3 H. & N. 351.] |