For a libel charging that plaintiff was a "black sheep," with an innuendo. M'Gregor v. Gregory, 11 M. & W. 287; 2 Dowl. N. S. 769; [O'Brien v. Clement, 16 M. & W. 159.] 4. For a Libel upon the Plaintiff in his Office. (e) For a libel upon plaintiff in his office of mayor, imputing peculation in regard to charity funds. Godburne v. Bowman, 9 Bing. 532; 2 M. & Sc. 700. For a libel on a justice of the peace. Adams v. Meredew, 3 Y. & J. 219; overruling 2 Y. & J. 417. On overseers of the poor. Cannell v. Curtis, 2 Bing. N. C. 228; Wood ward v. Dowsing, 2 M. & R. 74; Cheese v. Scales, 10 M. & W. 488. On churchwardens. Jackson v. Adams, 2 Scott, 599; 2 Bing. N. C. 402. On an alien Turkish Dragoman. Pisani v. Lawson, 6 Bing. N. C. 90. 5. For a Libel upon the Plaintiff in his Profession. (ƒ) Upon a proctor, charging extortion. Clarkson v. Lawson, 6 Bing. 266. On an attorney and vestry clerk of a parish. May v. Brown, 3 B. & C. 113. On physicians, see cases cited, ante, Obs. 6. For a Libel on the Plaintiff in his Trade or Occupation. (g) See general form for "Slander," post, 547, Form 9. 7. For Libels on and by Companies. See the last edition of this work, p. 572; [ante, 502, 538.] By a joint stock company. Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus Co. v. Hawkins, 4 H. & N. 89; 28 L. J. Ex. 201. Against a railway company, [for a libel published by means of a message sent through an electric telegraph.] Whitfield v. South Eastern Ry. Co. 27 L. J. Q. B. 229; [1 El., Bl. & El. 115.] (e) See Com. Dig. and Bac. Ab. Libels; Stark. Sl. 115; Lumby v. Allday, 1 Cr. & J. 301; [Miller v. David, L. R. 9 C. P. 125.] (f) See other cases as to libels on medical men, Smith v. Taylor, 1 N. R. 196; Ramadge v. Ryan, 9 Bing. 533; Ayre v. Craven, 2 Ad. & E. 2. Libel, that physician is not qualified, and evidence. Collins v. Carnegie, 1 Ad. & E. 695; Rosc. Ev. 6th ed. 373. Apothecary. Edsall v. Russell, 2 Dowl. N. S. 641; 4 M & G. 1090. What matter is actionable as a libel or slander of an attorney, see Day v. Buller, 3 Wils. 59; Phillips v. Jansen, 2 Esp. R. 624; May v. Brown, 3 B. & C. 113; 4 D. & R. 679; Stark. Slander, 123. See a form for accusing an attorney of "sharp practice," with innuendoes, &c. Boydell v. Jones, 4 M. & W. 446 ; 7 Dowl. 210. In order to prove that plaintiff is an attorney (if denied by plea) an entered copy of the roll of attorneys, signed by the plaintiff, is sufficient. So the book from the master's office, containing the names of all the attorneys, produced by the officer in whose custody it is kept, is good evidence, together with proof that plaintiff practised as attorney at the time of the words spoken. R. v. Crossley, 2 Esp. R. 526; Lewis . Walter, 3 B. & C. 138; Jones v. Stevens, 11 Price, 251. And the stamp office certificate, countersigned by the master of Q. B. is suf ficient primâ facie evidence of the party being an attorney of that court. Sparling v. Heddon, 9 Bing. 11. Where the libel itself admits plaintiff was an attorney, no other evidence thereof is requisite. As to what puts in issue the plaintiff's general professional character, Jones v. Stevens, 11 Price, 235. As to words of general abuse, not relating to plaintiff as attorney, Tomlinson v. Brittlebank, 1 H. & W. 573. (g) [See Weiss v. Whittemore, 28 Mich. 366.] The general rule is, that any libel or slander of a tradesman, though not of the goods which he sells, is actionable without special damage. Evans v. Harlow, 5 Q. B. 624. So of a party seeking a livelihood by any occupation (though not a trader subject to the bankrupt law); Whittington v. Gladwin, 5 B. & C. 180; and imputing to him insolvency, want of capacity, or dishonesty in his calling, and calculated to prejudice him therein. Bac. Ab. Slander, B. 4; Stark. Sl. 2d ed.; Selw. N. P. tit. Slander; Figgins v. Cogswell, 2 M. & S. 349; Saville r Sweeny, 4 B. & Ad. 514; Jones v. Littler, 7 M. & W. 423. Charge of immorality against a tradesman, supra. Partners in trade may join for a libel upon or slander of them in their business; Cook v. Batchellor, 3 B. & P. 150; or each may sue separately. Harrison . Bevington, 8 Č. & P. 708. 8. Other Forms for Libels on Parties in their Business, Trade, Occupation, &c.; see post, 548. Upon a banking firm, charging that they had stopped payment. Forster v. Lawson, 3 Bing. 452; Bromage v. Prosser, 4 B. & C. 247. The like, by one of a firm, for a similar charge. Robinson v. Marchant, 7 Q. B. 918; 15 L. J. Q. B. 135. Upon plaintiff as a stage-coach proprietor. Clement v. Chivis, 9 B. & C. 172. For a libel charging that a commercial firm were a swindling concern. Clarke v. Taylor, 2 Bing. N. C. 654; [Taylor v. Church, 1 E. D. Smith, 279; S. C. 4 Selden, 452.] Against a society for the protection of trade, for publishing the plaintiff's name in a list of persons who were deemed swindlers in trade by the society. Goldstein v. Foss, in error, 4 Bing. 489; Humphreys v. Miller, 4 C. & P. 7. For a libel on plaintiff as surveyor, &c. to a company. Rutherford v. Evans, 6 Bing. 451. For a libel on plaintiff as a civil engineer, with special damage. Brooks v. Blanchard, 1 Cr. & M. 779. For a libel on plaintiff as the vendor of a medicine. 3 Bing. N. Cr. 759. Morrison v. Harmer, By a servant against his late master, for a libel, whereby plaintiff lost a situation. Pattison v. Jones, 8 B. & C. 578. Form for a libel in giving a governess a false character, and law, &c. Fountain v. Boodle, 3 Q. B. 5. For a libel on plaintiff as a cook. Prudhomme v. Fraser, 1 M. & Rob. 435; 2 Ad. & E. 645. [For libel on a certificated master of a ship, imputing that he was drunk while in command of a ship. Irwin v. Brandwood, 2 H. & C. 960.] 9. For Slander. (h) For that the defendant falsely and maliciously spoke and published of the plaintiff [in relation to his "trade," or "profession," or "office," as the case may be, of "a butcher," which he then exercised and carried on], the words following, that is to say, (i) "he is a thief," or "he is insolvent." [If there be any special damage, (k) here state it with such reasonable particularity as to give notice to the defendant of the peculiar injury complained of; for instance:] whereby (1) he lost his situation as gamekeeper in the employ of A. (h) See Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, s. 61, sch. B. out. (i) The precise words used must be set Gutsole v. Mathers, 1 M. & W. 495. See Stannard v. Harper, 5 M. & R. 295; vice versâ, R. v. Berry, 4 T. R. 217. See, also, M'Pherson v. Daniels, 18 B. & C. 274; Bell Byrne, 13 East, 554; [ante, 541.] Words spoken at different times may be given in evidence on one count. Charlter v. Barret, Peake, 32. (k) Special damage, when it exists, should be alleged, whether the slander is actionable or not, otherwise the plaintiff cannot prove it, to enhance the damage. 1 Saund, 243, note (5). It is absolutely necessary to maintain the action, if the words be only of a disparaging nature, without imputing any crime, or are not spoken of the plaintiff in his office, &c. Kelly v. Partington, 5 B. & Ad. 645; Ayre v. Craven, 2 Ad. & E. 2; [Roberts v. Roberts, 5 B. & S. 384.] (1) This means entirely from the slander, Bing v. Watts, 8 C. & P. 614, though A. B. may not have believed it. Knight v. Gibbs, 1 Ad. & E. 43; [ante, 543.] [or "whereby A. B. and C. D. (m) refused to deal with or to recommend (n) the plaintiff in the way of his trade as a butcher," or "refused to send him a sum of money," or "to sell him goods on credit," or "to take him into their service as clerk ”]. 10. Other Forms for Slander of Plaintiff in his Business, Trade, or Occupation; see ante, 546, 547. (0) For words imputing insolvency to bankers. Bromage v. Prosser, 4 B. & C. 247; Forster v. Lawson, 3 Bing. 452; Robinson v. Marchant, 7 Q. B. 918; 15 L. J. Q. B. 135. For slander, imputing to plaintiff, a tradesman, that he had spread a report calculated to injure a public sale by another tradesman, whereby the latter refused to deal with the plaintiff. Wood v. Adam, 6 Bing. 481; 4 C. & P. 269. For slanderous words spoken of plaintiff as clerk of a company. Lumby v. Allday, 1 Cr. & J. 301; Francis v. Roose, 3 M. & W. 191. For slander of the plaintiff as chief mate of a merchant ship. Andrews . Thornton, 8 Bing. 431; 1 M. & Sc. 670, S. C. For a libel on a toll collector and treasurer. Sellers v. Tell, 4 B. & C. 655. For a libel on an assistant overseer, imputing false accounts. (Cannell v. Curtis, 2 B. & C. 228. For slanderous words of a coach proprietor and seller of horses, showing special damage. M'Pherson v. Daniels, 10 B. & C. 263. For slandering a boarding-house keeper and his wife; Saville v. Sweeny, 4 B. & Ad. 514; a governess; 2 Chit. Pl. 7th ed. 473. For slander of a journeyman in his occupation, whereby his employer discharged him. Towgood v. Spyring, 1 Cr., M. & R. 181. Slander of a domestic servant. 2 Chit. Pl. 7th ed. 463; Rogers v. Clifton, 3 B. & P. 587; Pattison v. Jones, 8 B. & C. 578; Child v. Affleck, 9 B. & C. 403; ante, 547. For slander, imputing to a pawnbroker that he had been guilty of "duffing' goods. Hickinbotham v. Leach, 10 M. & W. 361; 2 Dowl. N. S. 270. For slander of a butcher in his trade, that he "used two balls to his steelyard." Griffiths v. Lewis, 8 Q. B. 841; 15 L. J. Q. B. 249. By a policeman against a magistrate, for words uttered by him in the investigation of a case in which the policeman gave evidence, whereby plaintiff was dismissed. Kendillon v. Maltby, 1 Cr. & M. 402; 2 M. & R. 438. [Action by copartners as joint plaintiffs for slander respecting their trade. Cook v. Batchelor, 3 B. & P. 150; Maitland v. Goldney, 2 East, 426; Forster v. Lawson, 3 Bing. 452. (m) The names must be mentioned; Malachy v. Soper, 3 Bing. N. C. 382; Delegal v. Highley, 8 C. & P. 444; unless leading to great prolixity; and the parties themselves must be called, their declarations not being sufficient. 1 Saund. 243 d, note; [ante, 542, 543.] As to loss of trade, ante, Obs. "Damage.' (n) This is not proved by evidence, that the defendant repeated the words to A. B., who, in consequence, refused to deal with the plaintiff. Ward v. Weeks, 7 Bing, 211. See Sterry v. Foreman, 2 C. & P. 592. (0) Spoken words imputing to a man misconduct in his office or trade are actionable, although the office or trade is not one of which the court can take judicial notice. Foulger v. Newcomb, 2 L. R. Ex. 327. For slander imputing bankruptcy to a tradesman. B. 596. Brown v. Smith, 13 C. For slander of an innkeeper, stating special damage. Evans v. Harries, 1 H. & N. 251. For slander in calling a stockbroker a "lame duck." Morris v. Langdale, 2 B. & P. 284. For slander of a corn dealer, imputing that he delivered goods worse than those bargained for. Thomas v. Jackson, 3 Bing. 104. Thomas v. Jackson, 3 Bing. 104. See Babonneau v. Farrell, 15 C. B. 360. For slander of a gamekeeper, imputing that he killed foxes. Foulger v. Newcomb, L. R. 2 Ex. 327. 11. Counts for Slander in respect of Words not actionable in themselves, but only in Respect of the Special Damage caused thereby. For slander of minister, imputing incontinence, stating loss of some of his congregation. Hartley v. Herring, 8 T. R. 130. For slander, imputing incontinence to the plaintiff, whereby she lost the society and hospitality of her friends. Moore v. Meagher, 1 Taunt. 39; Wilby v. Elston, 8 C. B. 142.] FOR SLANDER OF TITLE. See Forms, 2 Chit. Pl. 7th ed. 480; Rowe v. Roach, 1 M. & S. 304; Pitt v. Donovan, 1 M. & S. 639; Smith v. Spooner, 3 Taunt. 246; Millman v. Pratt, 2 B. & C. 486; Malachy v. Soper, 3 Bing. N. C. 371. The law on this subject is fully explained in the latter case: an action for either written or verbal defamation of a chattel will not lie without special damage. Ingram v. Lawson, 6 Bing. N. C. 212; 9 C. & P. 326; Malachy v. Soper, ubi sup. As to publishing that goods offered for sale by auction were the property of another, Carr v. Duckett, 5 H. & N. 783; 29 L. J. Ex. 468; see Gutsole v. Mathers, 1 M. & W. 495; Rowe v. Roach, 1 M. & S. 304. [As to saying of a cattledealer that he then had the cattle disease among his cows, see per Blackburn J. in Watkin v. Hall, 3 Q. B. 399. As to saying of a stallion kept by the owner for the use of mares that he has got the venereal disease, see Wier v. Allen, 51 N. H. 177.] There must be either express or implied malice; Hargrave v. Le Breton, 4 Burr. 2422; see Brook v. Rawl, 4 Ex. 524; 19 L. J. Ex. 114; Smith v. Spooner, 3 Taunt. 246; [Like v. McKinstry, 3 Abb. (N. Y.) App. Dec. 62; Stark v. Chitwood, 5 Kansas, 141;] but malice will not be inferred from the defendant having put a wrong construction on a complicated act of parliament. Pater v. Baker, 3 C. B. 868; 16 L. J. C. P. 124. The libel or the very words themselves must be set out verbatim. Gutsole v. Mathers, 1 M. & W. 495. LIGHTS. See Ancient Lights," "Injunction." OBS. LODGING-HOUSE KEEPER. See ante, "Innkeeper." There is no duty on the part of a lodging-house keeper to take care of his lodger's goods. And therefore, in the absence of any misfeasance by him, he is not responsible for a loss arising from neglect to take such care of his house as a prudent owner would take, or for the wrongful act of a stranger, to whom, with the license of the lodger, according to the usage between landlord and tenant, he had shown the apartments for the purpose of letting them after the expiration of the lodger's tenancy. Houlder v. Soulby 8 C. B. N. S. 254; 29 L. J. C. P. 246; Dansey v. Richardson, 3 El. & Bl. 144; 23 L. J. Q. B. 217. See, also, the first resolution in Calye's case, 8 Co. R.; 1 Smith's L. Cas. MAGISTRATE. See "Justice of the Peace." OBS. MAINTENANCE. Ante, 307, note (t), 436; [2 Chitty Contr. (11th Am. ed.) 996, and note See declaration against an attorney for procuring a suit to be commenced; Flight v. Leman, 4 Q. B. 883; 12 L. J. Q. B. 353; where it was held that as the count was not for maintenance in its proper sense, it was necessary to aver that the action was commenced and prosecuted without reasonable or probable cause. See a count for instigating a suit, and another for maintenance. Pechell v. Watson, supra. For the statute against maintenance, see the report of the Osborne case, 11 L. J. Ex. 227. See ante, pt. 1, p. 307, note (t). MALICIOUS ARREST AND PROSECUTION. OBS. · Malicious Arrest. — In order to maintain an action for a malicious arrest the plaintiff must show: 1, the absence of reasonable or probable cause for such arrest; 2, malice in instituting the former action. [Shafer v. Loucks, 58 Barb, 426; Deitz v. Langfeit, 63 Penn. St. 234; Preston v. Cooper, 1 Dill. 589; Fullenwider v. McWilliams, 7 Bush (Ky.), 389; Burnaps v. Albert, Taney, 244; Lindsay v. Larned, 17 Mass. 190; Brigham v. Aldrich, 105 Mass. 212, 213; Dickinson v. Maynard, 20 La. An. 66; Moore v. Sauborin, 42 Missou. 490; Ammerman v. Crosby, 26 Ind. 451; Cook v. Walker, 30 Geo. 519; Barron v. Mason, 31 Vt. 189;] 3, the former suit, and arrest or imprisonment therein by the defendant; and 4, that the former suit has been determined in the plaintiff's favor. The absence of reasonable or probable cause must be alleged. Dimmock v. Bowley, 1 C. B. N. S. 542; 26 L. J. C. P. 231; [Dennehey v. Woodsum, 100 Mass. 195; Closson v. Staples, 42 Vt. 209; Given ". Webb, 7 Rob. (N. Y.) 65.] Whether or not there is reasonable or probable cause for an action or prosecution is a mixed question of fact and law; the jury have to find the facts attending, and giving a character to the prosecution, and the judge has to decide the question of law, whether or not the circumstances, when found and undisputed, afforded probable cause. Panton v. Williams, 2 Q. B. 169. See Douglass v. Corbett, 6 El. & Bl. 511. If there are not any facts in dispute, the judge alone must decide the question. Watson v. Whitmore, 14 L J. Ex. 41; Hinton v. Heather, 14 M. & W. 131; [Bacon v. Towne, 4 Cush. |