papers, and where he remains on stated days, and at tends to all business coming before him, the fact that he also maintains an office in another district of his county, where he remains a large part of the time, does not constitute an abandonment of his office.STATE V. SPRINGFIELD, Tenn., 37 S. W. Rep. 5.

53. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Lease-Covenant.-In a lease of lands irrigated by a ditch maintained and owned in common by those having lands to be irrigated, each landowner being entitled to a certain part of the water in the proportion that the number of acres owned bore to the number irrigated, a covenant to defend the lessee in the peaceful and quiet possession of the premises, and every part thereof, does not require the lessor to maintain the ditch; and therefore he is not liable to the lessee for damages caused by the temporary destruction of the ditch by floods.-STEVENS V. WADLEIGH, Ariz., 46 Pac. Rep. 71.

54. LIBEL.-Publishing, concerning one engaged in the railway and steamship ticket business, that a certain firm engaged in that business were compelled to discharge him for "conduct not irreprehensible," followed by a publication that while such person gives notice in a circular that he is no longer with such firm, but has moved his business, "as a matter of truth, and to guard the public against any surprise, we must confirm the statement, already publicly made," that he "has not moved away, but has been discharged" by said firm "for conduct not irreprehensible," is libelous per se, so that special damages need not be averred or proved.-TONINI V. CEVASCO, Cal., 46 Pac. Rep. 103.

55. LIBEL-Privileged Publication.-Publication in a newspaper of remarks made, at a meeting of a city council, by the city's representative in the State assembly, purporting to give information as to the conduct of the representative of the city in the State senate with reference to passage of city charter amend. ments, is not privileged, though the newspaper be the official paper of the city, the article being a mere voluntary unofficial report, published as a matter of news; especially where the paper circulated outside the city and the senator's district. - BUCKSTAFF v. HICKS, Wis., 68 N. W. Rep. 403.

56. LIFE INSURANCE-Statement in Application.-In construing an application for life insurance, and the answers to questions therein calling for a statement by the applicant as to whether or not he has ever had any disease of certain organs, a mere temporary all. ment, not indicating any vice in the constitution, nor such as to affect the general health or continuance of life, is not to be considered a disease, a failure to state which constitutes a misrepresentation. -RAND V. PROVIDENT SAV. LIFE ASSUR. SOC., Tenn., 37 S. W. Rep.

7.

57. MANDAMUS-Compelling Levy of Tax.-On review of a judgment for relator on mandamus to compel county commissioners to levy a tax to pay a judgment, the question whether the discretion of the court in granting a peremptory writ can properly be affected by matters of defense, in bar or abatement, to the war. rants on which judgment was obtained against the county, cannot be considered, no such matters having been pleaded or proved below.-BOARD OF COM'RS OF GRAND COUNTY V. NEW HAMPSHIRE SAV. BANK OF CONCORD, Colo., 46 Pac. Rep. 107.

58. MASTER AND SERVANT Action for Injuries to Brakeman.-In an action by a brakeman for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by a defective drawhead in the engine tender, and a defective coupling link, it was error to charge that it was defendant's duty to furnish plaintiff safe and proper links and drawheads, and that there was in law an implied promise to do so, which plaintiff might rely on, since it was necessary for defendant only to exercise ordinary care to furnish safe appliances, and there was no implied promise that it would do more than exercise such care.-TEXAS MEXICAN RY. Co. v. KING, Tex., 37 S. W. Rep. 34.

59. MASTER AND SERVANT-Fellow-servants.-A conductor of a freight train, and a person employed at a railroad station to inspect cars and ascertain if they are in a safe condition, are not fellow-servants.-ILLINOIS CENT. R. Co. v. HILLIARD, Ky., 37 S. W. Rep. 75. 60. MASTER AND SERVANT-Safe Place.-One R was employed by the foreman in charge of the track hands on a railroad operated by a receiver, and was taken, with other track hands, to a cut on the line of the road, and set to shoveling dirt onto a flat car. On the day before R was employed and set to work, the bank at the side of the cut had been undermined for two or three feet, and the wedges had been driven into the earth at the top of the bank, in order to throw the earth down. The bank had been left in this condition overnight, during which rain had fallen. No notice was given to R of the conditon of the bank, and it could not be discerned from the place where he was working. Shortly after R began work, the bank of earth fell upon him and killed him: Held, that leav. ing the bank in such dangerous condition was negli. gence, for which the receiver was liable.-THOMAS V. Ross, U. S. C. C. of App., 75 Fed. Rep. 552.

61. MECHANICS' LIENS-Mortgage-Priorities.-Under Rev. St. 1894, § 3350 (Rev. St. 1881, § 2931), which pro vides that a conveyance not recorded within 45 days from its execution shall be fraudulent and void as against subsequent bona fide purchasers for value, a mortgage not recorded till several months after its execution, and after rights to liens had been created in favor of [mechanics and material-men against the property, is inferior to the statutory liens, though notice of them was not filed till after the recording mort. gage.-JENCKES V. JENCKES, Ind., 44 N. E. Rep. 632.

62. MORTGAGES Foreclosure Sale.-Where land is sold on foreclosure in two parcels, and one of the purchasers sues out a writ of possession for the property purchased by him, the other, though not placed in possession of his parcel by writ, may, while the foreclosure suit is still pending, move to quash the former's writ, on the ground that it embraces a portion of the land purchased by movant.-RICHART V. GOOD. PASTER, Ky., 37 8. W. Rep. 77.

63. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION - County Government Act. The territory within which a municipal govern. ment is exercised is still a part of the State, and, for all purposes other than municipal government, is subject to the State's control, with the right on the part of the State to authorize the election therein of such offi. cers as may be required to execute its general laws, or to perform such functions, disconnected with the municipal government, as may pertain to the govern. ment of the State; hence, as to such officers, the city and county of San Francisco is within the provisions of the county government act of 1893, declaring what county officers shall be elected, prescribing their duties, and fixing their tenure of office at four years.KAHN V. SUTRO, Cal., 46 Pac. Rep. 98.

Secured

64. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT — Collaterals by Property.-When the holder of a note, who holds also collaterals, which in turn are secured by personal property, reduces the collaterals to judgment in his own name, he is under no legal obligation to pursue the personal property, but the owner of the collaterals must reduce the property, and apply the proceeds to the payment of his debt.-FIRST NAT. BANK OF CHATTANOOGA V. CHATTANOOGA PULLEY CO., Tenn., 37 S. W. Rep. 9.

65. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-Bona Fide Purchasers -Burden of Proof.-The assignee of a negotiable note transferred to him before maturity as collateral security for a pre-existing debt, though without any express agreement on his part for indulgence, is a bona fide holder for value, unaffected by equities between the original parties, of which he had no notice.-BARTON V. FERGUSON, I. T., 37 S. W. Rep. 49.

and another, who is not the payee, and whose indorsement is neither essential nor proper to the transmission of title to the note, signs his name upon the back of it, he becomes liable thereon either as joint principal or as surety, but does not, by thus signing his name, enter into such a contract of indorsement as will cut him off from setting up against the payee the defense that the note was founded upon an illegal consideration, and therefore void.-BENSON V. DUBLIN WAREHOUSE CO., Ga., 25 8. E. Rep. 645.

67. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT Contract for Sale.Where a debtor delivers to his creditor notes of a third person, payable to himself or order, under an agreement that, after inquiring as to the solvency of the maker, the creditor shall have the option of keeping the notes, and giving the debtor credit therefor, or of returning them, the refusal of the creditor, after a reasonable time, to return the notes, on demand, vests him with the ownership thereof, though they are not indorsed, and an assignment thereafter by the debtor conveys no title or interest to the assignee.-ESAU V. GREENE & BUTTON CO., Wis., 68 N. W. Rep. 405.

68. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS Pleading-Answer.In an action on a promissory note by a person who is not the payee thereof, where the petition says nothing about any indorsement of the note, but contains the allegation that said note was "for value sold and delivered to this plaintiff," such allegation may be put in issue by a pleading not verified by affidavit.-MORRIS V. CASE, Kan., 46 Pac. Rep. 54.

69. PARENT AND CHILD - Custody of Infant.-Ordinarily a father is entitled to the custody of his minor child, after the death of the mother; but the welfare of the child is paramount to the claims of the parent. -HUSSEY V. WHITING, Ind., 44 N. E. Rep. 639.

70. PLEADING-Action Prematurely Brought-Waiver. -Pleading to the merits is a waiver of the objection that the action is prematurely brought.-FIORE V. LADD, Oreg., 46 Pac. Rep. 144.

71. PLEADING Parties Contract.-A contract between a canal company and the shareholders in an unincorporated joint stock association, whereby the former, party of the first part, agrees to furnish water to the "respective" parties of the second part, and the latter agree to rent their "respective" shares in the association to said first party, is a several contract; and either of the second parties may maintain suit for damages occurring to him thereunder, without joining the others.-CONSOLIDATED CANAL CO. V. PETERS, Ariz., 46 Pac. Rep. 74.

72. PROCESS Service by Publication.-Within the meaning of Rev. St. 1894, §§ 320, 1299 (Rev. St. 1881, §§ 318, 1279,, providing for the service of process by publication in "a newspaper of general circulation," a periodical, ephemeral in form issued daily except Sundays, devoted to the general dissemination of legal news, and containing other matter of general interest to the public, is such a paper.-LINN V. ALLEN, Ind., 44 N. E. Rep. 646.

73. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT - Agency Ratification.Where a clerk who was left in general charge of a mercantile establishment during the absence of the proprietor ordered goods appropriate to the conduct of the business, which were received and placed in stock, and the proprietor, upon ascertaining these facts, did not, within a reasonable time, countermand the order and offer to return the goods, he was bound to pay for the same, although in the first instance the clerk may have transcended his authority in ordering the goods, it appearing that his want of authority was unknown to the seller.-SMITH V. HOLBROOK, Ga., 25 S. E. Rep. 627.

contributory negligence as will bar a recovery for the injuries.-SMITH V. CITY & SUBURBAN RY. Co., Oreg., 46 Pac. Rep. 136.

75. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Measure of Damages.-In an action against a railway company for destruction of hay by fire, the measure of damages, it appearing that there was no market for the hay at the place where it was destroyed, is the value of the hay at the nearest market, less the cost of transportation there, and not such value plus the cost of transportation from such market to the place where the hay was destroyed.-WATT V. NEVADA CENT. R. Co., Nev., 46 Pac. Rep. 52.

76. RAILROADS - Injury to Trespasser on Track.-A railroad company owes the duty of exercising reasonable care to prevent injury to trespassers on its tracks, and a greater measure of care is required in a populous part of a town or city, where houses in which children reside stand close beside the tracks, than in an unfre quented locality.-LINDSAY V. CANADIAN PAC. RY. CO., Vt., 35 Atl. Rep. 513.

77. SALE-Statute of Frauds.-Plaintiff purchased and took a bill of sale for wood piled on land of a third person, and subject to a lien for the cutting. The wood was measured and formally delivered, but was not moved. Within 3 1-2 hours thereafter, the seller paid off the lien of the choppers out of the money received from plaintiff: Held, that there was a sufficient delivery and change of possession, within Civ. Code, § 3440, declaring void, as against creditors, a transfer of personalty, unless there is an immediate delivery, followed by a continued change of possession.-DUBOIS V. SPINKS, Cal., 46 Pac. Rep. 95.

78. TAXATION Collection of Taxes.-Under Acts 1891 (Ex. Sess.), ch. 26, § 17, providing that a bill for the collection of taxes should include all taxes "due and unpaid on the property at the time of filing thereof," etc., if separate bills are brought to collect the taxes assessed in different years, and unpaid at the time the first bill is filed, complainant is entitled only to the costs of the first bill.-STATE V. BALDWIN UNIVERSITY, Tenn., 37 S. W. Rep. 1.

79. TAXATION Tax Deed as Evidence.-Hill's Ann. Laws, § 2823, making a tax deed prima facie evidence only of title in the grantee, when by a former statute it was made conclusive of the regularity of the ass-88ment and levy, except in certain cases, relates only to a matter of evidence, and does not impair the obliga tion of the contract between the State and a purchaser who bought lands at tax sale before its passage, but received the deed therefor afterwards.-HARRIS V. HARSCH, Oreg., 46 Pac. Rep. 141.

80. USURY-Action to Recover.-A complaint under Rev. St. § 1691, authorizing the recovery by a borrower of treble the amount of usury paid for a loan, is not defective because it fails to allege in terms that the sum paid was for the use of the money borrowed for a specified time, where it alleges facts showing that the amount exacted and paid exceeded by a certain sum the lawful interest on the money for the time it was kept by the borrower.-MATTHIESON V. SCHOMBERG, Wis., 68 N. W. Rep. 416.

81. VENDOR'S LIEN-Conveyance of Separate Interests. Where a vendee makes separate contracts with two persons, owning separate interests in a tract of land, for the purchase of their respective portions, but the land is subsequently conveyed to him by one deed, in which the vendors warrant generally the title to the whole tract (a gross sum being named as consideration), a recital in the instrument that "the vendor's lien is hereby expressly retained upon the land conveyed, to secure the payment of four bonds given for deferred payments of purchase money" (two of the bonds being payable to one vendor, and two to the other), subjects to the payment of the debt due each vendor the entire tract, and not merely his interest therein.-PATTERSON V. GROTTOES Co., Va., 25 S. E. Rep. 602.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., NOVEMBER 13, 1896. Cases like Conner v. Canter, recently decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana, will have special pertinency at this time, reminding candidates for office that a contract to appoint certain person as deputy or clerk, in case he is elected, is void as against public policy. It is important to the public that offices be filled by competent and efficient persons, and that the duties be discharged honestly. The persons having business to transact through a public office are entitled to considerate and courteous treatment, and are therefore directly interested in the personnel of all public officers. It is the duty of the person having the power of appointment to exercise it in such a manner as that the public interests will be best subserved. He must be left free to make the best appointments in his power at the time when he makes the appointment; for such appointments are, in a measure, made for the public good. He cannot abridge this right by contracts previously made. If he should promise the office to one person, and should subsequently discover that the public will be better subserved by the appointment of another, he must be free to make the better appointment. It is quite clear, as the Indiana court holds, that a contract which tends or may tend to the injury of the public service is void as against public policy.

Renewed interest in the discussion as to the proper scope of the doctrine of "stare decisis" has been excited by a paper read at the last meeting of the New York State Bar Association by Professor C. G. Tiedeman entitled "The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and a Proposed Modification of its Practical Application in the Evolution of the Law." The writer maintains that "the doctrine of stare decisis, is not properly applicable to anything

of judicial opinions, but does not "propose to take away from the decisions of the appellate court their binding force as precedent, so far as to require inferior courts to follow the precedents of the appellate courts in its judgment that the plaintiff, on the proved facts of the case, shall or shall not recover. I would still provide for the publication of a report of each case decided by an appellate court, but the report should contain only a statement of the proved material facts of the case, and a concise statement of the ruling of the court on the questions of the law. As a substitute for the published opinions of the judges of the court I would pro

pose the appointment of a commission, composed of the ablest jurists of the State, of the same high character which is ordinarily attained in the selection of judges, who shall be charged with the reduction of the existing law to the form of commentaries on the different branches of the law, and after the completion of this primary task, to issue annuals, in which the judgments of the courts during the current year will be analytically explained in the light of their exposition of the existing law, and the modification stated, if any, which the new case has made in the prior law. The courts are to retain their present right to overrule the existing law, and will be required, at least the appellate courts, to yield no more obedience to the expositions of the commission than they now show to their own prior judgments. I would also propose that the expositions of the law set forth by the proposed commission shall not take on the rigid form of a statute or modern code. but rather the easy flowing form of a commentary. Any attempt to reduce the law to the rigid, contracted form of a statutory enactment will provoke the same litigation that an ordinary statute provokes that deals with matters of vital interest to the people." As exemplifying to some extent the suggestions made by Mr. Tiedeman reference may be made to the method now practiced by the

theoretical gist of decisions free from illustrative comment or mere dictum. Without reference to the further suggestion of Mr. Tiedeman as to appointment of commissioners, etc., it will be generally agreed that some change in the direction of doing away with elaborate opinions of courts in all except important cases would be desirable.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-DEPOSITIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.One of the points decided by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas in the case of Cline v. State is of considerable interest to those interested in criminal trials, the holding being that the provision of section 10 of the bill of rights, that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be confronted with the witnesses against him, refers to the prosecution by "public trial" before the "impartial jury," also guarantied him by the same section; and under that provision, and the declaration of section 29 that "everything in this bill of rights shall forever remain inviolate and all laws contrary thereto

* shall be void," the reading in evidence against the accused on his trial of testmony given by witnesses on another hearing, or on preliminary examination, cannot be legally authorized. We regret that lack of space prevents giving to our readers the learned and exhaustive opinion of the court.

EVIDENCE-PROOF OF FOREIGN LAWS.-In Dawson v. Peterson, 68 N. W. Rep. 247, the Supreme Court of Michigan discussed the question how the laws of a foreign State might be proven. It was an action to recover the value of professional services rendered by a firm of Ontario lawyers to a citizen of Detroit. The services rendered were in accordance with the rates established by the Ontario statute. To prove this a barrister and solicitor of Ontario was called, and he was shown a printed volume, declared to be the Revised Statutes of Ontario for 1887, and appeared to be printed at Toronto, at the Toronto law printer's. He was asked to state if that was a volume of the statutes commonly admitted and used as evidence in the courts of Ontario, and answered that it He also testified that sections 31 and

was.

34 (chapter 147) of that volume had reference to solicitors' fees. The book was then offered and received in evidence, under objection of defendant's counsel that it was incompetent and irrelevant, and that no foundation has been laid for its introduction. "The general rule is," said the court, "that foreign laws may be proved by a printed volume thereof, which a witness having means of information can swear is recognized as authentic, and received by the courts in the country in which such laws are alleged to exist. 23 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 294; Owen v. Boyle, 15 Me. 147; Woodbridge v. Austin, 4 Am. Dec. 740; Jones v. Maffet, 5 Serg. & R. 523. In the last case a printed copy of the Irish statutes was offered in evidence, with the testimony of a barrister of Ireland that he had received them of the King's printer in Ireland, and that they were good evidence there. The statute was received in evidence by the Pennsylvania court to show the law of Ireland. See, also, O'Keefe v. U. S., 5 Ct. Cl. 674; Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch, 1; Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400. In Lacon v. Higgins, 3 Starkie, 178, a printed copy of the French code, produced by the French consul resident in London, who obtained it at a bookseller's shop in Paris, was admitted as evidence of the laws of France by proof that it was admitted and used as evidence in France. In the present case the statute was sufficiently proved, and was properly received in evidence. Sections 31 and 34 fix the tariff of charges for solicitors' fees."

BOARD OF TRADE-SUSPENSION OF MEMBER -REVIEW-RES JUDICATA.In the case of Board of Trade v. Nelson, 44 N. E. Rep. 743, the Supreme Court of Iilinois decided, reversing the trial court, that where a board of trade (which is a voluntary organization, though incorporated, and owning a building from which it derives an income, and is given the right by the act incorporating it to admit or expel such persons as it may see fit, in a manner to be prescribed by its rules and bylaws) suspends a member, on a charge and hearing pursuant to its by-laws, under its bylaw providing that, when a member shall be guilty of any act of bad faith or any other dishonorable conduct, he shall be suspended or expelled by the board of directors, as they may determine, the determination of the di

rectors cannot be reviewed. Upon that point the court says:

The status of the board of trade has been determined by this court in numerous cases; and it has been held to be merely a voluntary organization, although incorporated under an act of the general assembly. It is averred in the petition that it owned a building, and rented out rooms as offices, from which it derived an income; that this income was insufficient for its expenses, and an assessment was required each year; and that the present value of a membership is about $800. This does not change in any respect the character of the association, which must be determined by its charter. Any club or voluntary association, whether incorporated or unincorporated, may rent out rooms, and derive income therefrom; but the character of the association is not changed by that fact. The right to pursue a business as a member of such an organization in the hall of the building devoted to that purpose may be a thing of value; but its value is incidental to the membership, and a determination of such membership destroys the rights under it. This corporation is not bound to admit any person to membership, nor was the relator in any way forced into such association. He voluntarily became a member, and by his contract is bound to abide by the rules and regulations of the board. The courts will never interfere to control the enforcement of bylaws of such associations; but they will be left to enforce their rules and regulations by such means as they may adopt for their government. People v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 80 Ill. 134. When the relator became a member of the board of trade, he voluntarily submitted himself to the operation of all laws enacted for its government, and agreed to be bound by them so far as within the corporate authority. The by-law in question was not unreasonable, immoral, contrary to public policy, nor in contravention of the laws of the land. A by-law of this board, providing that, if a member failed to comply with a business contract made with another member, he should be expelled, was held to be valid in People v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 45 Ill. 112. And the validity of this by-law is unquestionable. The court has repeatedly refused to interfere with the disciplinary powers of this board, in equity as well as at law. Fisher v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 80 Ill. 85; Baxter v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 83 Ill. 146; Sturges v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 86 Ill. 441; Pitcher v. Board of Trade, 121 Ill. 412, 13 N. E. Rep. 187. In the case of Ryan v. Cudahy, 157 Ill. 108, 41 N. E. Rep. 760, which was unlike the other cases in this court, in not involving the disciplinary powers of the board, but where the board constituted a committee for the trial of disputes as to property rights between members of the board, this court held a member not bound by a proceeding not according to the rules and regulations provided for the action of such committee. In that case the complainant was held to be entitled to the relief, because the committee refused to hear any evidence in his behalf, and turned him away without a hearing. In that case it was said that the complainant, when he became a member of the board, agreed to abide by its rules, regulations, and by laws; and it was held that, having selected his tribunal, he was estopped from denying the jurisdiction of the committee either as to the person or the subject-matter; and the court expressly disclaimed any intention to interfere with the disciplinary power of the board over its members. No such question is involved in this case as in that. There is no question that the

judgment of the board of directors was arrived at in accordance with the rules and regulations of the board. The relator was suspended by a tribunal which he had voluntarily chosen to determine the question, and according to the rules to which he assented in becoming a member; and he had due notice of the proceedings. Such a judgment cannot be collaterally reviewed by the courts. So far as the courts are concerned, the judgment of the board of directors is conclusive, like that of any other tribunal.

It is argued that the charge made was not suffi cient. It expressly charged the relator with bad faith and dishonorable conduct in not carrying out a certain agreement, and a copy of that agreement was attached to the charge. This paper is not to be tested by the strict rules of criminal pleading. The accused was informed in what the bad faith and dishonorable conduct consisted; and his communication to the board, set up in his petition, showed that he was fully informed as to its nature. Anything further would be matter of mere form, affording neither security nor information to him.

Whether the evidence before the board of directors was sufficient to authorize its finding cannot be examined into by the courts. The relator stands convicted by the sentence of a tribunal of his own choice. With the question whether that judgment was correct upon the facts, the courts have nothing to do. Having given him notice, and made due inquiry, where there is no question of the jurisdiction or legality of the proceedings, the courts will not sit as courts of appeal, and re-examine the facts. To do that would be to usurp an authority in cases of this kind for which there is no justification in the law.

It is urged that the judgment of suspension was invalid. But the by law provided for such suspension, and the enactment of such a by-law was within the powers of the corporation.

TRUSTS AND MONOPOLIES-RIGHTS OF MEMBERS-EQUITY JURISDICTION.-The case of Greer v. Payne, 46 Pac. Rep. 190, decided by the Court of Appeals of Kansas, is a good one on the subject of combinations and monopolies. It is there held that all combinations and associations of persons formed in that State for the purpose of imposing an unreasonable restraint upon the exercise of a trade or business are unlawful and void, as against public policy, and contrary to the statutes of the State; and that a court of equity will not lend its aid to a member of such unlawful association, to enable him to retain his membership therein, and to restrain the association from suspending or expelling him therefrom for a violation of its illegal rules and by-laws. Upon the law applicable to the case the court says:

The articles of association and the rules and bylaws must be taken as a whole, in order to determine the character of this exchange. It matters not how meritorious and praiseworthy its declared objects may be. The law cannot be evaded by colorable pretenses. It looks at the substance of things, whatever disguise may be assumed to conceal it. It is impossible to read the articles of association and by-laws of