transfer of the interest of Dodge from a lienholder to a judgment creditor, and then to an owner in fee, The insurance company was willing to insure Dodge. as the assignee of the mortgagee. The contention of counsel for the insurance company is that Dodge failed to notify the company of the change of ownership which occurred when he purchased the property at sheriff's sale, and have the permission of the insurance company for the change of ownership indorsed upon the policy. We cannot think that this is such a change of ownership as, is contemplated by that clause of the subrogation contract. The change of ownership in this case increased the interest of Dodge, who, under the subrogation contract, is the insured. In no way was the risk increased. The title had not vested in some one other than the insured. It cannot be said that the insurance company might not be willing to insure the property with Dodge as the owner, because Dodge was already the insured. No one else could have maintained an action for the recovery of the insurance money. "A change of title which increases the interest of the insured, whether the same be by sale under judicial decree, or by voluntary conveyance, will not defeat the insurance." Insurance Co. v. Ward, 50 Kan. 349, 31 Pac. Rep. 1080, and cases there cited. If the property had been sold to some one other than the insured, and the insured had knowledge thereof, there would be a reason why such knowledge should have been imparted to the insurance company, so that they could have elected whether they would have carried the insurance with such a person as owner. In this case there was at no time a change of the person insured. It was always the loan company and its assignees. The only change of title or ownership was to increase the interest of the insured in the property, and make his interest the absolute ownership thereof. Surely the insurance company cannot complain of this; nor is it entitled to any notice of such a change, under the terms of the subrogation contract. CRIMINAL LAW-HOMICIDE-MALICE-PRESUMPTION.-In Territory v. Lucera, 46 Pac. Rep. 18, the Supreme Court of New Mexico decides that it is error on a trial for murder, to instruct that malice is implied from the fact of killing, especially where the killing is admitted, and the evidence for defendant tends to show that it was done under circumstances of considerable provocation, after deceased had attempted to secure his freedom by slaying his guards. The court says on this point: A much more serious class of errors was committed in relation to instructions 14, 19, and 24 given at the request of the prosecution, which are as follows: "Fourteenth. In this case there is no presumption in favor of the defendants, Juan B. Romero or Sostenes Lucera, or either of them, but they are to be judged in the same manner as if they were not officers of the law, and had done the killing in question, which is admitted, without being armed with a writ or warrant; and after the killing has been established, which is not denied in this case, it devolves upon the defendants to establish that the killing done by them was either excusable or justifiable, and that there was no malice, express or implied, in so killing." "Nineteenth. If the jury believe that the defendants, or either one of them, without the other objecting or protesting, and standing by shot and killed the deceased under such circumstances, then they would be guilty of murder in the first degree, unless they established the fact that they were excusable or justifiable by evidence to the satisfaction of the jury." "Twenty-fourth. The court instructs the jury that, while it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove every material allegation of the indictment as therein charged, it is not required that the same shall be proved in every case literally as charged, such, for instance, as the date, which may be changed-which is not required to be proven of the date shown in the indictment; that, if the material allegations of the indictment are substantially proven as charged therein, the same will be sufficient; that nothing is to be presumed or taken by implication against the defendants, or either of them, until the fact of the killing has been established beyond a reasonable doubt; that then the killing is presumed to be malicious, and it devolves upon the defendants to establish to the contrary." Is it true that the law implies malice from the fact of killing, upon the trial on an indictment for murder? It is true that a jury would not be at liberty to rest their verdict of guilt upon the fact of the killing by the defendant. But this conclusion of fact is quite different from a presumption drawn by law. "Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, either express or implied." Acts 1891, ch. 80, § 1. It must be (1) a killing; and (2) with malice. The killing of a human being does not constitute murder, but, as Blackstone says, "the grand criterion" which distinguishes murder from other killing is that the killing must be with malice aforethought. 4 Bl. Comm. 198. Judge Christiancy observes: "To give homicide the legal character of murder, all the authorities agree that it must have been perpetrated with malice prepense or aforethought This malice is just as essential an ingredient of the offense as the act which causes death. Without the concurrence of both, the crime cannot exist; and as every man is presumed to be innocent of the offense of which he is charged, until he is proved to be guilty, this presumption must apply equally to both ingredients of the offense-to malice as well as the killing. Hence, though the principle seems to have been sometimes overlooked, the burden of proof as to each rests equally upon the prosecution, though the one may admit and require more proof than the other." Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212. It is true, the rule that the law presumes malice from the proof of the killing is sustained by numerous and respectable authorities. The leading authority is Com. v. York, 9 Metc. (Mass.) 93, 1 Benn. & H. Lead. Cr. Cas. 322. But courts and commentators have, especially of late, denied it as a sound legal principle, and condemned it as an excrescence upon the law. The true rule, more accurately stated, and which does not conflict with the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, nor as to reasonable doubt, we think, is that malice may be implied from the intentional killing, where the jury, from the whole case before them, and beyond a reasonable doubt, find the additional fact that no circumstances of justification or excuse appear, and when there are no circumstances mitigating the killing to that of manslaughter. If there is reasonable doubt as to justification, there is reasonable doubt as to malice. The evidence of the killing may be considered by the jury, together with the whole of the evidence, in ascertaining whether there was malice; but it would be error to tell the jury that the killing alone is presumptive evidence of malice afore thought, as it would allow the jury to find malice, without stopping to inquire whether a considerable provocation appeared, or whether the circumstances were such as to show a wicked and malignant heart, which are essential ingredients of implied malice. In discussing this subjet, Mr. Wharton observes: "We must keep in mind that the doctrine that malice and intent are presumptions of law, to be presumed from the mere fact of killing, belongs, even if correct, to purely speculative jurisprudence, and cannot be applied to any case that can possibly arise before the courts." Wharf. Cr. Ev. § 737. This is so, because in no case does the prosecution limit its proofs to the bare fact of a killing. There is always disclosed some surrounding circumstance tending to show how and why it was done. It is from the killing, and all the circumstances disclosed upon the whole case, that the jury determine whether malice has been made out beyond a reasonable doubt. "It is true that we hear occasional utterances, as in Massachusetts, of the old doctrine that malice is to be presumed from the mere act of killing; but whenever this is done it is followed by the admission that, when the facts of the killing are proved, then the malice is to be inferred from the facts. Now, as the facts of the killing are always proved, the idea of abstract malice, being presumed from the abstract killing, has no application to the cases before the court." Id. §§ 722, 738. And Mr. Wharton adds: "Should, however, the judge make the proposition not speculative, but regulative; should he direct the jury that the logical inferences of this class are presumptions of law, and tell them to presume malice from the act of killing-then this would be error." Id. § 738. That is exactly what was done in this case, and, indeed, the foregoing instructions went even further. They not only told the jury that malice was to be presumed from the killing, but that it devolved upon the defendants to establish the contrary. What is implied malice? "Malice shall be implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when all the circumstances of the killing show a wicked and malignant heart." Section 3, ch. 80, Acts 1891. Implied malice does not, therefore, arise merely from an intentional killing, but from a killing under such circumstances as that the jury can say that no considerable provocation appeared or that all the circumstances show a wicked and malignant heart. In State v. Vaughan (Nev.), 39 Pac. Rep. 733, 736, the defendant admitted the killing, and claimed self-defense in justification. It was held error to charge that "malice aforethought means an intention to kill." Bigelow, C. J., says: "The fact that the killing was intentional does not necessarily prove that it was done with malice; for an intentional killing may be entirely justifiable, as where it is done in necessary self-defense; or it may be only manslaughter, as where it is done in the heat of passion, caused by no sufficient provocation. What it is must depend on the manner of the killing, and the surrounding circumstances." And the court in that case points out that, inasmuch as the defendant admitted the killing, it was important that the instructions upon this matter should be correct, and that such an instruction was highly prejudicial, under the circumstances. Dennison v. State, 13 Ind. 510; State v. McKinzie, 102 Mo. 620, 15 S. W. Rep. 149; Trumble v. Territory, 3 Wyo. 280, 21 Pac. Rep. 1081; State v. Wingo, 66 Mo. 181; People v. Willett, 36 Hun, 500. The element of im. plied malice was not merely formal. It involved the real and vital questions contested before the jury in this case. The evidence for the prosecution tended to show that the killing was done without provocation, and was a result of a deliberate purpose, under cover of a pretended arrest and pretended resistance. The evidence for the defense tended to show that the killing was done under circumstances of considerable provocation, after deceased had actually attempted to secure his freedom by slaying his guards. It was for the jury to determine which side spoke the truth. The jury were told that malice was to be implied from the killing, and that the killing by the defendants was established; and therefore the jury were told, in effect, that malice was fully proven, while the evidence for the defense went directly to attack the essential element of implied malice, as defined in the statute. It will be remembered that the actual killing was done by one of the defendants, yet the jury were told in the fourteenth instruction that the killing done by the "defendants" was established, The instruction then goes on to say that it devolves on the defendants to establish that the "killing done by them" was either excusable or justifiable, and that there was no malice, express or implied, in the killing. Even if it be true that the law imputes malice to him who kills another, the vice running through these instructions is that the legal presumption is raised against both of the defendants, and it is not confined to the one who fired the fatal shot; and in all of them the jury were told that the burden rested upon both defendants, and not merely upon the one who fired the shot, to prove want of malice, and excuse or justification. In the nineteenth they were told that the justification or excuse must be established by the defendants by eyidence to the satisfaction of the jury. Even though it be true that the law implies malice from the simple fact of the killing, and even though both defendants had actually participated in the killing, these instructions treat the presumption arising from the killing as though the burden of proof became thereby shifted from the prosecution onto the defendants. The presumption of innocence until guilt is established to the satisfaction of the jury is thus completely brushed away. The defendants were required to prove their innocence as to one of the material and essential elements of the crime of which they were charged, namely, that the killing was not done with malice express or implied. In State v. Payne (Wash.), 39 Pac. Rep. 157, 160, the Washington court, while holding to the old doctrine that malice may be presumed from a killing done with a deadly weapon, say, "Of course it would not be proper to instruct the jury that it was incumbent upon the defendant to overthrow this presumption by testimony in his own behalf." When counsel for the territory drew instruction No. 24, in which the jury were told that not only was malice to be presumed, but that it devolved upon the defendants to show the contrary, he confounded a mere rule of procedure, touching the order of proofs, with the functions of the jury in weighing the testimony,and applied to the latter a rule relating merely to the former. Whart. Cr. Ev. §§ 330, 738. The proofs of the prosecution, no doubt, made out a prima facie case amply strong enough to convict. When the defense introduced evidence in explanation and denial, they be came actors; but upon the submission of the case it was for the jury to say, upon the whole case, whether every element was established beyond a reasonable doubt, and, if not, to acquit. The presumption of innocence did not end at any particular period in the proofs. It continued throughout the trial, and did not terminate until, upon the whole case, the jury returned their verdict. Whart. Cr. Ev. §§ 330, 331; Coffin v. U. S., 156 U. S. 432, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 394; Davis v. U. S., 160 U. S. 469, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 353. "In a criminal case the establishment of a prima facie case only does not take away the presumption of a defendant's innocence, nor shift the burden of proof." Ogletree v. State, 28 Ala. 695; 1 Bouv. Law Dict. 227. Suppose the defendants had not introduced any testimony, although they were legally entitled to demand that the jury find every element established beyond a reasonable doubt; yet, if instructions like the fourteenth and twenty-fourth were given, it would be tantamount to directing them to find a verdict of guilty, even though the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses which may have been such as to leave a reasonable doubt of guilt. If the proposition announced in these instructions be correct, the proof of the killing would not only raise a presumption of malice, but that presumption would become proof beyond a rea sonable doubt, as a matter of law, unless the defendants successfully assumed the burden of showing the contrary. Such a proposition overturns the funda mental principles of the criminal law. In Chaffee v. U. S., 18 Wall. 516, the jury had been charged that the government need only prove that the defendants were presumptively guilty, and the duty then devolved upon them to establish their innocence, and if they did not they were guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice Field, speaking for the court, says: "We do not think it at all necessary to go into any argument to show the error of this instruction. The error is palpable on its statement. All the authorities condemn it. The instruction sets at naught established principles." In Coffin v. U. S., 156 U. S. 432, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 405, the jury had been charged that when the prohibited acts were knowingly and intentionally done, and their natural and legitimate tendency was to produce injury, the intent to injure is thereby sufficiently established to cast on the accused the burden of showing that their purpose was lawful, and their acts legitimate. The supreme court, per Justice White, say: "The error contained in the charge, which said, substantially, that the burden of proof had shifted, under the circumstances of the case, and that, therefore, it was incumbent on the accused to show the lawfulness of their acts, was not merely verbal, but was fundamental." While the case of the prosecution, made up in part by legal persumptions, may be such as to render it expedient for the defense to produce some evidence to qualify, explain, or deny the facts from which the presumption is sought to be raised, the burden of proof is not thereby changed; and, even if the law permits the jury to infer malice from certain things, it does not require them to do so. People v. Willett, 36 Hun, 500. The presumption of innocence is itself to be considered as evidence in favor of the defendants in every criminal case, under a plea of not guilty. Coffin v. U. S., 156 U. S. 432, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 394; Davis v. U. S., 160 U. S. 469, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 358. Upon this principle it is easy to reconcile the rule that in no case can the judge peremptorily direct the jury to find a defendant guilty of a crime. Sparf v. U. S., 156 U. S. 51, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273. "Strictly speaking, the burden of proof, as those words are understood in criminal law, is never upon the accused, to establish his innocence, nor to disprove the facts necessary to establish the crime of which he is indicted. It is on the prosecution, from the beginning to the end of the trial, and applied to every element necessary to constitute the crime." Davis v. U. S., 160 U. S. 469, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 358. In State v. Wingo, 66 Mo. 181, the trial court had charged that "if the defendant, Wingo, shot and killed Gam ble, the law presumed it to be murder in the second degree, in the absence of proof to the contrary; and it devolved upon the defendant to show, from the evidence in the cause, to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury, that he was guilty of a less crime, or acted in self-defense." The supreme court held the charge erroneous, saying: "The defendant is entitled to the benefit of a reasonable doubt of his guilt on the whole case, not only as to whether the case made by the State is open to reasonable doubt, but if the evidence for the State be clear, and in the absence of other evidence conclusive, still, if the evidence adduced by the accused, whether it establishes the facts relied upon by a preponderance of the evidence or not, creates a reasonable doubt of his guilt in the minds of the jury, he is entitled to an acquittal. At no stage of the trial does he stand asserting his innocence." In the Stokes Case, 53 N. Y. 164, after an elaborate argument upon this subject, it was held that the jury must be satisfied from the whole evidence of the guilt of the accused; and it was clear error to charge them that when the prosecution has made out a prima facie case, and evidence has been introduced tending to show a defense, they must convict, unless they are satisfied of the truth of the defense. "Such a charge," says the court, "throws the burden upon the prisoner, and subjects him to conviction though the evidence on his part may have created a reasonable doubt of his guilt. Instead of leaving it to them to determine upon the whole evidence whether his guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, it constrains them to convict unless they are satisfied that he has proved his innocence." In State v. Gassert, 65 Mo. 354, Judge Henry alluded to the difficulty of reconciling the doctrine contained in such instructions as these with elementary principles, but yielded to the force of precedents in that State; but in State v. McKinzie, 102 Mo. 620, 15 S. W. Rep. 149, it was repudiated, and the earlier cases overruled. See, also, State v. Wingo, supra; State v. Hill, 69 Mo. 453. But in State v. Evans, 124 Mo. 411, 28 S. W. Rep. 8, it seems to have been restored. In Massachusetts the case of Com. v. York, supra, has been greatly modified, if not overruled, in Com. v. Pomeroy, reported Whart. Hom. Append. (2d Ed.) 753, and is so considered by the Supreme Court of the United States in Davis v. U. S., 160 U. S. 481, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 353. See, also, Com. v. Hawkins, 3 Gray, 463; U. S. v. Armstrong, 2 Curt. 446, Fed. Cas. No. 14,467. The only case which we have found in this territory which seems to hold that the defendant must prove his innocence of the crime charged is Territory v. Trujillo, 32 Pac. Rep. 154, where it was held that the burden was upon the defendant to prove an alibi. But that ruling is not sustained by sound principle (Whart. Cr. Ev. 333), and is at variance with the rule laid down in Davis v. U. S., 160 U. S. 469, 16 Sup. Ct. 353. An alibi, if true, meets and completely overthrows every allegation against the accused in the indictment. 2 Thomp. Trials, § 2436. Extrinsic defenses which do not traverse the averments of the indictment, it is perhaps true, must be affirmatively shown by the defense, Of this class have been mentioned such as autrefois acquit, license command of superior officer, etc. Whart. Cr. Ev. § 331 et seq. But such matters of provocation, excuse, or justification which tend to traverse the element of intent or mal. ice must be weighed by the jury, not as a defense, but with all the other evidence, in determining whether every essential element of the crime has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Id. § 331; State v. Porter, 34 Iowa, 131; State v. Hill, 69 Mo. 451; People v. Marshall (Cal.), 44 Pac. Rep. 718; People v. Coughlin (Mich.), 32 N. W. Rep. 905; Coffin v. U. S., Davis v. U. S., and Hickory v. U. S., supra. BICYCLES AS BAGGAGE. Whether a bicycle is ordinary baggage within the meaning of the law governing common carriers is a question not only of novel interest, but is of considerable importance in view of the very general use now made of such vehicles. That, as yet, the exact point has not been determined by any court of last resort will give special value to a consideration of the authorities leading up to and bearing upon the question. As preliminary to the main question it may be well to emphasize one feature of the law relating to baggage and the origin thereof. In the leading English case of Macrow v. Great Western R. R., this feature and its origin is very clearly stated by Chief Justice Cockburn as follows: "The impossibility of traveling without the accompaniment of a certain quantity of baggage for the personal comfort and convenience of the traveler has led from the earliest times to the practice on the part of carriers of passengers for hire of carrying, as a matter of course, a reasonable amount of luggage for the accommodation of the passenger, and of considering the remuneration or the carriage of such luggage as comprehended in the fare paid for the conveyance of the passenger." Mr. Lawson in his "Legal Defini 2 3 tion of Baggage," said: *** The right of the traveler to take with him his baggage is one accorded by the carrier himself in the earliest era of the business of carrying passengers for hire—an inducement to attract travelers, like an easy seat or a warm car. It has always been for the obvious interest of carriers of passengers to encourage travel by permitting the passenger to take with him what he may require for his personal use on his journey, and this privilege of a reasonable amount of 1 In the preparation of this article liberal use has been made of an exhaustive brief prepared by Franklin Ferriss and J. H. Zumbalen, of the St. Louis bar, in the case of State ex rel. Bettis v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., before the St. Louis Circuit Court, wherein the question discussed by this paper was considered. It may be well also to state that the court, in its opinion, wherein a bicycle was held to be baggage, adopted substantially the argument and authorities herein reviewed. 26 Q. B. 612. 3 38 Cent. L. J. 5. baggage has ripened into a right like any other right of reasonable accommodation." Thus, while it is true that the having certain articles carried without extra compensation arose originally from the indulgence of the carrier, it has long since ripened into a right which the carrier cannot withhold if he would. And while in the beginning the carrier may have carried baggage without remuneration, now he is paid for that service, the price of the service being included in the fare of the passenger. The passenger having paid the regular fare to his point of destination, has the legal right to insist on the carrier's carrying his ordinary baggage-not free of charge, as the respondent claims, but without other compensation therefor than he has already paid in buying his ticket. It is in no sense true that the carrier now gets no pay for transporting ordinary baggage. The only limitation generally placed upon this right of the passenger and the corresponding duty of the carrier, is that which limits the passenger's right to an amount of baggage not exceeding a certain number of pounds in weight. But for this the carrier would be obliged to carry for the price of the regular fare all the property a passenger might have, which fell within the definition of ordinary baggage, without respect to its weight or amount. What, then, is meant by "ordinary baggage?" In Macrow v. Great Western R. R., Chief Justice Cockburn thus defines "personal" or "ordinary luggage," which is the English term corresponding to "ordinary baggage:" "We hold the true rule to be that whatever the passenger takes with him for his personal use or convenience according to the habits or wants of the particular class to which he belongs, either with reference to the immediate necessities, or to the ultimate purpose of the journey, must be considered as personal luggage. This would include, not only all articles of apparel, whether for use or ornament, but also the gun-case or fishing apparatus of the sportsman, the easel of the artist on a sketching tour, or the books of the student, and other articles of an analogous character, the use of which is personal to the traveler." This definition is now the accepted definition in England, and it has been cited with approval by ▲ Supra. the United States Supreme Court," and by other American courts and law writers.6 Under Chief Justice Cockburn's definition above quoted, "several things must be observed before it can be said that the particular personal property is or is not baggage. First. The property must be for the personal use or convenience of the passenger, and not for the personal use of another. Second. In ascertaining the necessity of such 'personal use or convenience' we must take into consideration the habits or wants of the passenger. Third. In ascertaining the habits or wants of the passenger, the particular 'class to which he belongs' must be considered. Fourth. The passenger's personal use or convenience according to the habits or wants of the class to which he belongs, must be considered with reference to the immediate necessities or to the ultimate purpose of the journey." A bicycle clearly meets all the requirements of the foregoing definition, when sought to be taken by its owner for his own personal use and convenience. The habits and wants of a bicyclist often occasion the necessity for carrying the bicycle with him for his own personal use and convenience for purposes of recreation, pleasure and locomotion. These habits and wants with respect to the purpose of carrying a bicycle are the same as those of the whole class of wheelmen or bicycle riders, to which he belongs who are in the habit of making railroad journeys for the purpose of carrying them to some favorable point from which they may proceed to use the bicycle for recreation, pleasure, etc., and the ultimate purpose of such journeys is for such use of the wheel. In a recent article in this JOURNAL,8 in which all the cases on the subject are reviewed, Mr. Lawson gives a definition of the term baggage, supporting each branch thereof by the citation of many adjudicated cases. This definition is as follows: "In the law of common carriers the term baggage means such goods and chattels as the convenience, or comfort, the taste, the pleasure, or the protection of passengers generally makes it fit and proper for the passenger in question Ry. Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U. S. 24. 6 Gleason v. Transp. Co., 32 Wis. 85; Anderson's Law Dictionary, Black's Dictionary and Bouvier's Dictionary, title Baggage. 7 See article on "What Constitutes Baggage," 29 Cent. L. J. 206. 8 38 Cent. L. J. 5. 9 accord to take with him for his personal use, ing to the habits or wants of the class to which he belongs, either with reference to the period of transit or the ultimate purpose of the journey." In the leading American case on the subject of baggage, the United States Supreme Court affirmed an instruction given below that baggage could not include such unusual articles as the exceptional fancies, habits or extravagancies of some particular individual prompts him to carry. As the things carried by him must be for his personal use, it is clear that such articles as a lady's sack and muff, or woman's jewelry, when carried in the trunk of a male passenger could not be deemed his baggage. Nor could presents for his friends. * * * Articles for use at the end of the journey, or during a temporary stay at a particular place are as properly baggage as those actually used, or intended to be used in transit. Thus, the gun and case of a sportsman on a shooting tour, or the fishing apparatus of one on a fishing trip, or the easel of an artist on a sketching trip, are certainly baggage. A leaves his home in the town of C to take up his residence in New York. He takes with him his ordinary wearing apparel, none of which he intends to use on his journey. This is baggage.10 So A, traveling by rail at night has an opera glass in his trunk. This is baggage. A student on the way to college, carries in his trunk manuscript books which it is necessary for him to study there. These are baggage.12 In this case it was said: With a lawyer going to a distant place to attend court; with the author proceeding to his publishers; with the lecturer, traveling to the place where his engagement is to be fulfilled, manuscripts often form, though a small, yet indispensable part of his baggage. They are indispensable to the object of his journey; and, as they are carried with his baggage, in accordance with universal custom, I see no reason why they should not be deemed as necessary a part of his baggage as his novel or his fishing tackle." A further striking illustration of the two branches of the definition involved in the case at bar, is the case of Ry. Co. v. Fraloff. 14 In that case the 9 Ry. Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U. S. 24. 11 Hammond v. Ry., 33 Ind. 379. 12 Hopkins v. Westcott, 6 Blatchf. 64. 14 Supra. |