property to a carrier by the owner, to be shipped to another point, not the place of business of the factor, and the taking by the owner from the carrier of a bill of lading in the name of such factor, and forwarding it to him, are not conclusive on the question of the intent of the owner to deliver possession to the factor, where there are other facts in the case tending to show that it was not the purpose of the owner to surrender possession to the factor, but that the object of shipping in the name of the factor was to obtain the benefit of a through rate, which could not be attained if the shipment was made part of the way in the name of the owner, and thereafter the balance of the distance to the place of business of the factor in his name.ROSENBAUM V. HAYES, N. Dak., 67 N. W. Rep. 951.

56. JUDGMENTS-Federal Courts.-Where a judgment recovered in a State court against a county is assigned to a citizen of another State, the assignee may sue thereon in the proper federal court, although the original judgment is still in force. The assignee has a right to have judicially determined its right to enforce payment of the indebtedness, and the action is not to be considered as brought merely to vex defendant.-FIRST NAT. BANK OF BUCHANAN COUNTY V. DUEL COUNTY, U. S. C. C. (Neb.), 74 Fed. Rep. 373.

57. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES - Gifts.-Defendant, pursuant to the request of his deceased brother, gave to his mother his share as distributee in the personal property of such brother, and the mother received the same in good faith, and without knowledge as to the donor's indebtedness, and without intent to defraud his creditors: Held, that the gift was nevertheless fraudulent in law, and voidable at the instance of such creditors.-NORRIS V. JONES, Va., 24 S. E. Rep. 911.

58. GAMING-Recovery of Money Won.-One who furnishes money to another to bet on the result of an election cannot maintain suit for the winnings.-HELBER V. SCHANTZ, Mich., 67 N. W. Rep. 913.

59. GUARDIAN AND WARD-Power of Guardian to Compromise.-Unless limited by statute, a guardian has authority to compromise and release claims or demands on behalf of his ward, and the ward will be bound thereby, unless done in bad faith and in fraud of his rights.-MANION V. OHIO VAL. RY. Co., Ky., 36 S. W. Rep. 530.

60. INSURANCE - Change of Title.-Where a provis. ional clause invalidates a policy of insurance if "any change shall take place in the title or possession" of property insured without the consent of the insurer, the assured may show by parol evidence, in an action on the policy, that a nominal warranty deed, executed by him to another, was intended by the parties to it as security for money to be loaned to pay off an existing incumbrance, and that the insured remained in possession of the property, and was the real owner.GERMAN INS. Co. v. GIBE, Ill., 44 N. E. Rep. 490.

61. INTOXICATING LIQUORS-License-Signature.-Act 1895, § 9 (Laws 1895, p. 248), prohibits the granting of liquor licenses against which a remonstrance "in writing, signed" by a majority of the legal voters of certain county subdivisions, has been filed: Held, that the signature of a remonstrator, in which the Christian name is designated by initials, and the surname written in full, is sufficient.-COLLINS V. MARVEL, Ind., 44 N. E. Rep. 487.

62. INTOXICATING LIQUOR - What Constitutes Sale.Where defendant delivered liquor to another to be paid for in other liquor at some future time, the transaction was a sale within the law prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors within a local option district.KEATON V. STATE, Tex., 36 S. W. Rep. 440.

63. IRRIGATION-Diversion. -One having senior water rights need not use all the water to which he is entitled, where first used on his lands, but may sell part of the rights, and allow the purchaser to divert water to other lands.-LARIMER & WELD RESERVOIR Co. v. CACHE LA POUDRE IRRIGATING CO., Colo., 45 Pac. Rep. 525.

64. JUDGMENT-Equitable Relief-Garnishment.-In garnishment, judgment was rendered against the garnishee, who attempted to defend on the ground of liability incurred by indorsements for defendant above the amount due the defendant for salary. Subsequently, the defendant being insolvent, the garnishee was compelled to pay the notes, and, also, after the return day of the summons in the garnishment proceedings, voluntarily paid to an assignee of the defendant's salary a sum nearly equal to the amount of the judgment: Held, that the insolvency of the defendant was no ground for equitable relief to the gar nishee against the judgment rendered against him as garnishee.-FRANKLIN V. COMMERCIAL BANK OF LYNCHBURG, Va., 24 S. E. Rep. 918.

65. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE-Impeachment of Record. -Mills' Ann. St. § 2787, requiring justices to keep a record of their proceedings, etc., does not constitute a court of a justice of the peace a court of record importing absolute verity to the entries in the docket, but such record may be impeached by parol.-HAMILL V. FERRIER, Colo., 45 Pac. Rep. 522.

66. LIMITATIONS Actions by Foreign Mutual Fire Companies.-Laws 1893, ch. 293, which provided that all foreign mutual fire insurance companies that had been declared insolvent should collect "all claims due" from policy holders within the State for premiums or assessments within six months after the passage of said act, was not restricted to claims actually payable at that time, so as to become the proper subject of an action, but included claims on then existing premium notes for assessments made and notified after such enactment.-WYMAN V. KIMBERLY-CLARKE Co., Wis., 67 N. W. Rep. 932.

67. MANDAMUS - County Seat.- Where there is no other adequate and speedy remedy to test the validity of an election held to relocate a county seat, mandamus to compel the county officers to hold their offices at the legal county seat is the proper remedy to determine whether the county seat has been legally changed.-STATE V. LANGLIE, N. Dak., 67 N. W. Rep.

958.

68. MARRIAGE-License.-A marriage is valid, though the ceremony was performed in a county other than that from which the license issued. CUMMINGS V. STATE, Tex., 36 S. W. Rep. 442.

69. MASTER AND SERVANT-Injury-Apparent Danger. -If, by the negligence of a master, a servant is placed in a position which appears to him to threaten the loss of his life or his serious injury, and in an effort to save himself he is injured, the master will be liable for the injury, without regard to whether the servant acted as a prudent person might be expected to act under like circumstances.-GULF, C. & S. F. RY. Co. v. KNOTT, Tex., 36 S. W. Rep. 491.

70. MASTER AND SERVANT-Substitution by Employer. -A master cannot escape his liability to his servant for negligence by relegating his employee to the service of another; the servant being continued at his original employment, and no knowledge imparted to him of a change in the relations between him and his master. - MISSOURI, K. & T. RY. CO. OF TEXAS V. FERCH, Tex., 36 S. W. Rep. 487.

71. MASTER AND SERVANT-Vice-principals.-The fact that the engineer, who, together with the brakeman on the train, is under the control of the conductor, gives the signals upon which it becomes the duty of the brakeman to put on the brakes, does not make him the vice-principal of the railroad company within the meaning of Act March 10, 1891, which provides that "all persons engaged in the service of any railway corporation who are intrusted by such corporation with the authority to direct any other employee," are vice-principals of such employer.-TEXAS CENT. RY Co. V. FRAZIER, Tex., 36 S. W. Rep. 433.

72. MECHANIC'S LIEN-Payment.-A landowner executed notes in payment for material used in the erection of a building which showed that they were lien notes. Subsequently he executed other notes, after

the maturity of the first, which referred to the old notes as collateral security for the new, and afterwards executed another note for the full amount of the debt: Held, that the new notes were not necessarily a payment of the lien notes, so as to extinguish the lien as against a subsequent mortgagee.-GILBERT V. MOODY, Ky., 36 S. W. Rep. 523.

73. MORTGAGE-Breach of Covenant to Pay Taxes.A mortgage contained a covenant by the mortgagor to pay taxes, and a power of sale on default in payment of principal or interest when due, or "in case of non payment of taxes," and provided that in case of such sale the mortgagee should retain "the principal and interest which may then be due, together with costs and charges," etc.; but there was no stipulation that the mortgagee might pay taxes, and recover the amount as part of the mortgage debt, or that the debt should become due on default in payment of taxes: Held, that a mere breach of the covenant to pay taxes gave no right to foreclose.-HELLER V. NEEVES, Wis., 67 N. W. Rep. 923.

74. MORTGAGE-Foreclosure-Notice.-It is not in the power of the legislature to cure by retroactive legis. lation the defect in foreclosure proceedings arising from the failure to publish the notice of sale for the full period of 42 days, and thus validate the void proceedings.-FINLAYSON V. PETERSON, N. Dak., 67 N. W. Rep. 953.

75. MORTGAGES-Foreclosure-Grantee of Mortgaged Premises. Where a mortgagor conveys one of several tracts covered by a single mortgage by deed contain. ing a covenant for the assumption of the grantee of the payment of the entire mortgage as part of the consideration, and on foreclosure the proceeds of sale are insufficient to satisfy the mortgage, the said grantee is liable in equity directly to the mortgagee for the deficiency.-GREEN V. STONE, N. J., 34 Atl. Rep. 1099.

76. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION Defective Sewers. Evidence that, during an unusual rain storm, the lid of a manhole of a self-cleaning sewer was forced off by the water in the sewer, and that, prior to the day of the storm, there had been the usual slight accumulation of sediment, in the bottom of the sewer, is insufficient to warrant a recovery for damages to private property caused by the escaping sewage, on the grounds that the overflow was caused by defendants' negligence in allowing the sewer to become obstructed by an accumulation of refuse matter, and in failing to remove it when it had, or with reasonable diligence might have had, notice of the obstruction.-MAYOR, ETC., OF BALTIMORE V. SCHNITKER, Md., 34 Atl. Rep. 1132. 77. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Public Improvements - Estoppel. Where a property owner, having full knowledge, personally and through his agent, of a proposed street improvement, and of the assessment to defray the cost thereof, allowed the same to be completed without making any objection thereto, the collection of such assessment will not be restrained upon a bill brought several months after such completion, alleging irregularities in the assessment. FITZHUGH V. CITY OF BAY CITY, Mich., 67 N. W. Rep. 904.

78. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Refunding Bonds Constitutional Law.-Under Act March 3, 1877, authorizing the funding of city indebtedness, and providing that, after "funding bonds shall have been issued, no action or proceeding shall be instituted nor any defense to any action interposed by said city, or by any person, the object of which shall be to impair the validity or security or depress the value of said bonds," funding bonds which have passed into the hands of bona fide holders are not subject to defense by the city, and therefore are subject to be refunded, irrespective of the validity of the original indebtedness.-MYERS V. CITY OF JEFFERSONVILLE, Ind., 44 N. E. Rep. 452.

79. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Taxation. A city whose corporate limits extended to the low-water mark on the Indiana side of the Ohio river authorized

a bridge company to construct a bridge across the river, within its limits, with approaches upon its streets. The ordinance provided that the right to levy taxes on the portion of the bridge within the city limits should be reserved: Held, that the city could levy taxes on the entire portion of the bridge within its limits, for ordinary city expenses, including current expense of public schools, and for the payment of interest on water bonds, railroad aid bonds, and school bonds previously issued. HENDERSON BRIDGE CO. v. CITY OF HENDERSON, Ky., 36 S. W. Rep. 561.

81. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Taxation Extra Levy. The charter of the city of Denison (section 118) provides, that the city council may levy a tax of one and a half per cent. on all taxable property, and an additional tax of 1 per cent. for any purpose the accomplishment of which is authorized by the charter, if approved by two-thirds of the tax-paying voters. Under section 46, the council may provide by ordinance for the payment of existing indebtedness, and section 113 gives the council power to appropriate from the general revenue to discharge accrued indebtedness: Held, that the council has no power to levy the extra tax for the payment of a pre-existing debt, and mandamus will not lie to compel a submission of an extra tax levy to defray such indebtedness to the taxpayers.-CITY OF DENINSON V. FOSTER, Tex., 36 S. W. Rep. 401.

82. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Water-works.-A municipal grant of a franchise to a water-works company for a term of years, without receiving bids therefor publicly after due advertisement, as required by Const. § 164, is void.-NICHOLASVILLE WATER CO. v. BOARD OF COUNCILMEN OF TOWN OF NICHOLASVILLE, Ky., 36 S. W. Rep. 549.

83. MUNICIPAL COURTS-Jurisdiction-Constitutional Law. Under Const. art. 5, § 1, declaring that the "judicial power of this State" shall be vested in certain named courts, "and in such others as may be provided by law," the legislature cannot give a municipal court, created as an incident to a municipal corporation, jurisdiction concurrent with a State court over violations of State Laws.-LEACH V. STATE, Tex., 36 S. W. Rep. 471.

84. MUNICIPAL OFFICERS-Removal by Mayor.-St. § 2794, providing that the mayor may, by a written or der, giving the reasons therefor," remove from office any head of department, director or other officer ap pointed by him, does not authorize the removal of officers appointed for a fixed term, without notice and opportunity to be heard.-TODD V. DUNLAP, Ky., 36 S. W. Rep. 541.

85. NATIONAL BANKS-Stockholders.-One who know. ingly permits his name to be entered, upon the stock books of a national bank, as the owner, individually, of stock therein, cannot be permitted, as against creditors, or a receiver of the bank representing them, to show that he was not the owner of the stock; and he is liable for an assessment thereon, though he held the stock, in fact, as trustee for the bank itself.-LEWIS V. SWITZ, U. S. C. C. (Neb.), 74 Fed. Rep. 381. 86. NATIONAL BANKS Stockholders Transfer of Stock.-One C was the holder of stock in the D na tional bank, and was also an officer of the L bank, which held stock in the D bank. In the latter capacity, he was informed of an urgent demand upon the L bank to send $5,000 by telegraph in aid of the D bank. Within a week after this demand, L transferred his

stock in the D bank, without consideration, to his five children, one of whom was a married woman and two minors. Within five months thereafter, the D bank failed, and an assessment was made on the stockholders: Held, that the transfer must have been made by L, in contemplation of the liability, and that both he and his transferees were liable for the assessment, the latter because the liability was cast upon them by law when they became stockholders.-FOSTER V. LINCOLN, U. S. C. C. (Vt.), 74 Fed. Rep. 382.

87. NEGLIGENCE-Fire Set by Thresher Engine.-In an action to recover damages for the destruction of plaintiff's grain while being threshed by defendant with a steam threshing outfit, defendant's offer to show that improper fuel was furnished by plaintiff for the engine, if admissible under the pleadings, must connect the proposed proof with the fire by further showing that such fuel was more liable than other fuel to communicate fire to the grain.-HOLMAN V. BOSTON LAND & SECURITY Co., Colo., 45 Pac. Rep. 519.

$8. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-Extension of TimeSureties. The surety on a note is not released by the mere promise of the holder, made to the principal maker, without the knowledge or consent of the surety, to give an extension of the time of payment thereof, unless such promise be founded upon a new and sufficient consideration.-EATON V. WHITMORE, Kan., 45 Pac. Rep. 450.

89. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT Interest. When a note expressly provides that the principal bears interest at the rate of 7 per cent. from date until paid, and the mortgage securing the same provides that on default of payment of any part of the sum secured, when due, interest shall be paid at the rate of 12 per cent. per annum from the date of the note, the rate of interest recoverable in an action brought on the note and mortgage is controlled by the terms of the note, and is lim. ited to 7 percent. per annum.-NEW ENGLAND MORTGAGE SECURITY CO. V. CASEBIER, Kan., 45 Pac. Rep. 452. 20. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-Real Party in Interest. The indorsee and holder of a negotiable note, which is regularly transferred to him by a written indorsement in full, is vested with the legal title thereto, and may maintain an action thereon against the maker, in his own name, as the real party in interestwithin the meaning of the Code, no prior holder claiming any interest therein; and it is immaterial, in such case, what may be the equities and relations existing between the indorsee and his indorser as to the proceeds of the note.-LINNEY V. THOMPSON, Kan., 45 Pac. Rep. 456.

91. OFFICERS-Term of Office-Power of Removal.Under Code Pub. Gen. Laws, art. 23, § 121, providing that the chief officer of the insurance department of the State "shall be appointed by the governor, treas urer, and comptroller, for the term of four years, and shall be known as the insurance commissioner, and shall hold his office during the term for which he is appointed and qualified, unless sooner removed by the governor, treasurer and comptroller," the commissioner, while appointed for a fixed term, holds the position subject to the power of removal vested in the governor, treasurer, and comptroller; and, no causes of removal being specified by the law, as there are in case of many of the civil officers, such power must be held to rest in the discretion of the removing officers; and may be exercised by their unanimous vote, without the preferring of charges or giving of notice to the incumbent.-TOWNSEND v. KURTZ, Md., 34 Atl. Rep.

1123.

92. PARTITION Deed by Tenants in Common.-A deed by tenants in common which recites that it is made to the grantee "for the sole purpose of dividing the pieces or parcels of land hereinafter described, that deeds may come direct from the party of the second part to the parties of the first part, according to their respective interests," is binding on none of the grantors unless executed by all.-CENTER V. DAVIS, Cal., 45 Pac. Rep. 468.

93. PLEDGE Rehypothecation by Pledgee.-A rehy. pothecation of collateral securities by the holder thereof is not a conversion, but such securities remain as collateral so long as they are not sold and passed beyond the pledgor's control.-PACKARD V. DENVER SAV. BANK, Colo., 45 Pac. Rep. 511.

94. PLEDGE-Tender.-A tender to the attorneys of a pledgee of the amount necessary to redeem the pledge, on condition that the pledge be immediately surrendered, is not good, where the party making the tender knows that the attorneys have not the pledge in their possession, and the attorneys are justified in doubting whether the party making the tender is entitled to redeem.-MALONE V. WRIGHT, Tex., 36 S. W. Rep. 420.

95. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY- Action on Bonds.Where a bond is given for the faithful performance of a contract, the obligee may, on breach thereof, join in one suit the sureties on such bond and the sureties on a subsequent bond executed as additional security for the performance of the same contract.-DEUTSCHMAN V. BATTAILE, Tex., 36 S. W. Rep. 489.

96. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Subrogation of Surety.Under Code, § 527, declaring the bond of a tax collector a lien upon the property of sureties from the date of his default, the sureties, upon payment of a judgment against them for the default of a tax collector, are subrogated to the rights of the county therein, and as against a non-contributing surety acquire a lien for his share superior to any mortgage or other lien of date subsequent to such default.-CUMMINGS V. MAY, Ala., 20 South. Rep. 307.

97. PROCESS-Constructive Service.-Code, art. 16, § 112, providing for constructive service by publication in certain cases, must be strictly complied with; and where a bill was filed against the unknown heirs of the children of B H, deceased, and the order of publication notified and warned the children of A H to appear, the notice was fatally defective.-HARDESTER V. SHARRETTS, Md., 34 Atl. Rep. 1122.

98. PUBLIC LANDS-Entries-Cancellation.-The commissioner of the general land office, after issuance of a final certificate and before issuance of a patent, has authority after hearing, of which the entryman has had due notice, to cancel an entry of public lands allowed by subordinate officials of the department upon fraudulent final proofs.-CALDWELL V. BUSH, Wyo., 45 Pac. Rep. 488.

99. PUBLIC LANDS-State Lands.-Const. art. 14, § 2, providing that land certificates should thereafter be "located, surveyed or patented only upon vacant and unappropriated public domain, and not upon any land titled or equitably owned under color of title from the sovereignty of the State," did not inhibit the bringing of a suit by the State against the holder of such title to cancel the same and recover the land; and, when the land is recovered in such a suit, it ceases to belong to the class of prohibited lands, and is again subject to location.-FAULK V. SANDERSON, Tex., 36 S. W. Rep.

403.

100. RAILROAD OOMPANY-Street Railroads-Injuries to Passenger.-In an action against a street-railway company for injuries, where the plaintiff testified that his place of business was in the middle of the block below the crossing where he attempted to get off, and that the motorman saw him arise from his seat, and go to the door to get off at the crossing, it was compe. tent to show by the motorman that the plaintiff was in the habit of riding to the middle of the block before getting off, and had several times requested the motorman to slow down, and let him off there.-MCDONALD V. MONTGOMERY ST. R., Ala., 20 South. Rep. 317. 101. RAILROAD COMPANY-Street Railroads - Negligence. A street railway company propelling its cars by electricity along the public streets of a city owes a duty to the public which requires it to so regulate the movements of its cars at the intersection of such streets, when receiving or discharging passengers from a standing car, as not to unnecessarily expose

pedestrians to the danger of collision with a passing car on the opposite track.-CONSOLIDATED TRACTION Co. v. SCOTT, N. J., 34 Atl. Rep. 1094.

102. RAILROAD COMPANIES - Injury Contributory Negligence. In an action against a railway conpany for injuries, it appeared that plaintiff, a motorman on an electric street railway, stopped his car about 40 feet from the crossing of defendant's railroad, and looked in both directions, but saw no train. At this point, and up to within 10 feet of the track, a train could have been seen 570 feet distant, in a southeasterly direction. Plaintiff started his car, but did not look again until about 5 feet from the track, when he saw a train coming from the southeast, about 200 feet from him, and his car was struck before it got across the track: Held, that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence precluding a recovery.-VREELAND V. CINCINNATI, S. & M. R. Co., Mich., 67 N. W. Rep. 905.

103. RAILROAD COMPANIES - Injuries to Person on Track. The contributory negligence of a pedestrian, in placing himself in a dangerous position, by walking upon a railway track, will prevent a recovery for his death, caused by being struck by a train, provided those in charge of the train did not actually see his danger, though they could have done so, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, in time to have avoided injury to him.-TEXAS & P. RY. Co. v. BREADOW, Tex., 36 S. W. Rep. 411.

104. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Trespassers-Infants.-A railroad company owes no higher duty to an infant trespassing upon its tracks than to an adult, and is not liable for injuries suffered by such a trespasser, unless, after the discovery of his presence on the track, it has failed to use ordinary care to avoid injuring him.-FELTON V. AUBREY, U. S. C. C. of App., 74 Fed. Rep. 350.

106. REMOVAL OF CAUSES Federal Question. - A cause cannot be removed from a State to a federal court on the ground that it is one arising under the federal constitution or laws, unless the fact is shown by the complaint.-TEXAS & P. RY. Co. v. CAPLES, Tex., 36 S. W. Rep. 516.

107. RES JUDICATA.-A petition for mandamus will be examined by the supreme court when presented, and, unless probable grounds for issuance of the writ appear, it will be dismissed without citation. A verdict of a jury, when the time has passed in which the court has power to set it aside, is an adjudication of the facts at issue in the case, and may be pleaded in bar of another suit on the same cause of action, though no judgment has been entered upon it.-HUME V. SCHINTZ, Tex., 36 S. W. Rep. 429.

108. SALES-Description of Goods — Condition Precedent. In an action for damages for a breach of contract, it appeared that plaintiff had agreed to purchase from defendant all the steel scrap in his ship. yard, "consisting of clippings and punchings from the steel plates and angles and beams used in the construction of the United States cruisers" built by defendant. So far as the contract was evidence by writing, there was a sale of goods by specific descrip tion. After payment by plaintiff on delivery, it was found that materials of a different character were mingled with the steel scrap, much reducing its value: Held, that the written, specific description was not a warranty, but a condition precedent, that the goods sold should be what they were alleged to be, for a breach of which plaintiff could recover the difference between the price paid and the value of the goods delivered.-COLUMBIAN IRON WORKS & DRYDOCK Co. V. DOUGLAS, Md., 34 Atl. Rep. 1118.

109. TAXATION Exemption - School Building. — A house owned by a practicing attorney, in which he lives with his wife, she conducting therein a day and boarding school, is not within Rev. St. 1895, art. 5065, exempting from taxation, under authority of Const. art. 8, § 2, "all buildings used exclusively and owned by persons or associations for school purposes."— EDMONDS V. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, Tex., 86 S. W. Rep.

495.

110. TAXATION-Interstate Commerce-Express Com. panies.-The tax authorized by the Act of May 14 1894, is an excise tax, imposed for the privilege of earrying on the express business in this State, and sald act is a valid law.-ADAMS EXP. Co. v. STATE, Ohio, 44 N. E. Rep. 506.

111. TROVER-When Lies.-Plaintiff employed defendant as an attorney to bring suit on a claim, and sent a check, payable to defendant's order, to cover disbursements. Defendant cashed the check, but, having in. duced the debtor to promise payment without suit, used the proceeds for his own purposes: Held, that trover for conversion of the check, or of the proceeds thereof, would not lie.-SHRIMPTON & SONS V. CULVER, Mich., 36 N. W. Rep. 907.

112. TRUST-Resulting Trusts in Lands-Payment of Purchase Money.-Where the purchase price of land is paid by one person, and title taken in the name of another, a resulting trust will be presumed in favor of the one by whom the payment was made; giving him an equitable interest in the lands, which is subject to the lien of a creditor.-THOMPSON V. SANKEY, Pa., 34 Atl. Rep. 1104.

113. VENDOR'S LIEN-Waiver.-The taking of a mortgage on lands, to secure the unpaid purchase money, is an implied waiver of the vendor's lien.-PALMER V. DESLAURIERS, R. I., 34 Atl. Rep. 1108.

114. WATERS - Riparian Rights.-The State has no power to arbitrarily destroy the rights of a riparian owner on a navigable lake without his consent, and without compensation and due process of law, for the sole purpose of benefiting some other riparian owner, or for any other merely private purpose; and hence Laws 1891, ch. 202, conveying and relinquishing to one R, his heirs and assigns, all its right, title, and interest in and to all lands lying within the limits of Muskego Lake, and authorizing the drainage of such lake without the consent of riparian owners, is void.-PRIEWE V. WISCONSIN STATE LAND & IMPROVE MENT CO., Wis., 67 N. W. Rep. 918.

115. WILLS-Parol Evidence.-Where no ambiguity appears on the face of the will, parol evidence is inad missible to show that a different meaning was in. tended by testator from that appearing from the will. -JACKSON V. ALSOP, Conn., 34 Atl. Rep. 1106.

117. WITNESS

-

116. WITNESS-Credibility - Impeachment. — Under Code Cr. Proc. 1895, arts. 770, 790, allowing defendant in a criminal case to testify in his own behalf, and providing that a confession made by a defendant while in jail cannot be used against him unless he was duly warned, the State cannot examine a defendant, when a witness in his own behalf, as to a confession made by him while in jail, without being warned, for the purpose of laying a predicate for his impeachment, and then show by witnesses that he made the confession.-MORALES V. STATE, Tex., 36 S. W. Rep. 135. Transactions with Decedent.-Civ. Code, § 606, cl. 2, provides that no person shall testify for himself concerning any transaction with a dece dent. Clause 9 provides that the assignment of a claim by a person who is incompetent to testify for himself shall not make him competent to testify for another: Held that, as against the administrator of the payee of a note, a person appearing by indorsement on the note to be the assignee of the payee, who has reassigned the note during the life of the payee is incom petent to testify, in favor of his assignee, as to the assignment by the payee to him.-NEALE'S ADMR. V. NEALE, Ky., 39 S. W. Rep. 526.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., SEPTEMBER 11, 1896.

In most of the States there are in existence, statutes providing for what is known as "struck juries" or "special juries," in place of the ordinary jury. Such statute exists in Minnesota. An effort was made in the recent case of Lommen v. Minneapolis Gas Light Co., 68 N. W. Rep. 53, to induce the Supreme Court of Minnesota to declare the act invalid upon the ground that it is in violation of the constitutional provision that "the right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate." The court rendered a very elaborate opinion, and the decision of the majority, together with the dissenting opinions of the minority, constitute a valuable addition to the law upon the subject of jury trials. The court said that since no American constitution declared what was meant by a jury trial, the question was an historical one, and that history revealed that the essential attributes of a jury trial were the number (12), impartiality and unanimity, and that if the law in question violated any of those attributes it must be that of impartiality. The mode of selecting a jury is only the means to the end, and it can be changed or altered at the will of the law-making power, so long as this fundamental attribute of impartiality is not overstepped. Two grounds for the unconstitutionality of the act were urged. First, that it eliminated the element of lot; and, second, that there was no right of peremptory challenges. But the court said that the element of lot was unknown to the common law, since the sheriff selected the jury from the freeholders; nor was there any such thing at common law as a peremptory challenge in civil cases. Both of these were American innovations. Special or

struck juries were well known at the common law, their origin being so ancient that the date could not be ascertained, and they were specially provided for by a number of English statutes. The court also made an exhaustive search as to similar statutes in other States, and found an abundance of them, the constitutionality of which had never been questioned. The court concluded its opinion by saying: "In view of such a consensus of opinion on the part of the legislatures, and

impliedly of the courts and bar of the country, that statutes of this kind do not impair the common law right of trial by jury as known and understood in American constitutional law, we would not be warranted in holding this act unconstitutional. With the policy of the law we have nothing to do. If conditions have so changed that it results in abuses such as counsel suggest, the remedy is with the legislature." There are two strong dissents from this decision, and Judge Canty does not hesitate to express himself very freely about what he designates the "one-man power." The dissenting opinions proceed upon the theory that the courts have no right to go back to the most ancient common law in the determination of this question. The common law is progressive. The standard of impartiality may be different to-day from what it was in the reign of the Georges; and while the rule that impartiality is the test must be permitted to stand, the end of the nineteenth century, and the spirit of American jurisprudence the "American common law"-demands that that attribute be weighed in finer scales than the unequal balances in use when the sheriff possessed an almost unlimited authority.

Our readers will probably recall a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri on the subject of "special juries," upon which we commented at the time of its rendition42 Cent. L. J. 191, 198, 345. The question presented differed from that in the Minnesota case, in the fact that the point as to the validity of such an act was not raised, though its constitutionality was impliedly admitted. The point involved in the Missouri case was as to the power of courts to adopt rules governing the selection of "special juries." It is interesting to note, in view of the controversy in the Minnesota case, that the Missouri court held that "special juries", as distinct from a common jury, were a feature of the common law, and that the legislature by adopting it must be presumed to have done so with a full understanding of the meaning, force and effect which that expression had, acquired during its long sojourn at common law," and that it is neither in the power of law makers nor courts to take away the right to a special jury, or by the operation of rules force a litigant who lawfully asked for such a panel to