indication of an intention to waive the same.HACKETT V. MOXLEY, Vt., 34 Atl. Rep. 949.

52. INSURANCE — Description of Property.—In an action upon a fire policy, in which the property insured was described as a frame building and additions used as a dwelling and a greenhouse, it appeared that the building destroyed was used exclusively as a dwelling, the greenhouse proper not being attached thereto, but that it was the intention of the owner and of the agent who issued the policy to insure that particular build. ing: Held, that the question whether the property de. stroyed was covered by the policy was for the jury.— HOLTER LUMBER Co. v. FIREMAN'S FUND INS. Co., Mont., 45 Pac. Rep. 207.

53. INSURANCE Iron Safe Clause.-Where it was the custom of the insured to enter the credit sales each day upon a blotter, the entries being afterwards transferred to the regular books of account, the failure to produce a record of the credit sales of the day before the fire, because of the destruction of the blotter, which was not placed in the safe at night, is not a violation of the condition in a fire insurance policy providing that the insured shall keep a set a books, showing the cash and credit sales, in a fireproof safe, and that failure to produce such books shall avoid the policy.-RROWN V. PALATINE INS. Co., Tex., 35 S. W. Rep. 1060.

54. INTOXICATING LIQUOR — Sale.-In a prosecution for an illegal sale of intoxicating liquor, it is error for the court to instruct the jury that evidence of other unlawful sales may be considered, without restriction, to determine whether the defendant is guilty of making the sale on which the State elects to rely for a conviction.-STATE V. HUGHES, Kan., 45 Pac. Rep. 94.

55. JUDGMENT-Revival - Scire Facias.-It is proper to render judgment of "fiat executio" on the return of "Nihil" to two successive writs of scire facias on the original judgment. After the original owner of a judgment had been declared a bankrupt, his executrix revived the judgment by scire facias proceedings: Held that, the assignee in bankruptcy having ratified the action of the executrix, by making himself a party to the proceedings and procuring a decree compelling the transfer of the judgment to him, the judgment defendant could not complain that the executrix had no power to revive the judgment.-BROWN V. WYGANT, U.S. S. C., 16 S. C. Rep. 1159.

56. LANDLORD AND TENANT- Forfeiture of Lease.Where a lease provides that the leased premises shall be used only as a dwelling and boarding and lodging house, and shall not be sublet, and also contains a provision that the lease shall be void if the tenant fails to perform on his part, a justice of the peace has no jurisdiction to remove the tenant by summary proceedings for an alleged breach of said conditions.STATE V. SINCLAIR, N. J., 34 Atl. Rep. 943.

37. LANDLORD AND TENANT Possession by Mortgagees of Goods.-Where mortgagees of a stock of goods in a leased store building take possession of the stock, and continue to occupy the building for the purpose of sale, they are bound by the promise of their attorney to the landlord to pay the rent after they took possession.-HATCH V. VAN DERVOORT, N. J., 34 Atl. Rep. 938.

58. LANDLORD AND TENANT - Lease.-Where a lessee for a term of years sells the remainder of his term, puts the vendee in possession, and tells his lessor that thereafter, he must look to the vendee for his rent, and thereupon the lessor cancels the lease, and executes a new one to such vendee, there is a complete surrender of the original lease by the lessee.-MORGAN V. MCCOLLISTER, Ala., 20 South. Rep. 54.

5. LIMITATIONS-Non-resident.-Where a debtor, before limitations have run against his debt, removes from the State, periods of time which he subsequently spends in the State as a salesman, traveling from place to place, and remaining only a few days in each place, cannot be included, to complete the period of limita. tions.-WEILLE V. LEVY, Miss., 20 South. Rep. 3.

62. MASTER AND SERVANT Fellow-servants.-Where a firm of general contractors had taken a contract to grade a street, and had two gangs of laborers at work thereon, each under the charge of a foreman having no control over the other, but having power to hire and discharge his own men and control their operations, held, that the foreman of one gang was a fellowservant of the laborers under him, so that the master was not liable for an injury caused to one of them by his negligence.-BALCH V. HAAS, U. S. C. C. of App., 78 Fed. Rep. 974.

63. MASTER AND SERVANT-Fellow-servants.-A foreman of a railroad bridge gang, who is a subordinate of the superintendent of bridges, but has authority to hire and discharge the men under him, and sole power to direct and control them in their work, is their fellow. servant, with respect to injuries caused to one of them by his negligence in adopting and pursuing a danger. ous method of doing a given piece of work, such as throwing down a railway transfer shed, and the company is not liable therefor.-CLEVELAND, C., C. & ST. L. RY. Co. v. BROWN, U. S. C. C. of App., 73 Fed. Rep. 970.

64. MASTER AND SERVANT-Negligence-Knowledge of Incompetency.-An employer is liable for injury to an employee, caused by the incompetency of a coemployee whom the employer, with knowledge of his incompetency, retains in his service, if such incompetency was not known to the person injured.-TEXAS & P. RY. Co. v. JOHNSON, Tex., 35 S. W. Rep. 1042.

65. MECHANICS' LIENS-Attachment to Land.-Const. art. 16, § 37, declaring that mechanics and material-men shall have a lien upon the buildings made by them for the value of their labor done thereon or material furnished therefor, and that the legislature shall provide for the enforcement of said liens, gives a lien upon the interest that the person causing such building to be made thereon has in the land, to the extent that it is necessary to the enjoyment of the building, or that it may be set apart to be used in connection therewith.STRANG V. PRAY, Tex., 35 S. W. Rep. 1054.

66. MECHANICS' LIENS-Priority.-The owner of two lots subject to the lien of five judgments, having induced the holders of the last four judgments to release one of the lots, which was unoccupied, erected houses thereon, and mechanics' liens were subsequently filed against such houses and the lot on which they were built. The owner afterwards assigned for the benefit of creditors, and both lots were sold by the assignee: Held, that the mechanic's lien claimants had an equitable interest in the proceeds of the lot on which the new buildings were erected, which was superior to that of the judgment creditors who had released their liens.-IN RE BITNER'S ESTATE, Penn., 34 Atl. Rep. 957. 67. MORTGAGE.-Code 1886, § 1868, imposing a penalty on a mortgagee, or the transferee of a debt secured by a mortgage, which is of record, for a failure to enter partial payments on the record, at the request of the mortgagor or his grantee, judgment creditor or lienholder, is constitutional.-GAY V. ROGERS, Ala., 20 South. Rep. 37.

68. MORTGAGES-Foreclosure.-A mortgage on land upon which is situated a gin mill, purchased by the grantor on conditional sale, does not secure a purchase money note given for the mill, and paid by the

mortgagee at the mortgagor's request.-BUTLER V. ADLER-GOLDMAN COMMISSION CO., Ark., 85 S. W. Rep.

1110.

69. MORTGAGE-Foreclosure.-A second mortgagee, holding the legal title, but as a mortgagee only, who, at the request of the debtor, conveyed a portion of the premises, thus releasing his lien thereon, to one having knowledge of the facts, is entitled to have such portion first sold under a foreclosure of the first mortgage.-STULB V. AINSLIE, Wash., 45 Pac. Rep. 157.

70. MORTGAGES-Estoppel.-A corporation which accepted a conveyance of a water-works plant by a deed describing certain mortgages thereon, and expressly declaring that the conveyance was made subject thereto, held estopped thereby from questioning the validity of the mortgages.-AMERICAN WATER-WORKS Co. of ILLINOIS V. FARMERS' LOAN & TRUST Co., U. S. C. C. of App., 78 Fed. Rep. 956.

71. MORTGAGES-Parol Agreement.-A parol agree. ment between the parties, by which a first mortgagee agrees to hold his mortgage subject to a mortgage to secure the loan to the mortgagor to enable him to build on the land, is not within the statute of frauds.-LOEWEN V. FORSEE, Mo., 35 S. W. Rep. 1138.

72. MUNICIPAL BONDS-Innocent Purchasers-Recit als. Recitals in county bonds, that they are "issued pursuant to an order of the county court of said county, authorized by a majority of the legal votes cast at an election held in said county, pursuant to law," and under the provisions of certain statutes, and that they are in part payment of "a subscription to the capital stock" of a named railroad company, estop the county, as against an innocent purchaser, from showing that the bouds are void, because in fact issued as a donation to the railroad company, whereas the statute only authorized a subscription to its stock.-WESSON v. SALINE COUNTY, U. S. C. C. of App., 73 Fed. Rep. 917.

73. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-City Warrants-Taxation.-Interest upon city warrants drawn on the gen. eral fund cannot be compounded. Where a city has already levied a tax to the limit allowed by law, the proceeds of which have been used for the necessary city expenses, it will not be compelled to levy a special tax to pay outstanding city warrants.-PORTLAND SAV. BANK V. CITY OF MONTESANO, Wash., 45 Pac. Rep. 158. 74. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Control Over Sidewalks.-Cities of the third class have power to open and improve streets, avenues and alleys, and make sidewalks, build bridges, culverts and sewers within the city; and where the mayor and council have determined by ordinance that a new sidewalk is necessary, and by ordinance provide for the removal of the old walk and the building of a new one, designating the material, and providing the dimensions of the walk, their determination is final, and no action will lie by an abutting property owner to enjoin the construction of such walks, when the ordinance is not unreasonable or unjust in its provisions.-STEWART V. CITY OF NEODESHA, Kan., 45 Pac. Rep. 110.

75. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Defective HighwaysLiability of Towns.-A statutory town is not liable in an action by a private person for injuries sustained by him while using its highways, which were caused either by its failure to repair or by direct acts of negli gence of its officers in repairing the highway.WELTSCH V. TOWN OF STARK, Minn., 67 N. W. Rep. 648. 76. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Powers of Mayor and Council. The mayor and council of a city of the third class have the care, management and control of the city and its finances, and have power to enact such ordinances as they shall deem expedient for the good government of the city, the preservation of peace and good order, the suppression of vice and immorality, the benefit of trade and commerce, and make such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry their power into effect, to open and improve streets, and make assessments upon the taxable property of the city to pay for the same, build sidewalks along the side streets, and make assessments upon abutting lots

to pay for the same.-STATE V. CITY OF NEODESHA, Kan., 45 Pac. Rep. 122.

Negligence.-A young

77. NEGLIGENCE - Imputed woman, while riding in a carriage, by invitation of the owner, driven by a driver sent by the owner, was injured on a public street in a city, by reason of the neg. ligence of the city in allowing the street to be ob structed by broken stone used in repairing it, along a high embankment, whereby the carriage was overturned down the embankment, and her leg broken. The court charged the jury that if the driver had sole charge of the vehicle and the animal drawing it, and she had no control over either, the negligence of the driver, if he was negligent, could not be imputed to her, and would not bar her recovery: Held not erroneous.-CITY OF LEAVENWORTH V. HATCH, Kan., 45 Pac. Rep. 65.

78. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-Defenses-Mistake of Law. That defendant signed note for money loaned to the corporation of which he was a director, under a belief that he would not be individually liable, is no defense.-MALEDON V. LEFLORE, Ark., 35 S. W. Rep.

1102.

79. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-Note-Consideration.The payment of a matured note is not a sufficient consideration to support a promise by the payee to extend another note not yet due.-WOLZ v. PARKER, Mo., 35 S. W. Rep. 1149.

80. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-Note-Contract of Indorser.-A general indorser of a note, in effect, contracted in writing, as provided for in Comp. Laws, § 4479, subd. 4, that he would pay it on due notice of the dishonor of the instrument; and where no such notice was given, evidence of a purported oral promise on the part of the indorser that he would guaranty the amount thereof, in any event, in case of default by the maker, was incompetent, under § 3545, excluding evidence of oral agreements when the contract has once been put in writing.-SCHMITZ V. HAWKEYE GOLD MINING CO., S. Dak., 67 N. W. Rep. 618.

81. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-Note-Garnishment.The maker of a note who, at the time of its maturity, has been garnished in attachment, then pending against the payee, cannot set up such garnishment as a defense to the action, nor to the recovery of costs and the attorney's fee provided for in the note.-GLUGERMOVICH V. ZICOVICH, Cal., 45 Pac. Rep. 174.

82. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-Stipulations for Attorney's Fees.-Plaintiff brought action, aided by attachment, upon a note not due. The note stipulated that, if placed in the hands of an attorney for collection, the maker should pay all costs of collection, including a certain attorney's fee. The attachment was found to have been wrongfully sued out: Held, that the action having been begun before any default on the part of the maker of the note, he was not liable for the attor ney's fee.-LANING V. IRON CITY NAT. BANK, Tex., 35 S. W. Rep. 1048.

83. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-Sureties-Discharge. -A surety who signs a note, blank as to date, amount and payee, and intrusts it to the principal, who fills out the blanks, and for a larger sum than the surety understood was to be inserted, and then delivers it to the payee, who takes it without notice, will generally be held liable for the note as the payee took it.-ROBERSON V. BLEVINS, Kan., 45 Pac. Rep. 63.

84. NUISANCE-Obstruction of Highway.-One who has contracted to haul dirt at a specified price per load may recover damages from a railroad corporation for thereafter erecting and maintaining a fence across a highway which was the natural route from the place where the dirt was taken to the place of delivery, and over which several loads could have been hauled in the time required to haul one load by the circuitous route which the contractor was compelled to take because of the obstruction.-KNOWLES V. PENNSYLVANIA R. Co., Penn., 34 Atl. Rep. 974.

shall be under the control of a board of nine members appointed by the governor and confirmed by the senate, to be designated the 'Regents of Education.' They shall hold their office for six years, three retiring every second year:" Held that, there being no provision for their holding over, the term of a regent is absolutely fixed at six years, and at its expiration, unless his successor has been appointed, the office becomes vacant. -STATE V. SHELDON, S. Dak., 67 N. W. Rep. 613.

85. OFFICE AND OFFICERS-Impeachment-Rules of Law.-Impeachment proceedings in the supreme court under Const. art. 7, §§ 2, 3, providing for the removal by the supreme court of the judicial officers of certain courts for specified causes, are criminal in their nature, and are governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal cases.-STATE V. ROBINSON, Ala., 20 South. Rep. 30.

87. OFFICE AND OFFICERS-Term of Office.-A legislative enactment "that the term of the office of city collector in any city of the third class shall be three years" is plainly prospective, and does not enlarge the term of one elected before its passage.-STATE V. JOHNSON, N. J., 34 Atl. Rep. 929.

58. PARTITION Community Estate.-The presumption that lots purchased by a husband and paid for during his second marriage were community estate of the second marriage is not overcome by evidence that, prior to his second marriage, he bought a factory with community money of the first marriage, for a sum about equal to the aggregate consideration of the lots, and that this factory was in his possession, and earned large profits, during the early part of his second marriage, but a few years later, and before the consideration for the lots was paid, was not in his possession.ALBRECHT V. ALBRECHT, Tex., 35 S. W. Rep. 1076.

89. PARTNERSHIP-Assignment for Creditors.-An assignment of all the property of a partnership, composed of three partners, for the benefit of their creditors, made by two of the partners only, may be subsequently ratified, and made valid by the assent of the other partner.-CORBETT V. CANNON, Kan., 45 Pac. Rep.

80.

90. PLEADING-Breach of Warranty.-In an action to recover the value of certain horses, defendants claimed under purchase from K, whom they impleaded, pray. Ing that, in event plaintiff obtained judgment, they might have judgment against K for a like amount: Held, that defendants were entitled to recover from K, as actual damages, only the price that they paid for the horses, and the price should have been alleged, in order to entitle them to recover under the cross complaint.-HUDSON V. NORWOOD, Tex., 35 S. W. Rep. 1075. 91. PLEADING-Joinder of Causes of Action.-Defendant agreed with plaintiff "to remodel and change the ice machine" used by plaintiff, for a specified sum, and quarantied that it would make seven tons per day: Held, that plaintiff in assumpsit could unite in different counts the common counts and a special count for breach of contract.-YORK MANUFACTURING Co. v. BESSEMER ICE MANUFACTURING & STORAGE CO., Ala., 20 South. Rep. 13.

92. PLEADINGS-Cross Bill.-In trespass to try title, where defendant, by cross bill or plea in reconvention, seeks affirmative relief, and the allegations of the cross bill show a cause of action against plaintiff with reference to the subject-matter of the suit, plaintiff cannot, by dismissing his bill, defeat (defendant's right to a trial on the cross bill.-SHORT V. HEPBURN, Tex., 35 S. W. Rep. 1056.

93. PLEDGE.-The owner of a stock of goods, mortgaged for $3,000, agreed with the mortgagees that, to secure payment of said debt, and enable them more readily to procure its payment, such owner pledged and delivered the goods to the mortgagees, to hold in trust, and not otherwise, "with privilege to sell and dispose of the same, and out of the proceeds of said property, after deducting the sum of $3,000 so owing, as aforesaid, to return and deliver to the 'owner' the

surplus of such sale of such property:" Held, that there was a transfer of title to, and not a mere pledge of, the goods to the mortgagees.-SENSEN V. BOWLES, S. Dak., 67 N. W. Rep. 627.

94. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Extension of Time.-A purchaser of real estate, holding a bond for title, who by a transfer of the bond, becomes, in effect, a surety for the payment of the notes given for purchase money, is not released from liability thereon by the making of a new contract between the vendor and the second purchaser extending the time of payment, when such contract provides that it shall not affect the original notes, nor operate to extend them, except at the election of the maker.-HODGES V. ELYTON LAND CO., Ala., 20 South. Rep. 23.

95. PROCESS -Service- Members of Legislature.Members of the legislature are not liable or subject to the service of civil process during the periods excepted by section 22, art. 2, of the constitution of the State of Kansas, and the service of original process upon them at such times is void, and gives the court no jurisdiction over the person of such member.-Cook v. SEN. IOR, Kan., 45 Pac. Rep. 126.

96. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Action for Stock Killed.In an action brought against a railroad company to recover damages for the alleged killing of stock, where the petition alleges that the railway company had failed to inclose its road with good and lawful fences, it is unnecessary for the plaintiff to further allege that the place so left uninclosed was not one which said company was not compelled by law to inclose.-MISSOURI PAC. RY. Co. v. BORRER, Kan., 45 Pac. Rep. 133. 97. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Consolidation.-Where a railroad company is consolidated with other railroad companies under a new name, it ceases to exist as a corporation, and an action brought by or against such railroad company before its consolidation cannot af terwards be prosecuted by or against it or in its origi nal name.-COUNCIL GROVE, O. C. & O. RY. Co. v. LAW. RENCE, Kan., 45 Pac. Rep. 125.

98. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Fires.-Where a railroad company is sued for damages resulting from a fire alleged to have been set by its locomotive, in order to raise the presumption of negligence, so as to cast on defendant the burden of showing that its engine had suitable appliances and was properly managed, the jury must be reasonably satisfied, from the evidence, that the fire was caused by sparks emitted in unusual and dangerous quantities from defendant's engine, and evidence merely "tending" to prove such fact is not, as a matter of law, sufficient.-LOUISVILLE & N. R. Co. v. MALONE, Ala., 20 South. Rep. 33.

99. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Rules of Employment.To prevent a recovery for the death of an employee of the defendant railroad company for personal injuries, on the ground that a violation by the employee of a rule of the company contributed to his death, it is necessary to show that the rule was known to the employee.-LOUISVILLE & N. R. Co. v. MOTHERSHED, Ala., 20 South. Rep. 67.

100. RECEIVERS-Attorney's Fees.-A receiver is not entitled to allowance for the services of an attorney in hunting up and taking into possession the property belonging to the estate, since it is the personal duty of the receiver to look after such matter.-SAULSBURY V. LADY ENSLEY COAL, IRON & RAILROAD CO., Ala., 20 South. Rep. 72.

101. REMOVAL OF CAUSES-Diverse Citizenship.-An agent or trustee, appointed by both parties to a sale of lands to hold the deed, purchase money notes, and mortgage securing them until certain conditions are performed, is a necessary, and not a merely formal, party to a suit for specific performance brought by the vendor against him and the vendee, wherein part of the relief sought is a decree compelling such trustee to record the deed and deliver the notes and mortgage in accordance with the contract; and if the complainant and the trustee are citizens of the same State, the suit is not removable by the vendee, though he be

a citizen of a different State.-ScoUTT V. KECK, U. S. C. C. of App., 73 Fed. Rep. 900.

102. REPLEVIN-Wrongful Attachment- - Pleading.M, who was a sheriff, under a writ of attachment, levied upon, seized, and afterwards, under execution, sold, personal property which was in the possession of J, a stranger to the attachment proceedings. J brought replevin to recover possession of the prop. erty, or the value thereof. In his answer, M averred that he levied upon and seized the property under and by virtue of a writ of attachment, but failed to aver and prove that the attachment proceedings under which the writ was issued conformed to the statute in relation to attachments: Held, that J was entitled to recover.-JONES V. MCQUEEN, Utah, 45 Pac. Rep. 202.

103. SALE BY HUSBAND TO WIFE.-Under the married women's act (Revision, p. 639), which leaves matters of dealing between husband and wife as at common law, a sale by a husband to his wife, attended by delivery of the thing sold, will not be sustained in a court of law. -HOMAN V. HEADLEY, N. J., 34 Atl. Rep. 941.

104. SALE-Chattel Mortgage.-Though a purchaser of chattels buys, after being informed that there had been a mortgage on them, without making any inquiry in regard to the mortgage, he can hold against it, though it has not been paid; it not having been recorded, and having expired by limitation five months before, without being renewed, and the mortgagee not having taken possession of the property.-DOLE V. BANK OF AKRON, Colo., 45 Pac. Rep. 226.

105. SALE

-

Conditional Sale.- Where a conditional sale of merchandise was made by the agents of the owner, retaining title until payment, and such agents afterwards agreed to a composition of the debt to enable the purchasers to make a resale, by which they were to accept from the new purchaser a smaller amount in full payment of part of such amount, and a tender of the remainder, divested the seller of title, and an action of detinue cannot be maintained.-INGERSOLL SERGEANT DRILL Co. v. WORTHINGTON, Ala., 20 South. Rep. 61.

106. SALE-Warranty.-Plaintiff bought an animal of defendant, taking a warranty to himself, but making the purchase, in reality, for others, to whom he at once turned over the property and assigned the warranty. Defendant knew for whom the purchase was made, and that the transfer was made to plaintiff for the purpose of enabling him to make a profit from the real purchasers: Held that, in equity, the sale was one to plaintiff, as agent for the purchasers, and that an action could be maintained by plaintiff, on the warranty, for the use of the purchasers who suffered loss by its breach.-DARDEN V. ONEAL, Tenn., 35 S. W. Rep. 1095.

107. SET-OFF-Federal Courts.-Where the State statute of set-off, as in Illinois, does not authorize a set-off, in action on contract, of unliquidated damages arising out of contracts or torts, not connected with the subject-matter of the suit, there can be no set-off, in an action at law, of such damages, even as against an insolvent or non-resident plaintiff.-CHARNLEY V. SIBLEY, U. S. C. C. of App., 73 Fed. Rep. 980.

108. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE Defenses.-In an action by a vendor to enforce the specific performance of a contract for the sale of lands, the existence of mortgages amounting to far less than the contract price to be paid by the purchaser, and which can be discharged out of the purchase money, does not constitute a bar to the action.-GUILD V. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. R. Co., Kan., 45 Pac. Rep. 82.

109. TRADE-NAMES Injunction.-Defendant, who was doing business under the name of the N. C. Co., unincorporated, on the formation of a corporation by that name, transferred to it his business, and the good will thereof, and was taken by the corporation into its employ as an officer for four years: Held, that defendant, on the dissolution of his connection with the corporation, and engaging in a rival business,

would not be enjoined from advertising himself as formerly connected with such corporation.-NEWARK COAL CO. v. SPANGLER, N. J., 34 Atl. Rep. 932.

110. TRESPASS TO TRY TITLE-Presumption of Title.The presumption of superior title in plaintiff, from prior possession, as against a trespasser, is not overcome by proof of a grant from the State to one with whose patent plaintiff's chain of title does not connect.-HOUSE V. REAVIS, Tex., 35 S. W. Rep. 1063.

111. TRIAL.-After defendant has answered, and a jury has been empaneled to try the issues of fact joined, the court is not authorized, on its own motion, to dismiss and withdraw from the jury a count of the complaint declaring on a separate cause of action.KYES V. BEST, Colo., 45 Pac. Rep. 227.

112. TRIAL - Juror - Competency.-In the examination of a juror on his voir dire, in an action against a railroad company for damages arising from personal injuries, he admitted that he had a feeling against railroads generally, and said that it would require a continual effort on his part to deal with the railroad company in the same way that he would an individ ual, and that, perhaps, he could not consider the case in an impartial way: Held, that the juror ought to have been excused on the challenge of the defendant for cause. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. CHANCE, Kan., 45 Pac. Rep. 60.

113. TRUST-Power of Sale-Mortgage.-A conveyance of all of an insolvent's stock of merchandise, including the unexpired lease of the store building, which empowers the grantee, as trustee, to take immediate possession, and to sell the same for cash, and apply the proceeds to current expenses, to the payment of certain items in full, and to a pro rata payment of creditors therein named, or in full if the proceeds are sufficient, the balance, if any, to be returned to the grantor, is a mortgage.-F. D. SEWARD CONFECTIONERY Co. v. ULLMAN, Tex., 35 S. W. Rep. 1072.

114. TRUST-Resulting Trust.-The mere fact that a husband purchased land with funds advanced by his wife, together with declarations on his part to third persons that the land belonged to his wife, does not necessarily raise a resulting trust in the land in favor of the wife, in the absence of evidence of an agree ment at the time of the purchase that the land should be purchased for the wife.-IN RE LAU'S ESTATE, Penn., 34 Atl. Rep. 969.

115. VENDOR'S LIEN-Foreclosure.-In a suit brought to recover a debt secured by a lien on real property, jurisdiction to foreclose the lien may be obtained by the statutory notice duly served without the State on a non-resident defendant.-ROLLER V. HOLLY, Tex., 35 S. W. Rep. 1074.

116. VENDOR'S LIEN-Waiver.-A vendor accepting, in payment for land, notes of the grantee which recite that they are liens on the other land,-that fact being also recited in the deed,-waives, as against a bona fide purchaser of the grantee, his vendor's lien.BRIGHT V. MURRAY, Tenn., 35 S. W. Rep. 1088.

117. WATERS-Irrigation - Riparian Proprietors.-In determining the rights of riparian proprietors to the waters of the stream, for irrigation, it is within the power of a court of equity to apportion the flow by periods of time, rather than by division of the quantity, when such apportionment would best secure the rights of the parties; and such apportionment may be extended to the use of the water for domestic purposes, when necessary.-WIGGINS V. MUSCUPIABE LAND & WATER CO., Cal., 45 Pac. Rep. 160.

118. WILLS-Life Estate.-Under a devise to testator's daughter of land "to be held and enjoyed by her during her natural life, and after her death to be equally divided among her children, if she shall leave chil dren, and, if not, then to be equally divided among my other children," the daughter took a life estate, with remainder to testator's other children, contingent on the death of the life tenant without surviving children. -ROSENAU V. CHILDRESS, Ala., 20 South. Rep. 95.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., AUGUST 14, 1896.

The Supreme Court of the United States has recently decided questions of constitutional law which are of more than ordinary importance and value. We refer to the cases of Hennington v. State of Georgia, 16 S. C. Rep. 1086; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. State of Illinois, 16 S. C. Rep. 1096, and Plessy v. Ferguson, 16 S. C. Rep. 1138. The two first mentioned cases dealt with the mutual relations of interstate commerce and State police power, while the last mentioned case involved the question of civil rights of negro travelers in those of the States which have adopted what is known as "separate coach" laws.

The Hennington case came up on writ of error from the Supreme Court of Georgia. It was therein held that a statute of Georgia making it a misdemeanor to run a freight train in that State on the Sabbath day is a regulation of internal police and not of commerce, and that such regulation is not invalid as interfering with interstate commerce, though its effect is to entirely prevent freight trains from passing through said State on that day from and to adjacent States. The opinion of the court by Mr. Justice Harlan refers first to the inherent power of the States to pass Sunday laws, the same being viewed not as religious but as purely police regulations, it being proper for a legislature to enact that a community shall observe an enforced day of rest once in each week for the general physical welfare. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Field, in Ex parte Newman, 9 Cal. 502, which has become the leading American judicial expression on the subject, is cited and its argument approved. The court then calls attention to the undoubted right of States to incidentally interfere with interstate commerce in the interest of public hygiene and physical safety, as, for instance, in maintaining quarantine regulations (Morgan's Louisiana, etc. Company v. Louisiana Board of Health, 118 U. S. 455), or general rules for licensing railroad engineers, and not permitting unlicensed persons to conduct trains within a State's boundaries. Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465; Nashville, etc. Ry. Co. v.

Alabama, 128 U. S. 96. The dissenting judges on the other hand contend that "this statute in requiring the suspension of interstate commerce for one day in the week amounts to a regulation of that commerce and is invalid, because the power of congress in that regard is exclusive."

In the case of Illinois Central R. Co. v. State of Illinois, it was held that an Illinois statute providing that all regular passenger trains shall stop a sufficient length of time at the railroad stations and county seats to receive and let off passengers with safety, as construed by the State Supreme court, requiring a fast-mail train, carrying interstate passengers and the United States mail from Chicago to places south of the Ohio river, over an interstate highway established by authority of congress, to turn aside from the direct interstate route, and run to the station in Cairo, three miles and a half away from that route, and back again, in order to receive and discharge passengers at that station, for the interstate travel to and from which the railroad company furnishes other and ample accommodation, is an unconstitutional obstruction of interstate commerce, and of the passage of the United States mails. The fact that the statute interfered with the speedy and uninterrupted carriage of the United States mails was as much of a factor contributing to the decision of the court as was the obstruction of interstate commerce.

The case of Plessy v. Ferguson was on writ of error to the Supreme Court of Louisiana. The decision was that an act requiring white and colored persons to be furnished with separate accommodations on railway trains does not violate Const. Amend. 13, abolishing slavery and involuntary servitude; that a State statute requiring railway companies to provide separate accommodations for white and colored persons, and making a passenger insisting on occupying a coach or compartment other than the one set apart for his race liable to fine or imprisonment, does not violate Const. Amend. 14, by abridging the privileges or immunities of United States citizens, or depriving persons of liberty or property without due process of law, or by denying them the equal protection of the laws. The opinion of the court by Mr. Jus