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Court, especially since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, by which the restraint upon the power of the States to pass laws affecting personal and private rights was made a part of the Federal Constitution, that it can only be necessary to refer to the conclusions reached by that court as affecting the question before us. Dent v. West Virginiu, 129 U. S. 114; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27; Mugler v. Kunsas, 123 U.S. 623; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678. No one questions the right of every person in this country to follow any legitimate business or occupation he may seel fit. This is a privilege open alike to every one. His own labor, and the right to use it as a means of livelihood, is a right as sacred and as fully protected by the law as any other personal or private right. But broad and comprehensive as this right may be, it is subject to the paramount right, inherent in every government, to impose such restraint and to provide such regulations in regard to the pursuits of life as the public welfare may require. This paramount right rests upon the wellrecognized maxim, Salus populi est suprema lex; and, whatever difficulty there may be in defining the precise linnits and boundaries by which the exercise of this power is to be governed, all agree that laws and regulations necessary for the protection of the health, morals, and safety of society are strictly within the legitimate exercise of the police power. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623; Railway Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26. As to the common and ordinary occupations of life, little or no regulation may be necessary; but if the occupation or calling be of such a character as to, require a special course of study or training or experience to qualify one to pursue such occupation or calling with safety to the public interests, no one questions the power of the legislature to impose such restraints, and prescribe such requirements, as it may deem proper for the protection of the public against the evils resulting from incapacity and ignorance; and neither section one of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, nor article 23 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of this State, was designed to limit or restrain the exercise of this power.

It is in the exercise of this power that no one is allowed to practise law or medicine or engage in the business of a druggist unless he shall have been found competent, and qualified in the mode and in the manner prescribed by the statute ; and, althongh the business and trade of a plumber may not require the same training and experience as some other pursuits in life, yet a certain degree of training is absolutely necessary to qualify one as a competent and skilful workman. We all know that in a large city like Baltimore, with its extensive sistem of drainage and sewerage, the public health largely depends upon the proper and efficient manner in which the plumbing work is executed, and, this being so, the legislature not only has the power, but it is eminently wise and proper that it should, provide some morle by which the qualifications of persons engaged in that business shall be determined.

In considering the power of the legislature to impose restraints upon all persons engaged in certain pursuits, the Supreme Court say: "The nature and extent of the qualifications required must depend primarily upon the judgment of the State as to their necessity. If they are appropriate to the calling or profession, and attainable by reasonable application, no objection to their validity can be raised.” Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114. The Act of 1886 now before us provides in the first place that no one shall engage in the business of plumbing except those qualified to work as registered plumbers; and, further, that no one shall be qualified to work as a registered plumber unless lie shall have made application to and received from the State Board of Practical Plumbers appointed by the government a certificate as to his competency. These requirements are appropriate, and relate to the business of plumbing, and are such as the legislature deemed necessary and proper for the protection of the health of the people of Baltimore against the consequences resulting from the work of incompetent and inexperienced plumbers. They are in themselves fair and reasonable, and impose no restraint or qualification which may not be complied with by reasonable training and experience. Such an Act is but the ordinary exercise of the police power of the State, and does not violate in any sense the constitutional rights of the traverser.

Judgment affirmed. 1 And so State v. Fleine mann, 80 Wis. 253, as to pharmacists ; and People v. Plippin, 70 Mich. 6 (1888), as to medical men and surgeons, Campbell, and MORSE, JJ, dissenting. Compare State v. Pennoyer, 65 N. H. 113 (1889), which holds unconstitutional, as being unequal, an exemption from the requirements of such a statute in favor of medical men who have resided and practised their profession in the place of their present residence for the last four years. A similar clause was sustained in People v. Phippin, ubi supra, the court (Long, J., at p. 21) saying: “ This Act ... makes a medical qualification the test of the right to practise. The real test of the right to practise is that he shall be a “graduate of any legally authorized medical college in this State, or in any one of the United States, or in any other country. And in this there is no discrimination. Now, the legislature saw fit in establishing this test, to except from its provisions a certain class of physicians and surgeons. Iu so doing it in effect declared that the physician or surgeon who had actually practised medicine continuously for at least five years in this State, and who is practising when this Act shall take effect, was as well qualified, in its judgment, to continue the practice of his profession as the student coming fresh from the halls of college with his diploma was to commence it. The reasons which induced the legislature to insert the exception may have been as varied as the different minds of its members. It certainly had power to insert it, and whether the power was reasonably or unreasonably exercised, or whether it was expedient to enact the law, are questions exclusively within the province of the legislative branch of the State government, and their judgment must necessarily be decisive upon these questions. State v. Dent, 25 W. Va. 1; Ex parte Spinney, 10 Nev, 328; Wert v. Clutter, 37 Ohio St. 347."

In Trageser v. Gray, 73 Maryland, 250 (1890), a non-naturalized Prussian applied for a writ of mandamus to compel certain commissioners to issue to him a license for the sale of intoxicating liquors. His petition was dismissed; and by a proceeding in the nature of a writ of error, he now raised the question whether the Maryland statute of 1890, c. 343, for regulating the sale of intoxicating liquors, was valid. The court (BRYAN, J ) in affirming the order of the court below, said * In the law which we are now considering, the legislature hedged around this traffic with such safeguards

as were deemed advisable for the purpose of protecting the public interest. It was an effort to restrict the licenses to such persons as would not abuse the privilege conferred; to this end the applicant was required to establish his fitness for the privilege by abundant testimony, aud to promise, under oath, that he would not permit on his premises certain violations of the law, which have frequently been associated with the traffic, and which have caused great scandal, iminorality, and disorder. Aud by section 653 j, it was enacted that the license should be refused in all cases, whenever, in the opinion of the said board, such license is net necessary for the accommodation of the public, or the petitioner or petitioners is or are not fit persons to whom such license should be granted; and if sufficient cause shall at any time be shown, or proof be made to the said board, that the party licensed was guilty of any fraud in procuring such license, or has violated any law of the State relating to the sales of intoxicating liquor, the said board shall, after giving notice to the person so licensed, revoke said license; and the criminal court of the city may ju like mammer revoke said license, if the party should be convicted before it, of any such violation. It was thought proper to confine the license to citizens of the Uniteil States, of temperate habits and good moral character. The privilege is very liable to be alused, and abuses would produce great public detriment. It therefore seemed wise to the legislature to confer' it only on those who, being natives of the country, might reasonably be supposed to have a regard for its welfare; or who, not being natives, had, as required by the naturalization law, proven by credible testimony before a court of justice, that they were attached to the principles of the Constitution of the Cnited States, and were well disposed to their good order and happiness. It was certainly the function of the lawmaking department to exercise its ju Igment on this question, and this court has no right to criticise its conclusion. We do not think that this law is, in any manner, in conflict with the Constitution of this State.

“We regard it as included ‘in that iinmense mass of legislation which embraces everything within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general government.' Gibbons v. Ogilen, 9 Wheaton, 203. It has been uniformly held in all courts that no clause in the Federal Constitution interferes with the power of the States to promote and protect the public health, peace, morils, and good orler within their respective limits. . . . It is, however, maintained by the appellant that although this statute was/ passed apparently for the purpose of exercising this power, vet it is in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment, because it denies to persons not citizens of the United States the right to obtain licenses to retail liquor, and thereby makes an unconstitutional discrimination against them. The section of the amen lment supposed to be involved is in these words : No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abriilge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State (leprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any, person within its juris liction the equal protection of th» laws. It cannot be said that any man, alien or citizen, has a natural right to retail intoxicating liquor. According to Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wallace, 129, it is not one of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. In Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, it was said that 'such a right did not inhere in citizenship,' and that it coulil not be said that government interfered with or impaired any one's constitutional rights of liberty or property, when it prohibited the manufacture and sale of intoxicating drinks. And it was held that this prohibition might be made although it would destroy or greatly diminish the value of manufactories, which has been erected when it was lawful to engage in snch business. In Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, a statute of Iowa prohibited the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors except for mechanical, medicinal, culinary, and sacramental purposes; but any citizen of the State was permitted to manufacture or buy and sell for these purposes, except hotel-keepers, keepers of saloons eating-honses, grocery-keepers, and confectioners. The Supreme Court decided that the statute did not in any way contravene any provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. We see that the privilege granted was confined to citizens of the State, and that there was a discrimination against five classes of these citizens. But in truth, the valid exercise of the police power does not depend on any question of discrimination for or against particu.

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lar persons or classes of persons. It is confided to the wisdom of the legislature to make such application of it as the public welfare may require. In the case of occupations which may become injurious to the community, they may prohibit them altogether, or they may permit them only in certain localities and on certain terms and uuder certain restrictions, or they may grant the privilege of pursuing them to some persons and deny it to others. Individual interests are not all considered in the exercise of this power. They must yield when they are in opposition to the public good. And the legislature is to determine what measures will best promote the public good in dealing with these matters. In Mugler v. Kansas it was said that it was not to be supposed that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to impose restraints on the exercise of the police power by the States. It was also said that a State could not by any contract limit its exercise of this power where the public health and the public morals would be prejudiced; and a case was cited with approval (Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814), where a charter to conduct a lottery had been granted to a private corporation for a large moneyed consideration, and was afterwards repealed, and the repeal was sustained as within the police power of the State And in the same case the court stated with great emphasis the necessity of upholding State police regulations which were enacted in good faith and which had appropriate and direct connection with that protection to life, health, aud property which each State owes to its citizens. And in this case, and subsequently in Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 684, it was shown that a statu^e enacted in good faith for the exercise of the police power could not be regarded as repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment, unless it had no real or substantial relation to the objects of such power. In the Slaughter-House Cases (16 Wallace, 86), it was held that in the exercise of the police power the State of Louisiana could lawfully grant to a single corporation, for twenty five years, the exclusive privilege of maintaining slaughter-houses in a district of country containing more than eleven hundred square miles and including the city of New Orleans The trade of a butcher, thongh of great utility and necessity, is liable under some circumstances to injure the public health, and was, therefore, liable to this sort of legislation.

“There are cases, unquestionably, in which discriminations against particular persons or classes of persons would be unlawful. They are indicated in Powell v. Pennsylvania and in many other cases, especially in the cases affecting the legislation of California on the subject of the Chinese. It is held that every one has a right to pursue an ordinary calling on terms of equality with all other persons in similar circumstances; that is, a calling not in any way injurious to the community, or likely to become so. The court did not, in Powell v. Pennsylvania, regard the making of oleomargarine as an ordinary business ; nor in McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 712, was the traffic in ardent spirits so regarded. In the Chinese Cases, Re Prfrott, 6 Sawyer, 349; Re Ah Chong, 6 Sawyer, 451, and Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, the legislation in question was directed against the Chinese, and was intended to prevent them from earning a livelihood by their own labor; or, at least, to impede and embarrass them as much as possible in their efforts to do so. This was most clearly evident, not only from the statutes and ordinances themselves, but from the article in the Constitution of California, under which they were framed. This article (19th) was entitled 'Chinese,' and it provided that no corporation should employ, directly or indirectly, in any capacity, any Chinese or Mongolian ; that no Chinese should be employed on any State, county, municipal or other work, except in punishment for crime; it declared that the presence of foreigners ineligible to become citizens (meaning the Chinese) was dangerous to the wellbeing of the State; and the legislature were directed to discourage their immigration by all means within their power, and were also directed to delegate all necessary power to the incorporated cities and towns of the State for the removal of Chinese beyond their limits, or for their location within prescribed portions of those limits; and were also directed to provide the necessary legislation to prohibit the introduction of Chinese into the State. One of the judges in Parrott's Case said of this article, 'It is in open and seemingly contemptuous violation of the provisions of the treaty which give to the Chinese the right to reside here with all the privileges, immunities and exemptions of the most favored nation. It is, in fact, but one and the latest of a series of

enactments designed to accomplish the same end.' 6 Sawyer, 365. It was apparent to the courts which decided these cases that, although the statutes and ordinauces in question were in the form and fashion of police regulations, yet in reality, in substance and in effect, they were enactments to take away from the Chinese the right to labor for a living

* They struck at those inalienable rights which belong to human beings at all times and in all places. They denied them the equal protection of the laws in particulars essential to their means of existence. Their evident effect and purpose were to accomplish an únconstitutional result, and therefore they were necessarily declared to be void. The statute now before us oppresses no one, and was intended to oppress no one. It does not take from any man a solitary right, privilege or immunity. It subjects no one to penalties for its violations which are not imposed equally on all offenders. It does not, it is true, make an equal partition of the privilege of liquor selling ainong all classes of persons. But there is no warrant for supposing that legislative control over this traffic must conform to any such standard. It is not crippled by any such restraint. It overrides all prirate interests and embraces all means which are necessary and proper to protect the public from evils connected with the subject. Assuredly the Supreme ('ourt did not consider this control as limited by the necessity of making an equal distribution of favors, when it said in speaking of the trade in liquor and its cousequences : * The police power which is exclusively in the States is alone competent to the correction of these great evils, and all measures of restraint or prohibition necessary to effect the purpose are within the scope of that anthority. Mug'er v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 659. Nor is any such limitation consistent with the decisions in Stone v. Mississippi, 101 United States, 814; Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 United States, 25; and Fertilizing Company v. Hyde Park, 97 United States, 659. In one of these cases a franchise which had been pur chased from the State was taken away from the purchaser without compensation to him, because it was considered by the legislature to be hurtful to the public morals. In the other two cases, by the exertion of the police power, property of vast amount was rendered valueless, although it had been acquired under the express sanction of the legislature. It is needless to refer again to the Slaughter- Ilouse Cases, where there was a severe discrimination in favor of a single corporation and against every one else, solely because the protection of the public health was involved.

“ It has been maintained that the appellant (Trageser) has rights under existing treaties which have been infringed by the denial of licenses to aliens. Our opinion on this question has been sufficiently indicateil. But a few words more may be added. If we assume, for the sake of argument, that Trageser has under treaties every right which a citizen could have, the answer is that no citizen of the United States can complain because a police regulation denies him the privilege of selling liquor, even if the privi. lege is granted to other citizens. We are unable to conceive that any one, citizen or alien, can acquire rights which could in any way control, impair, impede, limit or diminish the police power of a State. Such power is original, inherent and exclusive; it has never been surrendered to the general government, and never can be surrendered without imperilling the existence of civil society.

“ The Act of Assembly involved in this controversy being in our opinion in all respects a valid law, it is perhaps unnecessary to say anything more; but we will observe that, even if the clause relating to aliens were unconstitutional, the other portions of the statute would not be affected. Aliens could not even, in that event, obtain licenses to sell liquor without the approval of the Board of Commissioners. " The order refusing the mandamus must be affirmed.

Order offirmed.1

Alvey, C. J., and McSherry, J., concurred in the affirmance of the order appealed from, refusing the mandamus, but for reasons different from those assigned in the opinion of the majority of the court.

1 Compare Perry v. City Gov., 7 Utah, 143. — Ed.

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