old government, and in arms to support its authority. The government under the new Constitution had but a short and ignoble existence. In May, 1842, Dorr made an unsuccessful attempt, at the head of a military force, to get possession of the State arsenal at Providence, which was repulsed. In June following, an assemblage of some hundreds of armed men, under his command at Chepatchet, dispersed, upon the approach of the troops of the old government, and no further effort was made to establish the new government. In January, 1842, the charter government took measures to call a convention to revise the existing form of government, and a new Constitution was formed, which was ratified by the people, and went into operation in May, 1843, at which time the old government formally surrendered all its powers. Under this government Dorr was tried for treason, and in June, 1844, was sentenced to imprisonment for life. In October, 1842, Luther brought an action in the Circuit Court of the United States, against Borden and, others, to recover damages for the breaking and entering of his house in June, 1842. The defendants justified, alleging that there was an insurrection to overthrow the government, that martial law was declared, that plaintiff was aiding and abetting the insurrection, that defendants. were enrolled in the militia force of the State and were ordered to arrest the plaintiff. The plaintiff relied upon the fact that the Dorr government, to which he adhered, was the legal government of the State, and, as the new Constitution had never been recognized by any department of the old government, he offered to prove at the trial, by the production of the original ballots, and the original registers of the persons voting, and by the testimony of the persons voting, and by the Constitution itself, and by the census of the United States for the year 1840, that the Dorr Constitution was ratified by a large majority of the male people of the State, of the age of twenty-one and upwards, and also by a majority of those who were entitled to vote for general officers under the then existing laws of the State. The Circuit Court rejected the evidence, and instructed the jury that the charter government, and laws under which the defendants acted, were, at the time the trespass was alleged to have been committed, in full force and effect, and constituted a justification of the acts of the defendants. The correctness of this ruling involved the only question, which was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States for review. The Supreme Court held that the evidence was properly rejected. Of the correctness of that decision no one can entertain the shadow of a doubt. But the differences between that case and this are so many and so evident, as to deprive it of all force as an authority in the present controversy. In that case an entire cha the in the form of government was undertaken; in this, simply an amendment, in no manner affecting the judicial authority of those acting under the existing government, is sought to be incorporated into the existing Constitution. In that case the charter provided no means for its amendment; in this, the mode of an amendment is specifically provided. In that case the authority of the court was invoked

for the admission of oral evidence to overthrow the existing government and establish a new one in its place; in this, that authority is invoked simply to preserve the existing Constitution intact.

It is evident, from an examination of the entire case of Luther v. Borden, that the question which the court was considering pertained to the power of the Federal courts to determine between rival constitutions in the States. The power is not denied to the State courts, unless one of the constitutions involved in the controversy be the one under which the court is organized. This is fully apparent from the whole opinion. Referring to the trial of Thomas W. Dorr for treason, in the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, the court say: "It is worthy of remark, however, when we are referring to the authority of State decisions, that the trial of Thomas W. Dorr took place after the Constitution of 1843 went into operation. The judges who decided that case held their authority under that Constitution; and it is admitted on all hands that it was adopted by the people of the State, and is the lawful and established government. It is the decision, therefore, of a State court, whose judicial authority to decide upon the Constitution and laws of Rhode Island is not questioned by either party to this controversy, although the government under which it acted was framed and adopted under the sanction and laws of the charter government. The point, then, raised here has already been decided by the courts of Rhode Island. The question relates altogether to the Constitution and laws of that State; and the well-settled rule in this court is, that the courts of the United States adopt and follow the decisions of the State courts in questions which concern merely the Constitution and laws of the State. Upon what ground could the Circuit Court of the United States, which tried this case, have departed from this rule, and disregarded and overruled the decisions of the courts of Rhode Island?" It seems from the foregoing quotation, which is really the fact, that the courts of Rhode Island had determined the question involved in Luther v. Borden, and that the courts of the United States were bound by and followed that adjudication.

The language of the court which, it is claimed, asserts the doctrine that the question of a change of constitutions is a political one, with which courts have nothing to do, was clearly employed with reference to the peculiar facts of the case. This is apparent from the following language of the opinion, which is found upon pages 39, 40. "Indeed. we do not see how the question could be tried and judicially decided in the State court. Judicial power presupposes an established government, capable of enacting laws and enforcing their execution, and of appointing judges to expound and administer them. The acceptance of the judicial office is a recognition of the authority of the government from which it is derived, and if the authority of that government is annulled and overthrown, the power of its courts and other officers is annulled with it, and .if a State court should enter upon the inquiry proposed in this case, and should come to the conclusion that the

government under which it acted had been put aside and displaced by an opposing government, it would cease to be a court, and be incapable of pronouncing a judicial decision upon the question it undertook to try. If it decides at all as a court, it necessarily affirms the existence and the authority of the government under which it is exercising judicial power." That this reasoning is eminently sound no one can doubt. A court which, under the circumstances named, should enter upon an inquiry as to the existence of the Constitution under which it was acting, would be like a man trying to prove his personal existence, and would be obliged to assume the very point in dispute, before taking the first step in the argument. It is apparent that the reasoning employed in that case can have no application whatever to an amendment to a constitution, which does not affect the form of government, or the judicial powers of existing courts. The case of Luther v. Borden gives no countenance whatever to the doctrine that the sovereignty of the people extends rightfully to the overturning of constitutions and the adoption of new ones, without regard to the forms of existing provisions. It is true that right, under our form of government, exists, but it is a revolutionary and not a constitutional right. When that right is invoked, a question arises which is above the Constitution, and above the courts, and which contending factions can alone determine by appeal to the dernier resort. In such a case as that, might makes right. That there are questions of such a character as to admit of no adjustment but through an appeal to arms, we freely admit. This arises out of the imperfections of human government. A government which could provide for the peaceful adjustment of all questions would be more than human. But surely no sagacious statesman or wise jurist will seek, by a narrow construction of judicial power, to extend the questions which are beyond the domain of the courts, and capable of solution only by an appeal to arms. Happily for the permanency and security of our institutions, the present case, as we believe, involves no such question.

It has been said that changes in the Constitution may be introduced in disregard of its provisions; that, if the majority of the people desire a change, the majority must be respected, no matter how the change may be effected, and that the change, if revolution, is peaceful revolution. But the revolution is peaceful only upon the assumption that the party opposed surrenders its opposition and voluntarily acquiesces. If it objects to the change, then a question arises which can be determined only in one of two methods, by the arbitrament of the courts, or by the arbitrament of the sword. The contest between the rival governments in the State of Rhode Island raised a question which was above the power of the existing courts: and it is a matter of history that it was not determined until the adherents of the Dorr Constitution fled at the point of the bayonet. We have read history to little purpose, if we refuse to learn from its examples or profit by its teachings. The public dangers which threatened the republic from the rival claims VOL. I. — 17

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for the Presidency, so graphically and so beautifully described by appellant's attorney, were averted only through a commission created by Congress, intrusted with judicial powers, which judicially determined the questions involved, and to whose decisions the people yielded voluntary obedience. That judicial decision averted the horrors of a civil war. The political department of the government, to which so much reference has been made in this case, stood appalled and impotent in the face of the great danger, and yet we are asked to abdicate our functions, to deny our jurisdiction, and to leave the question of an amendment to the Constitution, unless voluntarily acquiesced in, to be determined by a resort to arms. We ought to ponder long before we adopt a doctrine so fraught with danger to republican institutions. All the danger lies in the line of the argument of appellant's attorneys. The courts can never overturn our institutions or subvert our liberties. They command neither the purse nor the sword of the State. But a people which is educated to disrespect the decisions and disregard the adjudications of the courts, is prepared for anarchy, with all its attendant evils and dreadful consequences. We may, perhaps, be excused, if in the interest of social order and public security, and the permanency of republican institutions, we enter a most earnest protest against the heresies which have been advanced in this case.

The appellant further cites and relies upon Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Company, 13 Pet. 414. The only point determined in this is, that where the President, in a message to Congress, and in correspondence carried on with the government of Buenos Ayres, denied the jurisdiction of that country over the Falkland Islands, the courts must take the facts to be so.

ate.

The determining of the territorial jurisdiction of a foreign country, from the very nature of the subject, cannot reside in the courts of this country, but must be intrusted to the treaty-making power, which rests in the President by and with the advice and consent of the SenWhen, therefore, the President, in his official communications, has denied the jurisdiction of a foreign country over specified territory, it may well be conceded that it would not be within the jurisdiction of the courts to determine the fact to be otherwise. We are, however, unable to see that this case has any bearing upon the question now under consideration.

The case of United States v. Baker et al., 5 Blatchford, 12, is also cited and relied upon by appellant. This is a nisi prius case. The defendants were indicted for piracy, and were tried in 1861. They were acting as privateers, under a commission from Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States, which they claimed was, at least, a government de facto, and entitled to the rights and privileges that belong to a sovereign and independent nation. Nelson, J., upon this branch of the case, charged the jury as follows: "The court do not deem it pertinent or material to enter into this wide field of inquiry.

This branch of the defence involves considerations that do not belong to the courts of the country. It involves the determination of great public and political questions, which belong to the departments of our government that have charge of our foreign relations- the legislative and executive departments. When those questions are decided by those departments, the courts follow the decisions, and, until those departments have recognized the existence of the new government, the courts of the nation cannot. Until this recognition of the new government, the courts are obliged to regard the ancient state of things as remaining unchanged." This case falls under the same principle as the preceding case.

The case of White v. Hart, 13 Wallace, 646, which is the only remaining case cited by the appellant upon this branch of the case, originated as follows: In January, 1866, the plaintiff instituted a suit in the Supreme Court of Chattooga County, Georgia, upon a promissory note. The defendant pleaded in abatement that the consideration of the note was a slave, and that, by the present Constitution of the State of Georgia, the court is prohibited to take and exercise jurisdiction or render judgment thereon. To this plea the plaintiff demurred. The court overruled the demurrer, and gave judgment for the defendants, thus enforcing the constitutional provision. The plaintiff excepted, and removed the case to the Supreme Court of the State, where the judgment was affirmed, and the plaintiff thereupon prosecuted a writ of error in the Supreme Court of the United States. The Constitution of Georgia of 1868 contains the following clause:

"Provided, that no court or officer shall have, nor shall the General Assembly give, jurisdiction to try, or give judgment on, or enforce any debt, the consideration of which was a slave or the hire thereof." The plaintiff insisted that this provision was in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, in that it impaired the obligation of contracts. The defendant sought to maintain the judgment in his favor, upon the ground, amongst others, that the Constitution of Georgia was adopted under the dictation and coercion of Congress, and is the act of Congress rather than of the State, and that, though a State cannot pass a law impairing the validity of contracts, Congress can, and that for this reason the inhibition in the Constitution of the United States has no effect in this case. In passing upon this question the court says: "Congress authorized the State to frame a new constitution, and she elected to proceed within the scope of the authority conferred. The result was submitted to Congress as a voluntary and valid offering, and was so received, and so recognized in the subsequent action of that body. The State is estopped to assail it upon such an assumption. Upon the same ground she might deny the validity of her ratification of the constitutional amendments. The action of Congress upon the subject cannot be inquired into. The case is clearly one in which the judicial is bound to follow the action of the political department of the government, and is concluded by it."