Mr. VAN ZANDT. Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Van Zandt.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. At this particular point, I would like to have Mr. Blandford tell us why we granted that authority.

Mr. BLANDFORD. I think that is a very simple explanation, Mr. Van Zandt. When the emergency started, we had a great many Reserve officers. We had to expand in a hurry. But these Reserve officers weren't all ensigns. These Reserve officers had been in the Reserve long enough to be promoted to junior grade and lieutenant and we had to order these Reserve officers to active duty.

They were the only ones available and we had to order them as lieutenants or lieutenants, junior grade. There just were not that many ensigns around. We couldn't violate the law, so we had to suspend the law which permitted them to have more jg's and more lieutenants than authorized.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. Isn't another factor the morale factor?

Mr. BLANDFORD. That is a very serious factor involved in the whole thing.

Mr. NORBLAD. Isn't that wide open in the Army and Air Force, as far as promotions are concerned?

Mr. BLADFORD. Yes. I would just like to mention in passing this, because I think you are attempting to come upon a common factor, a common percentage figure for all services, and I think it is impossible. A troop carrier wing has, for example, a ratio of 16.5 officers to enlisted personnel. Obviously, air wings are going to have more officers than they are going to have in a division of artillery or division of infantry troops.

You can't come upon a common percentage figure.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. Is it not true that a table of organization for the Marine Corps provides for more officers than does the Army? Mr. BLANDFORD. I think in aviation, that is correct.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. Yes, sir.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. Chairman, I move Mr. Davis be allowed to finish his statement without interruption.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Continue, Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS. My position with respect to this provision of law, Mr. Chairman, is that until affirmative action after consideration by this committee has been taken, that the rider will need to be modified, but that it would be a mistake, in my opinion, to completely repeal the rider because that will open the door completely and will open it up to further abuse-abuse which I believe I can demonstrate-has taken place in the past.

Mr. Chairman, I have read the staff report that was prepared for this committee. It was, of course- and I am sure the staff will be the first to agree to this—an ex parte hearing. The branches of the armed services were heard.

There was an acceptance on the part of staff that you really don't need any overall control, that you have that control through the budget, through the allowance of a certain amount of money for the payment of personnel. That, obviously, is a completely unsound theory. You can appropriate a million dollars for personnel of the Navy and that $1 million will pay for a number of enlisted men and a

our authority to the extent that we will say to the armed services,. "Whenever you need another general or another admiral, kick 10 enlisted men off the payroll and you will have the money to do it," I think we would indeed be guilty of negligence in the performance of our duty.

Mr. GAVIN. You think the services would take advantage of the situation?

The CHAIRMAN. Continue. Address the Chair.

Mr. DAVIS. The report was quick to agree to the problems which have been created as a result of the so-called Davis amendment, but nowhere did I find any questioning as to how in the world the service got into the position of being drastically affected by a reasonable limitation on officer strength.

And that is the situation that I hope to demonstrate by some charts that I brought along this morning, Mr. Chairman.

To explain the legend-this chart is for the Navy only. I have similar charts for the other branches of the armed services. The red represents the number of commanders. The brown represents the number of captains. The green represents the lower half admirals. The purple, for convenience purposes only, represents the upper half admirals and above.

The first line represents June 30, 1945, the date that was submitted to me as the high point of our World War II mobilization.

The next line represents October 31, 1951, which was the latest figure available to me at the time of the first draft of the Davis rider. The next line June 30, 1952, the end of the last fiscal year. Next, November 30, 1952, the latest date for which figures were available. The next line a few days ago, represents the figures given to us in the justifications before our subcommittee last year as the proposed strength on June 30, 1953. Here, in the last line, are the figures that would be permitted under the Davis rider, after the 1st of April, 1953. Now there may be some minor inadequacies, but I think by and large that those figures, inasmuch as they came from the Defense Department in all cases, can be considered accurate for purposes of this discussion.

There are a couple of things that to me seem rather significant. Let me say, first of all, that all of these divisions are not exactly the same. For comparable purposes they are the same. But larger divisions are used down here in the admiral brackets, in order to spread that out and give you a better picture. But the overall figures will be comparable.

You will note, first of all, that the Navy planned, by next June, to have more officers in the rank of commander and above than they had at the height of their World War II mobilization.

Mr. NORBLAD. What was the overall figure on strength, please? Mr. DAVIS. I have some percentage charts that I would like to present next, if you will just bear with me for a minute.

You will note, too, that the Navy planned to have, by next June, 7,558 commanders, as compared to 6,598 commanders at the height of World War II. In other words, I think it is up to the Navy to explain to this committee why they need approximately 1,000 more commanders in June of 1953 than they had in June of 1945, when the Navy had almost four times as many men in that branch of the armed

You will note, too, that while this graph does not give a completely adequate picture, the Navy now has and proposes to have more upper-half admirals than they have lower-half admirals.

Now the Navy gives an explanation for that, but I don't believe we would look with favor upon the Army or the Air Force or the Marine Corps if they came in and told us they wanted to have more major generals than they had brigadier generals.

And yet comparably speaking, that is what the Navy has today and that is what they plan to have.

Now, all the Davis rider did was to say, "When you say upper-half and lower-half admirals, you ought to mean that, and that you ought not have more upper-half than you have lower-half in actual number of admirals."

The big difficulty with the Navy has been in the rank of lieutenant senior grade. And let me explain here that I had no intention of causing any demotions in the rank of lieutenants senior grade. In fact, if you will look at the comparable records, you will note that the Davis rider provided for exactly, right down to the last one, the number of senior grade lieutenants that the Navy told us they wanted to have in their justification before our subcommittee. In the overall picture, and, as I said at the beginning, the Navy has shown good faith in keeping under the legal limitations that this committee set; the Navy talks about squeezing the number of senior officers down and thus causing demotions of lieutenants senior grade. Well, let me say this: There could be, under the Davis rider, within 300 of as many officers as the Navy said they needed in June 1953, out of a total of 43,000.

In other words, the overall effect on the officer personnel of the Navy, in ranks of senior grade and above, if the Navy's figures had only been correct, would have been less than two-thirds of 1 percent.

Now, because of inaccurate Navy estimates, we are faced with a tough situation now. Today the Navy tells us they have 5,400 lieutenants that have to be demoted, and I don't know how many hundreds or thousands of lieutenants junior grade that they can't promote to lieutenant. I guess that we will have to correct that situation, in order to alleviate the hardship that would be caused.

But, Mr. Chairman, I am a little bit tired and a little bit sick of picking up the irresponsible columns of newspaper columnists throughout the country and having the chairman of this committee quoted as saying he had just been to Korea and he had seen lieutenants demoted to lieutenant junior grade right in the middle of the combat zone in Korea, and all of the kind of irresponsible comments that have been made.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair has never made such a comment.

Mr. DAVIS. I didn't believe the Chair had made that statement, but I can show it to him in a column of one of the less responsible columnists of this country. I can also refer to some of the silly and irresponsible statements that have been made by some of the radio commentators in recent weeks, too, which the chairman is probably aware of.

Let me say, Mr. Chairman, that I have the personal assurance of Admiral DuBose that none of those irresponsible stories were originated

But, obviously, somebody in the Pentagon has had a field day leaking information which was completely inaccurate and was intended, with no regard for facts, to discredit my effort to control a situation that needed controlling.

The CHAIRMAN. I might say at that point, however, that I did talk to a good many lieutenants in the Navy who were very much perturbed, disturbed at the prospect of being demoted.

Mr. DAVIS. Why, I think they have every right to be disturbed, The CHAIRMAN. You appreciate their position.

Mr. DAVIS. I appreciate their position.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure.

Mr. DAVIS. And I said I had no intent to bring about that kind of a situation and it would not have been brought about if the figures I had had been accurate.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. It wasn't your fault.

Mr. DAVIS. This second chart presents a slightly different picture with respect to the Navy officer personnel. This gives you a percentage of overall personnel. There, again, the figures are based on June 30, 1945, as our top mobilization in World War II, and it goes over to October 31, 1951, June 30, 1952, November 30, 1952; June 30, 1953, proposed, and then the Davis rider.

Well, here you are. There are your total officers of the rank of commander and above at June 30, 1945.

Mr. HARDY. What is that percentage?

Mr. DAVIS. That figure was that is a little over three-tenths of a percent.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask him a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rivers.

Mr. RIVERS. Let me ask you this: Your amendment-when you started off, you started off with a knowledge of the Navy based on figures they gave you for this computation?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. RIVERS. And it was satisfactory to them then?

Mr. DAVIS. I wouldn't say so, sir. It was not satisfactory to them.

Mr. RIVERS. It was known to them, and subsequent to the enactment of that amendment and of the Appropriations Act of last year this haitus, so to speak, became known to the Navy as an afterthough, based on after-found figures or after-discovered evidence?

Mr. DAVIS. Some of it seems to be unaccountable. Other parts of it have been based on directives that have been given to the Navy. For instance, they have been directed to promote, oh, eight or nine hundred, as I understand it, Medical Corps and Dental Corps officers from junior grade to lieutenant.

That accounts for probably 900 out of 5,400 or so. And you can account for some others-reserves that they didn't know about it. But there is still a pretty big void.

Mr. RIVERS. Well, Dental Corps officers and Medical Corps officers start off as junior grade?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes.

Just to briefly complete this picture, this shows percentagewise that once they went from this peak, or from this figure for World War II, and jumped up here to October 31, 1951, and then moved up to June

overall effect of the Davis rider on the ranks of commander and above, even though, as I said, the navy did plan to have about a thousand more commanders next June than they had in June of 1945.

Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question at this point? The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. HARDY. I would like to ask, Mr. Davis, before you take that chart down: If I understood, the top of each line represents the percentage of total officers to enlisted men?

Mr. DAVIS. Total officers to overall personnel.

Mr. HARDY. Overall personnel?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes.

Mr. HARDY. What is that percentage, in your first line thereI believe you said it was 1945?

Mr. DAVIS. It looks to me as though it is just a little over threetenths of 1 percent.

Mr. HARDY. That is not the total, is it?

Mr. DAVIS. That is of commanders and above.

Mr. HARDY. Well, that is you total of commanders and above. And what is your figure there for June 30, 1953?

Mr. DAVIS. June 30, 1953, it would run about 1.25 percent.

Mr. HARDY. Three-tenths to 1.25, which means four times as many in proportion to the total personnel?

Mr. DAVIS. Roughly so, yes.

Mr. HARDY. Of commanders and above?

Mr. DAVIS. Roughly so, yes.

Mr. HARDY. And as between 1945 and June 30, 1953?

Mr. DAVIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARDY. I am having a little difficulty understanding that, myself.

Mr. DAVIS. Now let's take a look at this graph showing the number of Marine Corps officers. I do not have the percentage figures on the other branches because, as you will appreciate, it does take a considerable amount of work with a limited congressional staff to get all of these things prepared.

But this gives you the absolute figures with respect to the Marine Corps. And there you see pretty much the same story. Here are the lieutenant colonels and above in June of 1945, and you see the dip down to October 1951, and then you see what has happened since that.

In other words, the Marine Corps by next June would have nearly 2,000 officers, lieutenant colonels and above, compared to less than 1,500 at the height of their World War II mobilization.

For illustration, the Marine Corps had 1,029 lieutenant colonels at the height of World War II mobilization. They propose to have 1,350 by next June.

You can see the difference there between this width right in there, which will give you the comparative figures.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. RIVERS. In 1945, how large was the Marine Corps?

Mr. BLANDFORD. 489,000.

Mr. RIVERS. Four hundred eighty-nine?

Mr. BLANDFORD. Yes.