Mr. HOFFMAN. All right. Neither you nor any Member of Congress was up in the Chosen Reservoir fighting where this matter that the gentleman referred to took place. I do not want any controversy about it, but I do not propose to be put in the wrong just because I call your attention to an article which will be read by I do not know how many hundreds of thousands of our people.

Now, I am not reading from a book. I did not read from a book. The CHAIRMAN. You are getting ready to.

Mr. HOFFMAN. What?

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead. Spill it.

Mr. HOFFMAN. There is nothing to spill. I am just giving you something that is stated here. This foreword was written by Oliver P. Smith, Major General, United States Marine Corps, for this book. I am not trying to quote from this book to bear out the statement I made. I realize it would not be possible to get everything the men need up front. We all know that. But if you want to read, The New Breed, it may be interesting.

If the committee cares to take the attitude, which is not the one taken by the general, that nobody ever makes a mistake in connection with war, that no one who wears a uniform can ever make a mistake, that is all right with me, that is your business. Let me tell you what this former marine, who was there, that is in Korea, said

Mr. COLE. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cole.

Mr. COLE. Would the gentleman not tell us that the book he is referring to relates to a period 2 or 3 years ago, rather than the occasion as described by General Collins? They are talking about different situations.

Mr. HOFFMAN. I do not think it relates to 2 or 3 years ago. Two, maybe. It has nothing to do with operation Smack.

Mr. COLE. That book relates to the situation early in Korea.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Miller of California.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Chairmen, the article in Collier's says:

But one out of five in the winter of 1950-51 was a victim of frostbite and exposure.

The Korean War's first quadruple amputee was a frostbite case. We know that. That was in 1950-51.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Does it not carry the statement that the men up there had more casualties from the weather than from arms?

General COLLINS. No, sir; it does not. It definitely does not.

The author wrote: "We face the conclusion that the thermometer put more American troops out of action than did enemy action."

Mr. HOFFMAN. All right. We will skip it then. Call in the fellow who wrote for Collier's. I do not claim to have personal knowledge. I just know what I read and what I see.

The CHAIRMAN. We are not going back to 1951. We are going back to a week ago. Let us stick to it.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Does anyone who is on the committee, find any fault with the questions in the resolution of inquiry?

The CHAIRMEN. No. I am glad the gentleman introduced the resolution. He was disturbed, as all of us are. I am not criticizing

he has heard since introducing the resolution, that the committee. would be justified in tabling it.

Mr. HOFFMAN. All right, I will continue this letter.

The CHAIRMEN. It has served its purpose.

Mr. HOFFMAN. I get the cussing. That is all right.

But just let me read:

You were good enough to listen. I wrote you about the ammunition shortage, but beyond that it is mighty heartening to hear

the rest of it is personal, but this man tells a story he knew about, not about somebody else. It will be inserted at the end of my statement.

Talking about the attitude now, of course, we are all supporting the officers just as we are the men. There is no question about that. But that does not mean that we have no right to make inquiries as to whether they are being supplied with either weapons, clothing, or food. All through the Civil War there was a congressional com mittee that felt free to say something about the Civil War.

I recall that at Selfridge Field there was an officer who shot that colored gentleman. What did he get? The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Shafer I think, investigated that one. Well, he got a demotion in rank.

Now, I am not objecting and I am not criticizing the taking of pictures. Look. Here are three of those volumes, the official records of the Marine Corps. There are pictures of the actual fighting of the operation, and they are very valuable, and they have to have them if they wish to improve their methods. What I was trying to learn was whether these pictures which were taken over there were taken for the benefit of the services, or whether someone is going to make a movie for propaganda purposes. That is a legitimate inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. Not only legitimate, but laudable. Laudable. We thank the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. HOFFMAN. So I think you have my attitude on it.

Let me repeat: A mistake was made. The first one apparently was made over there in the form of the notice put out. The second was made by the press. Certainly our people are going to inquire as to the truth of the news stories as time goes on. I think the services should be grateful for having the situation brought to a head. The CHAIRMAN. We want to thank you.

Mr. HOFFMAN. So our people will go along and support the war. The CHAIRMAN. We want to thank the gentleman for being on his toes. He is always alert. I think it is good and healthy for the military to let them know they are at all times under civilian control.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Yes. And our resolution did not call for any moving pictures and television or anything of that kind. It was a simple resolution of inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. Might I ask the gentleman if he is satisfied now with the explanation that has been given? What further inquiry does the gentleman feel would be necessary or justified?

Mr. HOFFMAN. If the questions asked in the resolution are answered I am not posing as a critic or an expert. I am just asking them When I see the record I will tell you then if I am not. I will introduce another one or take it up on the floor.

[Article by Peter Kalischer, Collier's, February 7, 1953]

WINTER WARFARE

Fifteen wounded against scores of frostbites. Red China's entry into the Korean war may have surprised some of our military experts, but it was the cold, as inevitable as a date on the calendar, that really caught them with their winter pants down. Neither the men nor their machines were ready for winter war. No one knows how many Americans died in no man's land-or were capturedsimply because they couldn't cope with the weather. But official records show that 6,000 hospitalized casualties, one out of every five in the winter of 1950–51, were victims of frostbite or exposure (the Korean war's first quadruple amputee was a frostbite case). Add to this record the normal 5-to-1 ratio of minor cold injuries treated at first-aid stations and returned to duty within 48 hours and we face the conclusion that the thermometer put more American troops out of action than did enemy weapons.

The real shocker to these statistics is that these men suffered in temperatures no colder than prevail in many sections of the United States. The icy "retreat, hell" march by the Marines from the Changjin Reservoir to the sea was in the same latitude as southern Pennsylvania. Yet an army can freeze in Pennsylvania, as history recalls, and in terms of modern winter warfare our troops in Korea were almost as bad off as Washington's at Valley Forge.

By the time heavy clothing reached forward units racing for the Yalu River, the men were going the other way and often had to burn or abandon stocks en

route.

Vehicles were without antifreeze, gasoline and lubricants froze, batteries cracked, and jeeps were either thawed out by bonfire and blowtorch, towed with their wheels locked or left behind. All the unpreparedness that marked our entry into the Korean police action snowballed into one winter of misery and discontent.

[From the Washington Post, Monday, February 9, 1953]

PRODUCTION OF SHELLS RISING, ARMY SAYS

(By Raymond J. Blair, New York Herald Tribune News Service)

The Army indicated yesterday it is making progress toward solving ammunition shortages in Korea.

A Pentagon statement revealed that more than 52 million rounds of artillery ammunition and 3 billion rounds of small arms ammunition, valued at 2 billion dollars, were produced last year.

An Army spokesman said production of artillery shells, which have been the chief ammunition bottleneck up until now, is reaching the point where combat demands in Korea can be met and the Army can also start building up reserves. However, Army sources said the situation is unchanged from December 19, when officers at a Pentagon briefing revealed that President Eisenhower, who had just returned from Korea, was dissatisfied with the amount of ammunition available there.

Army sources said rationing of ammunition was still in effect in Korea, as it was during World War II. The Army says this is standard military procedure to prevent waste and that when there is a demand for a larger ration at the front, it is granted.

Yesterday's statement did not refer to criticism of supplies in Korea, but the Army apparently had this in mind. The statement quoted Maj. Gen. E. L. Ford, Army Chief of Ordnance, to the effect that in the 6 months immediately following the start of the Korean war, only slightly more than a million round of artillery ammunition were produced, while in a similar period last year, production totaled over 30 million rounds.

Accurate comparisons between combat requirements now and during World War II are impossible because of the difference in size and scope of the two operations," the Army said. "One marked difference between the two periods, however, is the authorized daily rate per gun per day of ammunition expenditure. In the most important calibers this rate for Korea has been established * * * several times greater than World War II rates."

An Army spokesman said artillery shell production was cut back sharply after

The spokesman said production is now "zooming and we are pushing toward our production goals," after a setback caused by last spring's steel strike.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask General Collins two questions?

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. BROOKS. General, you referred to the fact that you thought a mistake had been made in placing a cover on the operations procedure, the operations order, as you call it. The mistake to which you refer was not a mistake which would have cost the lives of any of our

men.

STATEMENT OF GEN. J. LAWTON COLLINS, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY-Resumed

General COLLINS. It had no effect on the operations whatsoever, Mr. Brooks.

Mr. BROOKS. If it were a mistake-and I assume it was, because I do not like the thought of dressing up these things, either, like a program to the opera in the evening-it was a psychological mistake that did not cost the lives of our men, and did not bring about the wounding of any of them.

General COLLINS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. BROOKS. That is all.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cunningham.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. General Collins, I have before me the February 1, 1953, issue of the Des Moines Sun-Register in which appears an interview given by a former lieutenant of the Air Force in Korea. I want to read just the first paragraph:

A Des Moines veteran of air combat in Korea disclosed here Saturady that our Air Force put on shows, too, for Congressmen and visiting officers while he was on active duty overseas last summer.

He goes on and I quote:

It seemed mostly for show purposes, and it was a pretty expensive proposition. I will ask the general if he knows of such shows having been put on in the past, in addition to what is before the committee now, known as Operation Smack?

General COLLINS. Many comparable operations such as this have been put on in the past, Mr. Cunninghan, but not for show any more than this one was put on for show.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. This man is a lieutenant in the Air Force. He was over there and he claims they were.

General COLLINS. I was a lieutenant once myself, and well remember it. It was one of the happiest periods of my service, incidentally. But, frankly, the point of view of the young man who is in an operation-I do not know the particular one this man was referring to there

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. The Seventh Division.

General COLLINS. He said that he was in the Air Force.

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. It is too long to read.

General COLLINS. This man is in the Air Force which service

is beyond my responsibility.

General COLLINS. Yes, sir. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I know of no better way to close this little hearing than to read this brief but very valuable contribution offered by the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Kilday.

God and the soldier we adore in time of danger, not before. Danger passes and all things righted God is ignored, the soldier slighted.

Thank you, General.

Mr. KILDAY. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to appear as the author. That was quoted by Churchill as coming from a veteran of the Duke of Marlborough's campaign.

Mr. COLE. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cole.

Mr. COLE. I should like to ask General Collins about another phase of the Korean operations which has nothing to do with Operation Smack.

General COLLINS. Right, sir.

Mr. COLE. But I am not sure, General, you are in a position to comment or desire to comment on it.

What I have in mind is with respect to the report of the court martial of a number of American troops because they either retreated in the face of fire or they did not advance in the face of fire. Do you have in mind the circumstances to which I refer?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir. I know the situation to which you refer, Mr. Cole. It has not reached my office or the Office of the Secretary of the Army. As you know, the law prescribes that courts martial must be reviewed by the successive echelons of command and that particular group of cases, so far as I know, has not yet reached the Department.

Mr. COLE. From what do you know were those cases centered in a certain regiment?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; they were in a single regiment.

Mr. COLE. Was that the Puerto Rican regiment?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Mr. COLE. I think I should say for the record that I talked with the Commissioner from Puerto Rico yesterday about it, and told him I was going to raise this question today, if possible, and he was unable to be here because of another meeting.

General COLLINS. Right, sir.

Mr. COLE. I am not doing this without his knowledge.

General COLLINS. Right, sir.

Mr. COLE. Do you know of any reason or any circumstance that explains why this particular group would not fulfill its battle responsibilities?

General COLLINS. Well, let me state that what I am going to say now I do not want to have affect my responsibility of later considering this particular group of cases. There might be some legal implication in that which is beyond my ken. I am not a lawyer.

I will say this: The Sixty-fifth Infantry when it first went to Korea was a very well trained and very ably led unit. It distinguished itself in action. It is inevitably the case that as those men who were more experienced left the unit under rotation and it obtained newer men who did not understand English, for example, as well as the original group did, and whose officers were less experienced than the original