what the general is saying, and so that the general himself can concentrate. Will you throw up your hand, General, or shake your fist at me, or something? Throw up your hand; that is what they

want.

General COLLINS. Thank you very much, Mr. Cole.

The CHAIRMAN. The point of order is very well taken. I did not want to cut the photographers off. Please take one more picture now, and then we will call it quits.

All right. Now proceed without any interruption or diversion. The Chair wants to be patient with the press.

General COLLINS. The first of these excerpts was sent in by Mr. Jim Robinson of the National Broadcasting Co., from Seoul, and I quote:

The military here are dismayed and absolutely perplexed at the reaction in the States as to last Sunday's raid. That raid took Allied troops storming against T-Bone Hill outpost on the western front. Evidently the report in the States is that the operation was staged with theatrical trappings. That has nothing whatsoever to do with the troops, as to the actual operation itself. The attack Sunday was an affair to test coordination between ground forces, tanks, and air. There was a briefing for the newsmen in general before the attack. This is nothing new. The military have to be briefed. Newsmen often are given briefings so as to give them better understanding of the action and the entire operation. From a front line, OP top brass watched the attack. Now, in this particular attack, which was a relatively small affair, the Red Chinese held the crest of a hill against the attack. This is nothing new here. They have held the crest of other hills we have attacked. And the attack was certainly not a staged affair to amuse generals. It was certainly serious business. Aside from testing coordination between air and ground, it had definite value to us. The enemy there had been staging a slow, creeping offensive. We hit them hard and stopped that. If we had not hit them, in a few days or maybe weeks they would have hit us and our casualties would have been far greater than on Sunday.

I should like also to read an editorial from the Washington News under the dateline of Saturday, January 31, 1953, which, aside from being an editorial, quotes from the report of Mr. Jim Lucas, whom many of this committee know as being a front-line correspondent; This editorial is headed "The Army was right," and I quote:

It is human to err, and newspapers, as human institutions, are by no means immune from that common failing. We are satisfied from the evidence at hand that a large section of theA merican press went off half-cocked in its editorial comment upon Operation Smack, the Army's combat operation on T-Bone Hill in Korea last Sunday. This raid has been described as a show put on for the benefit of visiting generals and other dignitaries, in which American troops allegedly were used as "expendable cannon fodder for publicity purposes," as one Member of Congress charged. The News refrained from editorial discussion of the issue until an investigation could be made by Jim G. Lucas, our war correspondent in Korea. Jim was a fighting Marine throughout World War II, winning his commission on the battlefield. He saw eight D-days, from Tarawa to Iwo Jima. Now, on his third assignment to the Korean front, Jim does not cover the war from Tokyo or Seoul, but goes into the field with the troops, where he can observe operations at first hand. Hence he was well qualified to pass judgment upon the raid in question, having participated in many similar ones himself. Jim Lucas was not present at the Sunday raid, but he has investigated the circumstances. Sunday's raid, Mr. Lucas found, was one of several planned and ordered by Gen. Mark Clark early this winter. Its purpose was to take prisoners and to destroy underground fortifications. The enemy was known to be digging.

It failed in the first objective, and was only partially successful in the second, but that is war. There were many witnesses at the cperation, and for good reason, in Jim's opinion. Newly assigned officers witness such operations as part of their indoctrination. The highest ranking "visiting fireman" attending this particular operation was an Air Force general interested in the study of close air support for

hand? Jim's answers are: "overzealous public relations" and "overzealous press coverage." Most correspondents regarded the raid as a 1-day story, and they now admit they overplayed it, he said. "All are saying frankly that the Army is right and we are wrong," he added. Unfortunately the misunderstanding and heartaches resulting from this overzealousness cannot be assuaged by this confession, but there is a serious lesson in this incident which all of us should take to heart. We are in a war, and war is deadly serious business. Wars can be lost on the home front as well as on the battlefield. Morale is as vital as ammunition. When constructive criticism is justified, no punches should be pulled, but our military leaders should be given the benefit of the doubt when there is any reason for doubt. Their task is a difficult one without making them whipping boys for emotional binges. That happened in this case, and the enemy profited because of it. It should not happen again.

Let me say, gentlemen, that I hold no brief whatever for the eager beaver who assembled the operation order for this raid, put it in a little folder and issued it with the printing of the divisional insignia on the cover of it. The young man who did this did it without the knowledge of the division commander, from the reports that I have, and he made an error in that regard. I recognize, however, that he was 8,000 miles away and had little opportunity to estimate the possible impact of this action at home and abroad. However, his enthusiasm gave no comfort to the enemy nor did it have any effect on the operation. So, the Army accepts it has a share of the responsibility for having gotten this thing off the track so far as the reports are concerned.

Now, with respect to the operation itself, I have read carefully the reports which General Van Fleet has sent in. I was briefed when I was in Korea on a series of raids of this character and, really without knowing it, had briefly the story of this one told to me. This was before the newspaper stories broke. I was in Korea just 2 or 3 days after this event.

I will ask your indulgence not to go into too many of the military details of this matter, which might be of benefit to the enemy; but the fact of the matter was that there was a gap in our knowledge of the units opposite a certain area of the front, and the Army commander had authorized a succession of raids by a series of units to determine what unit was opposite this particular sector of the front. And, as is also indicated in the dispatch from Mr. Robinson, the enemy had been gradually pushing forward his positions in this particular area. It was decided to combine the raid with the punishment of the enemy in this particular area.

Advantage was also taken of this planned raid to check on certain of our techniques for close air support, and that is why the commanding general of the Fifth Air Force came up to see this raid himself. Now, it so happened that the coverage by the Air, according to our official reports, was only about 40 percent effective. I think it was a very salutary thing that the commanding general of the Air Force was there to see what were the results of the bombing. If there was anything wrong with it, we expect that the lesson learned from this exercise will be put to good use in the next one.

Now, similarly, the tanks that played a part in this exercise had not quite gone out far enough to cover the flanks of the unit which was making the raid. Incidentally, this particular use of tanks is a relatively new technique. In a raid by one of the Korean divisions which participated in this same series of operations, the tanks had done an

out far enough and evidently did not cover the flank areas through which the unit was to operate. In consequence, then, the leading platoon was pinned down. Incidentally, there were three platoons involved in this operation, which was a relatively small-scale one. The first platoon was pinned down, and then the latter two platoons that were thrown in, almost got to the enemy's final positions, but received such casualties that they called off the operation without securing a prisoner.

Now, what were those casualties? We had 3 men killed in action and 61 wounded. I have had a check made since my return, and I have a report as to the status of the wounded. Of the 61 wounded, 12 were severely wounded and 5 critically wounded. The others had slight or moderate wounds. Twelve have already returned to duty. I also asked the question, because there seemed to be some legitimate question on the part of our public here at home, whether or not the briefing of the correspondents might have led to a leak to the enemy, which gave him warning of this raid. So, I asked the specific question: What time interval had existed between the briefing and the launching of the raid, and where was the briefing held? The reply which I received just this morning was that the briefing of correspondents was held in the Seventh Division Command Post. There was no briefing of correspondents in Seoul, from which one of the stories was written. The interval between the briefing of the correspondents and the initial air attack was 35 minutes. From the briefing to the initial ground action was 3 hours and 35 minutes. From the briefing to the movement of the first platoon across the line of departure was 4 hours and 15 minutes.

I asked a specific question. Here was the question I asked: What, if any, chance was there of information of the raid leaking to the enemy as a result of the briefing? The answer was "None."

Now, what damage was done to the enemy in this operation? Eighteen of the enemy's bunkers were destroyed. Fifty-seven bunkers were damaged. Two caves were damaged. Two OP's were damaged. Thirteen were killed in action, actually counted on the battlefield. Twenty-five additional were estimated killed in action. Three were known to be wounded in action.

General Van Fleet's final summary-I read from one of his official reports says:

This action was in no way designed as a demonstration for spectator benefit, but was intended to be a sound tactical operation for the capture of prisoners. It was felt that the coordinated use of air, artillery, and army would facilitate the task of infantry. All plans were approved by the commanding general of the First Corps. The execution of the operation was not considered to be satisfactory and has been critiqued in detail by the corps commander with the division commanders.

That ends my statement, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. General Collins, that is a very excellent statement. As I said on the radio and television last Thursday, I hope the American people, particularly those who were gravely disturbed and distressed by these sensational newspaper articles, will reserve their judgment until you have given us the full facts and the complete story. I stated that if it were an ordinary routine, normal operation there could be no valid or justifiable criticism from any source whatsoever; but if it were a staged show to entertain spectators, because some

then, of course, it was most reprehensible and the culprit should be apprehended and properly punished.

I am glad you could appear before us this morning, because I have received so many letters and telegrams and postal cards and other communications such as this [reading]:

Mr. SHORT: Like all the specimens from Missouri, you are long on shooting off your mouth but short on shooting a gun. Why don't you enlist and do some real fighting. Then you can tell 'em all about it. We don't pay you for shooting off your big mouth.

Here is another fair sample, from Watertown, Mass.:

DEWEY SHORT (Missouri): Pagans put on shows such as Operations SmackIndians, headhunters, etc. All responsible should be shot at-sunrise after a courtmartial. Treat them as the masters of concentration camps.

I think that is from a frustrated old maid.

Here is another communication, which comes from New York. The funny part of it is that most of them are anonymous. They do not have the courage to sign them. [Reading:]

No lies, General Collins, can cover the fact our boys were killed for the amusement of the Army cowards. We Americans are not all morons. Why did Maj. John Eisenhower need three Secret Service men to guard him. Get to the bottom of this. And no lies.

That is just a fair sample of the dozens and scores of communications which I have received, and no doubt other Members of Congress have received, since this tempest in the teapot exploded.

With the permission of the committee, I want to read a brief editorial which a friend of mine from Pittsburgh sent me. I received it just a few minutes ago. It appeared in the Pittsburgh PostGazette last Saturday, and it is so reasonable and sensible and such sound advice, which I think every Member of Congress should heed, that I am going to read it for our own benefit, as well as for the public. This article, which appeared in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Saturday, January 31, is as follows:

OPERATION BACKFIRE

Before condemning anyone in connection with Operation Smack in Korea, congressional investigators should get the answer to one basic question: Was this operation an essential step in an over-all objective, or was it simply a maneuver staged to settle an interservice dispute over the effectiveness of close air support? If it were the former, then we don't see any good reason for all the fuss that has been kicked up in the wake of a routine military operation that failed. Had the mission succeeded, we would have had heroes instead of complaints. The fact that an enthusiastic public-information officer dressed up the operational timetable in three colors is wholly irrelevant. The drawing of military timetables, with or without color, is standard and commendable procedure. Who Would be fool enough to send men into battle without first drawing up a schedule so that everyone involved would know what to do and when to do it?

Again, there is nothing new or wrong about having observers, brass or otherwise, at the front lines. That is a practice as old as military strategy itself. It is followed to train staff officers and to provide public information.

And I have several pictures here which were taken last September, when members of this committee-nine of us-flew in a helicopter up to the front lines, and rode in jeeps up the hillsides to observation posts. I want the other Members who are on this committee who were not on that trip, to look at this this morning. It could have been charged that you staged a show for us, but it was not. It was a natural military operation. We were there to learn.

How could it

The editorial goes on to state:

If, however, the attack on T-Bone Hill was staged to settle a dispute among the Marines and the Air Force as to which has the most effective system of close air support, then its perpetrators are subject to censure and punishment.

Any interservice dispute could and should be settled at training camps without risking the lives of troops. As things turned out, 3 men were killed and 87 were injured (57 of the injured returned to duty the following day) as 1 company failed to take the hill.

Quick and angry public reaction to this episode is readily understood. It reflects a deep-seated resentment of this strange and deadly war which nags continuously at the American conscience.

It would, however, be easy to do a grave injustice to American officers who after all, have been doing a good job with a nasty situation. Congress and the public should hold their fire until all the facts are in on Operation Smack.

You have given us the facts, which many of us anticipated. It merely confirms our deep-seated conviction, after a first-hand contact with the field commanders out there, that next to these men's own fathers, mothers, wives, and brothers and sisters, no one in all the world is so intensely and vitally concerned with the safety, welfare, and lives of those men than is their commanding officer.

General COLLINS. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Again I want to thank you, sir, for appearing before us this morning. I am glad that our colleague from Michigan, Mr. Hoffman, who was naturally and understandably concerned about these newspaper reports, written in garish manner, is here. I am glad that he, who introduced his resolution on Thursday of last week, is present this morning. It is only fair to him to give him an opportunity to be heard at this time.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. Mr. Chairman, may I ask some questions?

The CHAIRMAN. If the members of the committee would like to interrogate the general at this point, perhaps we should finish with him, because he is a busy man.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. General Collins, I am one Member of Congress who insisted that we wait for word from the field commander.

I would like to ask a few questions. This operation was planned, was it not, over a period of a few months?

General COLLINS. I do not know that it was planned over a period of a few months, Mr. Van Zandt, but it was definitely planned ahead of time. It was also rehearsed ahead of time, which is the standard procedure. As Mr. Short pointed out by this editorial, a definite time schedule has to be developed for operations of this character. If you do not do that, you are going to get more casualties.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. And your time schedule was put in print, was it not?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir; it was put in print, which is also the

standard procedure.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. Is it unusual for an operation of this type to have what we call an op plan?

General COLLINS. We always make up an operational plan; yes, sir. Mr. VAN ZANDT. That has been going on for years and years and years in the military?

General COLLINS. Yes, sir.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. I just went to my files and plan which we used in World War I not out this op plan apparently did