down. It has gone down in the officers, captain and below. On June 30, 1945, you had 29,000 officers, captain and below. Today you have 13,000, captain and below. And during that same time there has been an increase of 140 percent in the officers of the rank of major and above. And I got those figures by taking the officers, major and above, received from the Department of Defense, and figuring that into the total strength of the Marine Corps, which at that time was about 475,000, taking your officers, major and above, December 31, 1952, taking the total strength of the Marine Corps at about 235,000, and it shows an increase percentagewise of about 140 percent.

That does not make these over-all figures of officers and men very much, does it? That is the same kind of figures the Navy gave us last week, I might say.

General WENSINGER. Have you considered the 406 senior officers that we have diverted to new jobs?

Mr. DAVIS. I am taking the total officer strength.

General WENSINGER. Let me answer this question, if I can. You are talking now about such a large percentage when we have only about half what we had in World War II.

Mr. DAVIS. That is right.

General WENSINGER. I think I stated in my statement that to increase to our World War II structure, that it would only take a relatively small amount of higher grades. But you can't compare the higher grades-you can't cut those higher grades 50 percent.

Mr. DAVIS. I agreed with you on that. But I question your use of the total World War II officer strength, adding the billets that have been added and saying you need at least that many.

General WENSINGER. I think I was confronted with that question by somebody here.

Mr. DAVIS. That has been mentioned. If we are going to use the figures one way, we ought to consider them the other. That is the point I am trying to make.

Mr. ARENDS. Will the gentleman from Wisconsin permit General Devereux to ask a question?

General DEVEREUX. I think, as far as I am concerned, I understood that figure very well. We have fewer divisions in the Marine Corps activated now, and fewer regiments, battalions, and companies, and naturally we are going to have fewer junior officers today in proportion to the senior officers that we had.

Mr. DAVIS. I have conceded that, but that doesn't explain adding top officer strength to World War II, add billets, and come out with still more officers than that, is what they claim they need today.

Now, there is one more question. There has been some—you raised the point that you can't have less than lieutenant colonels in command of battalions of ground troops nor in command of squadrons of aircraft. Can you furnish us with exactly how many billets you have for command of battalions and ground troops and in command of squadrons of aircraft?

General WENSINGER. I don't have a detailed billet breakdown for that. I said in the last part of that statement that we had many other billets for lieutenant colonels which we could reconcile in detail if we had to.

Mr. DAVIS. Your major concern was that you didn't want to even

wanted to know just how many of your total officers of that 1,350 are actually going to be in those assignments.

General WENSINGER. We don't have a breakdown of the table of organization, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. Would it be proper to ask that that be furnished, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. ARENDS. Could you provide that, General?

Mr. VAN ZANDT. That is classified.

Mr. ARENDS. Is that classified, General?

General WENSINGER. No, sir; I don't think. I could supply that. Mr. VAN ZANDT. General, if you reveal the number of lieutenant colonels and their billets, you would have to reveal their location, which means you would have to reveal locations in Korea.

Mr. DAVIS. Just the number.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. Oh, just the number? All right.

Mr. ARENDS. If you would give the gentleman the number. Supply the number.

General WENSINGER. I think I can provide the committee with a satisfactory answer to Mr. Davis by giving numbers of battalions and regiments, and so forth, to which these people are assigned.

Mr. ARENDS. Do you have anything else?

Mr. DAVIS. That is all.

Mr. ARENDS. Thank you very kindly. I think that concludes the testimony.

We will proceed with another witness.

May I call the next witness, Major General Lee of the Air Force. General, do you have a prepared statement?

General LEE. I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ARENDS. Will you proceed.

General LEE. I have prepared a statement, but due to the time that has been allotted me I would like to cut that statement down in length and give you portions of the prepared statement. I will submit the prepared statement for the record, however.

Mr. ARENDS. All right, you do so, General.

General LEE. I would like to read from my prepared statement, sir. Mr. ARENDS. Fine.

General LEE. I think that a brief review is in order at this point to establish the background for our personnel actions. The authority for a Regular Air Force officer structure is contained in title V of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947. Title V is permanent law and continues in its operation throughout any period of war or national emergency. Authority for relaxing the provisions of the act as it applies to the Air Force is contained in two of its sections. Section 507 (b) provides that in time of emergency declared by the President or by the Congress, and in time of war, the President is authorized to suspend all or any part of the several provisions of law pertaining to promotion. Regarding this section, no action has been taken which relates to the Air Force. Section 514 (f) states that in time of emergency declared by the President or by the Congress, and in time of war, the President is authorized to suspend the operation of all or any part of the several provisions of law prescribing mandatory retirement or separation of Regular Army (Air Force) officers. Regarding this section, the Air Force is included with the Army in an Executive order which suspends the mandatory retirement provisions which

The Air Force is continuing to build its Regular officer structure in accordance with the Officer Personnel Act. I want to emphasize that the grade restrictions in that law are not suspended by the Korean emergency and are now applicable to the Air Force.

At such times as Congress authorizes the Air Force to have more officers than the number which has been authorized for the Regular Air Force, section 515 of the Officer Personnel Act allows the Air Force to promote officers to temporary grades which are higher than their permanent grades. These temporary grades have no effect upon the officer's permanent grade. The officer concerned must be considered and selected for his next permanent grade in accordance with the provisions of the Officer Personnel Act, regardless of the fact that he may be serving in a higher temporary grade.

After hearings on the Officer Personnel Act, the Congress accepted the concept that the Regular Air Force structure should contain peacetime force of permanent, professional officers-the "hard core" of a mobilization force in time of war or emergency. Since this force must remain stable over long periods of time, the Officer Personnel Act encompasses a Regular officer's entire career span from entry to retirement. Consequently, the promotion system contained in that act is directed primarily to producing an adequate number of officers of proper ages, skills, and experience, in proper grades to meet the long-range needs of the Regular Air Force.

Today, instead of the 27,500 officers contemplated in the Officer Personnel Act, we have approximately 125,000 officers. The law wisely provides for this expansion and offers opportunities for advancement to all qualified officers.

The act has proved to be the finest piece of personnel legislation in the history of the military service. It is entirely adequate to the needs of the Air Force during peace or war, and at this time we feel quite strongly that it should continue in effect without major modification.

Section 634 of the fiscal year 1953 appropriation act provides for the application of the percentages to the average military strength during the fiscal year. However, since its ultimate effect depends on our commissioned officer strength during the last quarter, it has been difficult to assess the specific number affected. Our initially programed end strength has been influenced by the following:

First, delays in the negotiations for overseas base rights, certain construction readjustments and aircraft losses resulting from Korean operations have forced us to slow down some programed personnel actions during the year.

Second, we have been screening and rescreening our manpower requirements in the hope that we could improve further on the utilization of manpower reported to this committee by Air Force representatives last year.

Third, this is a significant year for commissioned officers of the Reserve forces. All Reserve officers not now serving under indefinite appointments are being afforded an opportunity to accept or reject such appointment.

I would say, gentlemen, that the Air Force today is made up approximately of 85 percent Reserve officers serving on active duty.

As a result of these changes, we will have a last quarter strength

at the beginning of the year, we had anticipated reaching. While these reductions in the program were taking place the Davis ceiling remained fixed-the gap was narrowed, thus reducing the impact of the limitation.

There are many features of this piece of legislation which make it objectionable to the Air Force. The percentage limitations which the amendment imposes upon the grades of captain and above are not related in any way to the officer requirements of the force-in-being, nor was there any apparent effort made to relate these percentages to our requirements. While we have been unable to determine exactly how these percentages were derived, they appear to be closely related to a grade structure which existed at some time during or immediately following World War II. Such an approach assumes that the particular grade structure used was adequate at the time and that the mission, weapons, and force requirements of the Air Force have remained unchanged. This is not the case. Our mission, weapons, and force composition have undergone a complete transition in recent years as a result of the changing military situation and technological advancements.

I would like to insert there that the technological advancements are a very important point in this discussion.

The history of air power has been marked by a series of revolutionary changes which have in every case generated completely new and different personnel requirements. We are now in the midst of a 50-percent build-up in operational strength with only a 14 percent increase in military personnel. To attain this objective requires a greater ratio of officers. Operating under a formula based on total military strength, the Air Force is now and will be increasingly penalized as we approach combat strength objectives. Consequently, the restrictive serves as a strong deterrent to meeting combat requirements both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Now, we heard some discussion during the hearings about the World War II strengths and I would like to continue on the historical data.

The historical data related to our grade structure during the war years cannot be compared to our present-day requirements unless conditioned by the following factors:

(1) The Air Force at that time was a part of the Army and was, therefore, concerned primarily with the development and employment of its tactical and strategic weapons. Many of the responsibilities which we must now fulfill were assumed for us by the War Department.

(2) The Army Air Corps entered the emergency in 1940 with 3,361 officers. By 1945 that officer corps had multiplied more than a hundredfold. About 98 percent of these officers had less than 4 years of commissioned service. During the war years our primary personnel objective was the development of the qualitative effectiveness essential to winning the war.

(3) The air weapon as a decisive element of modern war was little more than a conviction held by a few, and that conviction had yet to be proved. The conclusive proof has resulted in the present complex mission of the air weapon and its attendant personnel require

ments.

(4) Unlike World War II, today we must attract and retain officers

advancement. This is the primary factor which influences an individual to join any organization. Thus, when officers are prohibited from advancing to a grade which they know to be commensurate with their job assignment, they naturally seek other work. Failure to acknowledge this and force the officer to remain in a lower grade will mean the loss of the officer from the active establishment at the first opportunity.

Again, I call your attention to the fact that we are talking about 85 percent Reserve officers today.

Our losses for all causes in fiscal year 1953 will number approximately 24,190-88 percent of these losses being realized in the grades of captain and lieutenant.

(5) Grades must be commensurate with the responsibilities involved and must keep pace with the tremendous advances and changes that have occurred in aircraft and strategy. The crew of the B-36 is decidedly different in composition from the crew of a World War II B-17 for it is predominantly officer personnel. The operation of modern machines is vastly more complex than ever before and the crew assumes responsibility for a much costlier piece of equipment than in years past.

(6) Today we are maintaining a deterrent force on a peacetime table of organization basis from which we would expand in the event of an all-out war. A nucleus-type force has a greater number, percentagewise, in the upper grades. To illustrate, for a troop carrier group to go from peace strength to war strength requires an expansion of approximately 100 percent in the officer structure. Ninety-seven percent of this expansion is in the grades of captain and lieutenant.

In my opinion, the above factors decisively demonstrate the danger of limiting any personnel structure to the configuration of another wholly unrelated structure which happened to exist at some other point in time.

Let us consider the question of why we have officers in temporary grades more than one above their permanent grade.

Because approximately 70 percent of our officers are very close contemporaries in both age and service, it is our policy to force relatively large numbers of officers into competition for temporary promotion and to select from these numbers only a minority. At times, we select for promotion only one-tenth of those entered into competition. Against such odds, it is obvious that any junior officer who is able to overcome that handicap and jump ahead of those senior to him in permanent grade has shown himself qualified for rapid advancement and has proved that he should be promoted to the grade for which he is better qualified than any other officers. The system by which the Air Force promotes officers in temporary rank is without a doubt one of the most competitive systems that has ever been designed. Its primary objective is to select for advancement the most qualified individuals in each grade. It assumes greatest importance during periods of emergency, such as we are experiencing at present, when it is absolutely necessary that we exploit the military knowledge and skill of our best officers without being unduly handicapped by the strict controls which are applied by the permanent promotion systems. At present time, our permanent grade structure serves as a platform to to which we can readily return if we should revert to a minimum peace