is not a little inconsistent and strange from those who recommend a non-importation agreement, and who think we should even renounce the sea and devote ourselves to agriculture. Thus, to make our trade more free, it is to be embarrassed, and violently shifted from one country to another, not according to the in terest of the merchants, but the visionary thecries and capricious rashness of the legislators. To make trade better, it is to be made nothing.

Is not this increase of American shipping | said, for the benefit of France. This language rapid enough? Many persons say it is too rapid, and attracts too much capital for the circumstances of the country. I cannot readily persuade myself to think so valuable a branch of employment thrives too fast. But a steady and sure encouragement is more to be relied on than violent methods of forcing its growth. It is not clear that the quantity of our navigation, including our coasting and fishing vessels, is less in proportion to those of that nation: in that computation we shall probably find that we are already more a navigating people than the English.

As this is a growing country, we have the most stable ground of dependence on the corresponding growth of our navigation; and that the increasing demand for shipping will rather fall to the share of Americans than foreigners, is not to be denied. We did expect this from the nature of our own laws; we have been confirmed in it by experience; and we know that an American bottom is actually preferred to a foreign one. In cases where one partner is an American, and another a foreigner, the ship is made an American bottom. A fact of this kind overthrows a whole theory of reasoning on the necessity of further restrictions. It shows that the work of restriction is already done.

So far as commerce and navigation are regarded, the pretences for this contest are confined to two. We are not allowed to carry manufactured articles to Great Britain, nor any products, except of our own growth; and we are not permitted to go with our own vessels to the West Indies. The former, which is a provision of the navigation act, is of little importance to our interests, as our trade is chiefly a direct one, our shipping not being equal to the carrying for other nations; and our manufactured articles are not furnished in quantities for exportation, and if they were, Great Britain would not be a customer. So far, therefore, the restriction is rather nominal than real.

The exclusion of our vessels from the West Indies is of more importance. When we propose to make an effort to force a privilege from Great Britain, which she is loth to yield to us, it is necessary to compare the value of the object with the effort, and above all, to calculate very warily the probability of success. A trivial thing deserves not a great exertion; much less ought we to stake a very great good in possession, for a slight chance of a less good. The carriage of one half the exports and imports to and from the British West Indies, is the object to be contended for. Our whole exports to Great Britain are to be hazarded. We sell on terms of privilege, and positive favor, as it has been abundantly shown, near seven millions to the dominions of Great Britain. We are to risk the privilege in this great amount-for what? For the freight only of one half the British West India trade with the United States. It belongs to commercial men to cal

If we take the aggregate view of our commercial interests, we shall find much more occasion for satisfaction, and even exultation, than complaint, and none for despondence. It would be too bold to say that our condition is so eligible there is nothing to be wished. Neither the order of nature, nor the allotments of Providence, afford perfect content; and it would | be absurd to expect in our politics what is denied in the laws of our being. The nations with whom we have intercourse have, without exception, more or less restricted their commerce. They have framed their regulations to suit their real or fancied interests. The code of France is as full of restrictions as that of England. We have regulations of our own; and they are unlike those of any other country. Inasmuch as the interest and circum-culate the entire value of the freight alluded stances of nations vary so essentially, the project of an exact reciprocity on our part is a vision. What we desire is, to have, not an exact reciprocity, but an intercourse of mutual benefit and convenience.

It has scarcely been so much as insinuated that the change contemplated will be a profitable one; that it will enable us to sell dearer and to buy cheaper: on the contrary, we are invited to submit to the hazards and losses of a conflict with our customers; to engage in a contest of self-denial. For what-to obtain better markets? No such thing; but to shut up for ever, if possible, the best market we have for our exports, and to confine ourselves to the dearest and scarcest markets for our imports. And this is to be done for the benefit of trade; or, as it is sometimes more correctly

to. But it cannot bear much proportion to the amount of seven millions. Besides, if we are denied the privilege of carrying our articles in our vessels to the islands, we are on a footing of privilege in the sale of them. We have one privilege, if not two. It is readily admitted, that it is a desirable thing to have our vessels allowed to go to the English islands; but the value of the object has its limits, and we go unquestionably beyond them, when we throw our whole exports into confusion, and run the risk of losing our best markets, for the sake of forcing a permission to carry our own products to one of those markets; in which, too, it should be noticed, we sell much less than we do to Great Britain herself. If to this we add, that the success of the contest is grounded on the sanguine and passionate hypothesis of our

being able to starve the islanders, which, on trial, may prove false, and which our being involved in the war would overthrow at once, we may conclude, without going further into the discussion, that prudence forbids our engaging in the hazards of a commercial war; that great things should not be staked against such as are of much less value; that what we possess should not be risked for what we desire, without great odds in our favor; still less, if the chance is infinitely against us.

If these considerations should fail of their effect, it will be necessary to go into an examination of the tendency of the system of discrimination, to redress and avenge all our wrongs, and to realize all our hopes.

mon language, we shall not find that we are bound by treaty to establish a preference in favor of the French. The treaty is founded on a professed reciprocity, favor for favor. Why is the principle of treaty or no treaty made so essential, when the favor we are going to give is an act of supererogation? It is not expected by one of the nations in treaty for Holland has declared in her treaty with us, that such preferences are the fruitful source of animosity, embarrassment and war. The French have set no such example. They discriminate, in their late navigation act, not as we are exhorted to do, between nations in treaty and not in treaty, but between nations at war and not at war with them; so that, when peace takes place, EngIt has been avowed that we are to look to land will stand, by that act, on the same ground France, not to England, for advantages in trade. with ourselves. If we expect by giving favor We are to show our spirit, and to manifest to- to get favor in return, it is improper to make a wards those who are called enemies, the spirit law. The business belongs to the executive, in of enmity, and towards those we call friends, whose hands the constitution has placed the something more than passive good will. We power of dealing with foreign nations. It is are to take active measures to force trade out singular to negotiate legislatively; to make by of its accustomed channels, and to shift it by a law half a bargain, expecting a French law such means from England to France. The care would make the other. The footing of treaty of the concerns of the French manufacturers or no treaty is different from the ground taken may be, perhaps, as well left in the hands of by the mover himself in supporting his system. the convention, as usurped into our own. How- He has said, favor for favor is principle: nations ever our zeal might engage us to interpose, our not in treaty grant favors, those in treaty reduty to our own immediate constituents de- strict our trade. Yet the principle of discrimmands all our attention. To volunteer it, in inating in favor of nations in treaty, is not only order to excite competition in one foreign na- inconsistent with the declared doctrine of the tion to supplant another, is a very strange busi- mover and with facts, but it is inconsistent with ness; and to do it, as it has been irresistibly itself. Nations not in treaty, are so very unproved it will happen, at the charge and cost equally operated upon by the resolutions, it is of our own citizens, is a thing equally beyond absurd to refer them to one principle. Spain all justification and all example. What is it and Portugal have no treaties with us, and are bat to tax our own people for a time, perhaps not disposed to have. Spain would not accede for a long time, in order that the French may to the treaty of commerce between us and at last sell as cheap as the English?-cheaper France, though she was invited; Portugal they cannot, nor is it so much as pretended. would not sign a treaty after it had been disThe tax will be a loss to us, and the fancied cussed and signed on our part. They have few tendency of it not a gain to this country in the ships or manufactures, and do not feed their event, but to France. We shall pay more for colonies from us: of course there is little for a time, and in the end pay no less; for no ob- the discrimination to operate upon. The opeject but that one nation may receive our mo- ration on nations in treaty is equally a satire on ney, instead of the other. If this is generous the principle of discrimination. In Sweden, towards France, it is not just to America. It with whom we have a treaty, duties rise highis sacrificing what we owe to our constituents, er if borne in our bottoms, than in her own. to what we pretend to feel towards strangers. France does the like, in respect to tobacco, two We have indeed heard a very ardent profes- and a half livres the kentle, which in effect prosion of gratitude to that nation, and infinite re-hibits our vessels to freight tobacco. The mover liance seems to be placed on her readiness to sacrifice her interest to ours. The story of this generous strife should be left to ornament fiction. This is not the form nor the occasion to discharge our obligations of any sort to any foreign nation: it concerns not our feelings but our interests; yet the debate has often soared high above the smoke of business into the epic region. The market for tobacco, tar, turpentine and pitch, has become matter of sentiment; and given occasion alternately to rouse our courage and our gratitude.

If, instead of hexameters, we prefer discussing our relation to foreign nations in the com

has, somewhat unluckily, proposed to except from this system nations having no navigation acts; in which case, France would become the subject of unfriendly discrimination, as the House have been informed since the debate began, that she has passed such acts.

I might remark on the disposition of England to settle a commercial treaty, and the known desire of the Marquis of Lansdown, (then prime minister,) in 1783, to form such an one on the most liberal principles. The history of that business, and the causes which prevented its conclusion, ought to be made known to the public. The powers given to our ministers

ports being bought dearer, there would be lesɛ money and more need of it. Necessity would produce credit. Where the laws are strict, it will soon find its proper level; the uses of credit will remain, and the evil will disappear.

were revoked, and yet we hear, that no such | disposition on the part of Great Britain has existed. The declaration of Mr. Pitt in parliament, in June, 1792, as well as the correspondence with Mr. Hammond, shows a desire to enter upon a negotiation. The statement of the report of the secretary of state, on the privileges and restrictions of our commerce, that Great Britain has shown no inclination to med-foreign nations, as well as the remedy for credle with the subject, seems to be incorrect.

The expected operation of the resolutions on different nations, is obvious, and I need not examine their supposed tendency to dispose Great Britain to settle an equitable treaty with this country; but I ask, whether those who hold such language towards that nation as I have heard, can be supposed to desire a treaty and | friendly connection. It seems to be thought a merit to express hatred: it is common and natural to desire to annoy and to crush those whom we hate, but it is somewhat singular to pretend, that the design of our anger is to embrace them.

The tendency of angry measures to friendly dispositions and arrangements, is not obvious. We affect to believe, that we shall quarrel ourselves into their good will: that we shall beat a new path to peace and friendship with Great Britain-one that is grown up with thorns, and lined with men-traps and spring-guns. It should be called the war path.

But the whole theory of balances of trade, of helping it by restraint, and protecting it by systems of prohibition and restriction against

dit, are among the exploded dogmas, which are equally refuted by the maxims of science and the authority of time. Many such topics have been advanced, which were known to exist as prejudices, but were not expected as arguments. It seems to be believed, that the liberty of commerce is of some value. Although there are restrictions on one side, there will be some liberty left: counte restrictions, by diminishing that liberty, are in their nature aggravations and not remedies. We complain of the British restrictions as of a millstone: our own system will be another; so that our trade may hope to be situated between the upper and the nether millstone.

On the whole, the resolutions contain two great principles-to control trade by law, instead of leaving it to the better management of the merchants; and the principle of a sumptuary law. To play the tyrant in the countinghouse, and in directing the private expenses of our citizens, are employments equally unworthy of discussion.

To do justice to the subject, its promised advantages should be examined. Exciting the Besides the advantages of the system, we competition of the French, is to prove an ad- have been called to another view of it, which vantage to this country, by opening a new seems to have less connection with the merits market with that nation. This is scarcely in- of the discussion. The acts of states, and the telligible. If it means any thing, it is an ad- votes of public bodies, before the constitution mission, that their market is not a good one, was adopted, and the votes of the House since, or that they have not taken measures to favor have been stated as grounds for our assent to our traffic with them. In either case, our sys- this measure at this time. To help our own tem is absurd. The balance of trade is against trade, to repel any real or supposed attack upon us, and in favor of England. But the resolu- it, cannot fail to prepossess the mind: accordtions can only aggravate that evil, for, by com-ingly, the first feelings of every man yield to pelling us to buy dearer and sell cheaper, the this proposition. But the sober judgment, on balance will be turned still more against our the tendency and reasonableness of the intercountry. Neither is the supply from France meddling of government, often does, and probless the aliment of luxury, than that from Eng-ably ought still oftener to change our impresland. Their excess of credit is an evil, which sions. On a second view of the question, the we pretend to cure by checking the natural man, who voted formerly for restrictions, may growth of our own capital, which is the un- say, much has been done under the new condoubted tendency of restraining trade; the pro- stitution, and the good effects are yet making gress of the remedy is thus delayed. If we will progress. The necessity of measures of counter trade, there must be capital. It is best to have restriction will appear to him much less urgent, it of our own; if we have it not, we must de- and their efficacy, in the present turbulent state pend on credit. Wealth springs from the profits of Europe, infinitely less to be relied on. Far of employment, and the best writers on the from being inconsistent in his conduct, consistsubject establish it, that employment is in pro-ency will forbid his pressing the experiment of portion to the capital that is to excite and re- his principle under circumstances which baffle ward it. To strike off credit, which is the the hopes of its success. But if so much stress substitute for capital, if it were possible to do is laid on former opinions, in favor of this meait, would so far stop employment. Fortunate-sure, how happens it that there is so little on ly, it is not possible; the activity of individual industry eludes the misjudging power of governments. The resolutions would, in effect, increase the demand for credit, as our products selling for less in a new market, and our im

that which now appears against it? Not one merchant has spoken in favor of it in this body; not one navigating or commercial state has patronized it.

It is necessary to consider the dependence of

were then in an infant state. They are now supposed to have considerably more than doubled their numbers since the peace; and if, instead of having us for competitors for the supply as before, we should shut ourselves cut by refusing our supplies, or being refused entry for them, those two colonies would rise from the ground; at least we should do more to bring it about than the English ministry have

the British West India islands on our supplies. | I admit, that they cannot draw them so well, and so cheap, from any other quarter; but this is not the point. Are they physically dependent? Can we starve them and may we reasonably expect, thus to dictate to Great Britain a free admission of our vessels into her islands? A few details will prove the negative.-Beef and pork sent from the now United States to the British West Indies, 1773, fourteen thou-been able to do. In 1772, six hundred and sand, nine hundred and ninety-three barrels. In the war time, 1780, ditto from England, seventeen thousand, seven hundred and ninetyfive: at the end of the war, 1783, sixteen thousand, five hundred and twenty-six. Ireland exported, on an average of seven years prior to 1777, two hundred and fifty thousand barrels. Salted fish the English take in abundance, and prohibit its importation from us. Butter and cheese from England and Ireland are but lately banished even from our markets. Exports from the now United States, 1773; horses, two thousand, seven hundred and sixty-eight; cattle, one thousand, two hundred and three; sheep and hogs, five thousand, three hundred and twenty. Twenty-two years prior to 1791, were exported from England to all ports, twenty-nine thousand, one hundred and thirtyone horses. Ireland, on an average of seven years to 1777, exported four thousand and forty live stock, exclusive of hogs. The coast of Barbary, the Cape de Verds, &c. supply sheep and cattle. The islands, since the war, have increased their domestic supplies to a great degree.

seventy-nine vessels, the actual tonnage of which was one hundred and twenty-eight thousand, were employed in the West India trade from Great Britain. They were supposed, on good ground, to be but half freighted to the islands; they might carry lumber, and the freight supposed to be deficient would be, at forty shillings sterling the ton, one hundred and twenty-eight thousand pounds sterling. This sum would diminish the extra charge of carrying lumber to the islands. But is lumber to be had?—Yes. in Germany, and from the Baltic. It is even cheaper in Europe than our own: besides which, the hard woods, used in mills, are abundant in the islands.

We are told they can sell their rum only to the United States. This concerns not their subsistence, but their profit. Examine it, however. In 1773, the now United States took near three million gallons of rum. The remaining British colonies, Newfoundland, and the African coast, have a considerable demand for this article. The demand of Ireland is very much on the increase. It was, in 1763, five hundred and thirty thousand gallons; 1770, one million, five hundred and fifty-eight thou- sand gallons; 1778, one million, seven hundred

The now United States exported about one hundred and thirty thousand barrels of flour, in 1773, to the West Indies. Ireland, by graz-and twenty-nine thousand gallons. ing less, could supply wheat; England herself usually exports it; she also imports from Archangel. Sicily and the Barbary States furnish wheat in abundance. We are deceived, when we fancy we can starve foreign countries. France is reckoned to consume grain at the rate of seven bushels to each soul. Twenty-six millions of souls, the quantity one hundred and eighty-two millions of bushels. We export, to speak in round numbers, five or six millions of bushels to all the different countries, which we supply; a trifle this to their wants. Frugality is a greater resource. Instead of seven bushels, perhaps two could be saved by stinting the consumption of the food of cattle, or by the use of other food. Two bushels saved to each soul is fifty-two millions of bushels, a quantity which the whole trading world, perhaps, could not furnish. Rice is said to be prohibited by Spain and Portugal to favor their own. Brazil could supply their rice instead of ours.

I must warn you of the danger of despising Canada and Nova Scotia too much as rivals in the West India supply of lumber, especially the former. The dependence, the English had placed on them some years ago, failed, partly because we entered into competition with them n very superior terms, and partly because they

Thus we see, a total stoppage of the West India trade would not starve the islanders. It would affect us deeply; we should lose the sale of our products, and, of course, not gain the carriage in our own vessels; the object of the contest would be no nearer our reach than before. Instead, however, of a total stoppage of the intercourse, it might happen, that each nation prohibiting the vessels of the other, some third nation would carry on the traffic in its own bottoms. While this measure would disarm our system, it would make it recoil upon ourselves. It would, in effect, operate chiefly to obstruct the sale of our products. If they should remain unsold, it would be so much dead loss; or if the effect should be to raise the price on the consumers, it would either lessen the consumption, or raise up rivals in the supply. The contest, as it respects the West India trade, is in every respect against us. To embarrass the supply from the United States, supposing the worst as it regards the planters, can do no more than enhance the price of sugar, coffee and other products. The French islands are now in ruins, and the English planters have an increased price and double demand in consequence. While Great Britain confined the colony trade to herself, she gave to the colonists