Congress he was a member, and rendered eminent service in the preparation of some of the state papers of that body. He remained in Congress until the autumn of 1777, when he was chosen a commissioner to the Court of France, in the place of Silas Deane, who had been appointed the previous year, with Dr. Franklin and Arthur Lee, "to negotiate treaties with foreign powers." On the thirteenth of February, 1778, he sailed from Mount Wollaston, in Braintree, taking with him his eldest son, John Quincy Adams; and on the eighth of April following arrived at Paris. He learned on his arrival that Dr. Franklin and Mr. Lee had concluded the treaties of alliance and commerce between France and the American Colonies, and all that remained to be done was their ratification. After continuing in Europe a few months, without waiting for a recall he returned to Boston, where he arrived on the second of August, 1779. On his arrival, he was elected to the convention which formed the constitution of Massachusetts, and as a member of the committee, prepared the draught of that instrument. While in this position he was appointed by Congress "a minister plenipotentiary for negotiating a treaty of peace and a treaty of commerce with Great Britain." This appointment he accepted, and on the afternoon of the thirteenth of November, sailed on board the French Frigate, The Sensible. After a long and tedious passage he reached Paris, and at once entered upon the arduous duties of his mission. A short time subsequent to the appointment of Mr. Adams to this service, Henry Laurens was appointed to negotiate a treaty of amity and commerce with the United Netherlands. On his passage to Europe he was captured by a British cruiser, and confined in the Tower at London. On the receipt of the intelligence of Mr. Laurens' misfortune, Mr. Adams proceeded to the Netherlands. Soon after he received a commission from Congress to negotiate a loan, and to conclude a treaty of amity and commerce with the States General of Holland, with instructions to accede to any treaty of neutrality that might arise from regulations to be perfected by a Congress of the European States, then in contemplation. For the next two years the career of Mr. Adams exhibits an overwhelming variety of duties. Congress, in 1781, made a new appointment of commissioners for concluding a treaty of peace with Great Britain. These were Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, Henry Laurens, Thomas Jefferson, and Mr. Adams. A provisional treaty was signed at Paris in November, 1782, and a defini- ' tive treaty concluded on the third of September of the following year. While the treaty was under consideration Mr. Adams arrived in Paris from Holland, where he had resided for a greater portion of his time since his arrival from America, and on its conclusion he again returned to Holland, where he remained until 1784. In February, 1785, he was appointed by Congress the first minister plenipotentiary from the United States to Great Britain, and in the subsequent May removed to England. His course in this position is too familiar to require notice here. On his return home in 1788, he was elected the first Vice President of the United States, under the Federal Constitution, in which position he remained during the eight years' administration of Washington, on the termination of which he was elected President.* Soon * On the day of his inauguration, March 4th, 1797, Mr. Adams was in his sixty-second year. He was dressed in a full suit of pearl-colored broadcloth, with powdered hair. He was then bald on the top of his head. Mr. Adams was of middle stature and full person, and of slow, deliberate manner unless he was excited, and when this happened he expressed himself with great energy. He was a man of strong mind, of great learning, and of eminent ability to use knowledge, both in speech and writing. He was ever a man of purest morals; and is said to have been a firm believer in Christianity, not from habit and example, but from diligent investigations of its proofs. He had an uncompromising regard for his own opinion, and was strongly contrasted with Washington in this respect. He seemed to have supposed that his opinions could not be corrected by those of other men, nor bettered by any comparison. He had been from early manhood a zeal. ous patriot, and had rendered most essential services to his country, at home and abroad. These he always seems to have had in mind. He well remembered the painful struggles experienced in Europe, to obtain aid for the patriots at home, and an acknowledgment of independence from governments there, while the war was yet regarded in England as rebellion. He ought to have known, as would seem from his own writings, ir what manner public services are estimated. An individual can easily remember how much good he has done to a community; but those who are benefited as easily forget. If public ingratitude is common, it is also very natural. It is not improbable that Mr. Adams was impatient in finding how much more the easily-understood services of military men were appreciated, than were the secluded though no lese important ones of diplomatic agency and cabinet counsel. So made up from natural propensities, and from the circumstances of his life, Mr. Adams came to the presidency at the time when more forbearance and discretion were required than he is supposed to have had. He seems to have been deficient in the rare excellence of attempting to see himself as others after his retirement from the Presidency, the office of Governor of his native State was tendered him. This honor he declined, on account of his advanced age and a desire to remain in the quietude of his home. On the assembling of the Massachusetts convention for the revision of the constitution of that State, he was chosen President of that body. This was his last public act. He died on the afternoon of the Fourth of July, 1826. A remarkable particular in the last scene of his varied and memorable life is thus given by one of his cotemporaries. The jubilee of independence roused his declining faculties. He inquired the cause of the salutes, and was told it was the Fourth of July. He answered, "It is a great and glorious day," and never spake more. Thus his last thoughts and latest words were like those of his whole life-thoughts and words which evinced a soul replete with love of country and interest in her welfare.* SPEECH IN DEFENCE OF THE SOLDIERS.† the court, expressed by the clerk, to the Supreme Judge of judges, empires, and worlds, "God send you a good deliverance." This speech was delivered by Mr. Adams in the trial of William Weems, James Hartigan, and others, soldiers in His Majesty's TwentyWe find, in the rules laid down by the greatninth regiment, for the murder of Crispus At-est English judges, who have been the brightest tucks, Samuel Gray, and others, on Monday of mankind:-we are to look upon it as more evening, the fifth of March, 1770.‡ beneficial that many guilty persons should escape unpunished than one innocent person should suffer. The reason is, because it is of more importance to the community that innocence should be protected than it is that guilt should be punished; for guilt and crimes are so frequent in the world that all of them cannot be punished; and many times they happen in such a manner that it is not of much consequence to the public whether they are punished or not. But when innocence itself is brought to the bar and condemned, especially to die, the subject will exclaim, it is immaterial to me whether I behave well or ill, for virtue itself is no security. And if such a sentiment as this should take place in the mind of the subject, there would be an end to all security whatsoever. MAY IT PLEASE YOUR HONORS, AND YOU, GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY: I am for the prisoners at the bar, and shall apologize for it only in the words of the Marquis Beccaria: "If I can but be the instrument of preserving one life, his blessings and tears of transport shall be a sufficient consolation to me for the contempt of all mankind." As the prisoners stand before you for their lives, it may be proper to recollect with what temper the law requires we should proceed to this trial. The form of proceeding at their arraignment has discovered that the spirit of the law upon such occasions is conformable to humanity, to common sense and feeling; that it is all benignity and candor. And the trial commences with the prayer of saw him; and he ventured to act as though everybody saw as he saw himself. He considered only what was right in his own view, and that was to be carried by main force, whatever were the obstacles.-Familiar Letters on Public Characters, pp. 146–147. *Thomas Jefferson died on the same day with Mr. Adams. Mr. Jefferson's death occurred at ten minutes before one I will read the words of the law itself. The rules I shall produce to you from Lord Chief Justice Hale, whose character as a lawyer, a man of learning and philosophy, and a Christian, will be disputed by nobody living; one of the greatest and best characters the English nation ever produced. His words are these (2 H. H. P. C.): Tutius semper est errare misericordiæ quam ex parte justitiæ-it is alin acquietando quam in puniendo, ex parte ways safer to err in acquitting than punishing, on the part of mercy than the part of justice. The next is from the same authority, 305. Tutius erratur ex parte mitiori-it is always safer ✦ This speech is taken from a report of the trial, "taken to err on the milder side, the side of mercy. in short-hand by John Hodgson," and "published by per- H. H. P. C. 509: The best rule in doubtful nission of the Court," in Boston, 1770. A copy of this pamcases is rather to incline to acquittal than conphlet, which makes nearly two hundred and fifty closely-viction; and in page 300: Quod dubitas, ne feceprinted pages, is in the Library of the New York Historical o'clock, and Mr. Adams' at five o'clock, P. M. The Declaradelphia, at a quarter before five o'clock, on the Fourth of tion of Independence was first read to the people at Phila July, 1776.-Christian Journal: Pennsylvania Packet: Society. See note at page 60. ris-where you are doubtful, never act; that is, if you doubt of the prisoner's guilt, never declare him guilty. This is always the rule, espe cially in cases of life. Another rule from the | first is murder, which is killing with malice same author, 289, where he says: In some cases presumptive evidences go far to prove a person guilty, though there is no express proof of the fact to be committed by him; but then it must be very warily pressed, for it is better five guilty persons should escape unpunished than one innocent person should die. The next authority shall be from another udge of equal character, considering the age wherein he lived; that is, Chancellor Fortescue in Praise of the Laws of England, page 59. This is a very ancient writer on the English law. His words are:-"Indeed, one would rather, much rather, that twenty guilty persons escape the punishment of death, than one innocent person be condemned and suffer capitally." Lord Chief Justice Hale says:-"It is better five guilty persons escape, than one innocent person suffer." Lord Chancellor Fortescue, you see, carries the matter further, and says, 'Indeed, one had rather, much rather, that twenty guilty persons should escape, than one innocent person suffer capitally." Indeed, this rule is not peculiar to the English law; there never was a system of laws in the world in which this rule did not prevail. It prevailed in the ancient Roman law, and, which is more remarkable, it prevails in the modern Roman law. Even the judges in the Courts of Inquisition, who with racks, burnings, and scourges examine criminals,-even there they preserve it as a maxim, that it is better the guilty should escape punishment than the innocent suffer. Satius esse nocentem absolvi quam insentem damnari. This is the temper we ought to set out with, and these the rules we are to be governed by. And I shall take it for granted, as a first principle, that the eight prisoners at the bar had better be all acquitted, though we should admit them all to be guilty, than that any one of them should, by your verdict, be found guilty, being innocent. I shall now consider the several divisions of law, under which the evidence will arrange itself. The action now before you is homicide; that is, the killing of one man by another. The law calls it homicide; but it is not criminal in all cases for one man to slay another. Had the prisoners been on the Plains of Abraham, and slain an hundred Frenchmen apiece, the English law would have considered it as a commendable action, virtuous and praiseworthy; so that every instance of killing a man is not a crime in the eye of the law. There are many other instances which I cannot enumerate-an officer that executes a person under sentence of death, &c. So that, gentlemen, every instance of one man's killing another is not a crime, much less a crime to be punished with death. But to descend to some more particulars. The law divides homicide into three branches: the first is justifiable, the second excusable, and the third felonious. Felonious homicide is subdivided into two branches: the aforethought; the second is manslaughter, which is killing a man on a sudden provocation. Here, gentlemen, are four sorts of homicide; and you are to consider whether all the evidence amounts to the first, second, third, or fourth of these heads. The fact was the slaying five unhappy persons that night. You are to consider whether it was justifiable, excusable, or felonious; and if felonious, whether it was murder or manslaughter. One of these four it must be. You need not divide your attention to any more particulars. I shall, however, before I come to the evidence, show you several authorities, which will assist you and me in contemplating the evidence before us. I shall begin with justifiable homicide. It an officer, a sheriff, execute a man on the gallows, draws and quarters him, as in case of high treason, and cuts off his head, this is justifiable homicide. It is his duty. So also, gentlemen, the law has planted fences and barriers around every individual; it is a castle round every man's person, as well as his house. As the love of God and our neighbor comprehends the whole duty of man, so self-love and social comprehend all the duties we owe to mankind; and the first branch is self-love, which is not only our indisputable right, but our clearest duty. By the laws of nature, this is interwoven in the heart of every individual. God Almighty, whose laws we cannot alter, has implanted it there, and we can annihilate ourselves as easily as root out this affection for ourselves. It is the first and strongest principle in our nature. Justice Blackstone calls it "the primary canon in the law of nature." That precept of our holy religion which commands us to love our neighbor as ourselves, does not command us to love our neighbor better than ourselves, or so well. No Christian divine has given this interpretation. The precept enjoins that our benevolence to our fellow-men should be as real and sincere as our affections to ourselves, not that it should be as great in degree. A man is authorized, therefore, by common sense and the laws of England, as well as those of nature, to love himself better than his fellow-subject. If two persons are cast away at sea, and get on a plank (a case put by Sir Francis Bacon), and the plank is insufficient to hold them both, the one has a right to push the other off to save himself. The rules of the common law, therefore, which authorize a man to preserve his own life at the expense of another's, are not contradicted by any divine or moral law. We talk of liberty and property, but if we cut up the law of self-defence, we cut up the foundation of both; and if we give up this, the rest is of very little value, and therefore this principle must be strictly attended to; for whatsoever the law pronounces in the case of these eight soldiers will be the law to other persons and after ages. All the persons that have slain mankind in this country, from the beginning to I shall now read to you a few authorities on this subject of self-defence. Foster, 273, in the case of justifiable self-defence:-"The injured party may repel force with force in defence of person, habitation, or property, against one who manifestly intendeth and endeavoreth with violence or surprise to commit a known felony upon either. In these cases he is not obliged to retreat, but may pursue his adversary till he finds himself out of danger; and if in a conflict between them he happeneth to kill, such killing is justifiable." Keiling, 128, 129. I must entreat you to consider the words of this authority. The injured person may repel force by force against any who endeavors to commit any kind of felony on him or his. Here the rule is, I have a right to stand on my own defence, if you intend to commit felony. If any of the persons made an attack on these soldiers, with an intention to rob them, if it was but to take their hats feloniously, they had a right to kill them on the spot, and had no business to retreat. If a robber meets me in the street, and commands me to surrender my purse, I have a right to kill him without asking any questions. If a person commits a bare assault on me, this will not justify killing; but if he assaults me in such a manner as to discover an intention to kill me, I have a right to destroy him, that I may put it out of his power to kill me. In the case you will have to consider, I do not know there was any attempt to steal from these persons; however, there were some persons concerned who would, probably enough, have stolen, if there had been any thing to steal, and many were there who had no such disposition. But this is not the point we aim at. The question is, are you satisfied the people made the attack in order to kill the soldiers? If you are satisfied that the people, whoever they were, made that assault with a design to kill or maim the soldiers, this was such an assault as will justify the soldiers killing in their own defence. Further, it seems to me, we may make another "Where a known felony is attempted upon question, whether you are satisfied that their the person, be it to rob or murder, here the real intention was to kill or maim, or not? If party assaulted may repel force with force, and any reasonable man, in the situation of one of even his own servant, then attendant on him, these soldiers, would have had reason to believe or any other person present, may interpose in the time of it, that the people came with an for preventing mischief, and if death ensues, intention to kill him, whether you have this the party so interposing will be justified. In satisfaction now or not in your own minds, this case nature and social duty co-operate."they were justifiable, at least excusable, in Foster, 274. Hawkins, P. C., chapter 28, § 25, firing. You and I may be suspicious that the towards the end:-"Yet it seems that a pripeople who made this assault on the soldiers, vate person, a fortiori, an officer of justice, who did it to put them to the flight, on purpose that happens unavoidably to kill another in enthey might go exulting about the town after-deavoring to defend himself from or suppress wards in triumph; but this will not do. You must place yourselves in the situation of Wemms and Killroy-consider yourselves as knowing that the prejudices of the world about you were against you-that the people about you thought you came to dragoon them into this day, had better have been acquitted, than | obedience to statutes, instructions, mandates, that a wrong rule and precedent should be and edicts, which they thoroughly detestedestablished. that many of these people were thoughtless and inconsiderate, old and young, sailors and landsmen, negroes and mulattoes-that they, the soldiers, had no friends about them, the rest were in opposition to them; with all the bells ringing to call the town together to assist the people in King street, for they knew by that time that there was no fire; the people shouting, huzzaing, and making the mob whistle, as they call it, which, when a boy makes it in the street, is no formidable thing, but when made by a multitude, is a most hideous shriek, almost as terrible as an Indian yell; the people crying, "Kill them! kill them! Knock them over!" heaving snowballs, oyster-shells, clubs, white birch sticks, three inches and a half 'diameter;-consider yourselves in this situation, and then judge whether a reasonable man in the soldiers' situation would not have concluded they were going to kill him. I believe, if I was to reverse the scene, I should bring it home to our own bosoms. Suppose Colonel Marshall, when he came out of his own door, and saw these grenadiers coming down, with swords, &c., had thought it proper to have appointed a military watch; suppose he had assembled Gray and Attucks that were killed, or any other person in town, and applanted them in that station as a military watch, and there had come from Murray's barracks thirty or forty soldiers, with no other arms than snowballs, cakes of ice, oyster-shells, cinders, and clubs, and attacked this military watch in this manner, what do you suppose would have been the feelings and reasonings of any of our householders. I confess, I believe they would not have borne one half of what the witnesses have sworn the soldiers bore, till they had shot down as many as were necessary to intimidate and disperse the rest. Because the law does not oblige us to bear insults to the danger of our lives, to stand still with such a number of people around us, throwing such things at us, and threatening our lives, until we are disabled to defend ourselves. dangerous rioters, may justify the fact, inasmuch as he only does his duty in aid of the public justice." Section 24:-" And I can see no reason why a person, who, without provocation, is assaulted by another, in any place whatsoever, in such a manner as plainly shows an intent to murder him, as by discharging a pistol, or pushing at him with a drawn sword, &c., may not justify killing such an assailant, as much as if he had attempted to rob him. For is not he who attempts to murder me more injurious than he who barely attempts to rob me? And can it be more justifiable to fight for my goods than for my life? And it is not only highly agreeable to reason that a man in such circumstances may lawfully kill another, but it seems also to be confirmed by the general tenor of our law books, which, speaking of homicide se defendo, suppose it done in some quarrel or affray." "And so, perhaps, the killing of dangerous rioters may be justified by any private persons, who cannot otherwise suppress them or defend themselves from them, inasmuch as every private person seems to be authorized by the law to arm himself for the purposes aforesaid."-Hawkins, p. 71, § 14. Here every private person is authorized to arm himself; and on the strength of this authority, I do not deny the inhabitants had a right to arm themselves at that time, for their defence, not for offence. That distinction is material, and must be attended to. Hawkins, p. 75, § 14: "And not only he who on an assault retreats to the wall, or some suc strait, beyond which he can go no further before he kills the other, is judged by the law to act upon unavoidable necessity; but also he who being assaulted in such a manner and in such a place, that he cannot go back without manifestly endangering his life, kills the other without retreating at all." 16: "And an officer who kills one that insults him in the execution of his office, and where a private person, that kills one who feloniously assaults him in the highway, may justify the fact without ever giving back at all.” 128, says: "Now it has been held, that if A ot his malice prepensed assaults B to kill him, and B draws his sword and attacks A, and pursues him, then A, for his safety, gives back and retreats to a wall, and B still pursuing him with his drawn sword, A in his defence kills B; this is murder in A. For A having malice against B, and in pursuance thereof endeavoring to kill him, is answerable for all the consequences, of which he was the original cause. It is not reasonable for any man that is dangerously assaulted, and when he perceives his life in danger from his adversary, but to have liberty for the security of his own life, to pursue him that maliciously assaulted him; for he that has manifested that he has malice against another, is not fit to be trusted with a dangerous weapon in his hand. And so resolved by all the judges when they met at Seargeant's Inn, in preparation for my Lord Morley's trial." In the case here we will take Montgomery, if you please, when he was attacked by the stout man with a stick, who aimed it at his head, with a number of people round him, crying out, Kill them! kill them! Had he not a right to kill the man? If all the party were guilty of the assault made by the stout man, and all of them had discovered malice in their hearts, had not Montgomery a right, according to Lord Chief Justice Holt, to put it out of their power to wreak their malice upon him? I will not at present look for any more authorities in the point of self-defence; you will be able to judge from these how far the law goes in justifying or excusing any person in defence of himself, or taking away the life of another who threatens him in life or limb. The next point is this: that in case of an unlawful assembly, all and every one of the assembly is guilty of all and every unlawful act committed by any one of that assembly in prosecution of the unlawful design they set out upon. There is no occasion for the magistrate to read the riot act. In the case before you, I suppose you will be satisfied when you come to Rules of law should be universally known, examine the witnesses and compare it with the whatever effect they may have on politics; rules of the common law, abstracted from all they are rules of common law, the law of the mutiny-acts and articles of war, that these sol- land; and it is certainly true, that wherever diers were in such a situation that they could there is an unlawful assembly, let it consist of not help themselves. People were coming from many persons or a few, every man in it is guilty Royal Exchange Lane, and other parts of the of every unlawful act committed by any one of town, with clubs and cord-wood sticks; the the whole party, be they more or be they less, soldiers were planted by the wall of the Custom in pursuance of their unlawful design. This is House; they could not retreat; they were sur-the policy of the law: to discourage and prerounded on all sides, for there were people be- vent riots, insurrections, turbulence, and tuhind them as well as before them; there were mults. a number of people in Royal Exchange Lane; the soldiers were so near to the Custom House that they could not retreat, unless they had gone into the brick wall of it. I shall show you presently that all the party concerned in this unlawful design were guilty of what any one of them did; if any body threw a snowball, it was the act of the whole party; if any struck with a club or threw a club, and the club had killed any body, the whole party would have been guilty of murder in law. Ld. C. J. Holt, in Mawgrige's case, Keyling In the continual vicissitudes of human things, amidst the shocks of fortune and the whirls of passion that take place at certain critical seasons, even in the mildest government, the people are liable to run into riots and tumults. There are Church-quakes and State-quakes in the moral and political world, as well as earthquakes, storms, and tempests in the physical. Thus much, however, must be said in favor of the people and of human nature, that it is a general, if not universal truth, that the aptitude of the people to mutinies, seditions, tumults, and insur |