one set of men, can we believe that all the new | eral government in which they are not palpa members who are yearly sent from one State bly in the wrong, and often when they are or another, would instantly enter into the What is to be feared from the efforts of Consame views? Would there not be found one gress to establish a tyranny, with the great honest man to warn his country of the dan- body of the people, under the direction of their ger? State governments, combined in opposition to their views? Must not their attempts recoil upon themselves, and terminate in their own ruin and disgrace? or, rather, would not these considerations, if they were insensible to other motives, for ever restrain them from making such attempts? Suppose the worst-suppose the combination entered into and continued. The execution would at least announce the design; and the means of defence would be easy. Consider the separate power of several of these States, and the situation of all. Consider the extent, populousness, and resources of Massachusetts, Virginia, Pennsylvania; I might add, of New York, Connecticut, and other States. Where could Congress find means sufficient to subvert the government and liberties of either of these States? or, rather, where find means sufficient to effect the conquest at all? If an attempt was made upon one, the others, from a sense of common danger, would make common cause; and they could immediately unite and provide for their joint defence. There is one consideration, of immense force in this question, not sufficiently attended to. It is this that each State possesses in itself the full powers of government, and can at once, in a regular and constitutional way, take measures for the preservation of its rights. In a single kingdom or state, if the rulers attempt to establish a tyranny, the people can only defend themselves by a tumultuary insurrection; they must run to arms without concert or plan; while the usurpers, clothed with the forms of legal authority, can employ the forces of the state to suppress them in embryo, and before they can have time or opportunity to give system to their opposition. With us, the case is widely different. Each State has a government, completely organized in itself, and can at once enter into a regular plan of defence; with the forces of the community at its command, it can immediately form connections with its neighbors, or even with foreign powers, if necessary. In a contest of this kind, the body of the people will always be on the side of the State governments. This will not only result from their love of liberty, and regard to their own safety, but from other strong principles of human nature. The State governments operate upon those immediate familiar personal concerns to which the sensibility of individuals is awake. The distribution of private justice belonging to them, they must always appear to the senses of the people as the immediate guardians of their rights. They will, of course, have the strongest hold on their attachment, respect, and obedience. Another circumstance will contribute to the same end: Far the greatest number of offices and employments are in the gift of the States separately; the weight of official influence will therefore be in favor of the State governments; and, with all these advantages, they cannot fail to carry the people along with them in every contest with the gen The causes taken notice of, as securing the attachment of the people to their local governments, present us with another important truth-the natural imbecility of federal governments, and the danger that they will never be able to exercise power enough to manage the general affairs of the Union; though the States will have a common interest, yet they will also have a particular interest. For example: as a part of the Union, it will be the interest of every State to pay as little itself, and to let its neighbors pay as much, as possible. Particular interests have always more influence upon men than general. The federal States, therefore, consulting their immediate advantage, may be considered as so many eccentric powers, tending in a contrary direction to the government of the UNION; and as they will generally carry the people along with them, the CONFEDERACY will be in continual danger of dissolution. This, Mr. Chairman, is the real rock upon which the happiness of this country is likely to split. This is the point to which our fears and cares should be directed-to guard against this, and not to terrify ourselves with imaginary dangers from the spectre of power in Congress, will be our true wisdom. But let us examine a little more closely the measure under consideration. What does the bill before us require us to do? Merely to grant duties on imposts to the United States, for the short period of twenty-five years; to be applied to the discharge of the principal and interest of the debts contracted for the support of the late war; the collection of which duties is to be made by officers appointed by the State, but accountable to Congress, according to such general regulations as the United States shall establish, subject to these important checks, that no citizen shall be carried out of the State for trial; that all prosecutions shall be in our own courts; that no excessive fines or penalties shall be imposed; and that a yearly account of the proceeds and application of the revenue shall be rendered to the legislature, on failure of which it reserves to itself a right of repealing its grant. Is it possible for any measure to be better guarded? or is it possible that a grant for such precise objects, and with so many checks, can be dangerous to the public liberty? Having now, as I trust, satisfactorily shown, that the constitution offers no obstacle to the measure; and that the liberty of the people cannot be endangered by it, it remains only to | some late resolutions, means to discount the inconsider it in the view of revenue. terest she pays upon her assumption to her own The sole question left for discussion is, Whe-citizens; in which case there will be little ther it be an eligible mode of supplying the federal treasury or not? The better to answer this question, it will be of use to examine how far the mode by quotas and requisitions has been found competent to the public exigencies. The universal delinquency of the States during the war, shall be passed over with the bare mention of it. The public embarrassments were a plausible apology for that delinquency; and it was hoped the peace would have produced greater punctuality. The experiment has disappointed that hope, to a degree which confounds the least sanguine. A comparative view of the compliances of the several States, for the five last years, will nish a striking result. coming from her to the United States. This seems to be bringing matters to a crisis. The pecuniary support of the federal government has of late devolved almost entirely upon Pennsylvania and New York. If Pennsylvania refuses to continue her aid, what wil! be the situation of New York? Are we willing to be the Atlas of the Union? or are we willing to see it perish? This seems to be the alternative. Is there not a species of political knight-errantry in adhering pertinaciously to a system which throws the whole weight of the confederation upon this State, or upon one or two more? Is it not our interest, on mere calculations of State fur-policy, to promote a measure, which, operating under the same regulations in every State, must During that period, as appears by a state-produce an equal, or nearly equal, effect every ment on our files, New Hampshire, North Caro- where, and oblige all the States to share the lina, South Carolina, and Georgia, have paid common burthen? nothing. I say nothing, because the only actual payment, is the trifling sum of about 7,000 dollars by New Hampshire. South Carolina indeed has credits, but these are merely by way of discount, on the supplies furnished by her during the war, in consideration of her peculiar sufferings and exertions while the immediate theatre of it. Connecticut and Delaware have paid about one-third of their requisitions. Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Maryland, about one-half; Virginia about three-fifths, Pennsylvania nearly the whole, and New York more than her quota. These proportions are taken on the specie requisitions, the indents have been very partially paid, and in their present state are of little account. The payments into the federal treasury have declined rapidly each year. The whole amount, for three years past, in specie, has not exceeded 1,400,000 dollars, of which New York has paid 100 per cent. more than her proportion. This sum, little more than 400,000 dollars a year, it will readily be conceived, has been exhausted in the support of the civil establishments of the Union, and the necessary guards and garrisons of public arsenals, and on the frontiers; without any surplus for paying any part of the debt, foreign or domestic, principal or interest. Things are continually growing worse; the last year in particular produced less than two hundred thousand dollars, and that from only two or three States. Several of the States have been so long unaccustomed to pay, that they seem no longer concerned even about the appearances of compliance. Connecticut and Jersey have almost formally declined paying any longer. The ostensible motive is the non-concurrence of this State in the impost system. The real one must be conjectured from the fact. Pennsylvania, if I understand the scope of If the impost is granted to the United States, with the power of levying it, it must have a proportionate effect in all the States, for the same mode of collection every where will have nearly the same return every where. What must be the final issue of the present state of things? Will the few States that now contribute, be willing to contribute much longer? Shall we ourselves be long content with bearing the burthen singly? Will not our zeal for a particular system, soon give way to the pressure of so unequal a weight? And if all the States cease to pay, what is to become of the UNION? It is sometimes asked, Why do not Congress oblige the States to do their duty? But where are the means? Where are the fleets and armies-where the federal treasury to support those fleets and armies, to enforce the requisitions of the Union? All methods short of coercion, have repeatedly been tried in vain. Let us now proceed to another most important inquiry. How are we to pay our foreign debt? This, I think, is estimated at about 7,000,000 of dollars, which will every year increase with the accumulations of interest. It we pay neither principal nor interest, we not only abandon all pretensions to character as a nation, but we endanger the public peace. However it may be in our power to evade the just demands of our domestic creditors, our foreign creditors must and will be paid. They have power to enforce their demands, and sooner or later they may be expected to do it. It is not my intention to endeavor to excite the apprehensions of the committee, but I would appeal to their prudence. A discreet attention to the consequences of national measures is no impeachment of our firmness. The foreign debt, I say, must sooner or later be paid, and the longer provision is delayed, the heavier it must fall at last. We require about 1,600,000 dollars to dis charge the interest and instalments of the present year, about a million annually upon an average, for ten years more, and about 300,000 dollars for another ten years. The product of the impost may be computed at about a million of dollars annually. It is an increasing fund. This fund would not only suffice for the discharge of the foreign debt, but important operations might be ngrafted upon it towards the extinguishment of the domestic debt. Is it possible to hesitate about the propriety of adopting a resource so easy in itself, and so extensive in its effects? Here I expect I may be told there is no objection to employing this resource. The act of the last session does it. The only dispute is about the mode. We are willing to grant the money, but not the power required from us. Money will pay our debts; power may destroy our liberties. It has been insinuated that nothing but a ust of power would have prevented Congress from accepting the grant in the shape it has already passed the legislature. This is a severe charge. If true, it ought undoubtedly to prevent our going a step further. But it is easy to show that Congress could not have accepted our grant without removing themselves further from the object than they now are. To gain one State they must have lost all the others. The grants of every State are accompanied with a condition that similar grants be made by the other States. It is not denied that our act is essentially different from theirs. Their acts give the United States the power of collecting the duty; ours reserves it to the State, and makes it receivable in paper money. The immediate consequences of accepting our grant would be a relinquishment of the grants of other States. They must take the matter up anew, and do the work over again to accommodate it to our standard. In order to anchor one State, would it have been wise to set twelve, or at least eleven others, afloat? It is said, that the States which have granted more would certainly be willing to grant less. They would easily accommodate their acts to that of New York, as more favorable to their own power and security. five for one; that of North Carolina to two for one; that of South Carolina may perhaps be worth fifteen shillings in the pound. If the States pay the duties in paper, is it not evident that for every pound of that duty consumed by the citizen of New York, he would pay twenty shillings, while the citizens of South Carolina would pay fifteen shillings; of North Carolina, ten shillings; and Rhode Island, only four! This consideration alone is sufficient to condemn the plan of our grant of last session, and to prove incontestably that the States which are averse to emitting a paper currency, or have it in their power to support one when emitted, would never come into it. Again, would those States which by their public acts demonstrate a conviction that the powers of the UNION require augmentation; which are conscious of energy in their own administration-would they be willing to concur in a plan which left the collection of the duties in the hands of each State; and of course subject to all the inequalities which a more or less vigorous system of collection would produce? This, too, is an idea which ought to have great weight with us. We have better habits of government than are to be found in some of the States; and our constitution admits of more energy than the constitution of most of the other States. The duties, therefore, would be more effectually collected with us than in such States, and this would have a similar effect to the depreciation of the money, in imposing a greater burthen on the citizens of this State. If any State should incline to evade the payment of the duties, having the collection in its own hands, nothing would be easier than to effect it, and without materially sacrificing appearances. It is manifest, from this view of the subject, that we have the strongest reasons, as a State, to depart from our own act; and that it would have been highly injudicious in Congress to have accepted it. If there even had been a prospect of the concurrence of the other States in the plan, how inadequate would it have been to the public exigencies, fettered with the embarrassBut would Massachusetts and Virginia, whichments of a depreciating paper! have no paper money of their own, accede to a It is to no purpose to say, that the faith of plan that permitted other States to pay in pa- the State was pledged by the act to make the per while they paid in specie? Would they con- paper equal to gold and silver; and that the sent that their citizens should pay twenty shil- other States would be obliged to do the same. lings in the pound, while the citizens of Rhode What greater dependence can be had on the Island paid only four, the citizens of North faith of the States pledged to this measure, Carolina ten, and of other States in different than on the faith they pledged in the confeddegrees of inequality, in proportion to the rela-eration sanctioned by a solemn appeal to tive depreciation of their paper? Is it wise in this State to cherish a plan that gives such an advantage to the citizens of other States over its own? The paper money of the State of New York, in most transactions, is equal to gold and silver; that of Rhode Island is depreciated to Heaven? If the obligation of faith in one case has had so little influence upon their conduct in respect to the requisitions of Congress, what hope can there be that they would have greater influences in respect to the deficiencies of the paper money? There yet remains an important light in which to consider the subject in the way of cautious about doing any thing that might affect revenue. It is a clear point that we cannot the credit of our currency. The legislature hav carry the duties upon imports to the same ex-ing thought an emission of paper advisable, i tent by separate arrangements as by a general consider it my duty as a representative of the peo plan-we must regulate ourselves by what we ple to take care of its credit. The farmers apfind done in the neighboring States; while peared willing to exchange their produce for Pennsylvania has only two-and-a-half per cent. it; the merchants, on the other hand, had large on her importations, we cannot greatly exceed | debts outstanding. They supposed that giving her. To go much beyond it would injure our a free circulation to the paper would enable commerce in a variety of ways, and would de- their customers in the country to pay, and as feat itself. While the ports of Connecticut they perceived that they would have it in their and Jersey are open to the introduction of power to convert the money into produce, they goods free from duty, and the conveyance from naturally resolved to give it their support. them to us is so easy-while they consider our imposts as an ungenerous advantage taken of them, which it would be laudable to elude, the duties must be light or they would be evaded. The facility to do it, and the temptation of doing it, would be both so great, that we should collect perhaps less by an increase of the rates than we do now. Already we experience the effects of this situation. But if the duties were to be levied under a common direction, with the same precautions every where to guard against smuggling, they might be carried without prejudice to trade to a much more considerable height. As things now are, we must adhere to the present standard of duties, without any material alterations. Suppose this to produce fifty thousand pounds a year. The duties to be granted to Congress ought, in proportion, to produce double that sum. To this it appears, by a scheme now before us, that additional duties might be imposed for the use of the State, on certain enumerated articles, to the amount of thirty thousand pounds. This would be an augmentation of our national revenue by indirect taxation to the extent of eighty thousand pounds a year, an immense object in a single State, and which alone demonstrates the good policy of the measure. It is no objection to say that a great part of this fund will be dedicated to the use of the United States. Their exigencies must be supplied in some way or other. The more is done towards it by means of the impost, the less will be to be done in other modes. If we do not employ that resource to the best account, we must find others in direct taxation. And to this are opposed all the habits and prejudices of the community. There is not a farmer in the State who would not pay a shilling in the voluntary consumption of articles on which a duty is paid, rather than a penny imposed immediately on his house and land. There is but one objection to the measure under consideration that has come to my knowledge, which yet remains to be discussed. I mean the effect it is supposed to have upon our paper currency. It is said the diversion of this fund would leave the credit of the paper without any effectual support. Though I should not be disposed to put a consideration of this kind in competition with the safety of the UNION; yet I should be extremely These causes combined to introduce the money into general circulation, and having once obtained credit, it will now be able to support itself. The chief difficulty to have been apprehended in respect to the paper, was to overcome the diffidence which the still recent experience of depreciating paper had instilled into men's minds. This, it was to have been feared, would have shaken its credit at its outset, and if it had once begun to sink, it would be no easy matter to prevent its total decline. The event has, however, turned out otherwise, and the money has been fortunate enough to conciliate the general confidence. This point gained, there need be no apprehensions of its future fate, unless the government should do something to destroy that confidence. The causes that first gave it credit still operate, and will in all probability continue so to do. The demand for money has not lessened, and the merchant has still the same inducement to countenance the circulation of the paper. I shall not deny that the outlet which the payment of duties furnished to the merchant, was an additional motive to the reception of the paper. Nor is it proposed to take away this motive. There is now before the House a bill, one object of which is the establishment of a State impost on certain enumerated articles, in addition to that to be granted to the United States. It is computed on very good grounds, that the additional duties would amount to about £30,000, and as they would be payable in paper currency, they would create a sufficient demand upon the merchant to leave him, in this respect, substantially the same inducement which he had before. deed, independent of this, the readiness of the trading people to take the money can never be doubted, while it will freely command the commodities of the country; for this, to them, is the most important use they can make of it. In But besides the State impost, there must be other taxes; and these will all contribute to create a demand for the money, which is all we now mean when we talk of funds for its support; for there are none appropriated for the redemption of the paper. Upon the whole, the additional duties will be a competent substitute for those now in existence; and the general good will of the com munity towards the paper, will be the best security for its credit. Having now shown, Mr. Chairman, that there is no constitutional impediment to the adoption of the bill; that there is no danger to be apprehended to the public liberty from giving the power in question to the United | States; that in the view of revenue the measure under consideration is not only expedient but necessary-let us turn our attention to the other side of this important subject. Let us ask ourselves, what will be the consequence of rejecting the bill? What will be the situation of our national affairs if they are left much longer to float in the chaos in which they are now involved? Can our NATIONAL CHARACTER be preserved without paying our debts? Can the UNION subsist without revenue? Have we realized the consequences which would attend its dissolution? If these States are not united under a FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, they will infallibly have wars with each other; and their divisions will subject them to all the mischiefs of foreign influence and intrigue. The human passions will never want objects of hostility. The Western Territory is an obvious and fruitful source of contest. Let us also cast our eye upon the map of this State, intersected from one extremity to the other by a large navigable river. In the event of a rupture with them, what is to hinder our metropolis from becoming a prey to our neighbors? Is it even supposable that they would suffer it to remain the nursery of wealth to a distinct community? These subjects are delicate, but it is necessary to contemplate them, to teach us to form a true estimate of our situation. Wars with each other would beget standing armies-a source of more real danger to our liberties than all the powers that could be conferred upon the representatives of the Union. And wars with each other would lead to opposite alliances with foreign powers, and plunge us into all the labyrinths of European politics. The Romans, in their progress to universal dominion, when they conceived the project of subduing the refractory spirit of the Grecian republics, which composed the famous Achaian League, began by sowing dissensions among them, and instilling jealousies of each other, and of the common head, and finished by making them a province of the Roman empire. The application is easy: if there are any foreign enemies, if there are any domestic foes to this country, all their arts and artifices will be employed to effect a dissolution of the Union. This cannot be better done than by sowing jealousies of the federal head, and cultivating in each State an undue attachment to its own power. |