a duty would be very burdensome to some of the States. If Congress should, at any time, find it convenient to impose a salt tax, would it not be opposed by the eastern States? Being themselves incapable of feeling the necessity of the measure, they could only feel its apparent injustice. Would it be wise to give the New England States a power to defeat this measure, by recalling their senators who may be engaged for it? I beg the gentlemen once more to attend to the distinction between the real and apparent interests of the States. I admit that the aggregate of individuals constitutes the government; yet every State is not the government; every petty district is not the government. Sir, in our State legislatures, a compromise is frequently necessary between the interests of counties; the same must happen in the general government between States. In this the few must yield to the many; or, in other words, the particular must be sacrificed to the general interest. If the members of Congress are too dependent on the State legislatures, they will be eternally forming secret combinations from local views. This is reasoning from the plainest principles. Their interest is interwoven with their dependence, and they will necessarily yield to the impression of their situation. Those who have been in Congress have seen these operations. The first question has been, How will such a measure affect my constituents, and consequently, how will the part I take affect my re-election? This consideration may be, in some degree, proper; but to be dependent from day to day, and to have the idea perpetually present, would be the source of innumerable evils. Six years, sir, is a period short enough for a proper degree of dependence. Let us consider the peculiar state of this body, and see under what impressions they will act. One third of them are to go out at the end of two years, two thirds in four years, and the whole in six years. When one year is elapsed there will be a number who are to hold their places for one year, others for three, and others for five years. Thus, there will not only be a constant and frequent change of members, but there will be some whose office is near the point of expiration, and who, from this circumstance, will have a lively sense of their dependence. The biennial change of members is an excellent invention for increasing the difficulty of combination. Any scheme of usurpation will lose, every two years, a number of its oldest advocates, and their places will be supplied by an equal number of new, unaccommodating, and virtuous men. When two principles are equally important, we ought, if possible, to reconcile them, and sacrifice neither. We think that safety and permanency in this government are completely reconcilable. The State governments will have, from the causes I have described, a sufficient influence over the Senate, without the check for which the gentlemen contend. It has been remarked that there is an incon The sistency in our admitting that the equal votes in the Senate were given to secure the rights of the States; and, at the same time, holding up the idea that their interests should be sacrificed to those of the Union. But the committee certainly perceive the distinction between the rights of the State and its interests. rights of a State are defined by the constitution, and cannot be invaded without a violation of it; but the interests of a State have no connection with the constitution, and may be in a thousand instances constitutionally sacrificed. An uniform tax is perfectly constitutional, and yet it may operate oppressively upon certain members of the Union. The gentlemen are afraid that the State governments will be abolished. But, sir, their existence does not depend upon the laws of the United States. Congress can no more abolish the State governments than they can dissolve the Union. The whole constitution is repugnant to it, and yet the gentlemen would introduce an additional useless provision against it. It is proper that the influence of the States should prevail to a certain extent. But shall the individual States be the judges how far? Shall an unlimited power be left them to determine in their own favor? The gentlemen go into the extreme; instead of a wise government, they would form a fantastical Utopia. But, sir, while they give it a plausible, popular shape, they would render it impracticable. Much has been said about factions. As far as my observation has extended, factions in Congress have arisen from attachment to State prejudices. We are attempting by this constitution to abolish factions, and to unite all parties for the general welfare. That a man should have the power in private life of recalling his agent is proper, because, in the business in which he is engaged, he has no other object but to gain the approbation of his principal. Is this the case with the senator? Is he simply the agent of the State? No; he is an agent for the Union, and he is bound to perform services necessary to the good of the whole, though his State should condemn them. Sir, in contending for a rotation, the gentlemen carry their zeal beyond all reasonable bounds. I am convinced that no government, founded on this feeble principle, can operate well. I believe also, that we shall be singular in this proposal. We have not felt the embarrassments resulting from rotation, that other States have; and we hardly know the strength of their objections to it. There is no probability that we shall ever persuade a majority of the States to agree to this amendment. The gentlemen deceive themselves. The amendment would defeat their own design. When a man knows he must quit his station, let his merit be what it may, he will turn his attention chiefly to his own emolument: nay, he will feel temptations, which few other situations furnish, to perpetuate his power by unconstitutional usurpations. Men will pursue their interests. It is as easy to change humar nature as to oppose the strong current of the selfish passions. A wise legislator will gently divert the channel, and direct it, if possible, to the public good. It has been observed that it is not possible there should be in a State only two men qualified for senators. But, sir, the question is not whether there may be no more than two men, but whether, in certain emergencies, you could find two equal to those whom the amendment would discard. Important negotiations, or other business to which they shall be most competent, may employ them at the moment of their removal. These things often happen. The difficulty of obtaining men capable of conducting the affairs of a nation in dangerous times, is much more serious than the gentlemen imagine. As to corruption, sir, admitting in the Presi dent a disposition to corrupt, what are the instruments of bribery? It is said, he will have in his disposal a great number of offices. But how many offices are there, for which a man would relinquish the senatorial dignity? There may be some in the judicial, and some in other principal departments. But there are few, whose respectability can in any measure balance that of the office of senator. Men who have been in the Senate once, and who have a reasonable hope of a re-election, will not be easily bought by offices. This reasoning shows that a rotation would be productive of many disadvantages-under particular circumstances it might be extremely inconvenient, if not fatal to the prosperity of our country. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. constituents. Mr. Hamilton delivered the following speech, | State representatives. Its members are to hold on the twenty-seventh of June, 1788, in opposition to a proposed amendment of the constitution which was brought before the New York Convention, the object of which was, to materially abridge the power proposed to be conferred upon Congress, relative to imposing excise and laying direct taxes: This is one of those subjects, Mr. Chairman, on which objections very naturally arise, and assume the most plausible shape. Its address is to the passions, and its first impressions cre- | ate a prejudice, before cool examination has an opportunity for exertion. It is more easy for the human mind to calculate the evils, than the advantages of a measure; and vastly more natural to apprehend the danger than to see the necessity of giving powers to our rulers. Hence, I may justly expect that those who hear me, will place less confidence in those arguments which oppose, than in those which favor their prepossessions. their office two years, and then return to their here they act by their immediate representaHere, sir, the people govern: tives. You have also a Senate, constituted by your State legislatures-by men in whom you place the highest confidence, and forming anohave an executive magistrate, created by a form ther representative branch. Then, again, you of election which merits universal admiration. In the form of this government, and in the mode of legislation, you find all the checks which the greatest politicians and the best writers have ever conceived. What more can reasonable men desire? Is there any one branch in which the whole legislative and executive powers are lodged? No. The legislative authority is lodged in three distinct branches, properly balanced: the executive authority is divided between two branches; and the judicial is still reserved for an independent body, who hold their offices during good behavior. This organization is so complex, so skilfully contrived, that it is next to impossible that an impolitic or wicked measure should pass the After all our doubts, our suspicions and spec- great scrutiny with success. Now, what do ulations, on the subject of government, we gentlemen mean by coming forward and demust return, at last, to this important truth- claiming against this government? Why do that when we have formed a constitution upon they say we ought to limit its powers, to disfree principles; when we have given a proper able it, and to destroy its capacity of blessing balance to the different branches of administra- the people? Has philosophy suggested-has tion, and fixed representation upon pure and experience taught, that such a government equal principles, we may, with safety, furnish ought not to be trusted with every thing necesit with all the powers necessary to answer, in sary for the good of society? Sir, when you the most ample manner, the purposes of gov- have divided and nicely balanced the departernment. The great desiderata are a free rep-ments of government; when you have strongly resentation, and mutual checks. When these connected the virtue of your rulers with their are obtained, all our apprehensions of the ex- interest; when, in short, you have rendered tent of powers are unjust and imaginary. What your system as perfect as human forms can be then is the structure of this constitution? One-you must place confidence; you must give branch of the legislature is to be elected by the power. people-by the same people who choose your We have heard a great deal of the sword and complete in its structure; give a perfect proportion and balance to its parts; and the powers you give it will never affect your security. The question, then, of the division of powers between the general and State governments, is a question of convenience: it becomes a prudential inquiry, what powers are proper to be reserved to the latter; and this immediately involves another inquiry into the proper objects of the two governments. This is the criterion by which we shall determine the just distribunotion of powers. the parse: it is said, our liberties are in danger, if both are possessed by Congress. Let us see what is the true meaning of this maxim, which has been so much used, and so little understood. It is, that you shall not place these powers in either the legislative or executive singly: neither one nor the other shall have both; because this would destroy that division of powers, on which political liberty is founded, and would furnish one body with all the means of tyranny. But, where the purse is lodged in one branch, and the sword in another, there can be danger. All governments have possessed these powers: they would be monsters without them, and incapable of exertion. What is your State government? Does not your legislature command what money it pleases? Does not your executive execute the laws without restraint? These distinctions between the purse and the sword have no application to the system, but only to its separate branches. Sir, when we reason about the great interests of a great people, it is high time that we dismiss our prejudices and banish declamation. In order to induce us to consider the powers given by this constitution as dangerous-in order to render plausible an attempt to take away the life and spirit of the most important power in government, the gentleman complains that we shall not have a true and safe representation. I asked him what a safe representation was, and he has given no satisfactory answer. The assembly of New York has been mentioned as a proper standard; but, if we apply this standard to the general government, our Congress will become a mere mob, exposed to every irregular impulse, and subject to every breeze of faction. Can such a system afford security? Can you have confidence in such a body? The idea of taking the ratio of representation, in a small society, for the ratio of a great one, is a fallacy which ought to be exposed. It is impossible to ascertain to what point our representation will increase: it may vary from one, to two, three, or four hundred; it depends upon the progress of population. Suppose it to rest at two hundred; is not this number sufficient to secure it against corruption? Human nature must be a much more weak and despicable thing than I apprehend it to be, if two hundred of our fellow-citizens can be corrupted in two years. But, suppose they are corrupted; can they, in two years, accomplish their designs? Can they form a combination, and even lay a foundation for a system of tyranny, in so short a period? It is far from my intention to wound the feelings of any gentleman; but I must, in this most interesting discussion, speak of things as they are, and hold ap opinions in the light in which they ought to appear: and I maintain, that all that has been said of corruption, of the purse and the sword, and of the danger of giving powers, is not supported by principle or fact: that it is mere verbiage and idle declamation. The true principle of government is this: make the system The great leading objects of the federal government, in which revenue is concerned, are to maintain domestic peace, and provide for the common defence. In these are comprehended the regulation of commerce, that is, the whole system of foreign intercourse; the support of armies and navies, and of the civil administration. It's useless to go into detail. Every one knows that the objects of the general government are numerous, extensive and important. Every one must acknowledge the necessity of giving powers, in all respects, and in every degree, equal to these objects. This principle assented to, let us inquire what are the objects of the State governments. Have they to provide against foreign invasion? Have they to maintain fleets and armies? Have they any concern in the regulation of commerce, the procuring alliances, or forming treaties of peace; No. Their objects are merely civil and domes tic; to support the legislative establishment, and to provide for the administration of the laws. Let any one compare the expense of supporting the civil list in a State, with the expense of providing for the defence of the Union. The difference is almost beyond calculation. The experience of Great Britain will throw some light on this subject. In that kingdom, the ordinary expenses of peace to those of war are as one to fourteen: but there they have a monarch, with his splendid court, and an enormous civil establishment, with which we have nothing in this country to compare. If, in Great Britain, the expenses of war and peace are so disproportioned, how wide will be their disparity in the United States; how infinitely wider between the general government and each individual State! Now, sir, where ought the great resources to be lodged? Every rational man will give an immediate answer. To what extent shall these resources be possessed? Reason says, as far as possible exigencies can require; that is, without limitation. A constitution cannot set bounds to a nation's wants; it ought not, therefore, to set bounds to its resources. Unexpected invasions, long and ruinous wars, may demand all the possible abilities of the country. Shall not your government have power to call these abilities into action? The contingencies of society are not reducible to calculations. They cannot be fixed or bounded, even in imagination. Will you limit the means of your defence, when you cannot ascertain the force or extent of the in vasion? Even in ordinary wars, a government | supplies without limitation, and to borrow is frequently obliged to call for supplies, to the temporary oppression of the people. money to any amount. It is true, they must use the form of recommendations and requisitions: but the States are bound by the solemn ties of honor, of justice, of religion, to comply without reserve. Sir, if we adopt the idea of exclusive revenues, we shall be obliged to fix some distinguished line, which neither government shall overpass. The inconveniences of this measure Mr. Chairman, it has been advanced as a must appear evident, on the slightest examina- principle, that no government but a despotism tion. The resources appropriated to one, may can exist in a very extensive country. This is diminish or fail, while those of the other may a melancholy consideration indeed. If it were increase, beyond the wants of government. founded on truth, we ought to dismiss the idea One may be destitute of revenues, while the of a republican government, even for the State other shall possess an unnecessary abundance, of New York. This idea has been taken from and the constitution will be an eternal barrier a celebrated writer, who, by being misunderto a mutual intercourse and relief. In this stood, has been the occasion of frequent fallacase, will the individual States stand on so cies in our reasoning on political subjects. But good a ground, as if the objects of taxation the position has been misapprehended, and its were left free and open to the embrace of both application is entirely false and unwarrantable. the governments? Possibly, in the advance- It relates only to democracies, where the whole ment of commerce, the imposts may increase body of the people meet to transact business, to such a degree, as to render direct taxes and where representation is unknown. Such unnecessary. These resources, then, as the were a number of ancient and some modern inconstitution stands, may be occasionally relin-dependent cities. Men who read without atquished to the States; but on the gentleman's tention have taken these maxims respecting the idea of prescribing exclusive limits, and pre-extent of country, and contrary to their proper cluding all reciprocal communication, this would meaning, have applied them to republics in be entirely improper. The laws of the States general. This application is wrong in respect must not touch the appropriated resources of to all representative governments, but especially the United States, whatever may be their in relation to a confederacy of States, in which wants. Would it not be of more advantage to the supreme legislature has only general powthe States, to have a concurrent jurisdictioners, and the civil and domestic concerns of the extending to all the sources of revenue, than to people are regulated by the laws of the several be confined to such a small resource, as, on States. This distinction being kept in view, all calculation of the objects of the two govern- the difficulty will vanish, and we may easily ments, should appear to be their due propor-conceive that the people of a large country may tion? Certainly you cannot hesitate on this question. The gentleman's plan would have a further ill effect; it would tend to dissolve the connexion and correspondence of the two governments, to estrange them from each other, and to destroy that mutual dependence which forms the essence of union. Sir, a number of arguments have been advanced by an honor- | able member from New York, which, to every unclouded mind, must carry conviction. He has stated, that in sudden emergencies, it may be necessary to borrow; and that it is impossible to borrow, unless you have funds to pledge for the payment of your debts. Limiting the powers of government to certain resources, is rendering the fund precarious; and obliging the government to ask, instead of empowering it to command, is to destroy all confidence and credit. If the power of taxing is restricted, the consequence is, that on the breaking out of a war, you must divert the funds appropriated to the payment of debts, to answer immediate exigencies. Thus you violate your engagements, at the very time you increase the burden of them. Besides, sound policy condemns the practice of accumulating debts. A government, to act with energy, should have the possession of all its revenues to answer present purposes. The principle for which I contend is recognized, in all its extent, by our old constitution. Congress is authorized to raise troops, to call for be represented as truly as those of a small one. An assembly constituted for general purposes may be fully competent to every federal regulation, without being too numerous for deliberate conduct. If the State governments were to be abolished, the question would wear a different face; but this idea is inadmissible. They are absolutely necessary to the system. Their existence must form a leading principle in the most perfect constitution we could form. I insist that it never can be the interest or desire of the national legislature to destroy the State governments. It can derive no advantage from such an event; but, on the contrary, would lose an indispensable support, a necessary aid in executing the laws and conveying the influence of government to the doors of the people. The Union is dependent on the will of the State governments for its chief magistrate and for its Senate. The blow aimed at the members inust give a fatal wound to the head, and the destruction of the States must be at once a political suicide. Can the national government be guilty of this madness? What inducements, what temptations can they have? Will they attach new honors to their station-will they increase the national strength-will they multiply the national resources-will they make themselves more respectable in the view of foreign nations or of their fellow citizens, by robbing the States of their constitutiona privileges? But imagine, for a moment, that a | the State governments; they will be a mutual political frenzy should seize the government; protection and support. Another source of insuppose they should make the attempt; cer- fluence which has already been pointed out is tainly, sir, it would be for ever impracticable. the various official connections in the States. This has been sufficiently demonstrated by rea- Gentlemen endeavor to evade the force of this son and experience. It has been proved that by saying that these offices will be insignificant. the members of republics have been and ever This is by no means true. The State officers will be stronger than the head. Let us attend will ever be important, because they are necesto one general historical example. In the an- sary and useful. Their powers are such as are cient feudal governments of Europe there were, extremely interesting to the people; such as in the first place, a monarch; subordinate to affect their property, their liberty, and life. him, a body of nobles; and subject to these, What is more important than the administrathe vassals, or the whole body of the people. tion of justice and the execution of the civil The authority of the kings was limited, and and criminal laws? Can the State governments that of the barons considerably independent. become insignificant while they have the power A great part of the early wars in Europe were of raising money independently and without contests between the king and his nobility. In control? If they are really useful, if they are these contests the latter possessed many advan- calculated to promote the essential interests of tages derived from their influence and the im- the people, they must have their confidence mediate command they had over the people, and support. The States can never lose their and they generally prevailed. The history of powers till the whole people of America are the feudal wars exhibits little more than a se- robbed of their liberties. These must go tories of successful encroachments on the pre-gether; they must support each other or meet rogatives of monarchy. Here, sir, is one great proof of the superiority which the members in limited governments possess over their head. As long as the barons enjoyed the confidence | and attachment of the people, they had the strength of the country on their side, and were irresistible. I may be told that in some instances the barons were overcome; but how did this happen? Sir, they took advantage of the depression of the royal authority, and the establishment of their own power, to oppress and tyrannize over their vassals. As commerce enlarged, and as wealth and civilization increased, the people began to feel their | own weight and consequence; they grew tired of their oppressions, united their strength with that of the prince, and threw off the yoke of aristocracy. These very instances prove what I contend for. They prove that in whatever direction the popular weight leans, the current of power will flow; wherever the popular attachments lie, there will rest the political supe-he riority. Sir, can it be supposed that the State governments will become the oppressors of the people? Will they forfeit their affections? Will they combine to destroy the liberties and happiness of their fellow citizens for the sole purpose of involving themselves in ruin? God forbid! The idea, sir, is shocking! It outrages every feeling of humanity and every dictate of common sense? There are certain social principles in human nature, from which we may draw the most solid conclusions, with respect to the conduct of individuals and of communities. We love our families more than our neighbors; we love our neighbors more than our countrymen in general. The human affections, like the solar heat, lose their intensity as they depart from the centre, and become languid in proportion to the expansion of the circle on which they act. On these principles the attachment of the individual will be first and for ever secured by one common fate. On the gentlemen's principle, we may safely trust the State governments, though we have no means of resisting them; but we cannot confide in the national government, though we have an effectual constitutional guard against every encroachment. This is the essence of their argument, and it is false and fallacious beyond conception. With regard to the jurisdiction of the two governments, I shall certainly admit that the constitution ought to be so formed as not to prevent the States from providing for their own existence; and I maintain that it is so formed, and that their power of providing for themselves is sufficiently established. This is conceded by one gentleman, and in the next breath the concession is retracted. He says Congress have but one exclusive right in taxation-that of duties on imports; certainly, then, their other powers are only concurrent. But to take off the force of this obvious conclusion, immediately says that the laws of the United States are supreme, and that where there is one supreme there cannot be a concurrent authority; and further, that where the laws of the Union are supreme, those of the States must be subordinate, because there cannot be two supremes. This is curious sophistry. That two supreme powers cannot act together is false. They are inconsistent only when they are aimed at each other, or at one indivisible object. The laws of the United States are supreme as to all their proper constitutional objects; the laws of the States are supreme in the same way. These supreme laws may act on different objects without clashing, or they may operate on different parts of the same common object with perfect harmony. Sup-. pose both governments should lay a tax of a penny on a certain article; has not each an independent and uncontrollable power to collect its own tax? The meaning of the maxim, there cannot be two supremes, is simply this |