The confederation was framed amidst the agitation and tumult of society. It was com posed of unsound materials put together in haste. Men of intelligence discovered the feebleness of the structure, in the first stages of its existence; but the great body of the people, too much engrossed with their distresses to contemplate any but the immediate causes of them, were ignorant of the defects of their constitution. But when the dangers of war were removed, they saw clearly what they had suffered, and what they had yet to suffer, from a feeble form of government. There was no need of discerning men to convince the people of their unhappy situation; the complaint was co-extensive with the evil, and both were common to all classes of the community. We have been told that the spirit of patriotism and love of liberty are almost extinguished among the people, and that it has become a prevailing doctrine that republican principles ought to be hooted out of the world. Sir, I am confident that such remarks as these are rather occasioned by the heat of argument than by a cool con

that the true principle of a republic is, that the people should choose whom they please to govern them. Representation is imperfect, in proportion as the current of popular favor is checked. This great source of free government, popular election, should be perfectly pure, and the most unbounded liberty allowed. Where this principle is adhered to; where, in the organization of the government, the legislative, executive and judicial branches are rendered distinct; where again the legislative is divided into separate Houses, and the operations of each are controlled by various checks and balances, and above all, by the vigilance and weight of the State governments; to talk of tyranny, and the subversion of our liberties, is to speak the language of enthusiasm. This balance between the national and State governments ought to be dwelt on with peculiar attention, as it is of the utmost importance. It forms a double security to the people. If one encroaches on their rights, they will find a powerful protection in the other. Indeed, they will both be prevented from overpassing their constitutional limits, by a certain rivalship, which will ever subsist be-viction of their truth and justice. As far as tween them. I am persuaded, that a firm union is as necessary to perpetuate our liberties, as it is to make us respectable; and experience will probably prove, that the national government will be as natural a guardian of our freedom, as the State legislatures themselves.

my experience has extended, I have heard no such doctrine, nor have I discovered any diminution of regard for those rights and liberties, in defence of which, the people have fought and suffered. There have been, undoubtedly, some men who have had speculative doubts on the subject of government; but the principles of republicanism are founded on too firm a basis to be shaken by a few speculative and skeptical reasoners. Our error has been of a very different kind. We have erred through excess of caution, and a zeal false and impracticable. Our counsels have been destitute of consistency and stability. I am flattered with a hope, sir, that we have now found a cure for the evils under which we have so long labored. I trust that the proposed constitution affords a genuine specimen of representative and republican government, and that it will answer, in an eminent degree, all the beneficial purposes of so

Suggestions, sir, of an extraordinary nature, have been frequently thrown out in the course of the present political controversy. It gives me pain to dwell on topics of this kind, and I wish they might be dismissed. We have been told that the old confederation has proved inefficacious, only because intriguing and powerful men, aiming at a revolution, have been for ever instigating the people, and rendering them disaffected with it. This, sir, is a false insinua- | tion. The thing is impossible. I will venture to assert, that no combination of designing men under heaven, will be capable of making a government unpopular, which is in its principles a wise and good one, and vigorous in its opera-ciety. tions.

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.

This speech was delivered in the Convention | in its operations. This purpose can never be of New York, on the twenty-fourth of June, accomplished but by the establishment of some 1788, in opposition to a resolution brought for-select body, formed peculiarly upon this prinward by Mr. G. Livingston, as an amendment to the constitution, which proposed; That no person should be eligible as a senator for more than six years, in any term of twelve years, and that the legislatures of the several States should have power to recall their senators, or either of them, and to elect others in their stead, to serve for the remainder of the time for which such senator or senators, so recalled, were appointed.

I am persuaded, Mr. Chairman, that I in my turn shall be indulged in addressing the committee. We all, in equal sincerity, profess to be anxious for the establishment of a republican government, on a safe and solid basis. It is the object of the wishes of every honest man in the United States, and I presume I shall not be disbelieved, when I declare, that it is an object of all others, the nearest and most dear to my own heart. The means of accomplishing this great purpose, become the most important study which can interest mankind. It is our duty to examine all those means with peculiar attention, and to choose the best and most effectual. It is our duty to draw from nature, from reason, from examples, the best principles of policy, and to pursue and apply them in the formation of our government. We should contemplate and compare the systems, which, in this examination, come under our view; distinguish, with a careful eye, the defects and excellencies of each, and discarding the former, incorporate the latter, as far as circumstances will admit, into our constitution. If we pursue a different course and neglect this duty, we shall probably disappoint the expectations of our country and of the world.

ciple. There are few positions more demonstrable than that there should be in every republic, some permanent body to correct the prejudices, check the intemperate passions, and It is evident, that a body instituted for these regulate the fluctuations of a popular assembly. purposes, must be so formed as to exclude, as much as possible, from its own character, those infirmities, and that mutability which it is designed remedy. It is therefore necessary that it should be small, that it should hold its authority during a considerable period, and that it should have such an independence in the exercise of its powers as will divest it as much as possible of local prejudices. It should be so formed as to be the centre of political knowledge, to pursue always a steady line of conduct, and to reduce every irregular propensity to system. Without this establishment, we may make experiments without end, but shall never have an efficient government.

It is an unquestionable truth, that the body of the people in every country desire sincerely its prosperity: but it is equally unquestionable, that they do not possess the discernment and stability necessary for systematic government. To deny that they are frequently led into the grossest errors by misinformation and passion, would be a flattery which their own good sense must despise. That branch of administration especially, which involves our political relations with foreign states, a community will ever be incompetent to. These truths are not often held up in public assemblies; but they cannot be unknown to any who hear me. From these principles it follows, that there ought to be two distinct bodies in our government; one, which shall be immediately constituted by and peculiarly represent the people, and possess all the popular features; another, formed upon the principle, and for the purposes before explained. In the commencement of a revolution, which Such considerations as these induced the conreceived its birth from the usurpations of vention who formed your State constitution, to tyranny, nothing was more natural than that institute a senate upon the present plan. The the public mind should be influenced by an history of ancient and modern republics had extreme spirit of jealousy. To resist these en- taught them, that many of the evils which croachments, and to nourish this spirit, was the these republics suffered, arose from the want of great object of all our public and private insti- a certain balance and mutual control indispentutions. The zeal for liberty became predomi-sable to a wise administration; they were connant and excessive. In forming our confederation, this passion alone seemed to actuate us, and we appear to have had no other view than to secure ourselves from despotism. The object certainly was a valuable one, and deserved our utmost attention. But, sir, there is another object, equally important, and which our enthusiasm rendered us little capable of regarding: I mean a principle of strength and stability in the organization of our government, and vigor

vinced that popular assemblies are frequently misguided by ignorance, by sudden impulses, and the intrigues of ambitious men; and that some firm barrier against these operations was necessary: they therefore instituted your senate, and the benefits we have experienced, have fully justified their conceptions.

Now, sir, what is the tendency of the proposed amendment? To take away the stability of government, by depriving the Senate of its

permanency; to make this body subject to the | become madmen. While the constitution con- • same weakness and prejudices which are inci- tinues to be read, and its principles known, the dent to popular assemblies, and which it was States must, by every rational man, be coninstituted to correct; and by thus assimilating sidered as essential, component parts of the the complexion of the two branches, destroy Union; and therefore the idea of sacrificing the balance between them. The amendment the former to the latter is wholly inadmissible. will render the senator a slave to all the capri- The objectors do not advert to the natural cious humors among the people. It will probably strength and resources of State governments, be here suggested, that the legislatures, not the which will ever give them an important_supepeople, are to have the power of recall. With- riority over the general government. If we out attempting to prove that the legislatures compare the nature of their different powers, must be, in a great degree, the image of the or the means of popular influence which each multitude, in respect to federal affairs, and that possesses, we shall find the advantage entirely the same prejudices and factions will prevail; on the side of the States. This consideration, I insist, that in whatever body the power of important as it is, seems to have been little recall is vested, the senator will perpetually feel attended to. The aggregate number of reprehimself in such a state of vassalage and depend-sentatives throughout the States may be two ence, that he never can possess that firmness which is necessary to the discharge of his great duty to the Union.

you accommodate these different interests, Sir, if you consider but a moment the purwhich is the only way to set the government poses for which the senate was instituted, and in motion, you establish a general controlling the nature of the business which they are to power. Thus, whatever constitutional provi- transact, you will see the necessity of giving sions are made to the contrary, every govern- them duration. They, together with the Presment will be at last driven to the necessity of ident, are to manage all our concerns with forsubjecting the partial to the universal interest. eign nations; they must understand all their The gentlemen ought always, in their reason- interests and their political systems. This ing, to distinguish between the real, genuine knowledge is not soon acquired-but a very good of a state, and the opinions and prejudices small part is gained in the closet. Is it desirawhich may prevail respecting it: the latter ble, then, that new and unqualified members may be opposed to the general good, and con- should be continually thrown into that body? sequently ought to be sacrified; the former is When public bodies are engaged in the exercise so involved in it, that it never can be sacrificed. of general powers, you cannot judge of the proSir, the main design of the convention, in form- priety of their conduct but from the result of ing the Senate, was to prevent fluctuations and their systems. They may be forming plans cabals. With this view, they made that body which require time and diligence to bring to small, and to exist for a considerable period. maturity. It is necessary, therefore, that they Have they executed this design too far? The should have a considerable and fixed duration, senators are to serve six years. This is only that they may make their calculations accordtwo years longer than the senators of this ingly. If they are to be perpetually fluctuating State hold their places. One third of the mem- they can never have that responsibility which bers are to go out every two years; and in six, is so important in republican governments. In the whole body may be changed. Prior to the bodies subject to frequent changes, great politirevolution, the representatives in the several cal plans must be conducted by members in colonies were elected for different periods; for succession; a single assembly can have but a three years, for seven years, &c. Were those partial agency in them, and consequently canbodies ever considered as incapable of repre- not properly be answerable for the final event. senting the people, or as too independent of Considering the senate, therefore, with a view them? There is one circumstance which will to responsibility, duration is a very interesting have a tendency to increase the dependence of and essential quality. There is another view the senators on the States, in proportion to the in which duration in the senate appears necesduration of their appointments. As the State sary. A government, changeable in its policy, legislatures are in continual fluctuation, the must soon lose its sense of national character, senator will have more attachments to form, and forfeit the respect of foreigners. Senators and consequently a greater difficulty of main- will not be solicitous for the reputation of pubtaining his place, than one of shorter duration. lic measures in which they have had but a temHe will therefore be more cautious and indus-porary concern, and will feel lightly the burden trious to suit his conduct to the wishes of his. constituents.

Sir, when you take a view of all the circumstances which have been recited, you will certainly see that the senators will constantly look up to the state governments with an eye of dependence and affection. If they are ambitious to continue in office they will make every prudent arrangement for this purpose, and whatever may be their private sentiments of politics, they will be convinced that the surest means of obtaining a re-election will be an uniform attachment to the interests of their several States.

The gentlemen, to support their amendment, have observed that the power of recall, under the old government, has never been exercised. There is no reasoning from this. The experience of a few years, under peculiar circumstances, can afford no probable security that it never will be carried into execution with unhappy effects. A seat in Congress has been less an object of ambition, and the arts of intrigue, consequently, have been less practised. Indeed, it has been difficult to find men who were willing to suffer the mortifications to which so feeble a government and so dependent a station exposed them.

of public disapprobation in proportion to the number of those who partake of the censure. Our political rivals will ever consider our mutable counsels as evidence of deficient wisdom, and will be little apprehensive of our arriving at any exalted station in the scale of power. Such are the internal and external disadvantages which would result from the principle contended for. Were it admitted, I am fully persuaded, sir, that prejudices would govern the public deliberations, and passions rage in the counsels of the union. If it were necessary, I could illustrate my subject by historical facts; I could travel through an extensive field of detail, and demonstrate that wherever the fatal principle of-the head suffering the control of the members, has operated, it has proved a fruitful source of commotions and disorder.

This, sir, is the first fair opportunity that has been offered of deliberately correcting the errors in government. Instability has been a prominent and very defective feature in most republican systems. It is the first to be seen and the last to be lamented by a philosophical inquirer. It has operated most banefully in our infant republics. It is necessary that we apply an immediate remedy, and eradicate the poisonous principle from our government. If

this be not done, sir, we shall feel, and posterity | to banish stability from the system. The gen will be convulsed by a painful malady. tleman observes that there is a fallacy in my reasoning, and informs us that the legislatures

On the 25th, Mr. Hamilton continued his re- of the States, not the people, are to appoint the marks upon the same subject.

MR. CHAIRMAN: In debates of this kind it is extremely easy, on either side, to say a great number of plausible things. It is to be acknowledged that there is even a certain degree of truth in the reasonings on both sides. In this situation it is the province of judgment and good sense to determine their force and application, and how far the arguments advanced on one side are balanced by those on the other. The ingenious dress in which both may appear renders it a difficult task to make this decision, and the mind is frequently unable to come to a safe and solid conclusion. On the present question, some of the principles on each side are admitted, and the conclusions drawn from them denied, while other principles, with their inferences, are rejected altogether. It is the business of the committee to seek the truth in this labyrinth of argument.

senators. Does he reflect that they are the immediate agents of the people-that they are so constituted as to feel all their prejudices and passions, and to be governed, in a great degree, by their misapprehensions? Experience must have taught him the truth of this. Look through their history; what factions have arisen from the most trifling causes-what intrigues have been practised for the most illiberal purposes! Is not the State of Rhode Island at this moment struggling under difficulties and distresses, for having been led blindly by the spirit of the multitude? What is her legislature but the picture of a mob? In this State we have a senate possessed of the proper qualities of a permanent body; Virginia, Maryland, and a few other States are in the same situation; the rest are either governed by a single democratic assembly, or have a senate constituted entirely upon democratic principles. These have been, more or less, embroiled in factions, and have generally been the image and echo of the multitude. It is difficult to reason on this point without touching on certain delicate chords. I could refer you to periods and conjunctures when the people have been governed by improper passions and led by factious and designing men. I could show that the same passions have infected their representatives. Let us beware that we do not make the State legislatures a vehicle in which the evil humors may be conveyed into the national system. To prevent this, it is necessary that the Senate should be so formed as, in some measure, to check the State governments, and preclude the communication of the false impressions which they receive from the people. It has

States can have only a partial and confined view of national affairs; that they can form no proper estimate of great objects which are not in the sphere of their interests. The observation of the gentleman, therefore, cannot take off the force of my argument.

There are two objects in forming systems of government-safety for the people and energy in the administration. When these objects are united, the certain tendency of the system will be to the public welfare. If the latter object be neglected, the people's security will be as certainly sacrificed as by disregarding the former. Good constitutions are formed upon a comparison of the liberty of the individual with the strength of government; if the tone of either be too high, the other will be weakened too much. It is the happiest possible mode of conciliating these objects, to institute one branch peculiarly endowed with sensibility, another with knowledge and firmness. Through the opposition and mutual control of these bodies, the government will reach, in its opera-been often repeated, that the legislatures of the tions, the perfect balance between liberty and power. The arguments of the gentlemen chiefly apply to the former branch-the House of Representatives. If they will calmly consider the different nature of the two branches, they will see that the reasoning which justly applies to the Representative House will go to destroy the essential qualities of the Senate. If the former is calculated perfectly upon the principles of caution, why should you impose the same principles upon the latter, which is designed for a different operation? Gentlemen, while they discover a laudable anxiety for the safety of the people, do not attend to the important distinction I have drawn. We have it constantly held up to us, that as it is our chief duty to guard against tyranny, it is our policy to form all the branches of government for this purpose. Sir, it is a truth sufficiently illustrated by experience, that when the people act by their representatives they are commonly irresistible. The gentleman admits the position that stability is essential to the government, and yet enforces principles which, if true, ought

Sir, the senators will constantly be attended with a reflection that their future existence is absolutely in the power of the States. Will not this form a powerful check? It is a reflection which applies closely to their feelings and interests, and no candid man, who thinks deliberately, will deny that it would be alone a sufficient check. The legislatures are to provide the mode of electing the President, and must have a great influence over the electors. Indeed, they convey their influence through a thousand channels into the general government. Gentlemen have endeavored to show that there will be no clashing of local and general interests; they do not seem to have sufficiently considered the subject. We have in this State a duty of six pence per pound on salt, and it operates lightly and with advantage; but such