conclude, that the confederation is too defective to deserve correction. Let us take farewell of it, with reverential respect, as an old benefactor. It is gone, whether this House says so, or not. It is gone, sir, by its own weakness.

I am afraid I have tired the patience of this House; but I trust you will pardon me, as I was urged by the importunity of the gentleman, in calling for the reasons of laying the groundwork of this plan. It is objected by the honorable gentleman over the way, (Mr. George Mason,) that a republican government is impracticable in an extensive territory, and the extent of the United States is urged as a reason for the rejection of this constitution. Let us consider the definition of a republican government, as laid down by a man who is highly esteemed. Montesquieu, so celebrated among politicians, says, "that a republican government is that, in which the body, or only a part of the people, is possessed of the supreme power; a monarchical, that in which a single person governs, by fixed and established laws; a despotic government, that in which a single person, without law and without rule, directs every thing, by his own will and caprice. This author has not distinguished a republican government from a monarchy, by the extent of its boundaries, but by the nature of its principles. He, in another place, contradistinguishes it, as a government of laws, in opposition to others, which he denominates a government of men. The empire, or government of laws, according to that phrase, is that in which the laws are made with the free will of the people; hence then, if laws be made by the assent of the people, the government may be deemed free. When laws are made with integrity, and executed with wisdom, the question is, whether a great extent of country will tend to abridge the liberty of the people. If defensive force be necessary, in proportion to the extent of country, I conceive that, in a judiciously constructed government, be the country ever so extensive, its inhabitants will be proportionably numerous, and able to defend it. Extent of country, in my conception, ought to be no bar to the adoption of a good government. No extent on earth seems to me too great, provided the laws be wisely made and executed. The principles of representation and responsibility may pervade a large, as well as a small territory: and tyranny is as easily introduced into a small, as into a large district. If it be answered, that some of the most illustrious and distinguished authors are of a contrary opinion, I reply, that

authority has no weight with me, till I am-convinced that not the dignity of names, but the force of reasoning, gains my assent.

I intended to have shown the nature of the powers which ought to have been given to the general government, and the reason of investing it with the power of taxation; but this would require more time than my strength, or the patience of the committee, would now admit of. I shall conclude with a few observations, which come from my heart. I have labored for the continuance of the Union-the rock of our salvation. I believe that, as sure as there is a God in Heaven, our safety, our political happiness and existence, depend on the union of the States; and, that without this union, the people of this and the other States will undergo the unspeakable calamities which discord, faction, turbulence, war and bloodshed, have produced in other countries. The American spirit ought to be mixed with American pride-pride to see the Union magnificently triumph. Let that glorious pride, which once defied the British thunder, reanimate you again. Let it not be recorded of Americans, that, after having performed the most gallant exploits, after having overcome the most astonishing difficulties, and after having gained the admiration of the world by their incomparable valor and policy, they lost their acquired reputation, their national consequence and happiness, by their own indiscretion. Let no future historian inform posterity, that they wanted wisdom and virtue to concur in any regular, efficient government. Should any writer, doomed to so disagreeable a task, feel the indignation of an honest historian, he would reprehend and recriminate our folly, with equal severity and justice. Catch the present moment, seize it with avidity and eagerness, for it may be lost, never to be regained. If the Union be now lost, I fear it will remain so for ever. I believe gentlemen are sincere in their opposition, and actuated by pure motives; but when I maturely weigh the advantages of the Union, and dreadful consequences of its dissolution; when I see safety on my right, and destruction on my left; when I behold respectability and happiness acquired by the one, but annihilated by the other, I cannot hesitate to decide in favor of the former. I hope my weakness, from speaking so long, will apologize for my leaving this subject in so mutilated a condition. If a further explanation be desired, I shall take the liberty to enter into it more fully another time.

In May, 1807, Aaron Burr was arraigned in | the Circuit Court of the United States, held at Richmond, Virginia, for treason, in preparing the means of a military expedition against the possessions of the King of Spain, with whom the United States were at peace. Mr. Randolph, associated with Mr. Luther Martin and other distinguished lawyers, appeared in the defence of Mr. Burr, and spoke as follows:

The little fragment of time that is left for me, may it please your Honors, I shall not abuse. The day before yesterday I informed the court that I had reserved to myself the right of fully answering the arguments of gentlemen on the other side; but I forbore to exercise it, in consideration of my respect for Mr. Martin. But I said, that if any thing should be omitted by him, I would take the liberty of addressing the court, to supply the omission. There is scarcely any thing which Mr. Martin has not noticed. He has amused and instructed us; but it is difficult to come within that condition I had prescribed to myself; and there are two or three sentiments which I have much at heart, and on which I could not justify to myself to remain silent.

I do not mean to pass through the long series of authorities to which reference has been had, because not a single case has been adduced, by the gentlemen for the prosecution, that has not been fully answered, and its intended effects repelled. I shall endeavor to connect the observations I am about to make with the general subject already submitted to you; but though this cannot be done without mentioning principles which have been sufficiently discussed, I shall avoid repetition as much as possible, and endeavor to place the subject in such a clear point of view that our object cannot be misunderstood.

We have been charged with attempting to

A full report of this extraordinary trial, was taken in short-hand by Mr. T. Carpenter, and published in 8 vols.,

Svo. 1807.

"As to 'Burr's conspiracy," says Mr. Sullivan, "that fortunate man, on leaving the vice-presidency, in 1805, bocamo a wanderer. He appeared in the western States, in the course of that year, and there attempted to carry into effect some designs, but precisely of what character is not certain. It may be that he calculated on a war with Spain, and intended to advance his own interests under the supposed approbation of the administration, as Miranda did. It may be that he intended to possess himself of Mexico; or

exclude further testimony, and thereby encroaching on the sacred rights of the jury. Courts have their rights, and juries have theirs. They are capable of being reconciled, for they are bodies of the same system. But, although the court has no right to dictate the motion of, the jury, it has a right to restrain them within their proper orbits. They are brethren in the administration of justice, not rivals in power; and if I were permitted to draw an analogy, I would say that the court is the father of the judicial family-that both are essential to administer justice according to law. This the court is bound to enforce, and this the jury are bound to obey.

Why should they complain? Because, say gentlemen, we suppress testimony. How do we suppress testimony? They have a carte blanche, and are at liberty to suppose every other evidence, except what they know does not exist; that is, the presence of Mr. Burr, and that actual force was employed. They may, if they can, prove every thing short of these things. Have not gentlemen seized these with great eagerness? They have kept their eyes on the court, but alarmed the ears of the jury. They have professed to talk in the abstract, but have described with a pencil whose strokes, dark as Erebus, and intended similitude and application, could not be mistaken. They have thrown, with rhetorical magic, into the cauldron of public opinion, already overboiling, poisonous ingredients, to the ruin of Colonel Burr. We wage an unequal war—an individual against the whole power and influence of the United States. We have to defend ourselves but with law and fact. Only permit us, if you please, to come with this dreadful disparity (for thus we have to contend), even when clothed with the mail of innocence. We ask for the benefit of the law. Why should we be upbraided for asking no more than the law has given us? That we must have. There is not a power on earth that can refuse us what the law gives. It is a privilege given for good reasons as a check to prevent the danger of perversion to oppression; of degeneracy to tyran

ny.

perhaps to plunder New Orleans; or to sever the Union with the aid of Spain, and found a western empire; perhaps he

intended, as a last resort, to effect a settlement of lands on

the Washita river. His purposes do not appear to have been disclosed, so that they can be placed beyond conjec

ture."-Familiar Letters on Public Characters, page 243.

proved, the court may interpose with respect to the law, and state its necessity to the jury. This is not a case of equivocal testimony, where credibility and mere weight are to be considered, which it would be improper for the court to decide upon. We ask your opinion of facts, concerning which there is no doubt. Why should the trial proceed, if it should be the opinion of the court that proof of his absence cannot support the charge of his being present as an actor? Surely not to add fuel to the general inflammation, which has already spread far and wide, and that only for the mere purpose of gratifying any one man or set of men; for this court sits not for the amusement of the public fancy or the gratification of public malignity.

But, say they, may not the jury decide the law and the fact against the opinion of the court? But is it proper to produce a struggle between the court and jury? Ought the jury to disregard the opinion of the court when it is confessedly correct? When the court tells the jury truly, that the substratum does not exist, a respectable jury never did and never will find a verdict of guilty.

They say that they are determined to probe this conspiracy, as it is called, to the bottom; and therefore they make these extraordinary efforts; but is there no respect that counsel ought to have for their character, to prevent them from pressing on the jury doctrines which they know to be illegal? Is there no respect due from the jury to the admonition of the court? If irrelevant testimony be to be admitted, twenty or twenty-five days, or more, may be spent in hearing what has no relation to the subject, and cannot affect us. It is in vain, therefore, to proceed. What ought we to expect from the court? Its authority. If the law is to be regarded, we have a right to call on the court for the exercise of its authority to prevent the introduction of illegal testimony.

If, indeed, as Mr. Hay and Mr. Wirt said, the consequences of this interposition of the court would be the annihilation of the rights of the jury, I would answer, that any individual on earth ought to be sacrificed rather than that so great a danger should be realized. I wish not to touch so inestimable an institution. But there exists no such danger. Why do we wish to have juries? It is that men of our own condition, and who have a fellow-feeling for us, should determine controversies and try accusations against individuals among us; so that no standing jurisdiction or permanent tribunal is to be employed to dictate the fate of any individual. It is a wise and humane regulation, that a jury should thus interpose between the public and an individual. For it is very improbable that oppression will ever take place on that side. All is safe while decisions are on the side of tenderness. No precedent can be drawn from all this to sanction injustice ›r oppression.

It is objected that juries would thus be prostrated, and that the court might, on the same principle, decide against the accused. Who thus complains? Was it ever argued that the rights of the jury and the safety of the citizen were destroyed by a favorable opinion to the accused?

Let a Jeffreys arise and succeed you on that seat; let him arrogate to himself what powers he pleases; let him encroach on privileges and tyrannize over the rights of juries, and all those who shall advocate them; yet what examples would he take? If he would permit precedent to be quoted as authority before him, would he take the exercise of mercy for his example?

When this Jeffreys shall arise he will not act on precedent, but will boldly bound over every barrier if he wish to seize his victim; but if he were to follow precedent, he would never take one on the side of mercy. He would pursue an example of rigid severity and cruelty. Would Judge Chase have been impeached, if, in the case of Callender, he had decided on the side of mercy; if he had yielded to the highwrought pretensions of Callender? Would he have been impeached for a misdirection, in issuing process, had he directed a summons to issue instead of a capias? Sir, it is a phenomenon in law and judicial proceedings, that the accused should suffer now (as the counsel for the prosecution insist), in order to provide security for persons who may be accused hereafter; that his rights must be taken from him, in order that others may not lose theirs!

Sir, I am not surprised that the people have been taught to believe that we mean to smother testimony. I have been told of it out of doors, and I have no doubt that such is the general opinion. This is the effect of the improper publicity given to whatever passes here. I have remonstrated against this malpractice, but in vain. We see that not a particle of intelligence is received, no step is taken, nothing happens here, which is not in twelve hours made public. This intelligence will be diffused, augmented, and distorted. We make no attempts of this sort. These reports remain uncontradicted, and excite prejudices against us. I wish to know, then, how it can be shown that we have such an object in view. Where is the proof of smothering testimony? We deny the truth of the accusation. We wish not to suppress testimony, but it is our duty to oppose the admission of what is not lawful evidence, since so much prejudice has been excited against the accused.

Away, then, with this idea, that we wish to suppress testimony. We only claim what the law allows; and I am afraid that if he be deprived of this right, there never will be again found, in this country, a tribunal able to fortify itself against popular clamor, or counsel sufficiently firm to support an unfortunate client against popular fury. I want no precedents. I want nothing but pre-eminence of virtue and