Perkins v. Clements et als. 141
notice of the fact that the next day after | into possession by the husband in his protest, or receipt of notice thereof, is life-time. not a mail day; or of the time it re- quires for a letter to go by mail between any two places. Such matters, if ma- terial, must be proved. Idem, 228
5. Any party to a bill of exchange, or the notary who protests it, may give notice of its dishonor; and such notice will be sufficient, if it be sent by the notary on the day after, or the next mail day after protest; or by any party thereto, on the day after, or the next mail day after such notice is received by him-excluding Sunday in both cases. Idem, 228
6. The post-mark of a letter is not of itself evidence of the time it was depos- ited in the office, but it is prima facie evidence that it was mailed on the day stated therein. Idem, 228
1. A becomes the guardian of three infants, and B and C are his securities in his official bond. A never settles his accounts, and after the infants arrive at their majority, they unite in a deed by which, for valuable consideration, they release B from "all liability on account of his suretyship" aforesaid, and "all claims and demands, of whatsoever na- ture or kind, thence arising; provided that" this release "shall not be under-
stood to operate a discharge to C of his liability" as co-security. A is insolvent. HELD:
The release to B does not discharge C, except as to such portion of the debt as (if he had been made to pay it) he might have recovered against B, but for the release.
C is therefore liable, at the suit of the wards, for one-half of the debt due from A to them.
Hewitt's adm'r v. Adams, 34 2. A case in which no refunding bond required of legatees.
Young et als. v. Vass, ex'or, 167 3. I C advances money, arising from
the sale of his wife's interest in real estate, to T P, and takes T P's bond therefor, payable to C C, his wife. HELD: The bond is a chose in action belonging to the wife, and subject to be reduced
4. In an action at law upon the bond, afterthe husband's death, by the widow, against the obligor, a plea of set-off setting forth an agreement with the hus- band, that his dealings with the firm of T P & Co., and J K B & Co., of which the obligor was a member, should be set off against the bond, is waived by the defendant's counsel, and there is a judgment for the plaintiff. HELD: Upon a proceeding in equity by the obligor in his own right and as the administrator of the husband, to enjoin the execution of the judgment, that the offsets, if va- lid, constituted a legal defence, and no sufficient excuse having been shown for failing to make the defence at law, equi- ty will not interfere. Idem, 141
5. QUERE (per Thompson and Field judges): Whether such an agreement to set off was not merely executory, and, not having been executed in favor of P, by actual application or endorsement of credits on the bond in the husband's life-time, did constitute a reduction into possession. Idem, 141
6. The fact of I C's administrator not being a party to the action at law, does not entitle him to the aid of a court of equity to enjoin the judgment.
7. QUERE (per Thompson, J.): Whe- ther, the bond having been taken in the name of the wife, the obligor is not estopped to inquire into the considera- tion, and to deny that the consideration moved from the wife? Idem, 141
8. For the measure of damages in an action on a bond to indemnify sheriff for the sale of property seized under execution. See Damages, and
Crump v. Ficklin, for Guthrie, 201 CAPIAS AD SATISFACIENDUM.
1. A ca. sa. against principal debtor must issue and be returned non est in- ventus, before a scire facias can issue against the bail in the action.
Green v. Thompson, 427
2. In scire facias against bail, return- able to rules, there must be ten days between the return of the writ and the
first day of the next succeeding term of the court. Idem, 427
A contract by attorneys with their clients that they "shall have ten per cent. on whatever might be recovered in a certain chancery suit, commenced by them in 1834, for their services in the prosecution of it; and if nothing were recovered in it, then no compensa- tion for their said services, in attending before the commissioners to take ac- counts, or in court, or in taking deposi- tions" in the same. HELD:
1. Such a contract is not champertous or of immoral tendency. Major's ex'or v. Gibson, 48
2. It is not such an one as is forbid- den by the act in 1 R. C. 1819, ch. 76, 14, 15, pp. 270-1; for it comprehends services not embraced by that act-such as taking depositions, appearing before commissioners, &c. Idem, 48
3. Without that act, or for services not enumerated in it, counsel might re- Idem, 48 cover on a quantum meruit.
4. QUERE: Could the act be taken ad- vantage of, unless specially pleaded, any more than the act of limitations, bank- ruptcy, &c.? (Per Tyler, J.) Idem, 48
CHOSE IN ACTION.
husband, that his dealings with the firms of T P & Co and J K B & Co, of which the obligee was a member, should be set off against the bond, is waived by the defendant's counsel, and there is a judgment for the plaintiff.
HELD: Upon a proceeding in equity, by the obligor in his own right, and as administrator of the husband, to enjoin offsets, if valid, constituted a legal de- the execution of the judgment, that the fence, and no sufficient excuse having been shown for failing to make the de- fence at law, equity will not interfere.
not being a party to the action at law,
4. The fact of J C's administrator
does not entitle him to the aid of a court of equity to enjoin the judgment. Idem, 141
5. QUERE: (Per Thomspon, J.) Whe- ther the bond having been taken in the name of the wife, the obligor is not es- topped to enquire into the considera- tion, and to deny that the consideration moved from the wife. See Provision, and
Sherrard et als. v. Carlisle, 12
Even if the bill or petition, or other proceedings in the Circuit Court be ir- regular, no objection can be taken to them in an appellate court, if not taken in the court below.
Sherrard et als. v. Carlisle, 12
See Provision, and
Sherrard et als. v. Carlisle, 12 COMMITTEE.
See Lunatic, and
Ashby v. Harrison's Committee, 1 Edmunds v. Venable, 121
1. A court of equity, upon the ap- plication of the grantor, will not inter- fere to set aside a conveyance made to hinder, delay, and defraud creditors, on the ground of natural weakness of mind, evinced by habits of intoxication of the grantor, if he had legal capacity
1. The proper measure of damages in an action on a bond, to indemnify a sheriff for the sale of property, seized under execution, is the actual value of the property seized and sold, with in- terest in the way of damages, on the amount of the value, from the day fixed on by the jury, as the time at which the property is to be valued, until the time of the trial.
Crump v. Ficklin for Guthrie, 201
2. The relator has a right to recover in damages the value of the property, either at the date of the seizure, or that of the sale, or at any intermediate time between the two, with interest as aforesaid. Idem, 201
3. For the mere seizure of the pro- perty, (where a sale ensues,) the dama- ges ought to be nominal only.
1. An appellate court will not reverse the decree of an inferior court for an error which did not affect the interests of the appellants.
James et als. v Gibbs et als. 277
2. A decree in favor of a committee of a lunatic against the sureties of a former committee, may be used as evi- dence, in a suit in equity, by the sure- ties seeking to be subrogated to the
rights of the lunatic, against a fraudu- lent purchaser from the former commit- tee, of a portion of the lunatic's estate, to show that they have been held re- sponsible for the misapplication of the funds by the committee, and the pro- priety of that decree cannot be ques- tioned in such proceeding.
Edmunds v. Venable et als. 121
3. It is not error in an interlocutory decree for the sale of lands, to fail to require bond and security from the plaintiff, as prescribed by law, to per- form the future orders of the court; it will be a sufficient compliance with the law, if this is done in the final decree. Brockenbrough v. J. R. & K. Co. 94
1. A court of equity, upon the appli- cation of the grantor, will not interfere to set aside a conveyance, made to hin- der, delay, and defraud creditors, on the ground of the natural weakness of mind, increased by habits of intoxica- tion, of the grantor, if he had legal capacity to contract, unless it be shown that some advantage was taken, or un- due influence exerted, to procure the conveyance.
Smith v. Elliott's adm'r, 307
2. In the application of the maxim, in pari dilicto melior est conditio defen- dentis, a court of equity will not con- sider the relative moral guilt of the their understandings, but in order to parties, depending upon the strength of entitle either party to relief, it must be shown that there was some fraud or undue influence, so that the party did not exercise a free and intelligent will in assenting to the contract.
Idem, 307 DELINQUENT STOCKHOLDERS.
1. Internal improvement companies, which have the right to sell the stock of shareholders for delinquencies in the payment of installments called for by them, are not obliged to sell at the first failure to pay an installment, but may wait until delinquencies have occurred on them all, and may sell the stock, and hold the stockholder liable for the amount of any loss that may result to the company, with interest on the in-
1. A obtains advances from B & C, his millers, to pay off judgments against him- self, upon which executions had issued, B & C taking an assignment of one of the judgments to themselves. These ad- vances were obtained on A's crop of wheat, to be thereafter delivered. B & C afterwards made further advances of money and produce to A on the same account. After the wheat was deliv- ered by A, and before any settlement of the accounts between them, B & C sued out execution on the judgment assigned to them against A.
HELD: An injunction lies to restrain the execution of the judgment until a settlement of the accounts between A and his millers can be had before a com- missioner, and upon such account being returned, the injunction should be dis- solved in whole or in part, or perpetua- ted, according to the result of such ac- count. Isler v. Willis, 43
1. In a writ of right, where the mise is joined upon the mere right, if no ac- tual seizin by the demandants is proved, the tenants may give in evidence an elder patent than that under which the demandants claim, with which the title of the tenants is in no way connected, to show a better outstanding title in a third person, which is evidence to be weighed by the jury, but not conclusive against the demandants. (Dawson v. Watkins, 2 Rob. 259-accord.)
Breathed et al. v. Smith et al. 301
2. On the trial of the mise joined on the mere right in a writ of right, the record of a proceeding of unlawful en- try and detainer between the same par- ties, in which the tenents were plain- tiffs and the demandants were defend- ants, is admissible evidence to show that the tenants were out of possession at some time within three years before the commencement of the proceeding.
3. Upon a proceeding in equity to perpetuate testimony, on the ground that the complainant has no present right to institute suit, it is irregular to take depositions after the subpoena is issued, and before the bill is filed, and without an order of court.
Smith v. Grosjean, 109 4. When a decree is admissible evi- dence.
Edmunds v. Venable et als. 121 5. The question of due diligence in serving notice of dishonor of a bill of exchange is a question of law for the court, and not a question of fact for the jury. Early v. Preston, 228
6. What the court will not take judi- cial notice of, in an action on a bill of exchange, but will require to be proved. Idem, 228
3. A person, receiving from the com- mittee of a lunatic bonds, showing on their face that they belong to the estate of the lunatic, is bound to account in equity to the estate of the lunatic for what he has received for them, although he may have paid for them their full value, and knew nothing of the state of the committee's accounts.
Edmunds v. Venable, 121
4. Persons dealing with the commit- tee of a lunatic or other fiduciaries,
knowing them to be acting as such, cannot defend themselves from the con- sequences of such dealings, by impeach- ing the regularity of the appointment of such fiduciaries. Idem, 121
5. The vendee of a bona fide pur- chaser, without notice of property ob- tained by fraud, is entitled to hold the property against the original owner, whether he had or had not notice of the Montgomery v. Rose,
6. See Trusts and Trus.ees, and Turner v. Campbell et als.
See Pretermitted child, and Wilson and wife v. Miller et als.
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