Wagner v. Sutro. Bayard v. Turrell.
WAGNER, appellant, and SUTRO, respondent.
Decree unanimously affirmed. Opinion of the Chancellor (8 C. E. Green 388) adopted as the opinion of this court.
BYARD, appellant, and TURRELL, respondent.
Decree unanimously affirmed. Opinion of the Vice-Chancellor (ante, p. 135) adopted as the opinion of this court.
MURRAY, appellant, and ELSTON, respondent.
Decree unanimously affirmed. Opinion of the Vice-Chancellor (ante, p. 310) adopted as the opinion of this court.
1. Two arbitrators, after hearing the
evidence and arguments, being un-
able to agree, chose an umpire to
act as third arbitrator, and the
three met without notifying the See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 3, 7,
parties of the appointment of the
third arbitrator, or of the time
and place of their meeting, giving
no opportunity to the parties to be,
heard-Held, that their action,'
though believed by themselves to
be lawful and proper, was mis-
conduct in the sense of the law,
and fatal to the validity of the
award. Thomas v. West Jersey
R. R. Co.,
567
4. Every reasonable presumption will
always be entertained in favor of
the validity of the award, as in
case of a judgment, and the party
seeking to impeach it will, the: e-
Proceedings on attachment for con-
tempt in violating an injunction
permitted to stand over, on the
ground that steps were being taken
to permanently abate the nuisance,
the complainants, therefore, not
invoking immediate action by the
court; but attachment to be
promptly issued unless the nni-
sance be speedily abated. King
v. Town of Union,
353
See ARBITRATOR.
CONDEMNATION OF LAND.
See MULTIFARIOUSNESS.
PRACTICE, 2, 14.
PRAYER, 1-3.
fore, have upon himself the bur- See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 12-14.
den of proof to destroy the pre-
sumption. But this presumption
is destroyed by an admitted ab-|
sence of notice, and such absence
can be cured only by new matter
affirmatively shown. The burden,
in the latter case, is shifted from
the party impeaching to the party
supporting the award.
5. Where notice of the appointment
and of the time and place of meet-
ing is given, and a party remains
inactive and silent, a waiver may
be inferred.
See RAILROAD COMPANY, 1-7.
STREET RAILROAD, 1-4.
1. Where, under a contract with a
corporation, chattels are furnished,
and the corporation gives a mort-
gage upon the chattels to secure
the debt, in pretended compliance
with the contract, and the mort-
gagees suppose it was in actual and
full compliance with it, this court 2.
will not enjoin the mortgagees who
have been put in rightful possession
of the chattels under the mortgage
from selling them, at the instance
of a mere stockholder seeking to
deprive the mortgagees of a lien
to which they are equitably enti-
tled as against him, on the ground
that the corporation, in executing
the mortgage, acted ultra vires.
Amerman v. Wiles,
2. The execution of a chattel mort-
gage by the president and secre-
tary of a corporation, who were at
the time owners of two-thirds of
its stock, and its subsequent filing
in the clerk's office of the proper
county, is a substantial compli-
ance with a statute requiring, in
order to the validity of a mort-
gage by a corporation, that the
written assent of the stockholders
owning at least two-thirds of the
capital stock of such corporation,
should be first filed in the office of
the clerk of the county where the
mortgaged premises are situated. 4.
See MATTER OF MARCY, 451.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 8, 11.
See CONDEMNATION OF LAND, 2-4.
CORPORATION, 4, 5.
VENDOR AND VENDEE, 4.
1. Under an award by commission-
ers, appointed to appraise and esti-
mate the value of lands about to be
taken for a railroad, and assess the
damages, the presumption of law
is that damages were awarded the
owner for all injuries that might
result to him. For injuries not
considered by the commissioners,
no adequate remedy can be had at
law. Carpenter v. Easton & Am-
boy R. R. Co.,
249
Where, at the time of making an
award for damages for lands taken
by a railroad company, the repre-
sentatives of the company stated to
the commissioners that they would
cross certain low lands by an iron
bridge, resting upon posts, and
would protect and keep clear a
lane-the only convenient means
of communication between differ-
ent parts of a farm-but subse-
quently the company determined
to construct a high embankment
and have commenced it, and in-
tend to fill in and cut off the lane
entirely, it clearly appearing that
the commissioners did not consider
the embankment in the estimate of
damages; equity will restrain the
company from filling up the lane,
until compensation is made to the
owner of the land.
3. The Court of Chancery has power
to determine in such case the
amount of compensation.
It was referred to the commis.
sioners, who made the original es-
timate and appraisement of dama-
ges, to estimate and report the
proper amount of compensation,
5. An agreement, executed by the
owner of the lands, to abide by the
award, and that such agreement
should be a bar to any proceedings
to set aside or call in question the
award, or the right and title of the
company to the lands, and a bar
to any objection to the validity or
regularity of the award, is no bar
to the relief; the assurances of the
company's agents, confirmed by
character of the work already com
menced at the time of the execu
tion of such agreement, being that
the bridge was to be the plan pur
sued.
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