6 the U.S. retained residual rights as the sovereign in lands granted to the Indian Tribes. In the Panama situation, we will probably find lands being conveyed to a foreign power with no residual U.S. rights. Also, you may hear the Department of State citing some isolated instances where transfers were made by treaty alone in order to support the proposition that the treaty-making powers are concurrent with that of the Congress with regard to transfer of properties. The fact that Congress chose not to exercise its power in instances involving 43 gallons of whiskey in an Indian treaty, or some very minor parcels of property in Panama, does not mean that Congress does not have the disposal power and does not denigrate the powers granted by the clear and unequivocal language contained in Section IV, Article 3, Clause 2. With regard to the specific question of disposal of Panama Canal property to Panama, prior practice demonstrates what must continue to be the rule. Property of the U.S. associated with the Panama Canal enterprise has been disposed of in the past only in accordance with Congressional authorization with the exception of some small tracts of land which were conveyed as part of 1955 boundary adjustments and in which the Congress acquiesced. Certainly, if House as well as Senate authorization was necessary heretofore to dispose of appurtenant facilities or small tracts of land in the Zone, then there 7 must be full authorization for, in effect, transferring the entire Canal Zone and most or all Panama Canal property as we may see it in a draft treaty. Allow me to cite the precedents for transfer of Canal property. In 1932, in order to build a legation building on land that had been a part of the Canal Zone, Congress authorized the Secretary of State to modify the boundary line between Panama and the Canal Zone. In 1942, a House Joint Resolution permitted the transfer to Panama, free of cost, of the sewers and waterworks systems of Colon and Panama City, as well as certain railroad lots. This Resolution was passed in the Senate despite some objection that the transfer should have been accomplished by treaty without House participation. In the debate that confirmed this important legislative requirement, the then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Connally, stated: ..under the Constitution of the United States, Finally, in 1955, in the treaty of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation with Panama, major property transfers were 8 made dependent upon the Congressional authorization given in 1957. During hearings on the consideration of the 1955 Treaty, a representative of the State Department admitted that legislation would be needed to implement the transfer of all the territory and property mentioned in the treaty. Thus, Mr. Chairman, the prior practice with respect to the Canal Zone is clear. Based on the facts of this situation, our U.S. negotiators should proceed on the assumption that the House of Representatives and the Senate will both have to approve any agreement binding on the United States. In view of past practice, if the State Department does not want full Congressional authorization of disposal, the burden is on them to show that we do not own the Canal Zone or any properties therein. I would urge that the only treaty the Senate ought to accept is one which includes Congressional authorization for disposal of U.S. Canal property as one of its provisions. Absent that provision, the draft agreement should be remanded to the negotiators. This is especially important in view of the fact that the U.S. is negotiating with a military dictatorship in Panama whose treaty agreement on property rights could be overturned tomorrow. Mr. Chairman, if the Executive is permitted to sidestep the House of Representatives on this vital constitutional issue of disposal of Canal property, it will try to sidestep the Senate on another issue, and the Judiciary on still another. 9 The very fundamental precepts of the Constitution are at stake and we have already had one instance in which the Executive Branch attempted to expand its powers, resulting in the worst scandal in our nation's history Watergate. In addition to my personal views on this subject, I appear today because the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, which I chair, must be intensely interested and rightfully insistent on its prerogatives with respect to the Panama Canal. If the U.S. is to be a primary operator of the Canal under a new treaty arrangement for the next 25 years or so, then the Committee will presumably have legislative responsibility for such items as the structure of a new Canal operating entity; the basis for vessel tolls; the lands and waters and property rights relevant to the Canal; assets of the Canal entity; options for Canal modernization or a new sea-level Canal; the neutrality and international guarantees for the Canal; and ancillary operations. It would be disastrous for the Committee and the Congress to have to deal with a treaty wholly or mostly deemed by the Executive to be self-executing. To do this would be to make a farce of democracy. For this reason, I strongly urge that the Senate Committee forcefully act to retain appropriate Congressional powers and to ensure effective participation in any projected arrangements with Panama regarding the Canal. The Constitutional language of Article IV is clear and unequivocal. 94-468 - 77-10 10 Congress has the power to deal with U.S. property - it is the intent and duty of Congress in matters of such vital importance to assert its power. In conclusion, I would like to express the gratitude of the Members of the House of Representatives for the service which this Subcommittee is rendering in holding these essential hearings. |