tain the right to vote. If twenty days residence in the township may be required under such a Constitution, a longer period may be, and thus the Constitution might be rendered meaningless or nugatory. As to the effect of a change of boundaries of a district upon the residence of the voters therein see People vs. Holihan, 29 Mich., 116.

§ 66. The object of prescribing an oath to be taken by an elector who is challenged at the polls, or before registering officers, is to test the right of such person to vote or register. It is doubtful whether a statute requiring a challenged person to take an oath, the nature of which is such as not in any degree to test his right, would be held valid. It would probably be held to be not a proper regulation of, but an unnecessary and unwarranted restriction upon the exercise of his right to vote. Thus, in Nevada it was held that a statute requiring an oath to be taken by an applicant for registration, to the effect that he has not, since arriving at the age of eighteen years voluntarily been engaged in rebellion against the government, is void, because the Nevada Constitution provides that persons who were engaged in the rebellion, and who were afterwards pardoned, may vote. (Davies vs. McKerky, 5 Nevada, 368.)

§ 67. An act purporting to authorize the Governor of a State to set aside the registration of the voters of a county, and thus deprive them of the right to vote, is unconstitutional and void. It is not doubted that the people of a State expressing their will in the form of a constitutional provision or otherwise, may prescribe the qualifications of voters, whereby the elective franchise may be bestowed upon persons not before entitled to it, and may be

taken away from persons before entitled to it, subject to restrictions upon this power, contained in the Constitution of the United States. But the right of suffrage once conferred by a Constitution, the legislature has no power to divest it. It follows that where a person, entitled under the Constitution to vote has complied with such law, in regard to registration and the like, as the legislature may prescribe by way of regulating the exercise of the right, the legislature cannot authorize the Governor, or any other official, to take the right away from him. (State vs. Staten 6 Caldw. (Tenn.) 233. Sheafe vs. Tillman 2 Bartlett 907.)

§ 68. We have elsewhere seen that the act of Congress of March 3d, 1865, denying rights of citizenship to deserters from the army, must be held to apply to such persons only as have been duly convicted of the crime of desertion. It follows that to exclude a person from voting upon this ground evidence must be produced before the proper officers holding the election, that such person has been so convicted. It is the duty of such election officers to ascertain who are citizens, not to adjudge and enforce forfeitures of citizenship. In all cases where it appears that a person possesses the requisites as to birth and naturalization, age and residence of a voter, he must be presumed to be an elector until the contrary is shown by the best evidence, which in the case of a conviction for crime, must be the record, or a duly authenticated copy thereof. (Gotchens vs. Matheson, 58 Barb. [N. Y.] 152, 40 Howard, (N. Y.) Pr. 97. See Burkett vs. McCarty, 10 Bush, (Ky.) 758.)

§ 69. Where the Constitution confers upon the electors the right to choose an officer, it is as we

have elsewhere seen, often a difficult question to determine how far the legislature may go in the way of providing the necessary regulations for the regular and orderly expression of that choice. Thus in Pennsylvania the Constitution provided that vacancies in judicial offices, happening by death, resignation or otherwise, should be filled "by appointment by the Governor, to continue until the first Monday of December succeeding the next general election." Under this provision it was doubtless intended that an election by the people to fill any such vacancy, should be held at the next general election after its happening; but the General Assembly provided by law that all such vacancies should be filled at the first general election happening "more than three calendar months after the vacancy shall occur." The question of the constitutionality of this act arose in Commonwealth vs. Maxwell (27 Pa. State, 44) and it was held to be constitutional. It was conceded by the Court in that case, as indeed it must be by all, that a law intended to take away or unnecessarily and unreasonably postpone and embarass the right of election, would be set aside, as unconstitutional. But it was held that a provision requiring three months for deliberation in the choice of a successor in case of a vacancy, fixes only a reasonable time, and is, therefore, a valid and proper regulation. This decision goes upon the sound principle that a Constitution cannot enforce itself; it lays down fundamental principles according to which the several departments it calls into existence are to govern the people; but all auxiliary rules which are necessary to give effect to these principles must, of necessity, come from the legislature.

§ 70. We have already seen that a residence within a place over which the United States has exclusive jurisdiction is not a residence within the State, County or township, for voting purposes. It has, however, been held in Ohio, that a constitutional requirement of residence, for a prescribed time, within the State, County or township, as a qualification for voters, is satisfied, if at the time of the election the voter has a residence within the proper political division, and has resided there for the prescribed length of time, although there may have been a change of jurisdiction, as where, during part of the time, the United States has had exclusive jurisdiction over the place, but has ceded it back to the State. [Renner vs. Bennett, 21 Ohio St., 451.]

§ 71. The rule that every man is presumed to have a fixed domicile somewhere, applies as well to a single as to a married man, and though the domicile. of the former may be more difficult to find and prove, yet the rules of evidence by which it is ascertained are the same as those applicable in determining the domicile of other persons. (French vs. Lighty, 9 Ind. 478.) And in the same case it was held that upon a question of domicile, evidence of the conduct or declarations of a party, afterwards, as well as before a given day, may be received to ascertain his intention, as to his place of abode on that day. This is upon the ground of course, that the question of domicile generally turns upon the question of intent, and thus can, in the nature of the case, be shown only by circumstances.

§ 72. The doctrine that the legislature cannot add to the constitutional qualifications of voters is found

ed upon the well settled rule of construction that when the Constitution specifies the circumstances under which a right may be exercised, or a penalty imposed, the specification is an implied prohibition against legislative interference, to add to the condition or to extend the penalty to other cases. (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 64. Rison vs. Fair, 24 Ark. 161.) And upon precisely the same ground it is held, that where the Constitution defines the qualifications of an officer it is not within the power of the legislature to change or superadd to them, unless the power to do so is expressly, or by necessary implication, conferred by the Constitution itself. (Thomas vs. Owens, 4 Md., 189.)

§ 73. The better opinion seems to be that idiots and lunatics are by the common political law of England and this country disqualified from voting. (Cooley's Const. Limitations, 599.) But these unfortunate persons are expressly excluded from the right to vote, by the Constitutions of Delaware, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and perhaps by other States. Paupers are excluded in New York, California, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and West Virginia. Persons under guardianship are excluded in Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. Persons excused from paying taxes at their own request are excluded in New Hampshire. Capacity to read is required in Connecticut, and capacity to read and write in Massachusetts.

§ 74. A general and absolute pardon granted by