moved from, as soon as the voter completes his removal. It is acquired in the place removed to, only after such a residence therein as the law requires, and as no man can have two residences at the same time, it follows that he cannot acquire the right to vote in the new, by residing there, until he has ceased to have a residence in the old.

§ 47. A statute providing that "when two persons shall have an equal number of votes, the returning officer shall have the casting vote, but shall not vote in any other case whatsoever" is a constitutional and valid statute. (State vs, Adams, 2 Stewart, [Ala.] 231, Brightley's Election Cases, 286.) It is well settled that a citizen by accepting an office may waive a constitutional privilege. The constitution of each State grants the right of suffrage to all electors, and no elector can be deprived of this right otherwise than as prescribed by law. But the citizen can refuse to exercise this privilege, and he may also relinquish it for a time, in order to secure to himself a greater advantage, and therefore he may waive his right to vote, in common with other citizens, to secure the honors and emoluments of an office, and the power to give the casting vote in case of a tie.

§ 48. At common law voting by proxy is unknown, and every vote, whether given by a stockholder of a corporation, or by a freeman for his representative, must be personally given. A corporation may, however, by a provision in its charter, provide for voting by proxy, though it is to say the least, very doubtfui whether a provision in the by-laws of a corporation, providing for voting by proxy, could be upheld. Upon this general subject see the following authori

ties: State vs. Tudor, 5 Day, 219. Taylor vs. Griswold, 2Green, [N. 7.] 223. Angell & Ames on Corp. Chap. 4, 57. Brown vs. Commonwealth, Brightley's Election Cases 282. Phillips vs. Wickham, 1 Paige 598.

49. In most of the States electors are privileged from arrest, except for treason, felony or breach of the peace, during their attendance upon the election, and in going to and returning from the same. This privilege does not cease when the elector deposits his ballot, but it seems that he has a right to remain at the polls or near them until they are closed, and to plead his constitutional privilege if arrested while thus engaged. In Swift vs. Chamberlain, [3 Connecticut, 537,] it was held that an elector who, after depositing his vote, retired to a public house in the neighborhood, while the election officers were counting the votes, was "attending on the business of the election," and therefore privileged from arrest on civil process. As to what amounts to a breach of the peace, within the meaning of the Constitutional provisions referred to, see Mr. Brightley's note to the case of Swift vs. Chamberlain, supra, Brightley's Election Cases, page 280.

§ 50. The vote of an idiot, or person non compos mentis, ought not to be received, and if such a person has voted, his vote may be rejected upon a contest, without a finding in lunacy. Thompson vs. Ewing, (1 Brewster, 68-9.) But the vote of a man otherwise qualified, who is neither a lunatic nor an idiot, but whose faculties are merely greatly enfeebled by old age, is not to be rejected. (Sinks vs. Reese, 19 Ohio, State R 307.) When a vote is attacked on the ground that the voter who cast it was non compos

mentis, it is necessary to establish satisfactorily, by competent evidence, the alleged want of intelligence, and the test would probably be about the same as in cases where the validity of a will is attacked on the ground that the testator was not of sound mind, when it was executed. If the voter knew enough to understand the nature of his act, if he understood what he was doing, that is probably sufficient.

§ 51. By the terms of the treaty of peace of 1848, between the United States and Mexico, it was provided that the inhabitants of the territories annexed to the United States, and detached from Mexico, might elect to remain citizens of Mexico, by making known such election within one year from the date of the treaty, but the manner of making such election was not prescribed either by the treaty or by any act of Congress. Held, that a declaration in writing, signed by persons so electing to remain Mexican citizens, and filed in one of the Courts of the territory of New Mexico, in pursuance of a proclamation from the Governor of the territory, was sufficient, and that the persons signing such declaration remained citizens of Mexico, and could, after making such declaration, become citizens of the United States, only by the ordinary process of naturalization, and that the votes of such persons for delegate in Congress were illegal, and should be relected. Oltero vs. Gallegos, [1 Bartlett, 177.]

§ 52. Persons residing within the bounds of an Indian Reservation, in the Territory of Dakota, have no right to vote at an election for delegate in Congress. But it is otherwise with persons residing within the limits of a Military Reservation. It was

so held by the House of Representatives, in the case of Burleigh and Spink vs. Armstrong, 42d Congress.

§ 53. The House of Representatives of the United States has frequently held that residents upon an Indian reservation have no right to vote. [Daily vs. Estabrook, 1 Bartlett, 299. Morton vs. Daily, do 402. Bennett vs. Chapman, do 204.] In the latter case the House sustained this doctrine against the report of the Committee. These cases, however, were all from the territory of Nebraska, and were decided upon the ground that the organic act of the territory provided that "territory occupied as an Indian reservation shall not be considered a part of Nebraska territory, but that all such territory shall be excepted out of the boundaries until, by arrangement between the United States and the Indians, the title of the latter shall be extinguished." A similar provision will be found in the organic acts of most, and probably of all the territories,

§ 54. Inasmuch as naturalization is in nearly all the States necessary to qualify an alien to vote, it is proper in this connection to state briefly the general requirements of the law upon that subject. Congress has power "to establish a uniform rule of naturalization." [Const. Art. 1, Sec. 8.] And the power of Congress under this clause of the Constitution is exclusive, so that no State can pass a naturalization law, [Chirac vs. Chirac, 2 Wheat, 269. United States vs. Vallayo, 2 Dall., 372. Thurlow vs. Mass., 5 How., 585. Smith vs. Turner, 7 ibid, 556.]

The following is a summary of the naturalization laws:

1. The first step to be taken by an alien desiring naturalization is the declaration, under oath, of his intention, bona fide, to become a citizen of the United States, and to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign power, potentate, state or sovereignty whatever, and particularly by name, the prince, potentate, state or sovereignty whereof such alien may at the time be a citizen or subject. This declaration may be made before the Supreme, Superior, District or Circuit Court of some one of the States, or of the territorial districts of the United States, or a Circuit or District Court of the United States.

2. Such declaration of intention must be made two years at least prior to the time when such alien is admitted to citizenship, and may be made before the clerk of any of the courts above mentioned.

3. After having resided in the United States five years, and in the State or Territory where he applies for admission, one year at least, such alien may apply to any Court authorized to grant naturalization, and upon satisfying such Court that he has complied with the law in these respects-that he has made his declaration more than two years previously, and that he has behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same he may be admitsame—he ted to citizenship by taking the oath of allegiance required by the statute. But the applicant can, in no case, prove his residence by his own oath alone.

4. In addition to the Federal Courts, "Every Court of record in any individual State having com