rules in all. Thus, it is a general rule that in order to gain a residence in a particular place, a man must fix his domicil there with the intention of remaining an indefinite time, and with no fixed purpose of making that place a temporary abiding place only. But there are persons whose lives are necessarily migratory, whose business is to travel from place to place. As for example, a Methodist minister, who, by the law of his church, cannot remain permanently and pursue his calling in any one place; or a school teacher who resides wherever he can get employment, and removes when his business requires it; or a laborer who lives where there is an iron furnace, or a coal mine, or a railroad in process of construction, to furnish him employment and a livelihood, and when these fail him in one place, goes to another. With reference to these and other similar classes a different rule must be applied. As to what that rule is, nothing need be added to what is said in Cessna vs. Meyers; and let it be understood that the authorities cited in this chapter upon the general question of residence, are to be read with reference to the qualifications expressed in that report.

§ 39. Residence, within the meaning of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, as applied to the qualification of an elector, means the same thing as domicil, the place where a man establishes his abode, makes the seat of his property, and exercises his civil and political rights. (Chase vs. Miller, 41 Penn. State R. 404.) Such residence must have been with intent to become a citizen of the State, and to abandon the citizenship he may have had in another State. Mere residence for the purpose of business or pleasure, unaccompanied with an intention to abandon the former citizenship, is not sufficient. To constitute

residence there must be an intention to remain, but this intention is entirely consistent with a purpose to remove at some future indefinite time. (Miller vs. Thompson, 1 Bartlett, 118 Pigott's Case, ibid, 463.)

§ 40. Domicil or residence in a legal sense is determined by the intention of the party; he cannot have two homes at the same time; when he acquires the new home he loses the old one; but to effect this change there must be both act and intention. (State vs. Frost, 4 Harrington, 558 McDaniel's Case, 3 Penn., L. J. 310.)

When a man removes with his family into a county with the intention to make that his residence, that is the county where he should vote so long as his family remains there, though he may himself pass his time and engage in business or work in another county. (People vs. Holden, 28 Cal. 124.) Residence once acquired, by birth or habitancy, is not lost by a temporary absence for pleasure or business, with an intention of returning. (State vs Judge, &c., 13 Ala., 806. Lincoln vs. Hapgood, 11 Mass., 350. Harbaugh vs. Cicott, 33 Mich., 241.)

§ 41. The fact that an elector is a soldier in the army of the United States, does not disqualify him from voting at his place of residence, but he cannot acquire a residence so as to qualify him as a voter, by being stationed at a military post whilst in the service of the United States. (People vs. Riley, 15 Cal., 48; Hunt vs. Richards, 4 Kansas, 549; Bidale vs. Wing Clark & Hall, 504. Re-election Law, 9 Phil., 497.) As to the right of a student at a college, being of age, and otherwise qualified to vote, see Cessna vs. Meyers, supra, and also see Putnam vs. Johnson, 10 Mass., 488. Farlee vs. Runk, 1 Bartlett,

87, Opinion of Judges, 5 Met. 587, Cushing's Election
Cases, 436. It will be found from an examination of
these authorities, and from a full consideration of
the subject, that the question whether or not a stu-
dent at college is a bonafide resident of the place
where the college is located, must in each case de-
pend upon the facts. He may be a resident and he
may not be. Whether he is or not depends upon
the answer which may be given to a variety of ques-
tions, such as the following: Is he of age? Is he
fully emancipated from his parents' control? Does
he regard the place where the college is situated as
his home, or has he a home elsewhere to which he
expects to go, and at which he expects to reside? In
a word, it is necessary from a survey of all the facts
to determine whether while at college he is at his
home, his residence, or temporarily absent from it.
See Dall vs. Irwin, 78 Ills., 170.

§ 42. In the absence of statute regulations the
general rule seems to be that a pauper abiding in a
public almshouse, locally situated in a different dis-
trict from that where he dwells when he becomes a
pauper, and by which he is supported, does not ac-
quire a residence in the almshouse for the purpose
of voting.
(Monroe vs. Jackson, 1 Bartlett, 98;
Covode vs. Foster, 2 Bartlett, 600; Taylor vs. Reading,
2 Bartlett, 661; Dall vs. Irwin, 78 Ills., 170.)

But see Cessna vs. Meyers, supra, from which it would seem that this is not entirely settled. .

§ 43. In several of the States the elective franchise is given by Constitutional provision to "all male inhabitants above the age of twenty-one years,' having resided in the State for a given period. An important question has arisen as to whether unnatu

4

ralized aliens, otherwise qualified, have the right to vote under a provision of this character. The controversy is as to the meaning of the term "inhabitant," when used in this connection. Does it embrace the idea of citizenship? In Spragins vs. Houghton, [3 Ill. 377,] it was held that the question of citizenship does not enter into the qualification of a voter in such a case, and the question is there discussed at great length and with much ability. And this doctrine is sustained by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Stewart vs. Foster, [2 Binn. 110.]

$44. In Howard College vs. Gore, [5 Pick 370,] the Supreme Court of Massachusetts express a different view of the meaning of the word inhabitant. The question there was as to what constitutes an inhabitant of a county, within the meaning of the statute for taking the probate of Wills and granting administration on the estates of persons deceased "being inhabitants of or residents in, the same county at the time of their decease." And the Court in construing this statute say: "The term inhabitant, as used in our laws and this statute, means something more than a person having a domicil. It imports citizenship and municipal relations, whereas a man may have a domicil in a county to which he is alien, and where he has no political relations." And see opinion of Judge Cushing's Election Cases, 120 Malden's Case ib, 377.

§ 45. Notwithstanding the conflict of authority above referred to, it seems very manifest that where the term "inhabitant" is used especially in describing the qualifications of voters, it does not mean the same thing as citizen. It must be conceded that

while the two terms may to a certain extent mean the same thing, the term citizen has a more extensive signification than the term inhabitant, and it is therefore entirely fair to presume that when the framers of a law intend to express this larger meaning, they will use the larger term.

§ 46. The Constitution of Pennsylvania requires, among other qualifications of a voter, that he shall have resided one year in the State, "and in the election district where he offers to vote, ten days immediately preceding such election."

It was held in McDaniel's case [3 Pa.Law Journal 310, Brightley's Election Cases 238,] that an election district was any part of a city or county, having fixed boundaries within which the citizens residing therein must vote, as for example a ward in the city of Philadelphia. It was also held that a person who removed from one election district to another, within the ten days immediately preceding an election, lost his right to vote in the district removed from, and did not gain a right to vote at that election in the district removed to. The right to vote in the former does not continue until the same right is acquired in the latter, but is lost as soon as the removal is complete. There is therefore always a period following a change of residence, during which the citizen has no right to vote at any place. It is often laid down as a general proposition that in case of a removal by a person from one place to another, his first residence is not lost until the second is acquired. And this is true for some purposes, but not for the purpose of determining the right of such person to vote. That right ends in the place re