tion to these provisions, except that they propose a multiplication of election officers, and some additional labor and expense. To this objection we reply that the end is so important that, in comparison with it, the trouble and expenses made necessary to secure it are not worthy of a moment's attention. If however, the cost must be considered, it may be suggested that by having fewer elections a corresponding saving would be made. Let our officials be chosen for long terms. This would save much in the way of expense, and at the same time benefit the people by relieving them from the continual excitement and agitation caused by the struggle of parties for office and power. Another great advantage would result from the adoption of small precincts. The voters would be very generally known to each other, and in no single precinct would it be possible for any considerable number of non-residents, or otherwise disqualified persons, to cast fraudulent votes without detection. Nor would it be possible for fraudulent voters to personate absent or deceased persons. In a precinct composed of only a small number of voters, generally known to each other, such frauds would be impossible.

§ 561. It may be said that some of the worst frauds are committed with the assistance or connivance of the officers of election, and that, therefore, fraud in the election or in the count would be possible, notwithstanding the reduction of the size of precincts. This is very true, and the suggestion brings us to the next essential of an efficient election law, which is such provision as will prevent the selection of purely partisan election boards. All parties in in

terest should be represented in each board of election officers, and by witnesses to be present. The officers of the election should be required to perform all their official duties in the presence of each other and in the presence of a limited number of witnesses representing the several parties to the contest. No considerable fraud can be committed by an election officer without the knowledge of all the members of the board; and, therefore, great security is to be found in a statute requiring all sides to be represented upon such boards. Add to this a provision requiring the admission to the room where the ballots are received, deposited and counted, of at least one witness on behalf of each party interested, and great frauds with the knowledge or connivance of the board will become practically impossible. The witnesses should not be clothed with authority to interfere (otherwise than any citizen might, through the proper judicial proceedings) with the action of the officers, but should be permitted to witness every step in the progress of the election and the count, and to verify the correctness of the same. Officers of the law who propose to do their duty, and nothing more nor less, cannot reasonably object to the presence of witnesses representing the parties most interested, and officers who are capable of a violation of duty should not be permitted to object. It is a safe and sound principle, and one which ought to be applied to the preparation of election laws, that men are not apt to commit crime in the presence of witnesses. Let the law be so framed that every step, from the opening of the polls to the completion of the count and the announcement of the result, shall

be taken in the presence of at least two intelligent witnesses representing opposing candidates, and the chances of successful fraud will be reduced to the minimum.

§ 562. There is another mode of cheating which demands attention, and should be guarded against by legislation, and that is by tampering with the ballots after they are cast and before they are counted. This is generally done after the polls are closed. If the law permits, the board is apt to adjourn and its members to separate, for a time, during which a strict and honest watch over the ballot-box is not always kept. The only remedy is to require the votes to be counted immediately after the closing of the polls, and to strictly forbid the separation or adjournment of the board until the count is completed and the return signed.

It is of the utmost importance that the statutes of every State should imperatively require an immediate canvass by officers and before witnesses representing both sides.

What would the people of this country say to a proposition that Congress and our State Legislatures should sit with closed doors, excluding all witnesses from their presence, or that courts and juries should try causes in secret? The suggestion would, of course, meet with a storm of dissent and denunciation from all parts of the land. With equal, if not greater reason, may the people demand the utmost publicity in the proceedings of a popular election, whereby Congresses and Legislatures are made and unmade.

§ 563. Legislation upon this subject should not be

based upon the theory that officers of election will always do right. If that were the fact, no penal election laws would be necessary. On the contrary, the law should, if possible, be so framed that an election officer shall not, if he would, defraud the electors without exposure and punishment. In this connection is further seen the importance of the first named essential of an efficient election law, namely, small voting precincts; for if the number of ballots to be counted does not exceed three hundred, the time required for the canvass will not be great, and the work can conveniently be done without an adjournment or separation of the board.

§ 564. It is scarcely necessary to say that no statute regulating elections can be complete without containing ample provision for the prevention of every species of intimidation of voters, whether by violence, the exhibition of force, threats, or other means. In a well-ordered community this crime will be rarely committed, and in every such community public opinion will demand its prompt and severe punishment. The law should be so framed as to guard with scrupulous care the perfect freedom of the ballot, and every attempt to rob even the poorest and weakest elector of his free choice should be regarded as a high crime, since the rights of all are involved in the question of the protection of the rights of each.

§ 565. Another mode of cheating at elections is that known as the tissue-ballot fraud and other kindred contrivances, by means of which one person may deposit in the box a number of ballots. For this a plain, simple and effectual remedy will be

found in the enactment of a law prohibiting altogether the employment of such ballots, and forbidding the election board to count them if cast. This can be accomplished either by fixing the size of the tickets to be used, or by requiring the voter to place his ballot in an envelope containing nothing else, and hand it thus to the officer authorized to receive it.

§ 566. From what has now been said it will be seen that every efficient election law must, among other things, provide:

1. For small voting precincts.

2. That an elector shall vote only in the precinct of his residence.

3. For complete registration, especially in cities, and only persons registered to be allowed to vote. 4. For representation of all parties on boards of election and registration.

5. For the presence with the officers of election, at all stages of the proceedings of witnesses representing the parties in interest.

6. For a canvass of the vote immediately upon the close of the polls, and without an adjournment or separation of the board.

7. For the punishment of violence and intimidation.

8. For the prohibition of the use of tissue ballots, and kindred fraudulent contrivances.

These, in addition to the ordinary directory provisions, are essential. Experience will doubtless show the necessity for other and further enactments.

§ 567. Let us now refer to some existing election laws, State and national, in order to show how far