545. In a contested election case, where it was found by the contest court that the successful candidate for sheriff did, pending the election, furnish money to a third person, "to be used in the procure"ment of drinks of spirituous liquors, for voters "generally, with the intent to facilitate his election," and did various other acts equally culpable, and with like intent; but it was not found or shown that any elector was paid or promised anything for doing any act as an elector, nor was it shown that any judge, clerk or canvasser of the election was paid or promised anything for doing any act as a judge, clerk, or canvasser of the election. Held that a judgment in such a case for the contestee was correct. (Moonlight vs. Bond, 17 Kan., 351.)

§ 546. A New York statute makes it a felony for "any person other than an inspector of elections, to knowingly and wilfully put or cause to be put, ballots into a ballot box," at certain elections. It has been held that a prisoner on trial for a violation of this act, cannot be permitted to show that he was at the time acting as inspector, instead of another who had been appointed, and who had by power of attorney appointed the prisoner to act in his place. (Hogan vs People, 2 Thompson & Cook, 535.) No doubt it would be necessary for the prisoner in such a case to show that he had, at least, color of authority and an appointment by the legal inspector would not amount to that. Whether good faith might not be shown, in such a case, to rebut the presumption of a criminal intent seems at least doubtful, but the court in the case, supra, thought not.

§ 547. In many of the states there are statutes

authorizing the legal voters of counties, cities or townships to decide by a popular vote, at special elections, certain questions concerning municipal or local affairs as, for example, whether a tax shall be levied for internal improvements; or whether stock in a railroad corporation shall be subscribed for, and the like. The question when and under what circumstances the legislature may empower a majority of the voters or a municipality to bind the minority to submit to the burden of taxation for such purposes against their will, has been much discussed, and has been made the subject of numerous judicial decisions. Without reviewing the authorities at length the result of them all may be stated to be, that the legislature may authorize a municipal corporation, by a popular vote, to incur debts, issue securities or cause a levy and collections of taxes, for any public purpose. A public purpose is one which concerns the public welfare as contra-distinguished from the welfare of individuals or corporations. It is not enough that the object is one from which an incidental advantage will result to the public or the State. The paramount and direct object must be the exercise of some public or governmental functions.

§ 548. It is held, in accordance with this rule, that municipal corporations may be authorized to incur debts or vote taxes for such sanitary measures as draining, water supply and the like, also for the construction of highways, canals and railroads. [Rogers vs. Burlington, 3 Wall., 654.] Also for the locating and building of a school or university. (Hensley Township vs. People, 84 Ill., 544.) Also for the construction of a town hall. (Greeley vs. People, 60 Ill., 19,) of markets, water works and gas works. [State vs. City of Madison, 7 Wis., 688. Hall vs. Hough

ton, 8 Mich., 458. Sala vs. New Orleans, 2 Woods 188. City of Aurora vs. West, 9 Ind., 74.]

§ 549. On the other hand it has been held that a statute authorizing the city of Boston to raise money for the purpose of loaning it to the owners of property destroyed by the great fire in that city, was unconstitutional, the object not being public. [Lowell vs. City of Boston, 111 Mass., 454.] The same has been held as to a statute authorizing towns to loan their credit to persons who may engage in manufacturing. [Allen vs. Inhabitants of Jay, 60 Me., 124. Commercial Branch vs. City of Iola, 2 Dillon, 353 People vs. Bachellor, 58 N. Y., 128, 143.]

§ 550. Where the law authorizes municipal aid to internal improvements without more, the essential characteristic is that they shall be in their nature public. [Jones on Railroad Securities, 225.]

A bridge has been held to be an internal improvement within the meaning of such a law. [Union Pacific R. R. Co. vs. Colfax Co., 4, Nebraska, 450.] And the Supreme Court of the United States held that a steam grist mill is an internal improvement under the statute of Kansas. [Township of Burlington vs. Bensley, 94 U. S., 310.] Building turnpikes, public buildings, bridges and ferries, and reclaiming swamps, are all works of internal improvement of a public character. (Ibid.)

§ 551. A ballot is not vitiated by writing on the face of it an argument in favor of the vote cast, provided it is substantially in accordance with the law. The reason for the vote is mere surplussage, and goes for naught, unless it contains language rendering doubtful the meaning of the ballot as a whole.

Thus, when the question of voting a tax to a railway company was submitted to the voters of a township, and it was prescribed that the ballots should have written on them: "For Taxation," or "Against Taxation," and certain electors cast ballots bearing the words "Against Taxation, for the benefit of railroad companies or any other monopolies to the indebtedness of the poor man"-Held that such ballots should be counted the same as if in the prescribed form. [Cattell vs. Lowry, et. al., 45 Iowa, 418.]

§ 552. In the submission to the electors of a proposition for the outlay of money, two distinct objects, each calling for a certain specified amount of funds cannot be included in one proposition. The freedom of the voter is taken away when he is required by his ballot to pass in a single proposition upon more than one distinct question. Since he is compelled to vote for or against both, and is not at liberty to approve one and disapprove the other. [McMillan vs. Boyles et al, 3 Iowa, 311. Gray et al, vs. Mount et al, 45 Iowa, 591.

§ 553. When the constitution refers a question to popular vote, to be determined by "a majority of the legal voters of the county voting at a general election," the requirement calls for a majority of those who vote on any ticket, nomination or question at that election; not merely a majority of those who vote on the particular question presented. Where a question of township organization was submitted at an election at which about 2,500 votes were cast for officers, but many did not vote at all on the township question, so that the vote on that stood 900 in favor to 600 against-Held that the requisite

majority was not obtained. (State vs. Commissioners of Lancaster, 6 Neb., 474.)

§ 554. The recent opinion of the judges of the Supreme Court of Maine (not yet reported) in answer to questions submitted by the governor, growing out of the election and return of members of the legislature of that state, is important as illustrating the doctrine that statutes regulating elections are to be construed, if possible, so as to give full effect to the will of the electors as expressed by their ballots. The following, among other propositions, were, in substance, laid down by the judges:

1. If it appears to the House of Representatives that there was an election of representatives from any district, in fact, they should admit the persons elected to their seats, though no return thereof was made to the Secretary of State. The representative is not to be deprived of his rights because election officers have neglected their duty.

2. The constitution of Maine calls for a return that is regular in essential forms, and which truly represents the facts to be described by it; but much of the constitutional requirement is directory merely. It does not aim at depriving the people of their right of suffrage, or of their right of representation for formal errors, but aims at avoiding such a result. The object of the constitutional provisions respecting elections is to furnish as many safeguards as may be against failure, either through fraud or mistake, correctly to ascertain and declare the will of the people as expressed in the choice of their officers and legislators.

3. A statute which permits the correction of an