complete until the ballot is put into the box, and the name of the voter registered by the clerks, and that a defendant cannot, therefore, be convicted of illegal voting, if the act is not thus consummated. [Blackwell vs. Thompson, 2d Stew. & Port, 348.] But in Tennessee it is held that when a voter presents himself before the judges, hands his ticket to the officer, and his name is announced and registered, the act of voting is complete, without the actual placing of the ballot in the box. [Steinwehr vs. State, 5 Sneed, 856.]

§ 478. In Iowa it has been held that where a statute provided that where any person knowing himself not to be qualified, shall vote at any election authorized by law, he shall be punished, &c., it is sufficient if the indictment follow the language of the statute, and it need not state in what the disqualification consisted. [State vs. Douglass, 7 Iowa, 413.] But this is not the uniform doctrine of the courts of this country. The weight of authority, as well as of reason, probably is, that the defendant is entitled to be advised by the indictment more definitely as to the nature of the charge against him, e. g., if he is charged with voting without being qualified, the indictment ought to state wherein he is disqualified.

§ 479. A statute of New Jersey provided for the punishment of "any person who shall vote or fraudulently offer to vote," knowing that he is not duly qualified, &c. It was held by the Supreme Court of that State, that in charging a defendant with the offense of voting illegally under this statute, it was not necessary to allege that the illegal vote was

fraudulently given, but in charging such defendant with offering to vote illegally, it must be charged that he fraudulently offered to vote, knowing that he was not duly qualified, &c. It was also held in the same case that an indictment which failed to specify the particular disability which is relied on as a disqualification of the defendant as a voter, is fatally defective. (State vs. Moore, 3 Dutch., 105.) And see also State vs. Tweed, 3 Dutch., 111. And see United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U. S., 553.

§ 480. And in Tennessee it is held that an indictment charging the defendant with having "unlawfully and knowingly voted, not being a qualified voter, is bad," though in the words of the statute. There are various disqualifications, and the indictment must show which one is wanting. (Pearce vs. State, 1 Sneed, 937.) These cases are in conflict with State vs. Douglass, supra, and the doctrine of the latter case is sustained by The United States vs. Quin, 12 Int. Rev. Rec., 151, and U. S. vs. Bullard, 13 do, 195.

The ground upon which the courts proceed in holding that it is necessary to specify the disqualification, is this: There are numerous disqualifications, such as want of age, non-residence, having once voted, having been convicted of felony, non-payment of taxes, want of registration, and the like; it is, therefore, but fair that the defendant should be advised by the indictment, which of these disqualifications he is charged with, in order that he may intelligently prepare his defense. And this reasoning seems entirely sound.

§ 481. Nor is it always sufficient to charge an offense in the words of a statute. Whether this is

sufficient or not will depend upon the question whether to do so will make the indictment as specific as, according to the well known rules of criminal pleading, it ought to be. Thus, where the statute provided that "if any inspector, judge or clerk, shall be convicted of any wilful fraud in the discharge of his duties, he shall undergo an imprisonment," &c. It was held that an indictment charging that these officers "did commit wilful fraud in the discharge of their duties," without stating the particular acts constituting the fraud, was fatally defective. (Commonwealth vs. Miller, 2 Parsons, 480. Brightley's Election Cases, 711. And see United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U. S., 542. It was further held in the same case, that the inspectors, judges and clerks, cannot be joined in one indictment as defendants, their offices being distinct and their duties distinct and separate. And in Commonwealth vs. Gray, (3 Duvall, 373.) a similar ruling will be found. In that case the indictment was against one of the judges, and charged him with knowingly and unlawfully receiving the vote of an unqualified person. This was held sufficient, without showing whether the other judges of the election were opposed to, or in favor of allowing the illegal vote to be cast. And see also Commonwealth vs. Ayer, (Cush. Elect. Cases., 674.

§ 482. And it has been held in Indiana, that an indictment which charges that the defendant voted at an election "not having the legal qualifications of a voter," is bad for not specifying what qualifications the voter lacked-for alleging, not a fact, but a conclusion of law. (Quinn vs. The State, 35 Ind., 485) Under such an indictment, if held good, the State might prove the want of any one of the many quali

ifications required to be possessed by a voter, and the defendant could not learn from the indictment, precisely what he is expected to meet. This was, therefore, held to be one of the cases in which it is not sufficient to charge the offense in the words of the statute. And see Gordon vs. State, 52 Ala., 308. Compare State vs. Welch, 21 Minn., 22, and State vs Bruce, 5 Oregon, 68.

§ 483. Mere irregularities in the manner of holding or conducting an election, constitutes no defense to an indictment for illegal voting. If there was an election held in pursuance of law, at the proper time and place, it is sufficient. (State vs. Cohoon, 12 Ired, 178.) But if the election is an illegal one, the indictment cannot be maintained. [State vs. Williams, 25 Maine, 561.]

§ 484. Inasmuch as illegal voting is a local offense, it is necessary that an indictment therefor should state with precision, where the illegal vote was cast. (State vs. Fitzpatrick, 4 Rhode Island, 269.)

§ 485. In Maine it has been held that an indictment against a person for voting twice at one balloting, for the choice of a selectman at a town meeting, cannot be sustained unless such meeting was warned and notified in the manner prescribed by the statute. [State vs. Williams, 25 Maine, 561.] But this ruling, to be sustained, must be based upon the fact, that under the statute of that State no valid town meeting for the choice of selectmen, could be held, without such warning and notice. The true rule governing indictments for illegal voting is that the election at which the illegal vote was cast was a lawful and valid election. An informality or irregularity which does not go to the validity of the election itself, cannot be pleaded as a defense to such an indictment.

§ 485a. An indictment charging the defendant with having voted more than one time at a general election, held on a given day, in a particular county, is not demurrable, because it fails to allege the names of the persons or officers for whom the defendant voted. (Wilson vs. State, 42 Ala., 299.)

§ 486. On the trial of an indictment under a statute prohibiting a person from voting at any election, who has been convicted of any infamous crime, unless he shall have been pardoned and restored to all the rights of citizenship-the fact that the defendant was a minor when convicted of the felony, and also when discharged from prison, is no defense. (Hamilton

vs. People, 57 Barb., N. Y., 625.)

§ 487. The statute of Michigan, of 1851, provided that "if any person offering to vote shall be challenged as unqualified, &c., the chairman of the board of inspectors shall declare to the person so challenged the constitutional qualifications of an elector," after which, if he insists upon his right to vote, the inspectors are required to tender him the statutory oath. Subsequently, in 1859, the legislature of the same State passed a registry law, which, among other things provided "that the vote of no person shall be received whose name is not registered." Under these two statutes it was held that the inspectors were not bound to administer the oath to an unregistered voter, though he demanded it. (Wattles vs. The People, 13 Mich. 446)

§ 488. It is no defense to a prosecution for voting a second time at an election, to show that the first vote was illegal and not entitled to be counted. (State vs. Perkins, 42 Vt., 399.)

§ 489. A person charged with a public offense is entitled, before he can be required to answer, to demand a specific averment of the facts which consti