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& Ames on Corp., 9th Ed., Secs. 499-500. Bridgeport vs. Railroad, 15 Conn., 475. Talbot vs. Dent., 9 B. Monroe, 526. State vs. The Mayor, 37 Mo., 272. St. Joseph Township vs. Rogers, 16 Wallace, 644.) And see County vs. Johnson, 5 Otto, 369, where it is held that all qualified voters who absent themselves from an election duly called, are presumed to assent to the expressed will of the majority of those voting, unless the law providing for the election otherwise declares. See also to the same effect Everett vs. Smith, 22 Minn., 53.

§ 184. Where the managers of an election are clearly shown to have committed a fraud in the conduct of the election, or the counting or returning of the votes, and where the effect of the fraud discovered does not affect or change the result, it is a grave question whether the result should not be the rejection of the return in toto. In Judkins vs. Hill [50 N. H., 140,] it appeared that there were declared as cast at one of the precincts, twenty-seven more votes for county Commissioner than were marked on the check list. The court said, "if from the fact of this discrepancy the court ought to find that it was the result of fraud in the managers of the election the court would hesitate long to count any of the votes cast at an election so tainted, on the ground that with such proof of fraudulent, and corrupt purposes, no confidence could be entertained in coming to any reliable conclusion, as to what votes were actually given." And the safe rule probably is that where an election board are found to have wilfully and deliberately committed a fraud, even though it affect a number of votes too small to change the result, it is sufficient to destroy all confidence in their official acts, and to put the party claiming anything under the election conducted by them, to the proof of his votes, by evidence, other than the return. And

see Knox Co. vs. Davis, 63 Ill., 405. Russell vs. State, 11 Kas., 308.

§ 185. It was, however, decided in the case of Judkins vs. Hill, supra, that no inference of fraud can fairly be drawn from the single fact that the votes declared, exceeded by twenty-seven, the number of persons marked on the check list as having voted. This discrepancy, the court say, might have resulted from a failure to check all the names of persons voting; or from double voting without the knowledge of the board; or from a mistake in counting, and in either case the board may have acted in good faith. The presumption is that an election is honestly conducted, and the burthen of proof to show it otherwise, is on the party assailing the return. What we mean here to assert, is only this, that where a return is clearly shown to be wilfully and corruptly false in any material part, the whole of it becomes worthless as proof. For if false and corrupt in one part, it may be in others, and all faith in its reliability is destroyed. In such a case, however, it must not be assumed that the election is necessarily void. If satisfactory proof of the actual vote can be made, and the result thus ascertained, the election may stand, although the return falls to the.ground.

§ 186. A statute providing for a special election to be called on ten days' notice, will be construed as not coming within the provisions of a previously enacted registry law, for the reason that it would be impossible to make the registry, give the statutory notice, and revise the lists within ten days. Such at least, was the ruling in Illinois in the case of People vs. Ohio Grove [51 Ill., 191] and it is probable that under the provisions of none of the registry acts in this country, could a registration be legally perfected within so short a

period. Of course, where a registry act is by its terms to be applied to all elections by the people, it must be applied to an election subsequently authorized, unless the act authorizing such subsequent election contains provisions which make it impracticable so to apply it, in which case the subsequent act must stand and be held as modifying the registration act.

§ 187. It sometimes happens that a statute is passed providing that a particular officer named shall be chosen each year "at the general election," without further provision as to the time. In most, and it is presumed in all the States, the time for holding the general election, is fixed by a constitutional provision, and there can be no room for doubt but that a statute fixing the election of an officer "at the general election," should be construed to mean on whatever day the proper authority may fix as the day for that election. And hence, if after the passage of such an act, the time for holding the general election is changed, the time for holding the election of the particular officer named would be changed with it. The purpose of selecting the day of the general election in such cases, is not to select a particular day of the month or year, but to provide for the convenience of the people, by holding one, instead of several elections. See West Virginia Cases, 43d Congress. And see Sawyer vs. Hayden (1 Nev. 75.)

§ 188. A different rule prevails, however, where a statute provides that an election shall occur on a given day of the month, every year, or in given years, even though the day is also described as the day of the general election. Thus, for example, a statute of Illinois provided that certain commissioners should be elected "at the next general election,

on the first Monday in August, 1874, and every year thereafter," and it was held that the change of the time for holding the general election did not change the time for the annual election of said commissioners. In the former case the statute should be construed as fixing the day of the general election, and not a particular day of the month, but in the latter the particular day of the month and week in each year being specified, it must be presumed that the term "general election" was used as descriptive of the election, the time of holding which was fixed “on the first Monday in August" in each year. [People vs. Sloan, 14 Ill., 476.]

§ 189. A statute of Michigan authorized the election of two commissioners, but the election was conducted in all respects as if but one was to be chosen. Two persons were opposing candidates, and each voter voted for one of the two, but in no instance did a ballot contain more than one name for the office. Evidently the electors acted under the belief that only one commissioner was to be elected. It was held that only the one receiving the highest number of votes was elected, and that as to the other, there was a failure to elect, and the office remained vacant. [People vs. Canvassers, 11 Mich. 111.]

§ 190. An election will not be held void and set aside, on the ground that the mere police regulations of the election law, under which it was held were unconstitutional. The citizens possess the prerogative of voting, and the legislature cannot take that right away by encompassing an election law with unconstitutional provisions. If the voters think proper to go forward and vote under a defec

tive law, those who were candidates ought to be the last to complain when the result has been affected by neither the unconstitutionality of the law, fraud, error nor collusion. (Andrews vs. Lancier, 13 La. An., 301.) But, of course, where, by reason of the enforcement of unconstitutional and void regulations, even of a police character, the result is affected, the rule is different, and in such a case the election cannot stand

§ 191. The right to vote for, and be represented by county and State officers, being a constitutional right, it cannot be impaired or taken away by legislation. Hence, it has been held upon constitutional ground, that if an act for the organization of a new county was so framed that the inhabitants of such new county could not participate in the election of Judges and State Senators, the same was unconstitutional and void. And the fact that a future legislature was expected to remedy this difficulty by incorporating such new county in a senatorial and judicial district, does not cure the defect in such an act. (Lenning vs. Carpenter, 20 N. Y., 447. People vs. Maynard, 15 Mich., 471. Cooley's Const. Limitations, 616.)

§ 192. The principles of public policy, which forbid and make void, all contracts tending to the corrupting of elections held under authority of law, apply equally to what are called primary or nominating elections, or conventions, although these are mere voluntary proceedings of the voters of certain political parties. It is quite as much against public policy, to permit contracts to be made for the purpose of corrupting a convention or primary election

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