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seamen and marines on board the ships under the orders of the said rear-admiral in the late successful attack on the combined squadron of the enemy; and that the captains of the several ships be desired to signify the same to their respective crews, and to thank them for their gallant behaviour." The same Resolutions were also moved in the Commons, by the chancellor of the exchequer, and agreed to nem. con.

Debate in the Commons on the Preliminaries of Peace with France.] Nov. 3. The order of the day being read, the House proceeded to take into consideration the Preliminary Articles of Peace between his Majesty and the French Republic, signed at London the 1st of October 1801. And the said Preliminary Articles being read,

Sir Edmund Hartopp rose to move an Address of Thanks to his Majesty for his gracious communication relative to the signature of the Preliminaries of peace with the French republic; and he was emboldened to hope for the unanimous concurrence of the House, from the universal applause with which the peace had been received throughout the kingdom. For his own part, he could not help contemplating the event with exultation, as having put an end to one of the most arduous wars that this country had ever been engaged in. The zeal and unanimity with which the contest (purely defensive on our part) had been commenced and pursued, were, he thought, beyond all example; and when the numerous difficulties which ministers had to encounter were taken into consideration, their conduct entitled them to the approbation of the country. It was their arduous task to protect the state from the destructive machinations of hideous Jacobinism; the doctrines of whose disciples went to the entire subversion of our constitution, our government, and our laws, while they aided the inordinate ambition of the enemy to extend their power to every quarter of the globe. To guard against these fearful consequences, was the duty of ministers; and in the attainment of this great object, it was indispensably necessary to have recourse to continental alliances. The first impression made upon the principal powers of Europe, was nearly the same as that upon which Great Britain had acted. With them, therefore, we entered into concert, in defence of the common cause; and had the same zeal and perseverance

distinguished their conduct as had characterised that of the British sovereign," no disappointment of views would, in all human probability have taken place. The revolutionary principles which had been so industriously propagated in this country. had threatened the existence of our happy constitution. By the laudable exertions, however, of his majesty's ministers, those dangers had been averted; Jacobinism itself had been laid prostrate in the dust: and this country, in common with the rest of Europe, was henceforward to enjoy the blessings of peace. We had happily preserved our constitution, in church and in state; we had extended our dominion in every quarter: and our extended territories in the East and West Indies had derived a security which left no ground of alarm for the permanency of the manifold advantages which they would produce. The islands of Ceylon and Trinidad, in point of locality and commercial benefit, would prove of incalculable advantage to this country. The moderation and sound policy, which, on the part of his majesty's ministers, had distinguished the late negotiation, effectually rescued their conduct from the imputation of rapacity or injustice, while the territory that we had acquired by the event was calculated to produce lasting benefit. The defection of our continental allies had left us as much unconnected with the continent as we were before the war; while the enemy had extended their ter ritory and revenue so far as to render any further prosecution of the contest not only inexpedient, but hopeless. Under these circumstances, Austria was naturally induced to enter into a treaty with France, and thus ceased, of course, the war upon the continent. Deserted now by that ally, upon whose exertions we had placed the greatest reliance, there remained no hope of compelling the enemy to retire within the ancient limits of their territory. Measures of peace on our part, were then wisely resorted to; and the temper and moderation which distinguished the whole of the negotiation, were deserving of the utmost praise. By this generous conduct we held out to Europe an illustrious example of honour and of good, faith, which would not fail to prove highly beneficial to our interests and our reputation. Upon these grounds he gave the measure of peace his cordial support, and should conclude with moving the following Address :

"Most Gracious Sovereign; We, your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons of the United kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, in parliament assembled, beg leave to return your Majesty our most humble thanks for having been graciously pleased to lay before us a copy of the preliminaries of peace, which have been ratified by your Majesty and the French republic. We assure your Majesty, that having taken them into our most serious consideration, we reflect, with heartfelt gratitude, on the fresh proof which has been afforded, on this occasion, of your Majesty's paternal care for the welfare and happiness of your people; and contemplate with great satisfaction the prospect of a definitive treaty of peace, founded on conditions, which, whilst they manifest your Majesty's wisdom, moderation, and good faith, will, we trust, be productive of consequences highly advantageous to the substantial interests of the British empire."

Mr. Lee (member for Dungarvon) seconded the motion. His business, in the first place, should be to consider what were the objects of the war now so happily terminated, and whether any of those objects had been obtained by the peace. If the war had been undertaken with a view to reduce France to foreign subjection, to restore royalty to that country, or to force a government upon the people, it should have received his decided opposition. He had ever considered that it was a war of aggression on the part of France, and of self-preservation on that of this country. To show that this was the case it was necessary to advert to a declaration of the French government, in February 1792, that a treaty hostile to France had been entered into by certain continental powers, to which England had been invited to become a party, but refused to accede to it. Had England consented to enter into that confederacy, the war would have been altogether unjustifiable on her part; but this, it was well known, was not the case. When, in the same year, the king of France declared his acceptance of the new constitution, the same was an nounced by him to the several monarchs of Europe, and the answer of his Britan. nic majesty proved his determination not to interfere with the internal concerns of France. But what was the conduct of France at this time towards Great Bri tain? It was at that very period that her numerous emissaries appeared in England

and Ireland. He wished to bury in oblivion the consideration of the melancholy consequences that resulted from their designs on the sister country but these circumstances were too recent and too dreadful to be hastily forgotten. The addresses from some of the British societies and manufacturing towns to the government of France breathed an obvious spirit of revolution and were cordially received by the enemy. In so doing, did not France interfere with our internal government? Had we been disposed to have entered into the war at that time, sufficient grounds had been afforded; and our forbearance bespoke the reluctaance with which the intention was entertained. When, at length, by the aggression of France, we were forced to become parties in the war, we found Austria and Prussia united against France, upon principles evidently opposite to those upon which we had entered; for their objects were certainly hostile to the existing order of things in that country, while ours was purely that of self-preservation. Notwith. standing these circumstances, it became our interest to avail ourselves of their support. Before the invasion of Holland took place, the only principle of Great Britain was that of self-preservation; but, after that event, we had to prevent the aggrandizement of France, and to protect our ally. It happened, unfortunately that notwithstanding the effectual assist ance which was afforded that country, although the enemy were completely driven back to their own frontiers, the emissaries of Jacobinism were eminently successful; and the people, instead of uniting in support of their own indepen dence, bound themselves in strict alliance with France. Thus did the machinations of the Jacobinical factions procure that which the force of arms could not effect.

Our next great object was, the destruction of the enemy's commerce, as a means of bringing them to reasonable terms. For this purpose we directed our attention to the Western world. An able general, sir Charles Grey, directed our troops; and the naval department of the expedi tion was under the orders of that brave and skilful admiral lord St. Vincent. The enemy's colonies in that quarter were, by the prompt exertions of these distinguished officers, speedily reduced; and the fruits of their successes contributed greatly to the subsequent pros perity of our naval arms. After this

[54 event, our next object was, to render the and South America, it opened a mart for war, as much as possible, of a naval our manufactures, that must prove emidescription; and never, surely, had the nently beneficial to us. This acquisition exertions of this or any other country was important also, from the consideration proved so glorious. During the American of France having added the whole of St. war, a northern confederacy existed Domingo to her territories in the West similar to that with which we had lately Indies, against which, he doubted not, to contend. We then wished to check the island of Trinidad would prove a suffithe refractory spirit of those powers; but cient balance. In the progress of the the circumstances of the moment did not war, we had amply shown, that our prinpermit us to make the attempt. What ciple was not aggrandizement, but secuwe had not then the power to effect, we rity. Finding, however, that France was have since accomplished. The ministry making extensive acquisitions, it became of that day were of opinion, that it was necessary for us to keep pace with her. inexpedient and hazardous to make the If France had acquired an extent of seaattempt, and therefore the question in coast in Flanders, England had obtained dispute remained undecided. At length, a far greater extent of additional coast in however, the so-much-wished-for decision Asia, highly advantageous in a commercial has taken place; and the claims which we as well as territorial point of view. In the have substantiated are of such a nature, progress of the war, notwithstanding our that they can be abandoned only with the successes, every opportunity had been naval superiority of the country. The embraced to effect the return of peace. unexampled success of our naval exertions In the first instance, we offered to restore had so increased our commercial advan. the whole of our conquests in favour of tages as to enable us to pay the most the interests of our allies; but this proheavy taxes, and to support throughout, posal was rejected. In the negotiation the glory of the British character. We at Lisle, we had also agreed to a retroceshad acted on such principles as had laid sion of nearly an equal extent, it being the foundation of a maritime code more then the determination of ministers to readvantageous than any that had ever tain only the island of Ceylon and the before existed, while we had extended Cape of Good Hope. He was at a loss, our territories in every quarter. From therefore, to conceive how those gentlemen the time that we lost America, we had who at that time approved of the terms turned our attention to the East Indies. proposed by lord Malmesbury, could, with In the late war, although aggrandizement any degree of consistency, dissent from the formed originally no object of it, yet such preliminary conditions now before the a principle became necessary, from the House. The noble lord (Grenville), who progress which the enemy had made in signed all the papers of instruction in the case the extension of their territory. The of the treaty of Lisie, he anticipated, from king of Mysore, instigated by France, some particular circumstances, would. had become formidable to us, and his pro- oppose the present treaty; and if so, his ceedings were such that we had found lordship would find himself called upon to ourselves under the necessity of adopting say how he could agree to the terms promeasures effectually to check his career. posed at Lisle, and disapprove of those This was the only Indian power which now under the consideration of parliawas in alliance with France; and the ment. A right hon. gentleman (Mr. success of our exertions has deprived her Windham), he understood, also meant to of it. We either possess or control the dissent from the present treaty; but, upon whole of the Mysorean territory; and what grounds, it was extremely difficult while we had obtained this great addition to conjecture; he too, having been a mem to our territory, we had tranquillized and ber of the cabinet during the negotiations rendered friendly the native princes of at Lisle, As he was bound by his oath to that quarter of the world. While we thus support the interests of his country, he extended our dominions on the continent could not have approved of the terms of of India, we had rendered them still more fered at Lisle without being convinced secure by the acquisition of the island of that they were beneficial to the state; and Ceylon, the best of all the Dutch colonies. if they were, he could not consistently In the West Indies we had also received dissent from the present treaty, which ina material acquisition in the possession of cluded the possessions of the valuable isTrinidad. Being contiguous to Northlands of Ceylon and Trinidad. If he dis[VOL. XXXVI.]

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approved of the terms in the former case, he was convinced he would have thrown up his situation rather than continue in office, when measures contrary to his sense and judgment were adopted; for, on a recent occasion (the Catholic question), he had acted precisely in that manner; and he was ready to give the right hon. gentleman every credit for the purity of his intentions and the rectitude of his conduct. The probability, therefore, was, that he did not disapprove of the terms proposed at Lisle; and if so, it remained for him to reconcile his conduct on that occasion with his opposition to the present measure. With respect to the other articles of the treaty, they were nearly the same as those of the negotiations at Lisle. It might, perhaps, be asked, whether we had obtained any of the objects of the war? His answer would be, that we undoubtedly had. We had preserved our constitution, and had laid the foundation of an increase of commercial prosperity to the country. In the prosecution of the war, it necessarily became a struggle of conquest; but the use we had made of our acquisitions was the best proof of the moderation and justice of our intentions. The only objec⚫ tion which certain gentlemen could form to the terms of the treaty was, that we consented to neutralise instead of retaining the Cape of Good Hope. But was this an object which should have induced ministers to continue the war for another campaign? and so, he would ask, what that consequence was likely to prove? was there any probability of a protraction of the war enabling us to obtain better terms? If, with the assistance of the principal powers of the continent, we were unable to drive the enemy within their ancient limits, how could we do so when we stood unassisted and alone? But, it might be asked, where was the security for the continuance of the peace? His answer should be, that it was equally the interest of France and of this country to preserve a system of pacification. Both had gained by the war, and their several objects being attained, neither could have any reason to renew the contest. Another argument might be advanced with respect to the stability of the existing government of France; but whether the present order of things continued, or the colossal power of the republic tumbled to pieces, in either case it could properly be no concern of ours; we had no right to interfere in

the internal concerns of that or any other foreign country. The present government of France was more powerful than that of any of the Bourbons; and if the people were satisfied, it was not our business to endeavour to make them otherwise, by telling them that they were ruled by a military government. Whether we formed treaties with the Buonapartés, or with the Bourbons, was of very little consequence to us; and as to the fidelity of treaties, he considered it as a mere chimera, as it only had influence as long as the contracting parties considered it to be beneficial to their interests. This was the undisguised language of a former emperor of Morocco, who said that he broke treaties the moment it was his interest so to do. Other monarchs, the emperor added, endeavoured to throw the blame on each other; but he took all the credit of the transaction to himself. The spirit of the former part of this declaration, he was persuaded, actuated almost every modern court; and hence any argument of the description alluded to would weigh but little in his estimation. The war was commenced, on our part, for the preservation of our constitution; the object had been answered, and peace was therefore advisable. The constitution of England was purchased with the blood and treasure of our ancestors. It had been handed down to us as a sacred charge, and it was our duty to preserve it inviolate for our posterity. Mr. Lee next adverted to the national debt. At the close of the American war, it was 237,000,0007., and at present it amounted to between four and five hundred millions; but at the former period, we had no means of paying off the debt. From the sinking fund the country had derived manifest advantages. By means of this fund, the gradual payment of the national debt was provided for. If the peace continued seventy-three years, the whole of the debt would be cleared off. On the whole, he considered the present peace as the best that could possibly have been obtained under all the circumstances of the case.

Lord Leveson Gower could not agree, that any gentleman who was friendly to the terms offered at Lisle, was necessarily bound to give his approbation to the present preliminaries. At the time lord Malmesbury went to Lisle, the situation of this country was very different from what it was at the present moment. A short time before that negotiation com

duced his majesty's ministers to enter into a negotiation with the French republic, and to conclude the preliminaries of the treaty submitted this night to its consideration. The very reasons urged by my noble friend against the nature and terms of the treaty, tend, in my opinion, most directly and strongly to evince their propriety, and their claim to the approbation of the country. He has compared the project as proposed by lord Grenville at Lisle with the articles of the present adjustment-a mode of proceeding unwar

in their various relations; and he has assimilated things between which no comparison can exist. I state in positive terms, that they cannot be compared; for no man will venture to deny that lord Grenville would have been glad to have taken less from the government of France than he demanded at that period of negotiation. After nine years effusion of blood

menced the Bank had stopped payment, and commercial credit had received a most violent shock, a spirit of dangerous insubordination existed in our fleet, and the funds had fallen so low as almost to give birth to despair of the future resources of the country. In Ireland, symptoms of violent disaffection had been displayed, and communications were held with the enemy for the purpose of overthrowing the government. The navy of the enemy was then nearly equal to our own; in the North sea, we were inferior in point of numbers; and in the Mediterranted by the fair consideration of both ranean, not a British frigate was to be seen. But how changed was the present aspect of affairs! Credit and commerce had risen to the utmost pitch of splendour. Ireland was for ever secured to us by the act of Union. Our fleet was in a state of the most excellent discipline, and the spirit of our sailors was elated by the remembrance of the brilliant victories in which they had shared. Such was our state now, contrasted with what it was at the time when lord Malmesbury had negotiated at Lisle. Gentlemen seemed to forget that the cessions now made were infinitely greater than those proposed in that negotiation. We were, in addition to the possessions then proposed to be ceded, now to give up Minorca, Surinam, Porto Ferrajo, and Malta. And what had we obtained in recompence for such liberality of restitution? By the terms proposed at Lisle, the integrity of Portugal was expressly stipulated for, on the footing it stood previous to the war; whereas, we now pretended to guarantee this integrity after Portugal had purchased her own peace by humiliation and sacrifices. The terms of the preliminaries were, he confessed, far below his expectations, yet he was not disposed to give a vote against the peace. Peace was an object for which he was heartily joyful, and he was not now prepared peremptorily to assert that it could have been obtained on better terms. Tha peace, such as it was, had excited universal joy throughout the country, and having himself witnessed this joy, he could not consent to vote against it, though he had thought it his duty to throw out these observations.

Lord Hawkesbury rose and said:-I rise, Sir, at this early hour of the debate, in consequence of the observations which have fallen from my noble friend, and in order to explain, I trust, to the satisfaction of the House, the motives which in

after contracting an increase of debt to the amount of nearly 200 millions-after the indefatigable and uninterrupted exertions of the country-but, at the same time, after a series of the most splendid achievements and unexampled successes, there is not a man in the kingdom who must not admit that peace was a most desirable attainment, was the object of his sincerest wishes and most ardent desires. But, notwithstanding the hope and zeal with which all must have looked and laboured for the restoration of tranquillity, I solemnly disclaim the plea which has been set up by some persons-the plea of over-ruling necessity. I am sure, that such a cause for the conclusion of the preliminary treaty will not be traced to any thing like satisfactory grounds. I am desirous that his majesty's ministers should, in the adoption of that measure, be tried by those reasons in which the war originated, by which it was carried on, and which were found to exist when the contest ceased.

In saying thus much, I am, Sir, aware that the peace, however eligible, however adequate to the relative state of this country and of France, however it can be justified upon the principles of sound policy, is not free of all evil, of all chance, of all risk or danger. But let me ask, what event has taken place in the recollection of all who hear me, or what event may yet take place, in accounting for which it has been or will be possible to remove every objection? I do not at

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