its present stupendous pitch from a system of policy begun in the earliest times of our history, and brought to perfection in the time of the commonwealth by the enactment of the navigation laws. The principle then established was, to limit the commerce of Great Britain to her navigation, wherever the two clashed to prefer navigation and to sacrifice commerce. The trade of Britain was thus all confined to British ships, and this regulation was extended even to the time of war, with one single qualification, that a larger proportion of foreign seamen was then allowed. The consequence of those salutary laws was, that, upon the principles laid down by the confederacy, we had nothing to gain, but every thing to lose. We allowed no neutral navigation, and the more it was freed from restrictions, we suffered the more. France, on the other hand, had long found her navigation too small for her commerce. In peace she merely laid a small tonnage upon foreign shipping entering her ports, and in time of war she gave it every possible encouragement. Her system then was, to throw her commerce into the hands of neutrals, that she might add to the strength of her military marine. Thus the principles we contended for were not only abstractedly right, as between all countries, but of the most essential consequence to us in our individual circumstances. Yet, he would fairly allow, that he thought we should make the exercise of these rights as little vexatious as possible. It was wise not to push them too far; by seeming to recede, we might prop them more effectually. He had read almost every thing that had been written in defence of the claims of neutrals, and he had never found any reasoning to show that they had right upon their side. However, one strong argument was drawn from convenience. It was said that our principle, though just, was liable to abuse, and that theirs, though erroneous, might, in practice, be found less inconvenient. With a view to the preservation of our privileges (a thing he considered of the first importance) that foundation on which this argument against them rests should be for ever taken away. His lordship then made some observations, and quoted a passage from the treaty itself to prove that it was by no means meant as a new code of maritime law, but merely as a settlement of certain differences that had arisen between this country and three powers

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in the north of Europe. He went on to say that, in his view of the subject, there were in dispute four essential points, and one or two collateral: 1st, the right to seize enemy's property in neutral ships; 2nd, the affair of contraband; 3rd, the right to search vessels under convoy; and 4th, the right of blockade. A fifth and sixth might be considered, the colonial and coasting trade, or they might be considered together, and called a fifth. Of these we had gained all that were essential, and our concessions in the others would be attended with no disadvantage. The maxim of " free bottoms free goods,' was abandoned in the most unqualified manner, and enemies' property was declared seizable wherever it was to be found. Those who were dissatisfied because there was no new regulation with regard to contraband of war, ought to recollect that it was not our object to annul existing treaties. Even the armed neutrality had only made an enumeration of articles which was to apply to nations between whom no treaty existed. This treaty was not general, and by no means established the point that naval stores should not be reckoned contraband between others than the contracting parties. The advantage of the concession to Russia was as trifling. In the course of a season she did not send twelve ships without the Sound. He declared himself to be of opinion that, by our treaty with Sweden, naval stores were to be considered as contraband. All contraband was expressly excluded, and the list in which naval stores did not appear, was introduced by an ac specialiter. The right of search, he considered the most important of all; without it, the recognition of all the rest was of little value. Here a concession had been made, but he was free to declare that it had been voluntarily offered by the British government, on condition that the northern powers would recede from their inadmissible pretensions. He did not, however, join in the vulgar clamour against privateering, and it would be found that privateers would suffer very little by this abridgment of their rights, as the regulation extended only to ships under convoy. The noble lord who spoke last, in what he said concerning the manner of searching, had fallen into a great error concerning the law of nations. Where there was no ground of suspicion, there was no right to search, and the captain exercised this right always at his own risk. That there

was nothing new in the language used in this convention, he proved, from the treaties with Denmark and Sweden, concluded in the middle of the seventeenth century. It was only just ground of suspicion that authorised the searching of single ships, and with regard to ships under convoy, we had always the additional security of knowing when they were assembling, of being able to form conjectures as to their cargo and destination, and of having it in our power to watch them during the whole course of their voyage. It had been asked, who was to be the judge of the suspicion? Ex vi termini, he who feels it. Gentlemen were apt to confound suspicion and proof. The same course would now be pursued with convoys as formerly with single ships. The words had existed above a century and a half, and in their interpretation would not now undergo any change. The présent definition of blockade went as far as any esteemed writer on the law of nations had ever extended it. Upon this point, opinions had been in the extreme. While some contended that the power possessing a naval superiority has a right to declare any port whatever in a state of blockade, without sending a ship of war near it; others were of opinion, that a port ceased to be in a state of blockade, as soon as the blockading fleet, from whatever cause, left it open to neutral navigation. This treaty held a due medium between these two opposite doctrines. Considering that the liability of a blockading fleet to be blown off the port by stormy weather, constitutes the only difference between a blockade by sea and a blockade by land, the treaty declared that a port should then be considered in a state of blockade when there was a fleet assigned to lockade it. Thus these foar most essential points, which had all been disputed, were all abandoned to us. We have a right to seize enemies' property wherever met with on the seas; we have a right to consider every thing as contraband of war with which our enemies could be supplied to our annoyance; we have a right to search both individual ships and fleets under convoy wherever there is the least ground of suspicion; we have a right to blockade, not only with stationary, but with cruising squadrons, and all these are publicly acknowledged by those powers whose interest it is to dispute them. The remaining points he considered as collateral, and for this reason, that the [VOL. XXXVI.]

four former depend upon the law of nations, but the colonial and coasting trade are not to be considered per se, but to be regulated by particular treaties. If a nation allowed another to trade to its colonies in time of peace, there was no doubt that its colonial trade might be carried on by that nation in time of war. Those who said we had here granted neutrals all they demanded, he referred to the treaty of armed neutrality itself. It was there said, they should be at liberty to sail from port to port on the coast of the belligerent, but in this convention the words were "sail to the ports and on the coast." Was nothing intended by this alteration? He denied that neutrals would be at liberty, under these words, to commence a voyage from the ports of a power at war. The coasting trade was illegal in time of war, only because it was prohi bited in time of peace. He was told that Holland laid no restrictions upon this trade whatever; therefore in her case we could not suffer by this article, whatever construction was put upon it. The colony trade he considered to be in no way af fected by these regulations, but to remain on its ancient footing. It never entered into the consideration of the armed neutrality; and this treaty merely settled the disputes occasioned by their unwarrantable claims. However, as some doubts had arisen, and as it was most desirable that every ground of future disagreement should be obviated, an explanation upon this point had been requested from the court of Russia. It was not in his power officially to state the result of this explanation, but this he could state, that when produced it would be found highly satisfactory. The colony trade was expressly disallowed, with this trifling qualification, that whatever relaxation had been made during this war, should be continued in future to the contracting powers.--No ship was now to be considered to belong to that power whose flag it bore, unless the captain and one-half of the mariners were natives of the country. Those who knew how neutral colours had been abused in the two last wars, would not consider this regulation of small importance to us. It was said that the treaty was ambiguous; but what treaty was ever framed which did not leave room for the cavelling of the discontented? As to the question, whether more could have been gained, he trusted that ministers would receive credit

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for having used their utmost endeavours to promote the interests of their country. But in this case, if no more was gained, it was because no more was wished. The treaty did enough; it contained an ample recognition of all that was essential to us as the first maritime power on the globe. He knew there were some who saw no policy but in violence. For his part, if he could obtain what he considered substantial justice, he not only would let off his enemy without blows, but would help him to escape. We had gained by this treaty all that justice, all that policy required; and he did not see where would have been the dignity in pressing severely upon states, because, when compared with us, they were weak and feeble. A petty concession was not to be compared with the rancour and ill-will produced in extorting it. When the northern powers were confederated against us, and threatened to enforce their pretensions with the sword, we showed true magnanimity in using force to chastise their temerity; but we showed equal magnanimity in seizing upon the first symptoms of returning moderation to bring about an amicable arrangement. We thus proved that we would neither recede from our rights, nor push the exercise of them beyond the bounds of reason and justice. On these principles the treaty was founded, and on these principles he asked for it the approbation of the House.

Dr. Laurence said, it was argued, that we had established the right of preventing free ships from making free goods; yet that right had been previously acknowledged, and it was matter of fact, that the northern powers never seriously wished to contend with us for it. They had merely set up a plea against it, with a view of converting their opposition to advantage in other points. They had contended against our right in that instance, with a view of withdrawing their pretensions, in order to induce us to make concessions of importance in other respects. As to the right of search, it had never been disputed, when the circumstances of public affairs rendered the attempts of the northern powers more likely to succeed; when our ships were doubled in number by those of the enemy, and when our fleet was driven up the Channel by a very superior force. Yet, placed as the country was, in that alarming situation, no attempt had been made to deprive us of the right of search. When he considered the article

respecting the contraband trade in time of war, it did not appear to him, that any thing of moment had been gained by the convention. Whatever might be the terms in which the act of accession on the part of Denmark and Sweden might be notified, he trusted that the policy of this country would not treat the weak powers with severity. In considering the definition given by the learned gentleman, of the state of the blockade, he could not help observing, that it was rather a dangerous experiment. It had been changed six or seven different times. At one time, to constitute a state of blockade, it was necessary that the ships should be stationary; at another, it was required that they should be sufficiently near to the port to render the approach to it dangerous. Blockades could not be justly defined; for there was no certain standard, no precise rule, no traces of them in the admiralty laws. They had been indeed assimilated to sieges by land. Whenever the declaration of a state of blockade was announced, all vessels which endeavoured to enter the harbour, became from that moment liable to be seized; yet if the blockade was not actually kept up, that circumstance would give rise to strange contradictions in the jurisdiction of the country. He should also remark, that no specific time was settled, with regard to the determination of the blockade. A case in point had fallen within his own knowledge. On the 18th of April, the squadron which kept a port in a state of blockade, sailed from its situation, and on the 19th, after twentyfour hours sail from the place, the vessel to which he alluded was taken, and treated as if the port had been in actual blockade; yet who could undertake to say, that there existed at that moment evident danger in attempting to enter the harbour? No man would venture to assert, that such a case fell within the definition given by the learned gentleman. The right of convoy was consequently a consideration of the highest importance, and should never be enforced but in cases of great necessity. The treaty was, in that respect, drawn up with as much care as could be well expected; yet there might be a discretion in government to go farther. Under every impression of the treaty, he insisted that he would not have built it upon the basis of the armed neutrality; he would not have constructed this vessel upon that keel. Instead of weakening the power and influence of t