already rendered unavoidable. It was to throw away the only remaining chance of an adjustment, the only means for the preservation of peace with safety, which their former profuse concessions had left for a moment in their hands. Subscribing, therefore, to the truth of every allegation contained in the resolutions to which he had referred, he could have no hesitation in giving a hearty assent to the resolution which asserts, that by these instances of misconduct the ministers had proved themselves unworthy of the confidence of parliament, and incapable of administering the public affairs to advantage at a crisis of such difficulty and danger. In his conscience he fully subscribed to, and adopted, the averment of this resolution also; and with all the solemnity which he felt to belong to such a declaration, he declared, that he did not think the country safe while the administration of its affairs was suffered to continue in such hands. The question being put, That the other orders of the day be now read, the House divided: YEAS and blood-could hardly resist the tempt- But NOES So it passed in the negative. Upon which Mr. Pitt and several of his friends left the House. And the previous question being put, that the said first proposed question be now put, it passed in the negative. The second resolution being put, Mr. Fox said, he should not vote for the resolution, though it was impossible for him to approve of the conduct of ministers. He hoped that what had occurred would be a warning to them how they kept the House in the dark to the last moment. He could not agree to a vote of censure, because he did not know but that the successors of the present ministry might be more objectionable to him than they were. The House divided: YEAS Mr. Fox and several of his friends left the House without dividing. The third [5 H] and fourth resolutions were then negatived. The fifth was withdrawn; and at four in the morning, the House adjourned. Debate in the Lords on the Conduct of Ministers.] June 2. Earl Fitzwilliam brought forward certain resolutions, condemning the general conduct of ministers, in having held forward to the nation a confident expectation of a permanent peace, during the time that France was pursuing a hostile system towards this country. His lordship prefaced his motion by an able speech, in which he first pointed the attention of the House to the conduct of our ministers and of France, at the time of the treaty of Amiens. During the negotiation, the first consul, in contempt of decency, pursued his constant system of aggression. It was then that he made himself president of the Italian republic; changed Piedmont into a military arrondissement; annexed Parma and Placentia to France and it was after France had thus aggrandized herself, that our ministers consented to cede the conquered colonies also. When the first consul next seized upon Switzerland, our ministers sent a person over to that country with of fers of assistance, which could evidently be productive of no advantage to the Swiss. Numerous insults and aggressions had been passed over, without any spirited remonstrance, until, at length, the report of Sebastiani forced government to retain Malta. He considered the uniform conduct of the present ministry to be such as neither to command respect at home or abroad, and that they had proved themselves utterly unworthy of the confidence of the public. He then read a series of resolutions, which were exactly similar to those proposed in the House of Commons by Mr. Patten [See p. 1535]. The first resolution being put, The Earl of Limerick vindicated the conduct of administration, in the several points which had been alluded to by the noble mover. As to their conduct with respect to Switzerland, it was not their fault, that the continental powers would not interfere to save it. In the negotiation which had ended in war, he thought they deserved approbation instead of censure; they had avoided war as long as it was possible to avoid it with honour. He concluded by dwelling, with animation, on the rooted hostility of the first consul towards this empire, and his desire to remove from the neighbourhood and eyes of the French people, the image of a free country. Earl Grosvenor defended the conduct of ministers, and moved the previous question. Lord Mulgrave thought the present time improper for such discussions, as the greatest unanimity was now required; he therefore moved the question of adjournment. The Earl of Caernarvon deprecated an adjournment, and condemned the conduct of ministers. They had found the country, at the time they had the presumption to undertake its government, in the possession of many valuable acquisitions, which had been the fruit of former victories. These they had abandoned to France. Whatever private virtues ministers might possess, he considered the want of talents to be as highly criminal in those who had the direction of state affairs, as he did the want of courage to be in an officer. Lord Ellenborough said, he could not sit still when he heard the capacity of ministers arraigned by those who were themselves most incapable, and when he saw ignorance itself pretending to decide on the knowledge possessed by others. He warmly vindicated the firmness and ability displayed by ministers in the whole of the negotiation, and during the whole course of their administration. Lord Melville supported the question of adjournment, as he thought it was better not to discuss the question, than to discuss it partially. He expressed a strong disapprobation of many parts of the conduet of ministers, but thought it would be a dangerous time to address his majesty to remove them, as this was not a season in which the country could bear to be any time without an administration; and there might be a considerable difficulty in agreeing who should be the new ministers, even were the present removed. Lord Hobart complained of the manner in which ministers had been treated. It was evident that the adjournment would be an indirect censure upon ministers. Lord Grenville, although he disapproved in a variety of instances of the conduct of ministers, said, that he had hitherto abstained from expressing his disapprobation for fear we might appear to the enemy, not so firmly united as we ought to be. Of all the various acts of misconduct of the present administration, there were none which he condemned more severely than their uniform system of withholding the necessary information from parlia ment. The Lord Chancellor vindicated the conduct of ministers. He allowed that in a business so complicated, partial errors might have been committed, deprecated the motion for adjournment, and pressed for an immediate decision. At half past four in the morning the House divided upon the motion of adjournment: Contents, 18; Not-contents, 106. The House again divided on the previous question: Contents, 14; Notcontents 96. So it passed in the negative. The second resolution was also negatived; after which, the debate on the remaining resolutions was adjourned till the 6th, June 6. Earl Fitzwilliam having, after a short speech, moved the third resolution [See p. 1536], a long debate ensued, in the course of which, the resolution was opposed by the duke of Cumberland, lord Coventry, lord Grosvenor, lord De Dunstanville, lord Hobart, the Lord Chancellor, and lard Pelham; and supported by lord Minto, the earl of Warwick, lord Carysfort, lord Grenville, and earl Spencer. On a division, the numbers were, for the resolution, 17; Against it 86. The remaining resolutions were negatived without a division. Debate on the Army Estimates.] June 6. The Secretary at War having brought forward some of the Army Estimates of the year, and stated, that but a small augmentation was intended to be made in the regular army, Mr. Windham said, that his object in rising, was not so much to comment upon the details which had been laid before the House, as to take the opportunity, which the army estimates always afforded, of making some observations upon the war and the general state of the country. The first subject upon which he should make any observations, was, the propriety of having so large a part of our force to consist of militia. He thought the scale upon which it was proposed to form the military force was wrong, because the population of the country was such, that it would not afford, at once, a large militia and a large army. In fact, the system pursued of late years, if it did not "suckle armies and dry-nurse the land," must at least, be said to suckle the militia and dry-nurse the army. If such large bounties were given to men who engaged only for a few years, and for home-service, how was it to be supposed, that for a small bounty men would be induced to enter the army, to serve for life and in every quarter of the globe? The army, in such a state of things, must not only stand still, it must go backwards, for it was not to be conceived, that, with these high bribes, desertion would not become general. In fact, desertion, it was well known, had become a sort of trade. Men got a livelihood by passing from corps to corps, and performing, what they called, the grand tour. If, at the end of the tour the man remained in the service, the only effect of all these bounties was, that you had obtained a soldier in the militia or fencibles, in exchange for a soldier in the regular army. One reason, perhaps, for this anxiety for augmenting the militia, was, that the money with which they were levied, did not come in the shape of a direct tax, and therefore, it was thought, would pass without notice. But this was a poor and criminal policy. The money, though not raised avowedly by parliament, was equally drawn from the pockets of the people. His general objection, however, to the measure was, that it would create a militia, and not an army. It was the duty of those entrusted with the government of a country, in the first place, to form in their own minds, some idea of the nature of the war which they were to carry on, and then to regulate the public force accordingly. After endeavouring to preserve peace as long as they could, and longer than they ought, ministers were forced into war, when all their means of concession and submission were exhausted, and when no option was left ; and finding themselves in that situation, they seemed to have no idea of doing any thing but what they understood to have been usual on such occasions, and what the situation itself, indeed, necessarily forced upon them. They issued press-warrants, they offered bounties, they sent out recruiting parties, they put ships in commission, they did whatever they were told was regular and proper. If they could be said to have any plan at all, it seemed to be one of strict defence; that is to say, we were to wait passively, until we could find an opportunity of sneaking into a peace, as we had just sneaked out of one. There was not an instance, in which a nation successfully carried on a system of pure defence. But it remained to be con sidered how far a force of this sort was good, even as a mere defensive force. It appeared to him that for the purposes of defence, we ought to have as large a regular force as possible, because regular forces could only be opposed by regular forces it was diamond cut diamond." But even adopting the system that ministers were acting upon, and admitting the number of men to be realized, he should contend that there would not be men enough, supposing an invasion to take place and in the mean time that such exertions were made to raise an ineffectual force, the recruiting of an army, the force certainly most effectual, would be essentially impeded. If, at last, it would be necessary to have recourse to more extensive and energetic means of raising the force of the country, it would, in his opinion, be better to begin with them. He would have a force still less regular than the militia, but one that should not stand in the way of recruiting the army. Some such measure must in the end, be resorted to; and, in his opinion, it would be better to adopt it in the first instance. The only means we had to adopt was, either to strengthen ourselves, or to weaken the enemy; or we could not exist as an independent nation. This being the case, it remained only to consider the order in which these subjects were to be taken, and what the means by which they might severally be pursued. In touching upon this point fairly, he would refer for a moment to the events of last war. In that war, it appeared to him that the plan of weakening the enemy was not only the most proper, but, by far, the shortest and most practicable. He thought it would be more easy to kill the revolutionary tiger, than to chain or to cage him. To that object, therefore, almost the whole force of this country ought to have been directed, though there was no reason, in the meanwhile, that the other object should have been lost sight of. The same objects that existed at that time, exist at present; though, certainly, the progress of time may have changed the relations of these objects, as well as the means of attaining them. That which before was practicable, might now be hopeless; and, in that case, could be no longer an object of pursuit; for he knew of no situation so deplorable, as that of remaining, with respect to France, in our present relative state, with no means of augmenting our own force, or of diminishing that of our rival. Whatever might be thought, therefore, of the project of reducing the power of France; in the only way in which it can be reduced, namely, by co-operation with parties within, it had, at least, this recommendation, that if practicable at all, it was at once the most effectual and the most easy. Whether we believed or not in the truth of the notion, it was, at least, one which we must wish to be true. As Mrs. Cole said of the Roman Catholic religion, "that it was a most comfortable persua, sion to one of her calling" so we may say, that a possible co-operation with royalists and destruction of the present revolutionary government, or, which is the same thing, restoration of the ancient monarchy, is a very comfortable persuasion to persons in our situation. If some means of this kind were not adopted, the prospect before us would be gloomy indeed, in spite even of that mediation, of which gentlemen had talked so much, but from which, for his own part, he so little hoped any good. We were to consider what the task was, of restoring the lost balance of Europe, by the addition of consequence and power to ourselves. The treaty of Amiens had, by one stroke, taken from the power and consequence of this country, in point of actual possessions, to say nothing of character, what we might be well satisfied if ten years of successful war would replace. We had, in one fatal moment, so fallen to leeward, that unless some fortunate shift of wind should come to favour us, we might be beating for years and years against a headsea without regaining our former station. If he were asked what his hopes were of doing any thing at this moment, either in France itself or on the rest of the continent (the powers of the continent could hardly be considered in existence), he should certainly say "very little;" thanks to the treaty of Amiens, which had given away the powers and the mind of the continent from us, and had made the whole coast of Europe an iron-bound coast to us, not affording an inlet or a creek into which we could run a cutter. It might be said, that the powers of the continent detested France; he believed they did: but did gentlemen never hear of that maxim of tyrants, “Oderint dum metuant?" He, however, could not entirely abandon the hope, which he had placed in the exertions which the continent would, some time or other, make "Nor in the division of a battle knew "More than a spinster." for itself, and therefore he was the more and who had the resources of a continent hostile against the scheme of policy now at his command. Against such an attack proposed because it would not only render he confessed he wished to have something such exertions infinitely less probable but more than the mere loose notions, and would make us incapable of taking advan- vapouring talk of which we heard so much tage of them should they be made. It in that House. He entertained a high was his opinion, that if England would idea of the native courage of the people make an open declaration, in the face of of this country; but he did not quite unEurope, of her views and objects, he did derstand the notion, which many seemed not mean a romantic, chivalrous declara- to rely on with confidence, of stopping tion but, one that would draw with us the armies by peasantry. An army incapable sympathy and feeling of all Europe, it of recruiting itself, may be finally worn would contribute more than any single act, down by the continued attacks even of irto terminate the calamities which now op- regular troops; but he wished to know pressed the world. Much was always said where the examples were to be found of of the great power of the French republic, armies stopped by such troops, unless, but it was by no means right to confound possibly in circumstances far different together ideas so separate as those of from the present. He believed that none strength and durability. Nothing was of the generals whose names were familiar more intelligible than that a nation or in- to us, either in earlier or more recent hisdividual might be at the period of their tory, when they had beaten the army begreatest strength, when they touched the fore them, ever asked leave of the peasanvery moment of their dissolution. The try of the country, to pursue their march power of France was, at this time, indis- in whatever direction they thought proper. putable; but how long that power would Such notions belonged only to men, who exist was a different question. That we were totally ignorant of what they were wished and hoped to see an end to it, it talking about, who had hever heard a gun was impossible for us to deny, notwith-fired in anger, standing all the dissembling and crouching language which we held at certain times, and all the boastful and vapouring which we indulged in at others. That prospect was at the bottom of all our hopes. Every thing which he saw in our plans and counsels, as well as in those who were to conduct them, was calculated to throw him into despair; but he begged that this declaration might not be understood as implying any distrust in the resources and strength of the country, supposing them to be properly applied. Much as he thought of the dangers of invasion (and few persons were inclined to treat them more seriously), they were only formidable to him from the idea of the manner in which they might possibly be met. We were in the state of a ship in a storm. The vessel was tight and well-found, and nothing was wanted but care and conduct, to enable it to brave all the fury of the elements. But if the officers were ignorant or negligent, if the crew were drunken and mutinous, if all proper precautions were not taken, and all proper exertions used, down she might go with all the means of safety in her power. We must not dissemble to ourselves the violence of the storm, with which we were threatened. We had to deal with an adversary who would not do things by halves; Men who had really pretensions to be heard upon such subjects, would talk a different language, would tell us that invasion was neither to be despised nor dreaded, or was only to be dreaded, should it happen that by a foolish and ignorant policy it had previously been despised. Upon the whole, whether he considered the interest of the country with a view to the war in general, or, to the narrower and more immediate object of defence, he must equally condemn the present system, which went to create a great and disproportionate militia force, and by the same act, as well as by the means of carrying into effect, to impoverish and keep down the army. Mr. Pitt seemed to consider the number of militia to bear too great a proportion to the whole of our force. A war that should be completely defensive, would, in his opinion, be both dishonour. able and ruinous. He wished to establish it as a principle, that whatever was necessary for the defence or the honour of the country, either in men or money, must be obtained. The Chancellor of the Exchequer agreed in this sentiment, and said, that a considerable defensive force was at present ne |