was no other chance of saving the country but by showing the first consul, that we are not afraid of meeting France single handed, and that rather than suffer the smallest particle of the national honour to be tarnished, we were ready to re-commence hostilities. He should wish how ever to know, whether the discussions alluded to in his majesty's message, were new or of a long standing?

Lord Grenville said, he perfectly agreed in opinion with the last noble lord. He rejoiced at this first instance of sound political wisdom in his majesty's present ministers: they had seen the consequences of a system concession and meanness; and he hoped they would act with due energy and perseverance in that now proposed. The reasonings of this day, were warranted by the experience of the last eighteen months, and he therefore cordially assented to the motion.

domineering arrogance of an implacable rival, is positive ruin, to which war in its worst shape was preferable. He considered that an uniform, consistent, manly tone, might prevent war, by throwing all the blame upon the transgressor; and there was no man, however great his power, that was independent of public opinion; and above all, of the opinion of the people he governed. Whoever considered the history of the man who now governed France, would not consider attempts impracticable, because they are difficult. We should prepare our minds for an attempt upon this country. If it could only produce mischief and confusion, the person at the head of France, is the man who would coolly calculate upon the total destruction of an army, to accomplish a mighty mischief. But when he said that England was not able, single handed to contend with France, where did he get his information? Was it from the noble lords near him, whom he was proud to call his friends? (lords Nelson and Hutchinson) or at what period of our history was it, that he discovered England was not able to grapple with France? Should the enemy land, they would undoubtedly push for the capital; and certainly a pitched battle would be fought, which should end in the destruction of one army or the other, before he should be permitted to reach it. He concluded by exhorting ministers, in a very forcible manner, to make a common cause with the people, in the defence of their common country.

The Earl of Moira delivered a very animated speech in support of the address. He wished, however, to be satisfied, that sufficient cause existed for this appearance of energy; this sudden change in the conduct of his majesty's ministers. He hoped it was not a mere bravado, intended to cover some farther concession. The communication which had been made, had created a very general alarm, and materially affected those who had property in the funds. He hoped ministers would be able to show at a future day, that they had not done this unnecessarily. He wished ministers would speak out, and not be afraid of offending the first consul of France: as for his part, he had no notion of talking longer with compliment towards this new Hannibal; who had sworn on the altars of his ambition, deadly and eternal hatred to the interests and prosperity of this country. If we would consult our most immediate interests, and uphold our national character; we must show that man that we are not to be intimidated, by the menace of consequences. We must, in the language of our immortal bard,

"Be stirring as the time, be fire with fire; "Threaten the threatener, and out-face the brow

"Of bragging horror!" We must boldly look our danger in the face;

and be prepared to meet it in its worst form.-No man could more sincerely wish for peace than himself; no man regretted war more as a great calamity; but constantly to submit to the

Lord Auckland said, it was a matter of serious inquiry whether this great measure had been advisedly taken. After the most deliberate investigation of every circumstance that had come to his knowledge, he was free to declare, that the present measure was likely to produce the blessings of a secure peace. He never had beheld the peace of Amiens in a sanguine point of view. He saw the whole line of coast in the hands of the French, from Italy to the Elbe, with the single exception of the rock of Gibraltar; and from the first moment of the conclusion of that treaty, he had seen no sign of the French government being disposed to tread in the paths of peace. This had been his view of the peace from the beginning; and he owned he was in dread that, with the projects of the most unbounded ambition in their hearts, the French might have succeeded in lulling Europe into a

about loyalty, and attachment, and unanimity, and such like, to make us sensible of our duties, or to animate us to perform them. The emergency itself, without any other consideration, is full enough to engage every heart and hand in the nation to join in its defence. The cause is common to every man in Britain. It is necessity as well as duty. In fact we have no choice. The part of this duty which relates to his majesty has been performed. We have promised him our cordial support; and here I think we ought to pause and consider well, how far it may be proper for this House to permit ministers to include themselves, as undoubtedly they will if they can, in that promise, and to what degree their conduct entitles them to a share in it. On this day the House returns to its deliberative capacity, one of the first objects of which should be, to weigh well what is past, in order to judge well of what is to come, the state we are in, from what causes, and by whose mismanagement. They who stand in the situation that I do, with respect to the present ministers, I think have a right, rather more than others, to try their conduct by its effects, and to see whether, on a fair view of the result of their administration, they have a just and rational claim to our future support. Out of this House I have given them all the assistance, little as it is, that such an opinion as mine could carry with it. In this House they have had my concurrence and vote in the measures they have recommended for precaution and security. The question now is, whether the confidence, so far reposed in them, ought or ought not to be continued. To them personally I have no sort of objection. For some among them I have great personal regard; to none of them the smallest sentiment of ill will. I am not their competitor; it is not possible I should be their enemy. But this is no time for compliments. Considering the state in which the country stands at this moment, and which, in the first instance, I must impute to those who have had the management of its affairs, these gentlemen appear before this House and their country, I will not say as criminals, but as men in the highest degree accountable for their conduct. This is not the language of reproach or offence. It is strictly parliamentary, and I have a right to hold it in this place. I shall now state, as shortly and distinctly as I can, the grounds of my first opinion, and why I have changed it.

When the preliminaries were signed, and long before the articles were made public, I joined sincerely in the universal exultation which prevailed through the country, with very few exceptions, on that event. I was grateful for it, because it was a deliverance from the war. The country rejoiced at the peace, because it was peace, or they thought it so. I gave the ministers full trust that, in settling the definitive treaty, they would take care that, whatever the conditions might be, the peace itself would be real and secure. When the terms were known, considerable objections were made to them, and certainly not without reason. Still, Sir, I felt no disposition to canvass or object to the terms, considering them always as an equivalent yielded for the sake of obtaining with certainty in return a most important and most desirable object.-On this point I wish to state an opinion, which I have not taken up without due consideration. It leads to the same conclusion, and unites with other motives for not censuring or even examining the terms of a treaty of peace, except for some collateral purposes, which I shall presently mention. As long as it is in fact received and acknowledged as an established principle of the constitution, the truth of which I do not now mean to assert or deny, that the right of making treaties of peace is vested solely and exclusively in the crown, there can be no right in this House or any where else to try or to pass judgment on the merits of the terms, I mean always as a compact agreed upon with a foreign party. Factum valet. You have resigned all authority, you have abandoned all jurisdiction over that question to the executive power. In these transactions, the king is representative and agent of the nation, fully authorized to treat and conclude without appeal to any other tribunal. You cannot alter an iota in the articles agreed on, and therefore, if you had the right in question, it would be in vain to make use of it. In some other senses, undoubtedly, it is the right and the duty of parliament to examine the conduct of ministers in these transactions, and to call them to account, if the case should appear to require it. If you have reason to suspect treachery, you have à right to inquire for the purpose of pu nishing. If you suppose incapacity, you have a right to inquire for the purpose of removal. On your own principles you have no other. By the definitive treaty

much reason to think that their affairs have been palpably mismanaged. There is one consideration more, which indeed deserves the attention of the House, as much as any other. With that I shall conclude, and leave it to the reflections of men of greater authority and knowledge, than I can pretend to, to weigh the consequence. The country is surrounded with difficulties, exposed to distresses, and possibly approaching to a contest for its existence. In this awful situation, whether I advert to some who are present, or to others who are absent, the melancholy and astonishing fact is, that out of the councils and government of the country, at such a moment as this, all the eminent abilities of England are excluded. In fair weather, a moderate share of skill may be sufficient. For the storm, that seems to be coming, other pilots should be provided. If the ship sinks, we must all go down with it. In so great a common danger, I cannot trust to the conduct of imprudence, proved by experiment, merely because imprudence is not criminal.

at Amiens, it did certainly appear, that great concessions and sacrifices had been made to France and her allies; but these I still considered as a price paid in one way for value received in another, and though the purchase might be dear, still the thing we bought was worth paying for even at that high rate. Well, Sir, when we had made all the concessions, when we had submitted to all the sacrifi. ces, and paid the full price of a solid and secure peace, and much more than the full price as some persons think, have we obtained it? Is that the fact? No, Sir, the contrary is self evident. It appears now that all that his majesty's ministers have gained by their treaty, has been a hollow truce, a short cessation of arms, and war to be resumed at a greater expense and under greater disadvantages than if it had not been discontinued. They have parted with the pledges that were in their hands, and they have taken no security from the enemy. What explanations they may give hereafter, or whether they ever will give any, we know not. At present, the whole transaction on the face of it exhibits no proof of wisdom or ability. Then comes the question to the mind of every thinking man, in a prudential view; and without looking to direct crimination, is it rational, is it safe to commit the conduct of the war to the same persons, who have so poorly and lamely managed the transaction of the peace? Even in a pacific negotiation, it is no inconsiderable disadvantage, if they, who negotiate for you, are personally undervalued by the opposite party. Sir, we know not to what issue the present circumstances may lead us. I am far from thinking that England is not equal to a contest with France, especially in a cause which must and will unite all men. Availing ourselves wisely of our natural defences, and of the weapons that peculiarly belong to us, I am convinced we are more than equal to the task. Still, however, our situation is serious, and not at all fit to be trusted to weak councils or feeble hands. Within these few days, we have seen enough to judge of the further effects which a declared war will immediately produce. The sudden fall of public credit, with all its consequences to the general property, the repose and happiness of the country, is no light matter. As these effects continue to operate, they grow and increase until at last they cannot be endured, especially by a people who have so

Mr. Chancellor Addington:-Sir, the hon. gentleman professes a desire that nothing which fell from him might be considered as designed to disturb the unanimity which prevailed when this subject was formerly before the House. Now, Sir, I ask, if prudential reasons existed which rendered any explanation inexpedient on a former evening, whether, acting on the same principle, his majesty's ministers ought now to give that explanation? The hon. gentleman has said, that at a crisis when we may be called upon to contend for our very existence as a nation, it is a matter of deep regret that the whole ability of the country is excluded from his majesty's government. I will readily allow for myself, and I believe I may make the same avowal for my colleagues, that we feel in their utmost extent the arduous duties which we are called upon to perform, and are sensible of the responsibility that we owe to the country. This, Sir, may be a very fair subject of observation to the hon. gentleman; but, on what principle is it that this gentleman, who tells the House distinctly, that a ministry enjoyed his confidence from which the whole ability of the country is excluded, should now bring forward against them the charge of weakness and incapacity? I leave the hon. gentleman to explain the reasons for withdrawing the confidence which he for