Gambar halaman
PDF
ePub

sources that might be employed in accelerating the extinction of the national debt, was no very unsuccessful way of carrying on war with us? It was lately said, that the greatest part of the population of Ireland was disaffected; but, without ascribing great effects to the Union, nay, unless we suppose the government outrageously bad, the people of Ireland must, in a few years, be much less disaffected than they now are. Thus, a few years of peace and moderate

country, independently of loving my countrymen, and I should not be glad to see us reduced to a state of things, in which the country alone should be preserved, and every means of happiness and comfort finally torn from its inhabitants. High establishments would form no security against the danger which has been held out to us. Wise economy is the resource from which we shall draw the means of defending ourselves against every danger. If we have 25,000 men less, we shall in return in a short time have 25,000,000l. more to apply to our defence and to enable us to repel any aggression.

establishment would enable us to throw off a considerable part of that debt which in war was called the best ally of France; while peace would equally tend to fortify-Hitherto I have argued the question us in Ireland-a point where it is evident we now are vulnerable. Is not France, then, much more likely to direct her efforts against our finances than to invasion, in which, at any time, there is so little prospect of success, and in which, for some time, there can be no prospect of success at all? The funds by the late war, fell from 97 to 47; 50 per cent! They again have risen to 67; but, supposing a new war to take place, what would be the consequence of the funds losing 50, or even 30 per cent on the price of 67? Instead, however, of such a loss, if peace is preservd, and our resources, increased by economy, applied to the extinction of the public debt, I am almost sure that the funds would again rise to 97.-I have already remarked, that the strength of France and England is different; their offensive and defensive systems are different; the credit of this country is a main spring of its greatness and of its wealth. In France there was no great deal of credit before the Revolution, but the utter destruction of it by the war, and the events of the war though it spread much misery through France, did not unnerve that country. It rather contributed to swell the armies of the republic; and to add to the conquests they made. In England, the destruction of credit, though it would not be attended with the loss of the independence of the country (for we might still possess men and arms) yet it would spread infinite misery over the land. Let us therefore ward off from our finances and from our credit every danger; because though not fatal to our existence their overthrow would be fatal to our wellbeing. I confess that I never could enter so far into the sentiment, common in ancient times, of being able to love my [VOL. XXXVI.]

upon the ground that war was an event which we might expect in no very distant period. But I do not think that we are obliged to anticipate a speedy war. Again, at the hazard of misrepresentation I must declare it to be my opinion, that it is for the interest of the French nation and of the French government, and that it is their wish to cultivate peace, and that with good management, without any par ticle of submission, peace may be preserved. Though this be my opinion, I would not risk one iota of the public safety and interest on that which must be very vague and loose speculation. I have shown, however, that in regard to your finances, you would by economical estab. lishments, fortify your credit, and enlarge your resources for any future exigency.— The question of the navy establishment has been mixed with the consideration of the army; and I think strangely. It seems to be taken as a matter of course, that you must have a large army, because you have 50,000 seamen. Now, it appears to me, that the conclusion should be directly the reverse. It operates two ways. You need employ fewer soldiers for your defence, because you have augmented your navy and the additional expense by [sea, is an argument for additional economy in the establishment of your land forces. There is a way, too, in which a large army establishment may be raised; and it is hitherto unnoticed. Is there no constitutional consideration arising from a large standing army? A standing army without consent of parliament, is illegal; with the approbation of parliament, it may still be dangerous. I do not mean to say that the officers of the army are not friends to the constitution of their country. But consider the source of influence which the [4A]

army affords; there is scarcely a gentleman in this House, who by himself, or relation, has not some one to look to in the army. I do not say, that this influence is pushed to carry a particular vote; but its effects in procuring a general support to the measures of administration is obvious. I would not, however exclude officers of the army from sitting in parliament; that would render the evil worse, because it would too much separate the characters of soldier and citizen. How is an army to be viewed, as soldiers distinct, or as citizens forming a part of the country? In the one case, they may have no sympathies with the people; in the other, they may, in the exercise of civil privileges, give a dangerous preponderance in an election, for instance, to any side they might espouse: but in fact they are to many purposes already, and wisely so, put under a control different from their fellow subjects. To these remarks, how ever, the naval establishment is not subject; and for that reason I agree with an hon. gentleman, that the naval establish ment is on that account less liable to objection, while it affords us all the security we can have against the danger, magnified as it has been.-There is another view of the subject which, though not avowed, is perhaps entertained by some. It may be thought right to have a large establishment in order to go to war immediately, or very soon; certainly, if we are to go to war in a month or two, it would be idle to reduce our establishments. I can judge of ministers only from their words and their actions. The chancellor of the exchequer, if I rightly understood, said a few nights ago, that he saw no danger to the peace of Europe at present; and the secretary at war to day spoke out distinctly and candidly. He said it was our business to be armed against any danger. He and I differ as to the extent to which we should be armed; but he says, thatwe should provoke no war, that we should commit no aggression, that we should execute the treaty of Amiens, and that we should repel any insult or aggression with firmness and dignity. This is my creed. Is it probable then, that the aggression may come from France? An hon. general gave a very ugly reason why the peace should be agreeable to the late secretary at war, because the spirit of the country was become warlike; whereas, if the war had continued, the table would have been loaded with petitions against it. This is

rather a suspicious argument, because it seems to say, that we have only got rid of the bad war which could not be continued in order to get another more acceptable. My hon. friend himself, I am sure, rejoices in the peace, and does not wish to begin the war on a new score. But in fact every thing convinces me more and more that the people are decidedly for peace. Gentlemen, however brave and warlike in their language, always conclude with saying, "nevertheless I am for peace!" They naturally wish to stand well with their constituents, and they do not fail to utter a sentiment which they know will be agreeable to them. Much has been said of the tone we ought to assume, but what is the object to which all this tends? My hon. friend with much humour, alluded to those who, with their arms a-kimboo would sit stock-still, notwithstanding all their complaints against France. Now, whether my hon. friend could sit stock-still, with his arms a-kimboo, I cannot tell; he does little more than leave the tongue at liberty, and recommends you to acquiesce in peace after a bluster at proceedings with which we are not to interfere. It has been said, indeed, that a remonstrance has been presented respecting the attack on Switzerland. I know not whether in the precise circumstances or manner of that remonstrance it was proper, though I have no reason to believe that it was not. monstrances may be presented in cases where no war is deemed expedient, even if the remonstrance be ineffectual. This happened in the case of Corsica in 1769. As to philippics, sure we must have philippics to keep up the national spirit. am very willing that they be taken into account as provision for our security, but I hope that 30,000 men will, in lieu of them, be deducted from our establishments. But if we are to have the 30,000 men into the bargain, I do not see what benefit they will produce. If danger really did appear, if invasion actually were effected, every feeling would be absorbed in those of repelling the invader, from the sovereign motive of self defence; so that all the declamation which was to nourish the spirit of the nation, would be fruitless and unnecessary.-Much had been said about men and measures: if he, who had always opposed the measures of the late administration, should say he hesitated to support the present ministers because they had always approved of the conduct of the last, he should speak a language, which,

Re

whether right or wrong, would at least be sight. Now and then, perhaps, they are intelligible. But he could not see on what lamented, but not censured and exposed. ground the gentleman near him, should At all times, as on this night, he endeaobject to a ministry who had always sup vours to lead away the feelings of his ported the measures they pretended to countrymen from their abhorrence of have admired. If the noble earl (Temple) French conduct and French principles. and his friends had any advice to give to He treats the new system as an old gothe crown, why did they not move an ad- vernment; and seeks out similar instances dress to his majesty? But they had no of perfidy and oppression in the old goadvice to give-nothing to propose-and vernment. Look at old times, says hethis was what distinguished an honourable meaning that the morals of the republic party from an interested faction. They, had not been worse than those of the mowere satisfied with the measures of minis-narchy. But those who had seen them ters, but they wanted their places. The would best judge. These things had opelate chancellor of the exchequer was cal-rated a wonderful change on his mind! led for by the noble lord and his friends; but he had gone out, it seemed, on the catholic question. If that was the cause of his going out, how could he come in now? Their opinion of the present ministers was spoken plainly enough. It was not exactly what it had been described by an honourable gentleman opposite. They did not

Damn with faint praise, assent with civil leer,
And, without sneering, teach the rest to

sneer.

Theirs was certainly no praise at all; and, as certainly, nothing like civility; but, as to sneers, they were abundant enough. With regard to the views of Buonaparté, he saw no reason why, having gained great military glory, his ambition might not now induce him to turn his attention to the improvement of the commerce of his country. There was nothing improbable, nothing unnatural in this. Years of peace would enable this country to renew the war with increased means, but would not add, in the same proportion, to the resources of France.

Mr. Windham said, he felt it his duty to make some observations on the speeches of gentlemen who had delivered themselves early in the debate; but some parts of the speech of the hon. member who spoke last first deserved animadversion. That gentleman was certainly, in one respect, true to his principle. He always had entertained the same earnest desire for a peace with the French republic. He was now the apologist of their ambition and guilt. His language ever since the commencement of their revolution had been that of an apologist, often of an eulogist. He had exhausted volumes of encomiums on "that wonderful and stupendous fabric of human wisdom:" and up to this day he continued to look on it with affection. All the French enormities he keeps out of

They had operated that surprising love of peace which he did not feel before. On former occasions, particularly in 1787, what was his language? Did he not say that the treaty would stand in the way of future wars, and that was one among other reasors for his opposing it? And what wais? Why, to interfere with the balance of power in Europe But what was that but to inter ere in the internal affairs of other countries? Now, the whole colour of his mind was changed by the revolution. Before that, his sentiments were English-he was English to the backbone. Now, the hon. gentleman wishes to make it out that we are in no danger. He finds out, that, by the diminution of her navy, France has much less power to hurt us; but the extent of the sea-coast, from the Texel to the Mediterranean, with all her other means, made a very different appearance. Reasons as good might have been advanced against her successes in other countries. We know something of her activity. What was the case with the battle of Marengo? Had general Melas not listened to the idea of the impracticability of passing the Alps, he might have stopped the consular march. When the news came over, that the Austrian general felt himself quite safe and sound, there was reason to fear for his real state. The hon. gentleman may know, that in the last war, those in military stations were generally the least afraid of a bold and daring enterprise of the enemy, who had the least means of resisting them in such cases. They were most desirous of guarding every point, who knew by their own experience what talents and boldness might accomplish. The hon. gentleman had said, that though an invasion would be productive of much mischief, it would stop short of subjugation. But the

whole question was, what, in case of invasion, would be the best means of defending the country-the troops or the money? Twenty thousand men were far better than any equivalent sum of money in our pockets for such a purpose. Should the hon. gentleman's opinion of the pacific disposition fail him, then another part of his argument comes in questionthat of the finances. But what was this but the same sort of comparative question? He had kept out of sight the other great dangers arising from the French revolution, as if that of an invasion was the only one. We ought to consider what was the French navy, now that it consisted not only of the French, but Spanish, Dutch, and other ships; and what were the French means of commerce; and how they could make their military power bear upon matters of trade. So far as to troops and money compared. Then, as to the comparison the hon. gentleman made between our establishments after former pacifications. No inference was to be drawn from an antecedent state, as no times resembled these. He had said that, starting with low establishments, we had obtained splendid successes. But, does it follow, that a higher establishment would would prevent similar success? At the commencement of the Seven Years war, we had very ill success-the consequence of that fallen state we were placed in by a low peace establishment. The hon. gentleman men. tioned Ireland. Why, had we not had there two invasions? And was not that the most formidable which even disembarked her troops, that of Bantry Bay? Fleets may get across, then, and may land them in spite of our navy. Every measure was taken in France to promote conquest and hostility. This wonderful representative government, that was to give such liberty to all the world, has lately made another compulsory military conscription. He did not hear these matters from such high authority as the hon. gentleman; but he heard from very judicious, intelligent, and correct persons, who had been in France, that the idea of liberty had long been treated by all sober people as a government not fit for them; and the only consolation they had in view was, the grand consolidation of the grand empire of the world, by humbling or destroying us under their feet. There was a speech delivered in the course of the debate by an hon. gentleman (Mr.

Sheridan), of which he must speak in terms of very high praise, excepting one part of it; which, however, was not such as to make him alter his opinion of it as a whole. He did not like to speak of persons instead of measures and principles: but it was a custom to say of him, that he wished to plunge the nation into a war. It was utterly incorrect and unfounded. When asked, what he would advise to the House and to ministers, he had distinctly marked out the line. It was, not to give up any thing which success or accident might have thrown in our hands, and that some places had been imprudently parted with already. He would not give an opinion grounded upon imperfect evidence. Therefore, that we should have done well in making war at present, he could not take upon him to say. The hon. gentleman had said that French principles were the object of war with him (Mr. W.) and his friends. Now, his objection was to French principles and French power. His sentiments were, that their principles led to power. Another paltry expedient was, attributing to him an attachment to the Bourbons. He hated French power under any family; but he thought peace safer under them, than under the consul. Their temple of liberty was transformed into the temple of Mars. All the decoration and scrolls, &c. were destroyed, and fire and destruction went forth to consume the earth. The whole question lay in this money or money's worth. He preferred the latter.

Mr. Chancellor Addington said, it had been asked, whether there was any thing in the state of the country at this time which so peculiarly distinguished it from other situations of the country, as to render the present establishment necessary? He should not act fairly, if he said that any circumstances were known to his majesty's ministers, that could justify their adopting any thing less than the establishment proposed. He had no scruple in declaring, that if the war had terminated in a manner conformable to the wishes of this House; if it had terminated by the attainment of those objects for which it was entered into; if France had been confined within her original limits, he still should have exhorted the House to have acceded to a much larger peace establishment than at any former period: he should have done so for the reasons alluded to by a noble lord; reasons which proved, that, by an increase

[1098 of our peace establishment, we should not passed that vote with less information to only have a much better chance of the guide them in the propriety of passing it, continuance of peace, but of entering upon than ever was before submitted to parlia a war, in case circumstances should ment on similar occasions. The answer render hostile measures indispensable. given then to this observation by a noble lord But the condition in which the late was, that there was nothing in the history treaty had left France, furnished still of parliament respecting the granting of the stronger arguments for the necessity of information required, that made the late a formidable force. Her acquisitions in proceedings of the House differ from those the Austrian Netherlands, her influence of former times. Till now he had no opin Holland, Spain, Italy, Switzerland, portunity of answering these contradicand, in fact, over the whole continent, tions; but he would endeavour briefly to sufficiently evinced the necessity of a restate his objections. What is our situalarger armament than would have been tion, and what lights have we to enable us requisite, had peace been made under to judge of it? If we call for those lights more favourable auspices. He should we are referred to the speeches of minisnot act fairly by the committee, if he ters, which convey no information; and did not state, that, since the conclusion even if they did, are such speeches fit parof the definitive treaty, circumstances liamentary documents to justify the House had occurred, which furnished additional in coming to a decision on matters of the arguments for increasing our establish- gravest moment? He might firmly mainment. Taking, then, into consideration tain that no one instance has occurred in the necessity of having a larger esta- the parliamentary history of the country, blishment than that which existed at in which ministers have come down, after former periods, it was a duty imposed on the signing of a definitive treaty of peace, him to recommend the force which had to call for supplies or large establishments been moved for. Something had been without having advised his majesty to said by an hon. gentleman behind him, to make some communication from the which it was impossible not to advert; re- throne, intimating the probability that the ferring to what had fallen from another peace would be lasting, or that it might be right hon. gentleman, for whom he felt precarious, or if any dangers of a fresh as much respect and regard as could rupture existed, without alluding to those actuate the breast of one human being dangers. The hon. gentleman then aptowards another, he felt himself called pealed to several speeches and messages upon to answer the insinuation he had recorded in the Journals, in corroboration thrown out. He had stated, that the of what he had advanced. The notoriety right hon. gentleman to whom he alluded of a fact did not form a proper parliamenwas still responsible for the measures of tary ground of proceeding. Parliament government. He should be ashamed if should have real, solid, substantial docusuch charge could be supposed to be ments before them to judge by. The correct. For himself, and those who want of such documents on the present acted with him, he had only to say, that occasion appeared to him to be a deparcould they be supposed capable of sub-ture from the usual practice, dangerous to jecting themselves to the influence of others, they would have been totally undeserving of those marks of favour which their sovereign had bestowed upon them. He trusted he should at all times be ready to vindicate his own personal and official honour.

The resolutions were agreed to.

Dec. 9. The resolutions being reported,

Mr. T. Grenfell said, that those who heard what he had advanced when the navy estimates were under consideration, would recollect what were the grounds which he urged on that occasion. His assertion then was, that the House had

the constitution. Should not the House know what garrisons are to be supplied by the sums now to be voted? It is true that Malta has not yet been evacuated; it is equally known that orders have been sent out to retain the Cape. These were two considerable military points, and their fate should be known before an accurate judgment could be formed of the extent of the

supply necessary. The hon. gentleman next proceeded to observe on the manner on which the army estimates were yesterday opened by the secretary at war. Nothing could be more clear, explicit, and manly than that opening; yet at the conclusion of his speech, there were some expressions that called for particular at

« SebelumnyaLanjutkan »