application of a general rule will be injurious to important public interests, an exception is only reasonable.

550. The power to regulate commerce among the States is absolute in Congress, and rates on such commerce may be regulated by Federal authority with reference to trade conditions and circumstances of localities without infringing the rights or immunities of such commerce under the Constitution.

551. The decision in this case applies only to the present situation in the territory in question, and is not intended to lay down a permanent rule for the future nor to apply elsewhere.

Proctor & Gamble . The Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton Railroad Company, The Pittsburg, Cincinnati and St. Louis Railway Company, and The Pennsylvania Railroad Company. (4 I. C. C. Rep., 443.)

Proctor & Gamble v. The Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Company, The Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company, and The New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company.

Proctor & Gamble v. Orland Smith and H. C. Yergason, Receivers of the Cincinnati, Washington and Baltimore Railroad Company, and The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company.

552. A petition or motion for rehearing can not be granted on mere allegation of error in the findings of fact, and such a petition or motion must be supported by proof showing, prima facie at least, that there was such error. The affidavits in this case fail to make such showing.

The New York Board of Trade and Transportation, The Commercial Exchange of Philadelphia, and The San Francisco Chamber of Commerce v. The Pennsylvania Railroad Company, The Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and Chicago Railway Company, The Pittsburg, Cincinnati and St. Louis Railway Company, The New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, The Michigan Central Railroad Company, The Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway Company, The Chicago and Grand Trunk Railway Company, The New York, Lake Erie and Western Railroad Company, The Chicago and Atlantic Railway Company, The New York, Pennsylvania and Ohio Railroad Company, The New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Company, The West Shore Railroad Company, The Delaware, Lackawanna and Westorn Railroad Company, The Grand Trunk Railway Company of Canada, The Wabash Railroad Company, The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, The Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, The Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, The Boston and Maine Railroad Company, The Louisville, New Orleans and Texas Railway Company, The St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Railway Company, The Southern Pacific Company, The Union Pacific Railway Company, The Northern Pacific Railroad Company, The Canadian Pacific Railway Company, The Texas and Pacific Railway Company, The Illinois Central Railroad Company, and The Lehigh Valley Railroad Company. (4 I. C. C. Rep., 447.) 553. The act to regulate commerce specifically provides for the regulation of the transportation of foreign merchandise when brought from a foreign port of shipment to a port of entry of the United States and transported from such port of entry to a place within the United States upon a through bill of lading, or when transported from a foreign port to a port of entry of a forcign country adjacent to the United States and transported from such port of entry to a place of destination within the United States upon a through bill of lading.

554. The regulation thus provided is such as regulates the rates, charges, facilities afforded, and treatment of the foreign merchandise from the port of cutry in either instance as the case may be, to the place of destination of the merchandise within the United States, but it is not a regulation that extends to the control of rates made upon such foreign merchandise in the foreign port of shipment for its carriage to the port of entry of the United States or to the port of entry in a foreign country adjacent to the United States. 555. With respect to that part of the carriage of such foreign merchandise between the ports of entry and the place of destination in the United States the rule of the statute is that it is entitled to no preference in rates, charges, facilities afforded, and treatment over domestic merchandise or other merchandisc when these are a like kind of traffic transported from such ports of entry to such places of destination, but as to that service it stands upon the same basis of equality with domestic merchandise or other freight as to rates, charges, facilities afforded, and treatment, and must be carried upon this part of its journey under the inland tariffs of the carriers established for the transportation of domestic merchandise or other freights, and under the same rules governing their carriage, as to weight, bulk, valuc, expenses of carriage, and all such other circumstances and conditions as enter into the

making of just and reasonable rates and of avoiding unlawful prejudice and unjust discriminations, such as is provided by the statute. 556. The circumstances and conditions surrounding the making of the rates upon such foreign merchandise in the foreign port of shipment have had their weight and operation in its foreign carriage to the port of entry and in the charges made and facilities afforded for that service, but after such foreign merchandise has been brought within the United States on its way to destination in the United States it encounters other circumstances and conditions that are controlling in this part of its carriage, namely, the laws of the United States made for the regulation of its rates and carriage. 557. The publication of such inland joint tariffs for the transportation of such foreign merchandise under the statute and of advances and reductions should be made at the port of entry and also at the point of destination of freight in the United States by posting the same in a public place at the depot of the carrier where the freight is received in the port of entry and where it is delivered at the place of destination in the United States. 558. The term "a like kind of traffic," as it occurs in section 2 of the act to regulate commerce, and as used in this report and opinion, does not mean traffic that is identical, but it means traffic that is of "a liko kind" with other freight in the elements of a fair and just classification for the purpose of arriving at a just and reasonable rate and a rate that will avoid unjust discrimination and unlawful preference.

559. Commodity class rates described and discussed.

560. The power of interstate carriers to make commodity class rates and special class rates to meet the circumstances and conditions of traffic along their lines recognized and defined.

Coxe Brothers & Company v. The Lehigh Valley Railroad Company. (4 I. C. C. Rep., 535.)

561. Classification of freight.—Freight classification is deemed by the railroads convenient and essential to any practical system of rate making, and is so recognized though not enjoined by the act to regulate commerce. 562. Same. When classification is used as a device to effect unjust discrimination or as a means of violating other provisions of the statute, the act requires the Commission to so revise and correct such classification and arrangement as to correct the abuse.

563. Lower rates for longer hauls.-Besides terminal expenses and other aggregate charges not dependent upon the distance freight is moved, there are other conditions which justify a lower proportionate charge for longer distances. 564. Through carriage over connecting lines.-Through transportation over connecting lines is favored by the statute, and the rate over such through lines is correctly adjusted upon the distance through, and not upon the shorter distances over, the several lines.

565. Same.-Two roads by agreement carried bituminous coal from the Snow Shoe region in Pennsylvania to Perth Amboy, N. J., a distance of about 300 miles, at a higher aggregate, but lower proportionate, rate than was charged by one road on anthracite for the distance over its line, the distanco over such line being about 150 miles. Held, That this was no undue preference in favor of the bituminous coal traffic and subjected anthracite traffic to no unreasonable disadvantage, except as the anthracite charges might be excessive.

566. Practicable regulation.-A railroad company carrying coal as interstate traffic is the owner of the capital stock of a coal company, which under its charter holds lands, mines, buys and sells coal, and ships over the lines of said railroad company. Held, Where such conditions result in violations of the act to regulate commerce the only regulation practicable is the enforcement of the provision of the act requiring rates to be reasonable. 567. Group rates.-It is often impracticable to establish different rates on the same commodity from practically the same locality to the same market, and the owners of mines in the Lehigh anthracite region are subjected to no unreasonable disadvantage from the present grouping of mines based on more than actual distance when shipping cast and less than actual distance when shipping west.

568. Unreasonable rates.-A railroad company had in force for a period of more than two years next before the act to regulate commerce took effect a scale of charges on anthracite coal considerably lower than its present rates, which are higher on coal than on iron ore, pig iron, and other low-gradé freight, and also higher than the charges of said road on general freight, the expense of carrying which is much greater than the expense on coal. Held, That such higher rates on coal are unreasonable.

569. Commission to determine rates.-The act to regulate commerce declares every

unreasonable charge unlawful, requires the Commission to enforce its provisions and confers the power, and imposes on the Commission the duty of determining what are reasonable rates, as well as what are unreasonable. 570. Reasonable rates.-A railroad company by putting in force a rate of charges furnishes evidence that the rate is profitable, which is more convincing when such rate is long maintained; and where a carrier put in force and maintained for nearly two years, immediately after the act to regulate commerce took effect, a scale of charges largely in excess of that maintained for two years next before the act, and the lower rates were sufficient to meet all the obligations of the road, including income on investment. Held, The higher rate should be reduced.

The Boston Fruit and Produce Exchange v. The New York and New England Railroad Company, The New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company, The Pennsylvania Railroad Company, The Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, and The Lehigh Valley Railroad Company. (4 I. C. C. Rep., 664.)

571. The words "common control, management, or arrangement," as found in the first section of the act to regulate commerce, defined and applied to the special facts of the case.

572. Section 7 of the act may properly be considered in construing the general jurisdictional clause of the first section.

573. Contracts and tariffs filed with the Commission under section 6 of the act may be considered, although not specifically introduced in evidence on the hearing. 574. The Boston Fruit and Produce Exchange is a mercantile society, such as is described in the thirteenth section of the act, and as such has the right to maintain a proceeding like the present without showing special damage to itself.

575. Elements that will be considered in fixing the rates for the transportation of perishable fruit under special circumstances discussed and applied to the facts found. 576. The gist of the present complaint is that the rate on peaches from the Delaware district to Boston is unreasonably high and oppressive, and the fact being so found a reduction is ordered.

Hamilton & Brown v. The Chattanooga, Rome and Columbus Railroad Company, The Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, and The Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Railway Company. (4 I. C. C. Rep., 686.)

577. The rates on freight from interstate points to Kramer, Ga., via the Chattanooga, Rome and Columbus Railroad are made by taking the through rate to recognized "basing points," and adding thereto that local rate which will give the lowest combination. This method of determining a rate criticized, and as applied to such traffic to Kramer operates as an unjust discrimination against that locality. 578. All the carriers participating in the traffic, the rates for which were questioned in this proceeding, were not made parties, and the case while showing that the through rates were discriminatory and unjust failed to disclose sufficient facts upon which an accurate decision could be based, and accordingly it was held that the carriers who were parties to the proceeding be required to adjust their respective tariffs so as to avoid discrimination against Kramer, and that the carriers who were not parties be summoned to appear and show cause why a like order be not issued as to the business in which they participate, unless their tariffs are voluntarily adjusted so as to avoid the discrimination complained of.

New Orleans Cotton Exchange v. Louisville, New Orleans and Texas Railway Company. (4 I. C. C. Rep., 694.)

579. Posting schedules of rates and charges.-Common carriers are required to post in their depots, stations, and offices schedules showing the rates and charges for transportaion in force on the routes of such carriers, as well as on freight which is, as on that which is not, for export.

580. Order of reparation.-Where a carrier corrects the inequality of rates complained of and thus makes all the reparation asked in the complaint, or that the Commission could afford, no order is required, and none will be issued.

The Delaware State Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry v. the New York, Philadelphia and Norfolk Railroad Company; The Delaware Railroad Company; The Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad Company; and the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. (4 I. C. C. Rep., 588.)

581. For a special service by a carrier, such as the transportation of perishable freight, requiring quick movement, prompt delivery at destination, special

fitting up of cars, their withdrawal from other service, and their return empty on fast time, all involving greater expense to the carrier, a higher rate than for the carriage of ordinary freight is warranted by the conditions of the service and is reasonable and just.

582. But the higher rate for a special service should bear a just relation to the value of the service to the traffic, and is not wholly in the discretion of the carrier. While a carrier should be fully compensated, the public interests require that the traffic should not be rendered valueless to the producer if the charges of the carrier have such an effect and can be reasonably reduced. 583. The requirement of the statute that all rates shall be reasonable and just involves a consideration of the commercial value of the traffic, and implies that rates should be so adjusted that producers of traffic as well as carriers may carry on their pursuits successfully, if practicable for both, and without injustice to the carrier. The public good requires what is plainly the spirit of the law, that the transportation interests are not alone to be considered, but that in the just exercise of regulation care should be taken that the lawful and necessary occupations of citizens are not unjustly burdened. 584. The complaint was that the defendants' charges for the transportation of specified perishable articles of truck farming from stations on their lines of railroad to Jersey City and Philadelphia were excessive and unreasonable, and that the charges were higher for the shorter distances from their stations on the peninsula in Delaware and Maryland than for the longer distance from Norfolk, Va. It was found that the charges on certain articles specified from stations on the peninsula were excessive and a reduction was ordered. The reduced rates are, however, in many cases still considerably above the rates on the same articles from Norfolk, and the showing not being sufficient to enable the Commission to determine satisfactorily how far the lower Norfolk rates were justified by the differences in the conditions and circumstances, that subject is left for future consideration.

John P. Squire & Co. v. The Michigan Central Railroad Company, The New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, The Boston and Albany Railroad Company. (4 I. C. C. Rep., 611.) 585. The provision of the third section of the act to regulate commerce, prohibiting carriers from making or giving any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, firm, company, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsover, not only applies to relative rates on one description of traffic shipped to or from competing localities, but also to relative rates on differently described articles which are competitive in the same markets; and when carriers have established rates on articles of competitive traffic which are relatively reasonable and fair, they can not arbitrarily select particular articles of such traffic and materially raise or lower rates so established thereon without violating that provision of the statute.

586. The relation of rates ought to rest upon fixed and stable conditions. The fluctuations of markets are so frequent, especially as to competitive articles, and oftentimes unexpected, that commercial considerations alone would not furnish a sufficiently stable and fixed rule for guidance in making a rate that should remain substantially permanent through all fluctuations. The Commission does not, by a fixing of rates, attempt to overcome advantages which one producer or dealer may have in his geographical location, and to produce equality between competitors in all markets. It would be a useless task, even if it had the power, to attempt to accomplish such a result. The proper relation of rates for transportation of strictly competitive articles over the same line should be determined by reference to respective costs of service ascertained with reasonable accuracy.

587. Violation by one carrier of principles laid down in this case as governing relative rates on competitive articles does not justify similar violations by its competitors. 588. The rates involved in this case are those on live hogs, live cattle, and the dressed products of each. These are found to be competitive commodities, and therefore entitled to relatively reasonable rates for transportation proportioned to each other according to the respective costs of service. Jacob Shamberg v. The Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company and The New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Company. (4 I. C. C. Rep., 630.) 589. A firm of cattle dealers in the city of New York, who procured their cattle on a large scale from Chicago and other Western points for domestic con

sumption as well as for export, make an arrangement with two interstate rail carriers, constituting a through line from Chicago to New York, that the said firm will, under the name of an express company of their own creation, furnish not less than 200 or more than 400 improved live-stock cars for the transportation of these cattle. For the rental of these improved stock cars the carriers pay this express company three-fourths of a cent per mile, whether loaded or empty. Extraordinary facilities and rights of way are given these cars to enable them to make a large mileage, and they make more than twice the mileage of ordinary stock cars. Besides this, the carriers pay 50 cents for the loading of each of said cars with cattle at the Union Stock Yards in Chicago, for which no charge is made against the express company or the firm represented by it. In addition to this the carriers pay this firm yardage at the rate of 3 cents per hundred pounds on all their cattle, and upon all other cattle hauled for other firms in the care of this firm owning the express company, to its yards at Pier 45, East River. This yardage charge is thus paid to the said firm by the said carriers for keeping their cattle in the firm's own yards after delivery of them to the firm, and then this yardage charge is deducted from the tariff rate charged by the carrier. The amount of these rebates to this firm in rates on these cattle by these carriers more than pays the entire cost of the improved stock cars within two years after operations are commenced with them, including the expenses of operation, leaving said firm owning the cars and still operating them with all these advantages and rates and facilities. Held: (1) This is an unlawful preference to the firm owning these improved stock cars and a violation of the act to regulate commerce. (2) It is an unlawful and unjust prejudice to other cattle firms and dealers in New York who are competitors in the business of said firm owning said improved stock cars.

The New York and Northern Railway Company v. The New York and New England Railroad Company, The Housatonic Railroad Company, and The New England Terminal Company. (4 I. C. C. Rep., 702.)

590. Discrimination between connecting lines.-The respondent, which is a carrier by a railroad running through the State of Connecticut to a point in New York, had had for sometime a through billing arrangement and an agreement upon through rates for traffic over its own line destined to New York City, with petitioner's road, which connected therewith at its New York terminus. This arrangement respondent broke up, and declined to enter into any new one in its place.

The reason for breaking up this arrangement was that respondent had entered into a new arrangement with another road connecting with it at a point in Connecticut, whereby a New York City line was formed over which it was intended to take the business which formerly passed over respondent's line to petitioner's. It was not complained that petitioner's road was insolvent or not responsible for its contracts, or that the arrangement as before existing was unfair or unequal as between the parties thereto. Such action of the respondent is held to be in violation of the second paragraph of section 3 of the act to regulate commerce, which requires that "every common carrier subject to the provisions of this act shall, according to their respective powers, afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between their respective lines, and for the receiving, forwarding, and delivering of passengers and property to and from their several lines and those connecting therewith, and shall not discriminate in their rates and charges between such connecting lines; but this shall not be construed as requiring any such common carrier to give the use of its tracks or terminal facilities to another carrier engaged in like business." 591. Interest in the competing line.-One reason assigned for breaking up the arrangement with petitioner was that respondent was joint owner with the road making the new line of a terminal company for delivery of freight in New York. This interest is not an excuse under the statute for discrimination against petitioner's line, and this whether the interest in the terminal company was large or small. Petitioner did not require or ask the services of the terminal company, but only to be allowed to continue as competitor for the business affected by the discrimination, and to offer its services to the public as such. It is found in the case that the public interest was injuriously affected by the discrimination.

592. Terminal delivery by an agent.-It is of no importance to the question involved that after freight carried by petitioner's road reached High Bridge, in New York, its delivery from that point to the pier, which constituted the terminus of the carriage, was made by an agent or contractor employed for the purpose. Petitioner, being carrier for the whole distance, was entitled to the privileges given by the statute accordingly.