individual citizenship and property rights-would be treated simply as a "political question" and ignored by our courts. Moreover, any attempt by Congress to ride roughshod over the Constitution simply because it could not be brought to book therefor, would hardly recommend itself to right-thinking Americans. Such an attitude would be equivalent to arguing that if there was no policeman on the beat to prevent it, one could commit murder, robbery, or other lawless act without moral turpitude. It would reduce the measure of culpability to whether the particular violation of law could be put across with impunity.

Just how or where the American people empowered Congress to constitute the President "its agent" to alienate sovereignty, or the procedure to be followed in such event, is not specified. The further doctrine that the United States can alienate the Philippines because some Government body, clothed with brief authority, "wishes to do so," would, if given effect generally, relegate the Constitution to a museum specimen.

The disposition to endow Congress with practically omnipotent powers, and to acquiesce in measures by that body utterly unrelated to its legislative functions, is thus diagnosed by Mr. Justice Cooley in his Constitutional Limitations, seventh edition, page 124:

It is natural we should incline to measure the power of the legislative department in America by the power of the like department in Great Britain; and to concede without reflection that whatever the legislature of the country from which we derive our laws can do, may also be done by the department created for the exercise of legislative authority in this country. But to guard against being misled by a comparison between the two, we must bear in mind the important distinction already pointed out, that with the Parliament rests practically the sovereignty of the country, so that it may exercise all the powers of the Government if it wills to do so; while on the other hand the legislatures of the American States are not the sovereign authority, and, though vested with the exercise of one branch of the sovereignty, they are nevertheless, in wielding it, hedged in on all sides by important limitations, some of which are imposed in express terms, and others by implications which are equally imperative.

How our system of government differs in this respect from those of European countries was clearly brought out by Chief Justice Jay in the early case of Chisholm v. Georgia (2 U. S. 419, 471), where it is aid:

In Europe the sovereignty is generally ascribed to the prince; here it rests with the people; there, the sovereign actually administers the government, here, never in a single instance; our governors are the agents of the people, and at most stand in the same relation to their sovereign, in which regents in Europe stand to their sovereigns. Their princes have personal powers, dignities, and preeminences; our rulers have none but official; nor do they partake in the Sovereignty otherwise, or in any other capacity, than as private citizens.

The same principle was thus stated by Justice McLean in Spooner v. McConnell (Fed. Cases, No. 13249):

The sovereignty of a State does not reside in the persons who fill the different departments of government, but in the people from whom the government emanates and who may change it at their discretion. Sovereignty then, in this country, abides with the constituency and not with the agent, and this is true both in reference to the Federal and State Governments.

To the same effect Mr. Justice Day in Dorr v. United States (195 U. S. 138, 140)—a case arising in the Philippines-where it is said: It may be regarded as settled that the Constitution of the United States is the only source of power authorizing action by any branch of the Federal Govern

ment. The Government of the United States was born of the Constitution, and the powers which it enjoys or may exercise must be derived either expressly or by implication from that instrument.

Mr. Justice Cooley, in his Principles of Constitutional Law, pages 29, 31, thus states the relation of the Constitution to our scheme of government.

The Government created by the Constitution is one of limited and enumerated powers, and the Constitution is the measure and the test of the powers conferred. Whatever is not conferred is withheld, and belongs to the several States and the people thereof.

The Congress of the United States derives its power to legislate from the Constitution, which is the measure of its authority; and any enactment by Congress which is opposed to its provisions, or is not within the grant of powers made by it, is unconstitutional, and therefore no law, and obligatory upon no one.

The assumption that there are "extra-constitutional" powers or a "higher law" which can be invoked and exercised by Congress in its discretion, finds conclusive answer in Kansas v. Colorado (206 U. S. 46, 90), where our Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Brewer, said:

The proposition that there can be legislative powers affecting the nation as a whole which belong to, although not expressed in the grant of powers, is in direct conflict with the doctrine that this is a government of enumerated powers.

The following from Story on the Constitution, volume 1, section 426, has direct application to arguments which seek to justify the exercise of extra-constitutional powers by Congress on the plea of "expediency, benefits, or necessity":

A rule of equal importance is not to enlarge the construction of a given power beyond the fair scope of its terms merely because the restriction is inconvenient, impolitic, or even mischievous. If it be mischievous the power of redressing the evil lies with the people by an exercise of the power of amendment. If they do not choose to apply the remedy, it may be fairly presumed that the mischief is less than what would arise from a further extension of the power, and that it is the least of two evils. Nor should it ever be lost sight of, that the Government of the United States is one of limited and enumerated powers, and that a departure from the true import and sense of its powers is pro tanto the establishment of a new Constitution. It is doing for the people what they have not chosen to do for themselves. It is usurping the functions of a legislator, and deserting those of an expounder of the law. Arguments drawn from impolicy or inconvenience ought here to be of no weight. The only sound principle is to declare, ita lex scripta est, to follow, and to obey. Nor, if a principle so just and conclusive could be overlooked, could there well be a more unsafe ground in practice than mere policy and convenience. Men on such subjects complexionally differ from each other. The same men differ from themselves at different times. Temporary delusions, prejudices, excitements, and objects have irresistable influences in mere questions of policy. And the policy of one age may ill suit the wishes or policy of another. The Constitution is not to be subject to such fluctuations. It should be, so far at least as human infirmity will allow, not dependent upon the passions or parties of particular times, but the same yesterday, to-day, and forever.

The foregoing citations and quotations-which might be multiplied indefinitely state the uniform and universal rule laid down by our courts, and any Government official, or combination of them, running counter thereto, does so in violation of his oath to uphold and defend the Constitution, and is recreant to his trust as an agent and representative of the American people.

DOCTRINE OF FORCE MAJEURE

The only exception to the rule-if it can be so termed-is in case of force majeure, i. e., stress of necessity, where the life of the nation is imperiled. An agent, unless specifically authorized, can not legally convey or give away the property of his principal. With a gun at his head, however, and his life at stake, he can do so without legal or moral responsibility. Applied specifically, our Government can, in case of a disastrous war, cede territory of the United States as the price of self-preservation. This power or right, however, can not be extended beyond the exigency of the particular case, nor made the basis for claiming a general authority to cede territory and expatriate United States citizens at will.

While this emergency has never arisen in the history of the United States, and no such territory has ever been ceded, it is obvious that when and if such emergency arises such cession will be had by and through the treaty-making power of the Government. There is nothing in the decisions indicating that in the absence of paramount necessity the President and two-thirds of the Senate could, of their own motion, alienate territory of the United States. Speaking upon this point our Supreme Court, in Downes v. Bidwell (182 U. S. 244, 317), stated:

True, from the exigency of a calamitous war or the necessity of a settlement of boundaries, it may be that citizens of the United States may be expatriated by the action of the treaty-making power, impliedly or expressly ratified by Congress. But the arising of these particular conditions can not justify the general proposition that territory which is an integral part of the United States may, as a mere act of sale, be disposed of.

The fact, therefore, that territory can be alienated by treaty under stress of force majeure, furnishes no ground whatsoever for claiming that Congress can usurp this treaty-making function of the President and Senate, and itself alienate sovereignty by joint resolution or otherwise; this whether force majeure exists, or whether such action is undertaken simply to satisfy the party commitments, the personal viewpoint, or the political necessities of a majority of its members. The whole matter is outside its jurisdiction as a legislative body.

To the possible claim that the Philippine Islands are not an integral part of the United States, and can consequently be sloughed off at will, such argument ignores the fact that our inquiry has to do with alienation of sovereignty over territory, and not the measure of political rights enjoyed by or which may be accorded the occupants of such territory.

From standpoint of sovereignty, the Philippine Islands are just as much an integral part of the United States as is any other portion of our national commonwealth. Sovereignty is indivisible. Once completely and absolutely vested, as applies to the Philippines, it can not be split into classes or categories to satisfy the alleged needs of special interests nor to lend wings to the political kite of any partisan group. In the case of Loughborough v. Blake (5 Wheat. U. S. 317), decided in 1820, Chief Justice Marshall, discussing the then status of the Missouri Territory, stated:

The District of Columbia, or the territory west of the Missouri, is not less within the United States than Maryland or Pennsylvania.

The "territory west of the Missouri," here referred to by this great constitutional authority, was not held in 1820 under firmer title or more complete sovereignty than is the territory of the Philippines, now functioning under a duly organized civil government by virtue of laws enacted by the Congress of the United States.

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

When question arises as to the construction of a particular statute, the intention of those responsible therefor, and the sense or meaning given it when enacted, are controlling in its interpretation.

If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to that intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. (Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Vol. II, sec. 363.)

Opinions differ as to the present power of Congress to alienate sovereignty of the United States. A pronouncement on the question, therefore, by one of the framers of the Constitution, familiar with the proceedings which gave birth to that instrument, should not only carry great weight but should be conclusive in the absence of some express provision to the contrary.

Gov. Edmond Randolph, of Virginia, was a member of the convention which drafted the Federal Constitution, with opportunity to know the construction given it by himself and associates. Later, as a member of the Convention of Virginia, called to consider ratification of such Constitution, he spoke as follows in opposition to a proposed amendment which would have authorized three-fourths of the Members of both Houses of Congress "to cede the Territorial rights of the United States or any of them":

Of all the amendments, this is the most destructive, which requires the consent of three-fourths of both Houses to treaties ceding or restraining Territorial rights. * * * There is no power in the Constitution to cede any part of the United States. The whole number of Congress, being unanimous, have no power to suspend or cede Territorial rights. But this amendments admit in the fullest latitude, that Congress have a right to dismember the empire. (Debates and Other Proceedings of the Convention of Virginia, taken in shorthand by David Robertson, second edition, year 1805, p. 340.)

Recognition of a present power in Congress to alienate the Philippine Archipelago, and with it the analogous right to slice off other chunks of American territory, in its discretion, would, of necessity, result in the very catastrophe which Governor Randolph held could not be perpetrated under the Constitution-that is, "a right to dismember the empire."

As heretofore shown, if Congress can, of its own volition, alienate the Philippine Islands, where United States sovereignty and dominion "are completely and absolutely vested," then there is nothing in reason or principle to estop it from alienating sovereignty over other territory of the United States, and thus progressively dismember the Union. Certainly those early builders of our Nation, who so jealously guarded the rights and liberties of the American people against usurpation by their governmental agents, conferred no such authority and contemplated no such contingency.

PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE

PROPOSITION THAT RIGHT TO ACQUIRE AND ALIENATE TERRITORY
ARE CORRELATIVE

A final ground upon which it is argued that alienation of United
States sovereignty is presently authorized, is thus stated by Justice
Malcolm, in Philippine Constitutional Law, page 170:

If sovereignty permits the United States to secure additional domain, conversely, the same correlative right of sovereignty must permit the United States to dispose of its territory. tory and the Senate can approve the treaty, obviously the President and the If the President can initiate a treaty to annex terriSenate can, by the same, means cede territory.

Waiving the fact that this argument contemplates cession of territory under the treaty-making power and not by Congress, and that, as already seen, our Supreme Court limits the right to cede territory under the treaty-making power to the exigency created by a disastrous war, the proposition that because the United States can acquire territory it must have the correlative right to alienate territory, in nowise follows:

In Am. Insurance Co. v. Cantor (1 Peters (U. S.) 511, 540), Chief Justice Marshall thus stated the grounds upon which our Government is authorized to acquire territory:

The Constitution confers absolutely on the Government of the Union the powers of making war, and of making treaties; consequently, that government possesses the power of acquiring territory, either by conquest or by treaty.

The acquisition of territory, therefore, is a necessary "incident" of the powers granted by the Constitution to declare war and make treaties.

In Dred Scott v. Sandford (19 How. (U. S.) 393, 448), our Supreme Court, discussing the Louisiana purchase, stated:

It (Louisiana purchase) was acquired by the General Government as the representative and trustee of the people of the United States and it must, therefore, be held in that character for their common and equal benefit; for it was the people of the several States, acting through their agent and representative, the Federal Government, who in fact acquired the territory in question, and the Government holds it for their common use until it shall be associated with the other States as a member of the Union.

Territory once acquired by the United States does not belong to the President, to Congress, or to the Government, but to the American people, who are the principal in the transaction, and who, as seen, have delegated no constitutional authority to their "agents and representatives" to alienate their sovereign rights therein.

Simply because an agent, whether it be a government or an attorney in fact, is authorized to adminster lands of the owner, and is given further latitude, under certain conditions, to acquire additional property at the expense and in the name of his principal, confers of itself no authority whatsoever upon such agent to sell or convey such holdings simply because acquired through his agency.

An agent can likewise deposit funds of his principal in a bank, but this fact, standing alone, confers no right upon him to check against and withdraw money from such account. lands of his principal, or to cash checks in his name, specific authority If he undertakes to sell so to do by the owner would be required before the transaction would be remotely considered.