The Federalist: A Collection of EssaysColonial Press, 1901 - 488 halaman |
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Halaman iii
... Federal Convention . The cardinal principles of that constitution it sets forth , advocates , and defends against objections . Though occasional and con- troversial , it treats its subject with a philosophic breadth and a general ...
... Federal Convention . The cardinal principles of that constitution it sets forth , advocates , and defends against objections . Though occasional and con- troversial , it treats its subject with a philosophic breadth and a general ...
Halaman v
... federal force . IV . A nation with a federal structure , in which the States continue to exist with their general rights , but the Federal Gov- ernment has defined powers of legislation and taxation , and in execution of those powers ...
... federal force . IV . A nation with a federal structure , in which the States continue to exist with their general rights , but the Federal Gov- ernment has defined powers of legislation and taxation , and in execution of those powers ...
Halaman xiv
... Federal and State Governments and the People .................. . 257 No. XLVI .- ( Madison . ) Concerning the Separation of the Departments of Government .. 264 No. XLVII . ( Madison . ) Constitutional Connection of the Departments of ...
... Federal and State Governments and the People .................. . 257 No. XLVI .- ( Madison . ) Concerning the Separation of the Departments of Government .. 264 No. XLVII . ( Madison . ) Constitutional Connection of the Departments of ...
Halaman 29
... federal court . The submission was made , and the court decided in favor of Pennsylvania . But Connecticut gave strong indications of dissatisfaction with that determination ; nor did she appear to be entirely resigned to it , till , by ...
... federal court . The submission was made , and the court decided in favor of Pennsylvania . But Connecticut gave strong indications of dissatisfaction with that determination ; nor did she appear to be entirely resigned to it , till , by ...
Halaman 43
... federal government . In the Lycian Confederacy , which consisted of twenty - three " cities , " or republics , the largest were entitled to three votes in the Common Council , those of the middle class to two , and the smallest to one ...
... federal government . In the Lycian Confederacy , which consisted of twenty - three " cities , " or republics , the largest were entitled to three votes in the Common Council , those of the middle class to two , and the smallest to one ...
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admit advantage America Amphictyonic appear appointment army Articles of Confederation authority bill of rights branch Britain causes circumstances citizens commerce common confederacy confederation Congress consideration considered Convention councils courts danger declare defence degree duties effect elections equal eral ernment established executive exercise existence experience extent favor federacies federal government force foreign former greater impeachments important influence instance interests jealousy judges judicial judiciary departments jurisdiction lative latter lature laws legislature less liberty Macedon magistrate means ment militia mode Montesquieu national government nature necessary necessity objects observations officers particular parties peace Pennsylvania persons political possess President principle proper proportion proposed Constitution propriety provision PUBLIUS question reason regulation render republic republican requisite respect revenue Senate situation society South Carolina Sparta spirit stitution supposed Supreme taxation taxes tion treaties trial by jury Union United usurpation
Bagian yang populer
Halaman 135 - That the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of parliament, is against law.
Halaman 247 - No state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any duty on tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.
Halaman 288 - In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger...
Halaman 429 - Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.
Halaman 435 - NEXT to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support.
Halaman 268 - In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them : the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them : the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.
Halaman 246 - Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation.
Halaman 47 - ... of legislators, but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side, and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are and must be themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail.
Halaman 50 - It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representative too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the...
Halaman 429 - there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.