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interior of the country, or upon the frontiers, will they be passive spectators of their misfortunes, or faithful observers of peace? The exclusion of the islands of Candia, of Samos, of Ipsara, of Capos, of Scio, of Ecaria, of Patmos, of Sero, of Calymnos, of Assypalea, of Carpothos, and others, will not fail to force the emigration of men inured to war, driven to despair, who will infest the Grecian Seas, giving themselves up to piracy, favored by the proximity of so many uninhabited inlets, and of desert and undefended shores. What will then become of the rising State of Greece? Where will then be the tranquillity on land? Where will then be the security of commerce at sea? Where would independent Greece find sufficient means for keeping up a large fleet, and for paying numerous troops?

the Turks will occupy all the strong frontiers in the mountains, and will at every moment threaten the Greek State. They will henceforth exercise an influence irreconcilable with the elevated views of the august monarchs in settling its fate.

5. Even if the Porte should sincerely desire a lasting peace, would its subjects, accustomed in every age to insubordination, quietly conform themselves to its wishes, and would not the independent Greeks of the bordering provinces, not being protected by a boundary strong by nature, be continually exposed to sudden invasions of the hordes of Albania and Asia? Where then would be the guarantee of a permament peace between the Greeks and the Ottomans? Have even practicable means been offered to the inhabitants of the countries separated from the Greek States, of securing their property in case they should wish to renounce their country? No; for if, according to the protocol of the 3d of February, the Turkish inhabitants of the Greek State are permitted as the Greek inhabitants of the Turkish State are, to sell their property and to emigrate, it is evident that to the former, such as the Turks of Euboea, such a sale might be possible and profitable, considering that their property is situated in a country which is destined to enjoy the benefit and advantages of a regular adLet us, however, suppose every ministration: the case would be motive for a new struggle to have quite otherwise with the Greeks, ceased, and the martial character with those of Acarnania, for inof these people given up to Tur- stance, for whom such a sale key to have been softened down: would be either of trifling advan

4. The detached provinces of Roumelia, far from giving important revenues to the Ottoman empire, have always served as an asylum for a free and warlike people; causing to the Porte almost continual uneasiness and expense. Will not these provinces, to the independent and warlike spirit of which a new impulse has been given by nine years of war, and which is placed, it may be said, at the portal of two states, afford materials ready to be inflamed by the slightest incident, and to rekindle the fire of war which is hardly extinguished.

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tage, or altogether illusory. In fact, what man in his senses would purchase the property of an Acarnanian, in a country where arbitrary power alone exist, and which is a prey to disorder?

Independently of these fatal results, the restriction of the limits will draw into independent Greece a large number of indigent persons, who, with tears of despair, will quit their native but enslaved country. Can the inhabitants of the Greek State, united as they are to them by the ties of fraternity and by solemn oaths, abandon them to their wretchedness? Can they deliver up to misery of every kind, and to the scourge of epidemic diseases, a people already so often decimated by death. Members of the Greek family, do not these unfortunate individuals merit to be relieved in their afflictions? But what are the means of relieving them? Is it by means of the national lands, or the funds of the public treasury? The national lands!

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The fifth article of the Protocol states, The Act of Amnesty of the Porte shall proclaim that no Greek in the whole extent of its dominions shall be liable to be deprived of his property, or in any way disturbed in consequence of the part which he may have taken in the insurrection of Greece.'

'The Act of Amnesty of the Greek Government shall proclaim the same principle in favor of all the Mussulmans or Christians who may have taken part against its cause; and it shall further be understood and promulgated, that

the Mussulmans who may be desirous of continuing to inhabit the territories and islands allotted to Greece, shall preserve their properties therein,' &c.

We willnot dwell upon the observation, that the amnesty which already, de facto, exists on the part of the Greeks, never was, and never will be otherwise than illusory on the part of the Turks. We will be silent as to the fact that the same article relating to the amnesty, makes no mention of so many Greeks, who, plunged into misery, have been sold in Turkey, and concerning whose fate it is painful to the nation to remain uninformed. We will

not enter upon these subjects, although of great importance, and will only stop to examine another point which deserves most particular attention.

Does the article in question, in establishing the inviolability of the Mussulman property, foresee only two cases? The first, that of the Turks re-appearing in Greece as merchants, artisans, or proprietors of lands recently acquired by them? The second, a case like that of the Turks of Euboea, de facto, proprietors of land at the moment of the execution of the protocol? Or does it also involve the restitution of properties formerly belonging to the Turks- a restitution entirely incompatible with the existence of the new State? These properties, belonging of old to Greeks, usurped subsequently by the Turks during their sway, and now re-purchased at the cost of rivers of blood, have either been alienated at different periods, or mort

gaged during the negotiations for the two London loans. They at present maintain three fourths of a nearly naked population, and are at last destined either for indemnities, or for the liquidation of ancient debts of the State contracted at home.

It would be an irreparable misfortune, a catastrophe from which Greece would never recover, if the restitution of these lands were to be attempted.

The Senate, foreseeing nothing but the most fatal results from this measure, considers itself as fulfilling a sacred duty in representing to his Royal Highness the difficulty which it has in believing that the Greek people, seeing themselves injured in their rights and dearest interests, will patiently submit to lose the fruits of their labors, and to see their present and their future welfare compromised. But supposing even that, from prudential motives, dictated by imperious circumstances, they should remain silent, would they not soon become a herd of slaves in the midst of Turks, who would be powerful enough to oppress them; since, on the one hand, according to the acts annexed to the Protocol of the 3d of February, the Ottomans will be eligible to all public employments, and since, on the other, they will, as Greek citizens, and by means of their wealth, possess the exclusive right of suffrage; would independence, this precious gift of the Allied Sovereigns, be in this case, of real benefit to Greece? What would the Greek have gained after nine years of bloody strife? Living in a desert,

among the bones of his massacred relations, he would only have legitimatized his eternal slavery.

We will say more; should even the restitution not take place, the national lands will not suffice to relieve those of our brethren who will seek an asylum among us: will not, therefore, pecuniary resources be necessary, in order to perfect and consolidate the interior organization, and to cover during several years the deficit in the revenue of the State? In the official note from the Residents of the Allied Courts which accompanied the transmission to the Greek Government of the act of the 3d of February, it is said that the loan, this new pledge of the good wishes of our protectors, will be employed in the pay and maintenance of the troops which the Sovereign Prince shall find it necessary to raise for his service. The Greeks, nevertheless, flatter themselves that the revival of letters, the encouragement of agriculture, of industry, and of commerce, the indemnities due to the navy and the army, as well as the rewards deserved by a great number of citizens, distinguished by their deeds, and plunged into misery by their patriotism, will be the first object of the paternal solicitude of his Royal Highness.

There remains but one observation more for us to make.

The Residents of the Allied Courts have announced in their official communication to the Greek Government, that a stipulation agreed to between his Most Christian Majesty and his Royal Highness, secures to the Greeks of the Western Church the en

joyment of all political rights. by reservations of the highest importance.

This concession, conforming as it does, for the most part, to the existing laws of the country which regulate civil rights, is alone sufficient to convince us that the Greek religion is to be the prevailing one of the State.

But how great would be the national joy, if the religion to which the Greeks owe their political existence, what knowledge they possess, and the language of their ancestors, were to unite them by holy ties to his Royal Highness! How great would be their enthusiasm, if they were to see him who is to be the father of their country, offer up to the Eternal Father in their temples the same worship.

Napoli, the 10th of April, 1830.
(Signed)

The President, GEORGE SISINI.
The Sec'y, PANAJOTI SOUTZOS.

A true copy.
Napoli, (12th) 24th of April, 1830.

The Secretary for Foreign Affairs and the Commercial Navy. (Signed)

J. Rizo.

Resignation of Prince Leopold.

London, May 21, 1830.

The President distinctly inforins the Residents that the Provisional Government, according to the decrees of the Council of Argos, has no power to convey the assent of the Greek nation. That it is well known to the Residents, (who were present) that the decree in question declares, that no arrangements entered into by the Provisional Government with the Allied Powers, shall be binding upon the Greek nation till they are acknowledged and confirmed by its Representatives. That if the Representatives were called together, they would disobey the instructions of their constituents if they agreed to the propositions of the Allied Powers. But the last part of the President's note bears still more strongly on the views of the case, which the undersigned is compelled to entertain; for the President says, that with regard to the substance of the arrangement, the Government reserves to itself the power of submitting to the Prince, with the copy of the Note, such observations as they cannot conceal from him, without betraying their trust towards Greece and the Prince.

Here the undersigned feels it right to correct a mistake which might arise from the wording of the President's letter of the 6th of April.

The undersigned, after the most mature consideration, is unable to withdraw the opinion which he communicated to the Plenipotentiaries, in his note of the 15th. He cannot admit that the answer of the President of Greece to the Residents contains a full and The undersigned never gave entire adhesion to the Protocol. the President reason to believe In his judgment, it announces a that he was likely to adopt the forced submission to the will of Greek religion. Thus are offithe Allied Powers, and even that cially connected with the answer forced submission is accompanied of the Provisional Government to

hands, nor the valor, which, upon the field of battle, has secured the Throne and consolidated the independence of the country. Though entirely disposed to comply with reasonable desires, I will grant nothing to a spirit of faction, and will never consent to measures which would sacrifice the interests and prosperity of the nation to passion or violence. To conciliate, if it be possible, every interest, is the sole wish of my heart.

Abstract of Conventions. As there has of late been a good deal of discussion about the Treaties which constructed the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the source of the contributions which repaired the Belgic fortresses, and the obligations of the Allied Powers to protect the Orange family in the possession of Sovereignty, pointedly alluded to by the King of Holland at the opening of the States General, we make no apology for publishing the following abstract of all these Conventions:

July 21, 1814.

Act signed by the Secretary of State of His Royal Highness, the Prince of the Netherlands, for the acceptance of the Belgic Provinces.

Art. 1. The union of Belgium with Holland shall be entire and complete, insomuch that the two countries shall form only one and the same State, governed by the Constitution already established in Holland, which shall be modified by common consent, according to new circumstances.

2. There shall be no alterations

in the articles of that Constitution, which secure to all forms of religion equal protection and favor, and which guaranty the admission of every citizen, whatever be his religious creed to public offices and employments.

3. The Belgic Provinces shall be suitably represented in the Assembly of the States General, of which the ordinary sessions shall be held in time of peace alternately in a town of Holland and in a town of Belgium.

4. As all the inhabitants of the Netherlands will be thus constitutionally assimilated to each other, the different provinces shall equally enjoy all the commercial and other advantages which their respective situations require, without any restriction being imposed upon one of them for the profit of another.

5. Immediately after the union, the Provinces and town of Belgium shall be admitted to the commerce and navigation of the colonies upon the same footing as the Provinces and Towns of Holland.

6. The burdens of the two countries, as well as the advantages, shall be common. The debts contracted up to the time of the union shall be paid out of the General Exchequer of the Netherlands.

7. Conformably to the same principles, the expenditure necessary for the establishment and preservation of the fortifications on the frontiers of the New States shall be defrayed by the General Exchequer, as it is the result of an object interesting to the safety and independence of all the provinces and the whole nation.

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