the City's eyes," promptly and cheerfully performed the duty assigned to him. The occasion furnished no great scope for anything beyond rhetorical declamation. The address, too, bears the marks of the rapidity with which it was written. As it is evidently a production upon which Mr. Wirt bestowed but little care, and which seems to have sprung much more from the desire to oblige, than from the fervor of a mind which takes pleasure in imparting its thoughts, it is entitled to an exemption from that comment which a graver or more genial labor would challenge.

CHAPTER XVI.

1831.

IMPEACHMENT OF JUDGE PECK.-OUTLINE OF THE CASE. THE TRIAL.— EXTRACTS FROM THE SPEECH OF MR. WIRT.

THE impeachment of James H. Peck, a Judge of the District Court of the United States, for the District of Missouri, was resolved by the House of Representatives, on the 22d of April 1830.

In December 1826, it was first brought to the consideration of Congress by the memorial of Luke Edward Lawless, a citizen of Missouri and a member of the bar of that State. The Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, to whom this paper was then referred, and of which Mr. Webster was chairman, reported against the complaint, in that brief form known to parliamentary usage which suggests that the petitioner have leave to withdraw his petition. It was renewed at the second session of the next Congress, but with no better success. The committee to whom it was referred neglected or declined to make a report.

The House of Representatives which met in December 1829the first which was elected under the new administration,-found the revived memorial of Mr. Lawless amongst the earliest business which was submitted to their attention. On the 15th of December, the record shows that it was committed, as heretofore, to the Judiciary Committee. That committee consisted of Messrs. Buchanan of Pennsylvania, Wickliffe, Davis, Bouldin, Ellsworth and White. After an examination of several witnesses, they reported, upon the 23d of March 1830, a resolution of impeachment. Judge Peck presented a reply to the charges brought against him: a debate ensued, and finally, upon a divison of one hundred and twenty-three to forty-nine, it was resolved that the Judge be impeached of high misdemeanors in office. Messrs. Buchanan, Storrs, McDuffie, Ambrose Spencer and Wickliffe were ap

pointed a committee to prepare and report the articles of impeachment. These gentlemen were the leading lawyers of the House, and distinguished throughout the country for their forensic talent. They were subsequently elected to be the managers to conduct the trial. Judge Peck was arraigned upon a charge of oppressive administration of his judicial office, in his conduct towards the memorialist, Mr. Lawless. This charge may be briefly presented in the following narrative:

Mr. Lawless was counsel for the Representatives of Antoine Soulard, in a suit brought by them, in the District Court of Missouri, against the United States, to obtain the confirmation of their claim to certain lands in that State. Upon a full hearing of the case, the Judge, in December 1825, rendered a final decree against the claimants. An appeal was taken from this decree, to the Supreme Court. After this appeal, and after the close of the term of the court, Judge Peck was induced to write out the opinion he had delivered in the cause, and to publish it in "the Missouri Republican," a newspaper of St. Louis. This opinion having attracted the attention of Mr. Lawless, produced from him an anonymous review or reply, which was published, in about ten days after the appearance of the first paper, in "the Missouri Advocate and St. Louis Enquirer." Its professed object was "to point the attention of the public to some of the principal errors," which, the writer affirmed, he had discovered in the opinion-and it enumerated, in regular series, eighteen propositions in which he supposed the Judge to be mistaken in the law or the facts. This paper was signed "A Citizen," and purports to be written by one who heard the opinion delivered at the bar.

At the next term of the court, which occurred in April, the Judge, having ascertained that the strictures upon his opinion were written by the counsel, was sufficiently offended to institute proceedings against him for a contempt. The result was an order to commit Mr. Lawless to prison for twenty-four hours, and his suspension from practice in the court for eighteen months :—which proceedings were alleged, in the articles of impeachment, to be "to the great disparagement of public justice, the abuse of judicial authority, and to the subversion of the liberties of the people of the United States." Mr. Wirt and Mr. Meredith of Baltimore, were retained by Judge Peck as his counsel.

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The answer of Judge Peck was prepared by Mr. Wirt, and was submitted to the Senate of the United States, sitting as a High Court of Impeachment, on the 25th of May.

The defence of the Judge presents an elaborate statement of the character of a large number of land claims, of which that of the petitioners was one, all of which depended on the same principles, and a full discussion of the questions controverted by the counsel in his review of the published opinion. It states further that the Judge's opinion in the Soulard case, was delivered verbally in court, and was published at the request of several members of the bar who were interested in the parallel cases. That the subsequent review of this opinion by Mr. Lawless, the Judge regarded as a contempt of the court, because it misrepresented that opinion in a manner calculated to bring the court into "disrepute, contempt and ridicule." Because, also, there were other claims still pending, in which Mr. Lawless was counsel for the petitioners, which claims were of the same character and rested on the same general principles as Soulard's case. That the publication of these strictures had a tendency to prejudice the public mind on the subject, and to excite the resentment of a numerous body of claimants and their connexions, against the Judge who alone composed the court. That, although the case was pending, on appeal in the Supreme Court, it was liable to be remanded for further proceedings, in which event it might be prejudiced by the publication of the counsel.

The defence, then entering into a minute analysis of the strictures, with a view to show that they were written in a contemptuous and derogatory spirit against the opinion of the court, admits the proceedings against the counsel, alleging that all the forms of law were duly observed. It states that the court, having attached him for contempt, tendered to him the usual privilege of purging himself from the charge; that he was asked if he desired to have interrogatories exhibited, to which his reply was,—that if exhibited, he would not answer them: that, in open defiance and contempt of the opinion of the court, he read, in open court, a paper which re-asserted the truth of the publication, signed "A Citizen." That the court considering these acts as contumacious and an aggravation of the first contempt, did pass the sentence against him as set forth in the charge.

The preliminary proceedings having now been settled, no farther steps were taken in the trial until the following December. The trial began on the 20th of that month, and was continued, with occasional intermissions, until the 31st of January, 1831. I should, in vain, endeavor to abridge this case within the limits which the plan of this Memoir allows, and to furnish even an outline of the questions which were brought into discussion in the progress of the trial. Much less could I furnish any accurate exhibition of the character of the eloquence which was manifested by the speakers on both sides. As a parliamentary proceeding, this case will always attract the highest consideration from those who are interested in the study of grave and authoritative precedent. The trial is remarkable for the ability displayed by those who conducted it; not less so for its dignified and scrupulous conformity with the best usages known to parliamentary law; for its calm and dispassionate justice; for the august character of the tribunal, and the great value of the questions in debate. I can only refer my reader to the public volume which contains the report of the trial, for that full account of it which alone would satisfy him who desires to become acquainted with a proceeding so conspicuous in our Senatorial annals. My purpose here is to extract some passages from Mr. Wirt's speech on the trial, which I think will exhibit a fair specimen of the style of the orator, and of his manner of treating the most popular topics which the occasion supplied.

The chief points which occupied the counsel on both sides, were those which related to the liberty of the press and the right to publish comments on questions pending in the courts, and to the limitations upon the power of the courts to punish for contempts. Upon this latter point the argument is very full; and, perhaps, it is not too much to say of the trial, that it affords the most able and complete exposition of the doctrine of contempts and of the judicial decisions relating to it, to be found in the records of legal opinion. Mr. Wirt's argument upon this topic is presented with singular force, and furnishes an admirable example of logical analysis embellished by the happiest oratory. Indeed, this speech throughout, is remarkable for its power and beauty, and will always be regarded as one of the best in the literature to which it belongs. It is the only speech of Mr. Wirt's, with the exception