2. CREDITORS' BILLS TO REACH EQUITABLE ASSETS
CANNOT STAND until legal remedies have been exhausted, and
the complainants' rights as creditors have been established in the
jurisdiction where the equitable remedy is sought. (First Nat. Bank
v. Randall, 867.)

3. CREDITOR'S SUIT.-THE FEES AND COMPENSATION
OF AN EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR cannot be reached by a
creditor during the administration of the estate and before they
have been allowed by the probate court. (Overturf v. Gerlach, 704.)
See Fraudulent Conveyance, 3.

CRIMINAL LAW.

See Appeal, 12; Pleading, 7-10.

CROPS.

1. GROWING CROPS FORM A PART OF THE REAL ES-
TATE to which they are attached and follow the title thereto.
(Wootton v. White, 425.)

2. CROPS ON MORTGAGED PREMISES-SEVERANCE.—If a
crop is growing upon mortgaged premises, the mortgagor cannot,
by executing a bill of sale thereof, defeat the mortgagee's right to
sell the crop on foreclosure, or the right of the purchaser at such
a sale to claim the crop. A bill of sale does not work a severance
of the growing crop. (Wootton v. White, 425.)

3. CROPS ON MORTGAGED PREMISES-FORECLOSURE
BEFORE SEVERANCE-OWNERSHIP.-If a crop is growing
upon mortgaged premises, and the mortgagor gives a bill of sale
thereof to a third person, but the premises are sold under fore-
closure proceedings before the crop is actually severed from the
land, such crop passes to the purchaser. (Wootton v. White, 425.)

DAMAGES.

1. CONTRACTS-VOID-DAMAGES FOR BREACH.-An action
cannot be maintained for damages for the breach of a void contract.
(Jordan v. Greensboro Furnace Co., 644.)

2. CARRIERS-NEGLIGENT DELAY-MEASURE OF DAM-
AGES.-A carrier requested to ship promptly, and notified that the
goods are designed to fill a "penalty contract," is liable for such
special damages to the shipper as arise from negligent delay in the
transportation and delivery of the goods. (Railroad v. Cabinet Co.,

933.)

3.

CARRIERS-NEGLIGENT DELAY-MEASURE OF DAM-
AGES.-If property is shipped to market for general sale to such
purchasers as may be obtained, and the carrier unreasonably and
negligently delays the transportation, the measure of damages is
the depreciation in the salable quality and market value of the
property at the place of destination between the time when it should
have arrived and when it did in fact arrive. (Railroad v. Cabinet
Co., 933.)

4. CARRIERS-NEGLIGENT DELAY-MEASURE OF DAM-
AGES.-If property is sold at an advantageous price before ship
ment, on condition that it be delivered by a certain time, and the
carrier, with knowledge of that fact, undertakes the transportation,
and, through negligence, fails to make the delivery in time, and
the conditional purchaser declines to receive the property on ac
count of the delay, the liability of the carrier is measured by the

difference between the market value of the property when it arrived at its destination and the price at which it was conditionally sold before shipment. (Railroad v. Cabinet Co., 933.)

5. CARRIERS-NEGLIGENT DELAY-MEASURE OF DAMAGES.-If the intended use and application of the goods to be carried are expressly brought to the carrier's notice at the time they are received, or could be reasonably inferred from known circumstances, so that the special use or application may be fairly considered to be within the contemplation of both parties, the consignor is entitled to recover the damages naturally resulting from his being unable to use or apply the goods owing to the negligent delay of the carrier in transporting and delivering them. (Railroad v. Cabinet Co., 933.)

6. CONTRACTS-PENALTY-LIQUIDATED DAMAGES.—If a contract is for a matter of uncertain value, and a reasonable sum is fixed by the parties as the amount to be paid on a breach, that sum, though called a penalty in the instrument, is recoverable as Liquidated damage if the obligation is not in fact performed. If, however, the sum named is not reasonable, it must be treated as a penalty and its enforcement refused. (Railroad v. Cabinet Co., 933.)

See Conflict of Laws, 1; Eminent Domain, 1-3; Husband and Wife, 6, 7; Interest, 4.

DAY.

See Time, 1.

DEADLY WEAPON.

See Assault; Homicide.

DEATH.

See Agency; Execution, 2; Judgment, &

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

See Bankruptcy; Insolvency.

DEEDS.

1. DEEDS-COVENANTS, WHEN PERSONAL-A covenant in a deed to a railroad company agreeing to build a fence along the railroad, or not to hold the company liable "for any damage done to stock belonging to us," omitting the word "assigns," is personal to the grantors, and does not run with the land nor bind tenants or other successors in interest. (Brown v. Southern Pac. Co., 761.) 2. CONVEYANCE, WHETHER DEED OR WILL.-A written Instrument in form of a deed conveying a present interest in land to the children of the grantor, but attempting to postpone their enjoyment of the estate until after his death, and subsequently treated by the parties as a deed, must be construed as such, and not as an Instrument testamentary in character. (Love v. Blauw, 334.) See Covenants, 1-3; Dower, 2, 3; Homesteads.

DEFINITIONS.

"Assault." (State v. Baker, 863.)

"Cashier's check." (Clark v. Chicago etc. Co., 294.)

"County." (Prichard v. Board of Commissioners, 679.) "Day." (State v. Michel, 364.)

"Delusion." (Hemingway's Estate, 815.)

"Due process of law." (Carr v. Brown, 855.)

"Person." (Johnson v. Goodyear Min. Co., 17.)

"Public welfare." (State v. Hay, 691.)
"Reliction." (Hammond v. Shepard, 235.)

DELUSION.

See Insane Persons.

DEMURRER.
See Pleading, 2-4.

DESCENT.

SURVIVORSHIP-CONSTRUCTION OF WILL.-If three sisters execute wills by which each devises all of her real and personal estate to her two sisters or the survivor, and after her death certain legacies to certain named legatees, and subsequently all three of the testatrices lose their lives in the same disaster, with no fact or circumstance appearing from which it can be inferred that either survived the others, the question of survivorship is unascertainable, and the rights of succession to their estates are to be determined as if death occurred to all at the same moment. In such case the wills must stand as if they contained only the bequests to the legatees named and then surviving, and the residue of the estate, real and personal, of each testatrix, if any, passes as Intestate estate to her next of kin and heirs at law. (Willbor, Petitioner, 842.)

See Wills, 5.

DEVISE.

See Wills.

DIVORCE.

See Marriage and Divorce.

DOGS.

See Animals.

DORMANT JUDGMENT.

See Execution, 3, 4.

DOWER.

1. DOWER-PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGE - WIFE'S FAILURE TO JOIN IN-EFFECT OF.-Under the statute of Illinois a wife who fails to join in a purchase money mortgage is not entitled to dower as against the mortgagee or those claiming under him, but is entitled to dower as against all other persons. (Frederick v. Emig, 283.)

2. DOWER-RELEASE OR BAR-JOINDER IN DEED FRAUDULENT AS TO CREDITORS.-A wife's joinder in her husband's deed for the purpose of releasing her dower, which deed is set aside during his lifetime as a fraud upon his creditors, does not Am. St. Rep., Vol. LXXVIII-63

release or bar her right to dower, but she may assert it after his death, if not otherwise barred. (Frederick v. Emig, 283.)

3. DOWER-RELEASE OR BAR-CLAIM OF FEE, UNDER FRAUDULENT DEEDS.-A wife's claim to the fee of land transferred by her husband to her through his brother, in fraud of the husband's creditors, which deed was set aside for that reason during the husband's lifetime, does not affect her right to dower, which was at the time of such transfer a mere expectancy. (Frederick v. Emig, 283.)

4.

DOWER-REDEMPTION-RES JUDICATA.-If land has been sold for the beneât of creditors, and a controversy arises between the purchaser and the owner's wife, who claims the fee as assignee of a certificate of purchase on foreclosure, the purchaser's contention, if it prevails, that the wife's transaction was merely a redemption, is, as against him, res judicata in a subsequent proceeding by her for dower in the property. (Frederick v. Emig, 283.) 5. DOWER-WHEN RIGHT TO, DOES NOT EXTEND TO ENTIRE PREMISES.-If a husband's land, sold under a purchase money mortgage, in which his wife did not join, is redeemed by her, but is afterward sold for the benefit of his creditors, she can、 not have dower in that part of the land representing the amount of the encumbrance, especially where she has been reimbursed from a part of the proceeds of the latter sale. She must contribute ratably to the amount of the encumbrance, which was superior to her dower, or have dower only in the remainder. (Frederick v. Emig, 283.)

See Marriage and Divorce, 18-23.

DROVER'S PASS.

See Railroads, 8.

DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

See Constitution; Game Laws, &

EJECTMENT.

EJECTMENT-RECOVERY-TITLE.-A plaintiff in eject

ment must recover upon the strength of his own title, and not upon the weakness of his adversary's. (Hammond v. Shepard, 274.)

See Fraudulent Conveyance, 9.

ELECTIONS.

See Municipal Corporations, 2, 8.

ELECTRIC COMPANY.

OF

ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANIES-INSULATION WIRES-NEGLIGENCE.-It is the duty of an illuminating company, using electric light wires charged with a high-tension current. to see that its wires, when strung where persons are liable to coine in contact with them, are propely placed with reference to the safety of such persons and are properly insulated. Hence, if it runs such a wire into a store, but leaves it defectively insulated at points less than one foot from the front of the building, and a boy is injured by coming in contract therewith while cleaning the roof over a projecting window, there is strong prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the company, which should be submitted to the jury. (Brown v. Edison etc. Co., 442.)

ELEVATORS.

1. ELEVATORS INTENDED AND USED FOR FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION are in themselves warning that they are not intended for the use or safety of passengers. (Henson v. Beckwith, 847.)

2. LANDLORD AND TENANT-ELEVATOR ACCIDENT.—If the tenant of a building containing a freight elevator under his sole control invites a stranger to use it, he, and not the landlord, must give warning and look out for the safety of his guest, or respond in damages for his injury, if any are recoverable. (Henson v. Beckwith, 847.)

3. LANDLORD AND TENANT-ELEVATOR ACCIDENT.-If the lessee of a building containing a freight elevator, and fit for the purposes for which it is leased, covenants to keep the interior in repair, the lessor to have no control over the elevator nor the right to make alterations, the latter is not liable for an injury to a third person caused by or about such elevator while he is upon the leased premises under invitation of the lessee and not of the landlord. (Henson v. Beckwith, 847.)

EMINENT DOMAIN.

1. EMINENT

DOMAIN-DAMAGES-VALUE

OF LAND.

Where property is taken under the right of eminent domain, the damages must be measured by the injury to the fair market value of the land at the time of the taking. (Cochrane v. Commonwealth, 491.)

2. EMINENT DOMAIN.-THE MARKET VALUE of a piece of property is its value in view of all the purposes to which it is naturally adapted, whether actually used for those purposes or not. (Cochrane v. Commonwealth, 491.)

3. EMINENT

DOMAIN-DAMAGES-VALUE OF UNOCCUPIED LANDS FOR SPECIAL USE.-Where, under the right of eminent domain, an injury is done to property which is not commonly bought and sold, the amount of such injury may be ascertained by allowing testimony to be given of the value of the land for the special purpose for which it is by nature adapted, though it is not then used therefor, such testimony to be given by persons qualified to testify thereto from knowledge derived from experience in their own business in which they have dealt with similar property; but such testimony is admitted only when without it it is impossible to prove the value of the property in question. (Cochrane V. Commonwealth, 491.)

EQUITY.

1. EQUITY JURISDICTION.-The office of equity is to supplement, not to supplant, the law, and when the remedy at law is adequate, equity will not interfere. (First Nat. Bank v. Randall, 867.) 2. EQUITY JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE STATUTE.-A court of chancery has jurisdiction to enforce by injunction or otherwise, against foreign or domestic corporations, or their agents, the forfeitures provided by a valid anti-trust statute. Such proceeding is due process of law without any previous judgment or conviction in a court of law. (State v. Schlitz Brewing Co., 941.)

See Mistake, 1.

ESTATES OF DECEDENTS.

See Executors and Administrators.