tice's court to recover upon a promissory note made by defendant in the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars. The instrument provided for the payment of attorneys' fees in the event of suit. In his complaint in the justice's court plaintiff alleged that the sum of one hundred dollars was a reasonable attorney's fee. He asked judgment for the face of the note, with interest, and attorney's fee in the sum of one hundred dollars. Defendant joined issue in the justice's court, and, after trial, appealed to the superior court from the judgment given against him. The appeal was upon questions both of law and fact. After trial de novo in the superior court, judgment was again given for plaintiff for the amount of the note with interest, and for attorneys' fees fixed in the sum of one hundred dollars. From the judgment of the superior court defendant took the appeal to this court which is here sought to be dismissed. Attorneys' fees under a contract such as this are in the nature of special damage: Prescott v. Grady, 91 Cal. 519; Clemens v. Luce, 101 Cal. 432. Plaintiff's demand, therefore, in his action in the justice's court was for two hundred and fifty dollars, the principal sum of the promissory note, and the one hundred dollars pleaded by way of special damage as a reasonable attorney's fee. The justice's court was therefore without jurisdiction and its judgment void: Code Civ. Proc., sec. 112, subd. 1. Whether or not, upon a showing of these facts, the superior 560 court should have declared the judgment of the justice's court void, still as it tried the case and rendered a judgment against defendant for over three hundred dollars, he has the right of appeal to this court from that judgment, even though it be void. The fact that the sureties did not justify upon the three hundred dollar appeal bond is not a ground for dismissal of the appeal: Hill v. Finnigan, 54 Cal. 311; Tompkins v. Montgomery, 116 Cal. 120. Nor is the further fact that one of the attorneys of appellant became a surety upon the undertaking on appeal in violation of a rule of the superior court a ground of dismissal. It is a matter cognizable before that court, to be dealt with as it shall be advised. The motion to dismiss is denied. McFarland, J., Temple, J., Van Dyke, J., Harrison, J., and Garoutte, J., concurred. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.-ATTORNEYS FEES stipu lated for in a note in case of suit thereon are not in the nature of additional interest, but simply a provision against possible loss or damage of a certain and definite character: See the monographic note to Kittermaster v. Brossard, 55 Am. St. Rep. 441. JURISDICTION AS DETERMINED BY AMOUNT.-The aggre gate sum demanded is the test of jurisdiction: Martin v. Goode, 111 N. C. 288, 32 Am. St. Rep. 799. The amount actually due and for which judgment is demanded is the proper test in determining the limit of jurisdiction. A court having jurisdiction of actions only where the amount in controversy does not exceed three hundred dollars has no jurisdiction of an action on a note for three hundred dollars and interest: Wilson v. Sparkman, 17 Fla. 871, 35 Am. Rep. 110. CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT OB GEORGIA. MCMILLAN v. HARRIS. AUCTIONS-PUFFERS.-If a person having such control of an auction sale that he can, of his own volition, release a bidder from all responsibility for his bid, employs a person upon that kind of an understanding to bid at the sale without disclosing for whom he is bidding, for the purpose of preventing the property from selling at a sacrifice, or for the purpose of making it bring more than its actual value, the bidding under such employment is such a fraud upon the real bidders that the sale may be declared void at their instance. The only way for such person to prevent a sacrifice of the property sold is to fix a minimum price of which public notice is given, or make public the fact that he, either by himself or others, will be a bidder at the sale. AUCTIONS-PUFFERS.-The mere fact that a person is interested in the property to be sold at auction, or in the proceeds of such sale, does not preclude him from either bidding himself or from procuring another to bid openly or secretly, in his behalf, without regard to what the agreement may be with such bidder, if the one employing such bidder has not himself such control of the sale that he could absolutely release the bidder from all responsibility growing out of his having participated in the sale in that capacity. AUCTIONS JUDICIAL SALES-PUFFING.-A person who is entitled to the proceeds of a judicial sale of land by an executor may engage a third person to bid the property up to a specified price, with an agreement that if it is sold to such bidder, the person who thus employs him will take it off his hands. Denmark, Adams & Freeman, for the plaintiff in error. R. R. Richards, G. W. Owens, and A. C. Wright, for the defendant in error. 73 COBB, J. Stoyell C. Parsons and Elizabeth Catherine Mass, by her father as next friend and guardian, brought suit in the superior court of Chatham county against the executors of the last will and testament of Sarah M. Parsons, and others, alleging in their petition that they were joint owners of certain described realty in the city of Savannah, and praying that a certain deed alleged to be a cloud upon the title of petitioners might be delivered up to be canceled, and that the executors take charge of the realty and dispose of the same for the benefit of petitioners. When the case came on for a hearing a decree was entered, providing that the trust deed referred to be set aside and canceled, and that the executors "take charge of and dispose of the property set out in said petition, in accordance with the terms of compromise as agreed on," and to this end advertise the property in a designated way for sale at public outcry before the door of the courthouse of Chatham county, during the legal hours of sale, to the highest bidder, and report the sale to the court for confirmation. The sale was had in the manner prescribed in the decree, and on the day fixed in the advertisement the property was sold in several parcels and knocked down to different purchasers. The executors reported the sale to the court, when it appeared that one of the parcels had been knocked down to T. H. McMillan, the plaintiff in error, for the sum of fourteen thousand dollars. In answer to the rule nisi calling upon him to show cause why the sale should not be confirmed, McMillan set up that the price at which the property was knocked down to him was the result of "puffing" or "by-bidding" at the sale, done at the instance of parties owning an interest in the property, and in fraud of his rights as purchaser; that the property was run up by the owners thereof, without his knowledge, by bids that were not real or genuine, but made for the purpose of puffing the property, and that such conduct rendered the sale illegal and released him from the obligation to pay for the property. After hearing the evidence the judge held that sufficient cause had not been shown to authorize him to refuse to confirm the sale, and an order was passed confirming the sale and directing 74 McMillan to pay the amount of his bid into the hands of the executors. To this ruling McMillan excepted, assigning as error that the decision of the judge was contrary to law and the evidence; that the evidence required a finding that the sale was puffed, and was therefore illegal. It appears from the evidence that the petitioners in the original proceeding, Miss Mass and Dr. Parsons, were, under the will of Sarah M. Parsons, entitled each to a one-half interest in the property involved in the present case. Mr. Owens was an attorney at law representing Miss Mass. Mr. Seabrook was an attorney at law representing Dr. Parsons. Mr. Owens was at the sale and made several bids on the property, one of these bids being immediately before the bid of McMillan at which the property was knocked down to him. Mr. Owens was not bidding in his own interest. He was bidding for his client by authority given him to bid such an amount as in his discretion would be necessary to prevent the property from being sold at a sacrifice. It also appears that Mr. Owens and Mr. Seabrook, representing their respective clients, had agreed that the property should not be sold for less than thirteen thousand dollars, and that in pursuance of this agreement Mr. Owens became a bidder at the sale; and it is to be inferred from the testimony that, if the property had been knocked down to him, the purchasers would have been neither himself nor Mr. Seabrook, but their respective clients. It also appears that out of the proceeds of the sale different items of costs and expenses connected with the litigation were to be paid by the executors; the amount of such items which were due and unpaid at the date of the hearing of the petition brought to confirm the sale being more than two hundred and fifty dollars. The auctioneer who conducted the sale was one of the executors, and it appeared that neither in his capacity as auctioneer nor as executor did he have any connection whatever with the arrangement made between Mr. Owens and Mr. Seabrook, and there was no reason whatever why he could not, if the property had been knocked down to Mr. Owens, have treated him as the purchaser and invoked the aid of the court to that end. It appeared distinctly from the testimony that if there was any puffing or by-bidding, neither the auctioneer nor the executors had 75 any connection with the same, and that it was done without their consent, knowledge, or authority. The controlling question to be determined is, whether the conduct of Mr. Owens, in entering into the arrangement with Mr. Seabrook to bid on the property in behalf of their respective clients so as to prevent its sacrifice, and bidding at the sale for that purpose without the expectation of becoming a purchaser himself, was of such a character as to authorize the court to declare that McMillan was misled, and that for that reason the sale was void and should be set |